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ABSTRACT

Estimating Life Loss for Dam Safety Risk Assessment

by

Duane Michael McClelland, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2000

Major Professor: Dr. David Bowles
Department: Civil and Environmental Engineering

" Estimating Life Loss for Dam Safety Risk Assessment" explores the need for a
new life-loss model in dam safety risk assessment, historical foundations on which that
model can be built, and issues that are critical for a successful life-loss model to address .
After critiquing existing life-loss models, the work presents a summary of historical
insights that were derived by characterizing flood events on the level of subpopulations at
risk, using nearly l 00 carefully defined variables. Building upon both conceptual and
historical insights, the work culminates by presenting the conceptual basis for a new lifeloss model that remains under development.
Chapter I introduces the topic of dam safety risk assessment and the central role
that life-loss estimation plays in that field. Chapter II discusses important preliminary
considerations in model development. Chapter III provides a detailed review of previous
life-loss models that pertained to floods, including a critique of each. Chapter IV explores
the DeKay-McClelland model in detail and raises serious concerns regarding its future
use. Chapter V defines nearly l 00 variables and their respective categories for use in
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characterizing flood events. Chapter VI provides a detailed outline of historical insights
that relate to flood events in one of 18 logical categories. Chapter VII proposes the
framework for a new conceptual life-loss model-a model that is still under development
and has yet to be refined or offered for testing-with sufficient details to indicate how it
was developed and how it might be used. Chapter VIII provides a summary, conclusions,
and recommendations for future research. Appendices A through D provide material
related to over 900 pages of unpublished working documents developed while
characterizing 38 flood events and nearly 200 subpopulations at risk. Appendix E offers a
summary of existing software that, given additional development, might prove useful to
life-loss estimation in dam safety risk assessment.
(538 pages)
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PREFACE

Jeana, my youngest, looked up at me and asked, "Mommy, is this the end
of time?" l said, "No, honey, the end of time will come with fire, not water." Just
as I said that, a transformer hit the train trestle, and fire was shooting out
everywhere, and then the railroad trestle came down in the water. That just about
scared Jeana to death. (Deitz and Mowery, 1992, p. 184, quoting Barbara Spears
who lived through the Buffalo Creek dam failures .)
The water over the crest was more than l 0 ft in depth, and was rising at
the rate of 18 inches an hour. The fall of the water was about 40 ft, and the roaring
and surging that it produced can be better imagined than described. It was grand
and awe inspiring, and nothing in my opinion could in any measure compare with
it, except the falls of Niagara.
While thus gazing with awe on a sight such as l had never before
witnessed, l noticed a sudden commotion of the waters near the center of the dam.
For a moment the water where the commotion occurred seemed to recede, but it
was only for a moment. It then shot upward in a tremendous spout to a height of
perhaps 50 ft as if in gleeful fury, and l saw that the dam was giving way. The
commotion spread toward the east end of the dam, and there was a trembling of
the earth. The mighty waters roared and plunged with an indescribable fury, and
the river, which a moment before had presented a scene of graceful grandeur as it
curved over the dam, was turned into a seething maelstrom, so awful and so
terrible that nothing save the pen of a Dante or a Byron could do it justice.
l was appalled and entranced. My feelings were such as l had never before
and never again hope to experience. Suddenly above the dismal roar of the
surging raging waters there came a cry. 'The dam is breaking, the dam is
breaking." The sound of the cry was as dismal as that of the maelstrom, and
people shuddered and their blood seemed chilled, although the sun shone wannly
from a cloudless sky. When the break occurred the distance from the crest of the
wave as it rolled over the dam to the water below was about 40 ft in height and of
great width and length suddenly released from confinement, and you will have a
faint idea of the scene that l witnessed at the great dam across the Colorado River
yesterday morning, a few minutes before II o'clock. It was a scene that beggars
all description, and as the waters plunged and roared and seethed and foamed they
seemed to laugh in utter scorn at the futile attempts of man to bridle them .
(McLemore, 1900, p. 252, describing the failure of Austin Dam in Texas. Some
typographical errors have been corrected.)
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION

Dam safety risk assessment depends on credible estimates of life loss for
hypothetical failure events in order to quantify risk and make decisions about the
construction, rehabilitation, or removal of dams. Unfortunately, improvement in life-loss
estimation has been one of the most intransigent aspects of the field , causing some
decision makers to seriously doubt the credibility of analysts ' estimates. To attempt a
significant step forward in our ability to model life loss, this report intends to do the
following:
I.

Introduce the topic of dam safety risk assessment and the central role that

life-loss estimation plays in that field.
2.

Discuss important preliminary considerations in model development.

3.

Provide a detailed review of previous life-loss models that pertain to floods

and thoroughly critique each.
4.

Explore the DeKay-McClelland model in detail.

5.

IdentifY, define, and label variables that impact life loss and develop means

by which they might be used to characterize events.
6.

IdentifY numerous historic flood wave events and thoroughly characterize as

many as time allows, focusing on dividing the impacted populations into subpopulations
whenever possible, and justifying every characterization in print for the reference of
future researchers.
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7.

Provide a detailed outline of historical insights that arise during the

characterization process.
8.

If possible, propose a new life-loss model, with guidance on its

implementation, that significantly advances the state of the art.
9.

Provide a final summary and offer recommendations for future research.

Background

High hazard, low freq uency events have the potential to cause considerable
damage to property and loss of human life. Some events are outside human control, such
as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, and precipitation-induced floods. Some events are
a direct result of human or engineering failures , such as airplane crashes, toxic chemical
spi lls, or accidents at nuclear reactors. Dam failures generally fall in between these
extremes, sometimes resulting from faulty design under otherwise favorable
environmental conditions and sometimes failing despite superior engineering after being
overwhelmed by an extreme flood , earthquake, or latent geotechnical defect.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to so overdesign every dam that no dam will ever
fail. Theoretically, there always remains the possibility that a dam might have received a
hidden and critical flaw during construction, that there is a latent weakness in the soil or
rock supporting the dam, that the dam will deteriorate with time, or that a loading greater
than previously anticipated might occur. On a practical level, there are insufficient
disposable resources to improve the safety of every dam without limit.
When one considers that many small, isolated dams have little potential for
causing damage while others tower above densely populated regions and could kill

thousands if failure occurred, it makes sense to design some dams for a higher level of
safety than others. A reasonable criterion governing the design requirements for a dam is
the risk it poses to lives, property, the environment, or other considerations. Focusing on
the most important criterion-the risk to human lives-risk depends on the likelihood of
dam failure and the likelihood that lives will be lost given a failure. Annualized risk to
human lives can be defined as follows, where the summation is over all failure modes:
risk= L(probabi lity of any possible failure circumstance)*(expected number of
fatalities attributable to that failure circumstance)
Society has a vested interest in protecting lives by requiring due diligence from
dam safety officials and engineers. One can be diligent by following strict, deterministic
rules embodied in an engineering code, or one can seek to better understand the true
nature of risk by quantifying it probabilistically. Generally, deterministic approaches
have governed in the past, while probabilistic risk assessment has gained increasing
credence and popularity over the past two decades.
At the risk of oversimplification, deterministic approaches seek to surpass
minimum standards with limited regard to the precise reduction in risk accomplished, the
quickest or most economical means of reducing risk, or the order in which dam safety
rehabilitation projects should be approached within a portfolio of dams. Instead, a dam is
designated as adequate or inadequate based on a set standard, such as its ability to retain
or pass the probable maximum flood without failure. Standards may be raised or lowered
based on a dam's hazard classification (its ability to kill people or damage property), but
this classification is not strictly probabilistic and is usually limited to three categories.
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Probabilistic risk assessment seeks to meet or surpass minimum standards by
explicitly quantifying the risk associated with the status quo and each proposed
rehabilitation alternative (including darn removal). In this case, the standard might not be
the retention of a particular flood , but the minimization of risk to life, property, the
environment, or other considerations. Whether this standard results in more or less risk
than a deterministic approach depends on the criteria set by decision-makers. Regardless,
a probabilistic approach requires detailed consideration of every conceivable failure
mode and consequence, forcing analysts to consider the unique aspects of each darn,
some of which might otherwise be overlooked. It also requires risk to be specifically
quantified. This allows decision-makers to compare the rate and degree of risk reduction
between alternative rehabilitation sequences, to perform detailed cost-risk reduction
analyses, to prioritize darns within a portfolio, and to allocate limited funds where they
will do the most immediate good.
In many cases it can be demonstrated that enslavement to a deterministic standard
will cause less risk reduction, reduce risk more slowly, or squander valuable resources on
minimal risk improvements when compared to alternative solutions discovered during the
risk-assessment process. However, it is important to remember that probabilistic risk
assessment is simply one of many nonbinding tools to guide the choices of decisionmakers: risk assessment itself does not force any particular decision and it can be used
harmoniously as a complement to more traditional, deterministic methods of darn safety
assessment.

Overview of Risk Assessment and the Need for
Improving Estimates of Life Loss

Dam safety risk assessment is like a stool that stands on three legs. These legs
quantify the likelihood that various initiating events (hydrologic, seismic,
structural/internal, mechanical , or human error) will occur; the likelihood that the dam
would fail given these initiating events; and the likelihood that, given a failure, the
resulting flood wave would result in various levels of damage. Analysts use event-tree
models with either discrete branches or probability distributions to quantify the risk posed
by each combination. Adding a seat to the stool involves modifying these event trees to
explore the risk-reduction provided by various remedial upgrades.
Quantifying the risk in this way helps dam safety decision-makers identify the
potential vulnerabilities of a given dam, understand which vulnerabilities are most
important, and identify which dams in a portfolio are most urgently in need of attention.
It also allows decision-makers to compare the cost-benefit relationships for each remedial
possibility and to target limited funds in ways that maximize the risk-reduction benefits
in the shortest period of time.
The meaningful quantification of risk depends on credible estimates of the
damages that would result from each significant failure scenario. Loss of human life is
generally accepted as the most important consequence so it often dominates dam-safety
decisions. Unfortunately, the confidence with which life loss can currently be estimated is
low. This high level of uncertainty applies to both statistical confidence limits and to
expert opinion. As such, this single limitation is a critical hindrance to the credibility and
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value of dam-safety risk assessment results. Indeed, some would like to push the stool
over on its weak leg and abandon probabilistic risk assessment all together.

The Problem and the Primary Goal

Life-loss estimation is difficult because floods are remarkably unique and the
dynamics that affect life loss are amazing complex. Fortunately, relatively few dams have
caused life loss and the amount of life loss has often been lower than people might
intuitively expect. Unfortunately , this makes good historical data on life loss rare and
empirical studies challenging. However, whether a model is based on an analytical
description of human-flood interactions or whether it is based on a regression equation
derived from historic dam failures, confidence in the model must depend on its
correlation to actual life-loss/flood-wave dynamics. Empirical research cannot be
avoided.
It would belie the inherent uncertainty endemic to dam failure life-loss estimation
if this current work sought to offer a final solution. Instead, it is hoped that by expanding
the database of historic dam failures, by offering detailed critiques of existing life-loss
models, and by exploring new variables, a new model might be developed that can be
used with greater confidence than has been possible in the past. Also, since the quality of
any model will be limited by the quality of empirical information, a central goal of this
work is to provide an extensive database with sufficient documentation to serve as the
starting point for future research. In light of the evolving nature of this specialized field ,
this may be the greatest contribution of this report.

7

Important Terms and Symbols

Chapter V defines nearly l 00 different variables that affect life loss. For now,
however, it is important to introduce a few key terms that will be used frequently in the
text. Loss of life refers to the number of people who perish. It has frequently been
shortened to LOL in the past, but it will generally be shortened to L in this text to be
consistent with conventions introduced later. The population at risk is the number of
people who would get wet from a flood if they did not evacuate. The exact nuances of the
phrase are not important at this point, but it has historically been shortened to PAR and
will be written as Par in this text. The threatened population is a subset of Par that fails to
evacuate before the flood wave arrives. It will be shortened to Tpar. Warning time is the
time between the first warning to reach Par and the subsequent arrival of the flood wave.
It will be coded as Wt. When a symbol is followed by the subscript i, the symbol refers to
a subPar, Par;. Many of the symbols in this text, including Par, Tpar, and Wt, will be used
for both the singular and plural forms of the underlying names.

Organization of the Paper

Chapters I and II present the nature of dam safety risk assessment, the important
role life-loss estimates play within that field, theoretical considerations relevant to model
development, and the difficulty of selecting an unbiased data set for regression analyses.
Chapter Ill presents every important, flood-related life-loss model that had been
developed or proposed up to 1998. The chapter describes the contributions and

shortcomings of each model in detail and concludes with a summary of essential model
components and considerations for representing those components.
Until recently, the DeKay-McClelland regression equation DM-2d was the
dominant li fe-loss equation in use. However, it has often been used in a manner
inconsistent with its development and in violation of the assumptions that must be
satisfied for its estimates to be considered reliable. Hence, Chapter IV explores this
equation at length, raising important questions about its credibility and its usefulness.
Chapter V provides an extensive list of variables that pertain in some way to life
loss associated with dam failures or catastrophic flood waves. Although many of these
variables were identified in some form by previous researchers (see Table 8 in Chapter
Ill), this is the first time that most of them have been given specific names, symbols,
definitions, and categories by which they can be coded. Other variables, especially those
that show the greatest promise for estimating life loss, have been defined for the first time
and play a critical role in the proposed model presented below. All the variables are
summarized in easy-to-use reference guides in Appendix D.
Chapter VI provides the historical and theoretical foundations on which one or
more new models can be developed. Table 16 details the ways in which people perish
during floods and Table 17 details ways in which people survive floods . Table 18 then
o ffers a way to break issues that affect the rate of life loss into l8logical categories. The
remainder of the chapter catalogues numerous historical insights that are useful for
gaining a good understanding of the real-world dynamics within each category. These
insights are supported by event characterizations fully recorded in unpublished working
documents that underlie the examples and summaries in Appendix B and the master chart
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of characterized values in Appendix C; as well as by other failure events that have been
studied but not yet characterized.
Chapter VII presents important goals for a life-loss model, and seeks to approach
these goals by presenting a new conceptual model and its related concepts. The second
half of the chapter explores Table C.l in Appendix C to identify any statistical trends
among key characterizing variables that might be useful in refining life-loss estimates.
Chapter VIII presents a summary of the report, conclusions, and
recommendations for future research.
Appendices A through D provide material related to over 900 pages of
unpublished working documents developed while characterizing 38 flood events and
nearly 200 subpopulations at risk . A template was developed to standardize these
characterizations, and they followed the guidelines and definitions presented in Chapter
V.

Appendix E offers a summary of existing software that, given additional
development, might prove useful to life-loss estimation in dam safety ri sk assessment.
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CHAPTER II
PRELIMINARY CON SID ERATIONS
IN MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Attendant Circumstances and the
Uniqueness of Flood Events

All else being equal, life loss following a dam failure would be largely determined
by evacuation characteristics and flood dynamics. However, there are a number factors
which contribute to the uncertainty inherent in any life-loss outcome. Many of these are
not amenable to analysis at this time, but an awareness of the issues helps one understand
how complicated and unique flood events can become.
First, two phrases should be defined. Attendant circumstances are detrimental and
usually transitory conditions that accompany a specific type of dam failure and that make
life loss more likely. Susceptibility to loss of life is an inherent property of a community
that is independent of transitory influences. Just as insurance companies recognize that
certain categories of drivers are more susceptible to accidents than others, some
communities are more susceptible to fatalities. Attendant circumstances and susceptibility
to life loss combine to influence life-loss outcomes.
To get a feel for the uniqueness of each failure event, one can begin with the
cause of failure . The nature of the attendant circumstances for the three main failure
modes- hydrologic, seismic, and internal-are likely to be quite different. A probable
maximum flood (PMF) can loosely be defined as a flood resulting from the most runoffproducing combination of meteorologic and hydrologic events that are physically
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credible; that is, the worst flooding that can be expected to occur. Storm conditions
capable of causing a PMF-level flood event may include hurricane-force winds, certainly
wou ld include local flooding, and would likely provide inhospitable environmental
conditions including extreme darkness and risks of hypothermia. The risk of injury due to
driving accidents, falling trees and limbs, live power lines, and airborne debris would be
heightened. Power outages would be extremely likely, especially where wires were above
ground, and they could be expected on a wide scale, requiring hours or days to repair.
Evacuation notification would be hampered and evacuation itself could expose people to
extreme hazards like flooding, falling trees, undermined roads, and accidents while
driving in darkness without street lights in driving rain. Such conditions might make
decision-makers reluctant to issue an evacuation order prior to the initiation of an actual
dam breach. A delay would reduce people ' s danger if no failure occurred, while greatly
increasing their danger if a failure did occur.
A seismic failure would expose the Par to a different set of hazards. Streets might
buckle, individuals could become trapped in rubble or buildings in the path of the flood ,
power lines and gas mains might break causing fires and blocking streets, bridges could
collapse, escape routes might become blocked, traffic lights would probably fail , and
emergency crews would be delayed or overtaxed.
A piping or internal failure is unlikely to experience any unusual attendant
circumstances.
Compounding the attendant circumstances surrounding a particular failure mode
are the attendant circumstances associated with the timing of the event. Traffic hazards
a nd potentially lethal cold could accompany a failure in winter. Evacuations are more
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difficult at night than during the day due to difficulties in notifying families, the extra
time individuals require to respond, and the extra hazards that come with darkness.
Human response patterns are likely to be different when families are together (evenings,
weekends, and holidays) than when they are apart (work hours).
A community's susceptibi lity to life loss is governed by such factors as the size of
the dam , the distance from the dam, the nature of early warning systems, the slope of the
valley, the width of the valley, the location of the houses, the tendency of the population
to be in the open or within buildings, barriers to evacuation like backyard fences, the age
and mobility of the population, the height of structures, and numerous other factors.
Significantly, traditional variables like flood depth and forcefulness , the size of
the Par, and the warning time do not take attendant circumstances into account. Attendant
circumstances have been lumped indiscriminately into single data sets in earlier efforts to
estimate life loss from dam failure floods.
The preceding introduction to the uniqueness of flood events suggests several
lines of preliminary inquiry.
I.

Cause of dam failure: Can all dam failures be grouped into a single statistical

population, or should dam failures be analyzed according to failure mode, attendant
circumstances, or other refining criteria? What if the resulting data sets would be too
small to be statistically useful? Can flash floods be included with dam failures in a
common data set?
2.

Magnitude of storm: In light of the unique attendant circumstances found in

extreme storms, does the weather influence loss of life, or just the size of the flood ? In
other words, is the expected loss of life due to a probable maximum flood (PMF)
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comparable to the loss of life expected from a flood of the same volume produced by a
lesser storm over a larger basin? How can one reasonably predict the life loss in a PMFlevel event if no such event has been witnessed in the modem era?
3.

Magnitude of seismic event: Can one expect loss of life following a

maximum credible earthquake (MCE) to be the same as from a flood of the same volume
following a sunny-day failure? How can one predict L in a MCE-level event if no such
dam failure has been witnessed in the modem era?
4.

Effects of attendant circumstances on traditional variables:
a)

Flood forcefulness : Does woody debris deposited from a storm increase

the lethality of a flood? Does rubble from an earthquake? Is it reasonable to
assume that the lethality of a given velocity/depth ratio is the same for piping,
hydrologic, and seismic failures ?
b)

Size or location of Par: Do routine schedules (population distributions)

apply during severe storms or shortly after seismic events, or will schools,
campgrounds, and businesses be closed and empty? Do people swarm outside
following severe earthquakes, placing themselves in greater danger?
c)

Warning time: Under what conditions do phone systems become

jammed or severed and how does this affect the dissemination of warnings? Is the
average warning time the important variable, the initial warning time, or some
other characterization of warning time?
5.

Characteristics of Par: What effect do buildings play in sheltering Par? How

do children, the elderly, the infirmed, recreationists, or those who speak a minority
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language impact estimates of life loss? What about false alarms or prior flood
experience?
6.

The nature of probability: Is an empirically-based prediction necessary, or

can expert opinion offer estimates of life loss with equal credibility? How would one
become an expert?

Delimiting a Data Set: When Should FatalityFree Failures Be Included?

Mo re than 400 dams fai led in the United States from late 1985 to late 1994--most
of them small and many unregulated-and less than 2% of these resulted in fatalities
(Graham, 1998). A small dam failure or a partial dam failure is easy to overlook; without
something spectacular, little public interest is aroused. Consequently, smaller dam
failures may get ignored when L = 0, even iflife loss was highly probable. Recognizing
this, where is the cutoff for dams that should be included in a data set as hazardous, yet
yielding L = 0 by chance, versus those that were never truly hazardous? In other words,
which zero-life-loss events should one include?
Two dangers exist. If only dams with actual life loss are included in a data set,
then the resulting regression equation is likely to overestimate expected life loss, fmding
it at every tum. !fall dam failures are included in a data set, the number of zero-fatality
events are likely to dominate those with life loss and skew an equation toward
underestimation for truly hazardous events. Unfortunately, the dividing line is subjective.
This section and the next will present bias-producing shortcomings to the data set
produced by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). The reason is simple:
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Beginning in 1986 and culminating in 1989, they produced the most prominent data set
of lethal dam failures and flash floods . This data set was explored by Brown and Graham
( 1988) and later expanded by DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b)--<levelopers of
prominent life-loss models and equations that are presented in Chapters III and IV.
The USBR (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989) has concluded that its equations
are biased to overestimate life loss since the underlying data set excludes nearly all zerofatalit y events. To test this, they screened an extensive database of flash floods occurring
in May, June, July, or August of 1983 and 1984. Beginning with all floods that caused
loss of life, or at least $50,000 in damages, they then discarded events with unreliable
estimates for Par. Combining the 66 that remained, Par numbered 25,000 and L
numbered 25. Using the regression equations developed by Brown and Graham (U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), and assuming the cases would by typified by inadequate
warning, their regression procedure would have predicted a total of 1,559 deaths for these
66 events. Moreover, 86% of the flash floods resulted in no life loss. The USBR
concluded that their equations were conservative.
While their method raises questions of its own, such as the appropriateness of
mixing flash floods and dam failures and whether they treated Wt in a realistic manner, it
does highlight the difficulty in selecting the ideal data set. Ultimately, all data sets are
potentially biased, leading to regression equations that are likely to be most accurate
when applied to events like those in the data set. Hence, a data set can favor high-lethality
events, low lethality events, or any subset in between. The bias may not be the level of
life loss, but another factor like the relative length of warning times, the relative size of
Par, the ease with which people evacuate, the time of day or night, the size of the
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reservoir, or any one of dozens of other variables. Unless all possible variable
combinations are included in the data set in a representative manner, bias is unavoidable .
Recognizing this, several observations can help define the type of data set that
best serves the practitioner. First, overestimation of life loss is undesirable because it may
cause dam owners to spend money on safety improvements rather than more worthy
projects. Underestimation of life loss is undesirable because it might lead to unsafe dams
going without rehabilitation, needlessly increasing society's risk. However, slight
overestimation is probably the lesser of the two evi ls.
There are several possible ways to minimize the risk of bias. First, rather than
arbitrarily adding zero-life-loss events to a data set, one could compile a separate
database of such events and compare them to events with only a few deaths. It is possible
that distinguishing characteristics will appear that will clarifY the boundary. Second, if
relationships can be developed for which L has a linear relationship with the most
important variables, bias will be minimized. Third, large Par could be broken down into
subPar. If some of these subPar are examples of zero life loss, they might help define the
boundary between lethal and safe conditions because it is known that the same event with
different conditions was capable of taking lives. Fourth, if subPar are highly
homogeneous, they can be grouped according to bins. In this way, the key conditions that
lead to incipient life loss can better be identified and used to screen new subPar or global
events.
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Going Beyond the Data Set: When Should a Regression
Equation Be Viewed as Inapplicable?

As pointed out by Graham (1998) and DeKay and McClelland (1993b), the
Bureau of Reclamation 's data set includes no dam failures caused by earthquakes, nor
any dams above very large Par (greater than 10,000) for which warning time was near
zero. It contains no failures due to PMF-level flooding, terrorist attacks, or landslides into
the reservoir. No large, modem, concrete dams and few concrete or tall dams are
included in the failure set, with only 7 exceeding 15 meters in height. Since they code Wt
dichotomously with the highest value at 45 minutes, longer warning times do not enter
directly into their equations. The USSR's data set was also limited to failures occurring
after 1950 in countries with comparable levels of development to those in the U.S. 1
Hence, the largest U.S. dam disaster-the failure of South Fork Dam near Johnstown,
Pennsylvania, in 1889, in which 2,209 people died-was omitted; as was the largest nonBiblical flooding disaster in world history, when China's Banqiao and Shimantan Dams,
along with dozens of smaller dams, failed in 1975, killing at least 26,000 people and
possibly more than three times that many. As more variables are considered, more unique
failure scenarios are found to be missing or underrepresented.
More recent western failures were also omitted either due to lack of data or
because they were viewed as uncharacteristically unique. A classic example of the latter
reveals the potential for a catastrophic dam failure to virtually annihilate significant

1
Examples for which development levels are important include communication systems, flood
control systems, transportation systems, construction standards for buildings; and construction,
maintenance, and monitoring standards for dams. The USBR data set was also limited to cases having

sufficient infonnation for parameter quantification (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989).
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populations downstream. Consider Vaiont Dam in northern Italy on October 9, 1963 .
Wayne Graham describes this event in a draft report:
A 270 million cu. m. landslide fell within 20 to 30 seconds into the lake formed
behind the dam. The dam, at the time the world's second highest, did not fail.
However, the effect of this huge mass of material that ran into the lake, which was
almost at the maximum water level, was a gigantic wave of 50,000,000 cu. m. of
water that, after rising for 250 m in height, poured both towards Longarone, 4 km
downstream from the dam, and towards the lake, partly running over the towns of
Erto and Casso. About 2000 people died as a result of this event. The fatality rate
was about 94% in the community ofLongarone (1269 out of 1348 residents; U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 1989] which was about 2.0 kilometers downstream from
the dam. At Belluno, about 16 kilometers downstream from Longarone, there was
damage to more than 150 houses, however, the river dikes in most places
prevented spillage into built-up areas. (Graham, !998, p. 4-2)
The 875-ft high concrete arch dam, then the highest arch dam in the world, was
overtopped by more than 300 ft, and up to 230 ft of water filled Longarone. Most of the
79 survivors lived in a cluster of houses out of reach of the flood waters (U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, !989). Downstream, there were reportedly few fatalities in Bell uno, despite
substantial property damage. Apparently, once the flood wave attenuated to a point where
it resembled more moderate dam failures, and given the additional warning time provided
by extra distance, life loss more closely approximated that found in the USBR data set.
Nevertheless, about 700 people perished in communities other than Longarone, both
upstream and downstream from the dam, so the cataclysmic nature of the failure mode
proved consistently lethal in ways that are beyond the scope of most modem dam
failures.
An example of a large concrete dam that failed in the U.S., and which was

excluded from the USBR data set, is St. Francis Dam. It failed at midnight under normal
weather conditions when California was much less populated than it is today. The 57.3-m
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high structure, impounding 4.69 million cubic meters of water, failed due to structural
defects, killing about 420 people and claiming lives for an unusually extended distance
downstream. Although it is common for deaths to be restricted to the first 24 krn
(Graham, 1998), 84 out of 150 people located 27 km from the dam at the California
Edison Construction Camp perished-a fatality rate of 56%. Closer to the dam, death
rates in isolated Par; were I 00%. Warning and evacuation efforts did not begin until a
few hours after the dam had failed (Graham, 1998).
Such case studies remind us that the USBR data set is limited, covering only a
narrow selection of failure modes, magnitudes, and attendant circumstances. DeKay and
McClelland ( 1993 b) specifically advised that their equation should not be used for events
like Vaiont and St. Francis Dams. The point of this extended discussion is that, at present,
the empirical data available are not sufficiently comprehensive to justify rigid
enslavement to any regression equation or set of equations that might be developed. If
reason suggests that a hypothetical event will be unlike those underlying an equation,
analysts must reserve the right to adjust their estimates accordingly. Analysts should
never forsake reason in slavish reliance on a readily available formula.
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CHAPTER III
HISTORIC METHODS FOR ESTIMATING LOSS
OF LIFE IN THE EVENT OF A DAM
FAlLURE OR A FLASH FLOOD

Historic methods for estimating the expected loss of life in the event of a dam
failure fall into two main categories- those that are empirically based and those that rely
on parameters considered to be theoretically important, but for which insufficient data
exist to calibrate them empirically. Several models in each category deserve review. The
dominant empirical approaches have been developed for the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, first by Brown and Graham (1988), then by DeKay and McClelland
(1993b). Brown and Graham (1988) built on the conceptual model developed at Stanford
University by McCann et al. (I 985) for the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Quite recently, B.C. Hydro of Canada has rejected the empirical models and
developed a new conceptual model (Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998). While having
some theoretical appeal , and offering promise, at the time of this writing the parameters
in this model had not been sufficiently calibrated to yield results worthy of high
confidence. These models, as well as several others, are summarized below.

Ayyaswamy and Others 1974

The model
Colleagues at UCLA prepared four reports for the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission to evaluate the probabilities and potential consequences to ground-based

Par 1 of dam failures, airplane crashes, catastrophic toxic chemical spills, and
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meteorites striking nuclear reactors. The first report addressed dam failure, focusing
exclusively on "complete and instantaneous dam failure, with total release of the
impounded water .... Dam failure is equated with the probability of an intensity IX or X
earthquake [on the Modified Mercalli earthquake intensity scale] in the dam area"
(Ayyaswamy eta!., 1974, p. 3). Earthquakes were emphasized due to their relative
frequency in California, the location of II dams chosen for model application.
The approach had five main components: I) a computer model to estimate the
probability of a magnitude IX or X earthquake, 2) a flood routing methodology yielding
travel time and inundation zones, 3) the use of census data to quantify Par during the day
and during the night, 4) a curve expressing the evacuation rate, and 5) a mortality
relationship based on flood depths.
Recognizing that the model was breaking new ground, the authors considered the
estimated risk to be a first approximation. They recognized that their computer model
relied on uncertain frequency relationships and soil conditions, and that other earthquake
models existed and could later be developed. They also noted that only 2 out of 18 dams
in a previous study had failed completely when subjected to earthquakes, so the theory
that a IX or X magnitude earthquake would necessarily cause an uncontrolled release of
water was not valid (Duke, 1960).
Details of the model can be summarized as follows. Flood routing relies on
Manning 's equation,

1
Like " deer," Par will be used in this paper for the singular form (population at ri sk) and the plural
form (populations at risk). The same will hold true for derivatives of Par like su bPar, Par;, Tpar; Ptpar;, and
other var iables like Wt.

22
49

1. - )AR
Q= (n

213

S

112

(E ng 1·ts h umts
. )

using the Normal Depth Method with Manning ' s-n values ranging from 0.05 to 0.11.
Analysts must account for changes in the flow regime at obstructions in the channel.
Where an upstream failure overtops a second dam, the subsequent outflow is predicted
using equations for rectangular, broad-crested weirs.
Once the flood depths are known, the fatality rate is considered to be I 00%
wherever flood depths reach I 0 ft and 0% elsewhere. Hence, Par reflects the number of
individuals who could be submerged to I 0 feet if they did not evacuate. Since this can be
greater during the day in a setting where businesses occupy the floodplain near the river,
L is calculated separately for day and night failures. At the time the model was proposed,
Par was estimated using the 1970 census tracks from the U.S . Bureau of the Census.
To obtain L, analysts incrementally reduce Par by the percentage of people able to
evacuate over increments of flood-wave travel time. They first develop an evacuation rate
histogram based largely on experience. Numerically integrating this, they produce a
smooth evacuation curve. Time is measured from the moment of failure (the time of the
earthquake) until the wave reaches the center of each reach. The loss function is appl ied
to that fraction of Par that fa il s to evacuate. Reaches are delineated using uniform
increments of distance from the dam.

Contributions
This model broke new ground by attempting life-loss modeling for the purpose of
assessing dam safety. It recognized the unique danger posed by large-magnitude
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earthquakes and it identified the five major components of almost all consequence
models:
I.

The likelihood a failure will occur, based on the probability various loadings

will occur and that the dam will fail under each of those loadings;
2.

Flood mapping to define the flood zone;

3.

The quantification of Par by relating census data to the flood zone;

4.

The reduction of Par through an evacuation function dependent, at least in

part, on the amount of warning time; and
5.

The application of a loss function to those who remain in the flood zone

when the flood arrives.
Importantly, the model recognizes that not all individuals who get wet will lose
their lives and that the size of Par changes with the time of day.

Shortcomings
In the II cases to which the model was applied by the authors, losses ranged from
II ,000 to 260,000 deaths, exceeding the historical record for dam failures in the United
States by several orders of magnitude. While the model lacked both calibration and
refinement, the high estimates for L should not be discarded out of hand. It is safe to say
that few if any historical dam failures involved instantaneous dam failure due to an
extreme earthquake at a large reservoir above a densely populated area. On the other
hand, since the estimates generally exceed the historical life loss from the world's worst
dam failure events, the model may be overly conservative even for instantaneous dam
failures. This was a general trend in the early days of dam safety loss estimation.
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The second, third, and fourth components of the model, numbered above, need
refinement. Their method of flood mapping was based on unrealistic assumptions.
Manning ' s equation assumes a steady-state flow condition, which bypasses the effects of
attenuation, turbulence, and momentum that dominate instantaneous flood waves.
Modem methods of flood routing using a dynamic model like DAMBRK or FLDW A V
should yield more realistic results.
With respect to their loss function, empirical functions are more defensible than
an arbitrary fatal/nonfatal division at a depth of 10ft.
While evacuation curves could be customized, the authors presented only one set
(see Ayyaswamy et al. , 1974, p. 36-37). These curves assume that 50% of the population
can be evacuated in the first hour, 75 % within two hours, and that complete evacuation
requires more than 10 hours. While this may be realistic for heavily urbanized areas, it is
counter-historical for smaller communities and is probably overly conservative for the
riverside swath likely to see depths over I 0 ft. In any case, the curves do not appear to
have been empirically based. Also, warning time is assumed to be identical to wave travel
time in all cases, which appears to be unrealistic for an instantaneous, earthquake-induced
dam failure .
None of these shortcomings reflect poorly on the authors, however, since they
encouraged refinement of these results through future research. In their words, "the
conclusions should therefore be regarded as mainly illustrative and very tentative"
(Ayyaswamy et al. , 1974, p. 6).
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Friedman 1975

The model
Friedman (1975) developed a broad model that could be applied to virtually any
natural hazard: he addressed earthquakes, hurricanes, tloods, tornadoes, wind, and hail.
He calculated a loss potential index based on four factors: l) a natural hazard generator
used to determine the frequency of earthquakes or storms by section of the United States;
2) local conditions that modify the severity pattern proposed by the natural hazard
generator; 3) Par, defined as the number of persons exposed to the hazard and their
geographic distribution based on an 85,000 point grid system crisscrossing the U.S. and
input into a computer database from 1970 census data; and 4) the vulnerability of the Par,
which is its susceptibility to life loss during an event of a given severity. These four
factors represent the five common components identified under Ayyaswamy ' s model:
determination of the probability of a failure , mapping the flood inundation area,
quantification of Par; modification of Par or a loss function to account for temporal ,
spatial, or local conditions; and application of a loss function.
Recognizing that losses in natural hazards are not random with respect to time and
place among a population, Friedman asserted that losses must be estimated over an entire
area, rather than independently at individual sites. The natural hazard generator produces
smooth contours across the U.S., but these are made more jagged through adjustments for
local conditions. In this sense, if a community occupied more than one contour, Par
would be effectively divided into subPar.
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Friedman' s four model components interact collectively to generate a Loss
Potential Index. Several types of qualitative interaction are illustrated in Table 1.
Friedman did not consider dam failures directly, but he applied his model to
general flooding and to flash floods by developing a computer simulation model for the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This information was then
used in the development of the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program. He did not use
the national grid system in his model to calculate Par; instead, he used the 1970 Census to
determine the number of structures in each of 5,539 cities. He then determined the
percentage of these that were located in the flood plain from HUD data collected by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the U.S. Geological
Survey. He divided each floodplain into six zones representing different levels of hazard
based on the return period of floods of various depths. The number of dwellings were

Table I.

Examples of qualitative relationships among Friedman's model components
(adapted from Friedman, 1975, Table l-1 , p. 4. An • indicates that the
example originated with Duane McClelland, who tried to follow Friedman's
general logic pattern)

Natural Hazard
Generator
weak
weak
weak
moderate
moderate
moderate
moderate
moderate
Severe
Severe

Local
Conditions
good
good
good
good
medium
poor
poor
medium
medium
poor

Par
sparse
moderately dense
dense
sparse
moderately dense
dense
moderately dense
dense
moderately dense
dense

Vulnerability
low
moderate
high
moderate
moderate
moderate
high
moderate
high
high

Loss Potential
Index
very low
low*
moderate•
low*
moderate
high
high
high
high
very high
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converted to Par by assuming each dwelling housed an average of 3.0 people, based on
summary tabulations of the 1970 Census data.
The loss function was based on the estimated number of buildings expected to be
damaged. Using the annual flood tabulations of the American Red Cross, he assumed one
casualty would follow every 170 damaged dwellings, or every 85 dwellings in the case of
flash floods. Empirical studies of selected cities indicated that cities of different size
showed no variation in the distribution of dwellings across flood zones. Every city and
every zone was assigned the same ratio of commercial to residential structures as a first
approximation.

Contributions
The greatest strength of Friedman's model is that it recognizes that losses will
vary across the floodplain, so every city is divided into six subPar based on depths. This
helps customize the model to local conditions. Each subPar has a unique risk since the
probability of inundation decreases as the annual excedance probability (AEP) of floods
decreases.

Shortcomings
Unfortunately, whi le monetary damages increase with depth based on
relationships provided by the Federal Insurance Administration, the L functions do not
distinguish between major and minor damages. Thus, while the loss functions are
presumably based on historical records, there is no way to account for the relative
forcefulness of a flood or the height of the buildings.
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Friedman accounts for spatial distributions but not for temporal distributions.
That is, there is no evacuation function , so no distinction is made between events having
long or short warning times. Perhaps this was omitted because warning time can be much
more nebulous in cases of general flooding than for dam failures.

Petak and Atkisson 1982

The model
The natural disaster model developed by Petak and Atkisson ( 1982) can be
generalized into a three-step procedure: I) quantification of a hazard curve for a region
(AEP vs. intensity of event), 2) quantification of a vulnerability envelope or vulnerability
probability distribution (expected structural damages vs. intensity of event at the location
of the structure), and 3) an exposure distribution (how many of each type of structure,
parcels of property, people, etc., are exposed to each intensity level). These three
components-hazard, vulnerability, and exposure-are then related sequentially in an
event tree to generate values for annualized risk. Ideally, the three components are
integrated and automated via a computer model.
They treated structural damage as fundamental. "Typically, estimates of other
types of losses such as death, building content loss, unemployment, and homelessness
were related to the expected levels of damage to buildings" (Petak and Atkisson, 1982, p.

105).
Although dam failures were not considered in isolation, they addressed riverine
flooding by dividing the floodplain into regions according to frequency of flooding, as
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shown in Table 2. They apportioned the floodplain based on the work of previous
authors, including Friedman (1975).

Contributions
The strengths of this approach are twofold. First, this was one of the first
empirical approaches since this method used data from actual natural disasters to predict
the loss of life as a function of the expected economic damages due to flooding (or any of
7 other types of disasters). 2 Second, it recognized the importance of subPar, thus allowing
L to vary with flood depths by adopting different empirical damage functions for each
flood zone. Grigg and Helweg (1975) first reported the damage functions , but Petak and
Atkisson modified them slightly.

Shortcomings
Although the approach was empirical, the available data were limited and not
c haracteristic of dam failures. Instead of using flood data, they assumed that deaths from
h urricanes were evenly divided between storm surges (the rising of a large body of water
due to low local pressures and strong winds) and direct wind impacts. Flood losses were
then assumed to follow the same patterns as those for storm surges: 0.0956 deaths per
m illion dollars of damage to buildings
The drawbacks to this approach are obvious. First, storm surges are a rising of
s eawater that can last for hours, that is generally not instantaneous but progressive, and
that will be as wide as the local coastline, rather than confined to a channel and its
floodplain. In other words, it is very different from a dam fai lure. Second, arbitrarily

2

Earthq uake, tornado, hurricane, severe wind, storm surge, tsunam i, wind.
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Table 2.

Distribution of subPar by flood return period for the model by Petak and
Atkisson (Petak and Atkisson, 1982, p. 117)

Hazard Zone
A

B

c

D
E
F

Return Period of
Flood (years)
2-5
5-10
10-25
25-50
50-100
more than I 00

Fraction of Dwellings
in Each Hazard Zone
0. 135
0.150
0.200
0.245
0.270
1.000

dividing deaths due to flooding and wind into a 50:50 ratio undermines the validity of an
empirical function. Third , assuming a linear relationship between economic damages and
fatalities ignores the importance of variables like warning time, evacuation pathways, the
height of buildings, and other factors affecting mobility. Fourth, economic damages make
a poor surrogate for Par: not only are the number of people in an area not necessarily
proportional to the economic damages, but a Par consisting of backpackers, tent campers,
fi shermen, or rafters would not be included at all, even though they might face the
greatest threat from a dam failure. The authors themselves acknowledged many of these
shortcomings.

McCann and Others 1985: Stanford/FEMA Model

The model
McCann et al. ( 1985) recognized the importance of dividing a population at risk
into subPar. Their overall procedure can be summarized using the sequence of steps in
Figure I.
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Route the flood wave to determine its depths and boundaries. =- Plot these
on a topographic map. =- Superimpose the location and characteristics of
all structures onto the map.=- Divide the map into zones [subPar]
according to distance from the dam and maximum depth of inundation. =Apply a loss function to each subPar. =- Sum to determine total loss of
life.
Figure I.

Sequence of steps for the Stanford/FEMA Model (adapted from McCann et
al., 1985, Figure 6.1, p. 6-2).

This model allows the use of any modem flood routing method, but a single
method should be used consistently on all dams in a portfolio if a portfolio risk
assessment is desired. McCann et al. advocated the use of the National Weather Service
(NWS) software program DAMBRK for those familiar with it, as it represented the state
of the art in dynamic flood wave modeling in 1985. More recent versions ofDAMBRK
are sti ll widely used today. This program requires inputs describing the inflow
hydrograph, the reservoir topography, the height of the darn, the depth of the reservoir
pool, channel cross sections and related topography of inundated areas, and an estimate
of Manning's n values. Proposed alternatives to DAMBRK were the Soil Conservation
Service' s dam break flood routing procedure, a simplified NWS dam break program
called SMPDBK, and a method by the USBR (see McCann et al. , 1985, p. 6-5 to 6-6). In
each case, the assumptions chosen-for example, the rate of breach development needed
for SMPDBK-are stated to be less important than their consistent application across
dams in a portfolio.
Analysts draw lines of consistent depth on a topographic map of the inundation
area, then cross-hatch these lines at set distances from the dam-say every mile. Matched
pairs of the resulting closed polygons (one on each side of the river) are combined to
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form subPar, though they need not be matched in pairs if the zoning is dissimilar 3 Zones
should be selected or subdivided as necessary to represent contiguously simi lar land use
(primarily residential or primarily business). Analysts fill these polygons with coded
symbols to locate structures. Life loss (L) is estimated with equations SF- I a and SF-I b
and then summing across all subPar.

L, = ¢(d,)* r,

* P,

L, =¢(d,)*r, • p, * N,

where

~(d;)

=fraction of people losing their lives as a function of depth,

r;

= fraction of people present when the flood wave arrives at Par;,

P;

=population or number of residents in a Par;,

N;

=number of people occupying a zone during business hours, and

p;

= percent of time a given zone is occupied.

(SF-la)

(SF-lb)

Notice that the equations are identical, except that the first applies to a residential
area and the second applies to a more transitory business district (or to a recreational area
using the same logic). The concept is a simple definition: loss of life equals the number
of people being flooded at each depth (r*P or r*p*N) times the percent who should perish
at that depth

[~(d)].

The percent who perish is a function of depth, tabulated in Table 3. The flooded
are those who remain on the floodplain when the flood wave arrives, an estimate based

3
If this is difficult to picture, consider that a straight reach resembles the neck of a guitar. Since
lines of equal depth will roughly parallel the stream channel, the strings represent depth and the frets mark
the distance from the dam. Each resulting rectangle represents a subPar.
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Table 3.

Values proposed by McCann et al. for ¢(d) (McCann et al., 1985, Table 6.2,
p. 6-9)
Depth of Inundation (ft)
2
4

6
8
10
12
> 12

Fraction of Lives Lost
0.00
0.05
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.85

on daily occupational patterns, evacuation estimates, the quality/timeliness of the flood
warning system, the distance downstream or flood travel time, and the type of land use
patterns. Table 4 offers suggested values. Analysts can modifY the suggested values to
reflect his or her perception of the local conditions. Values for P, N, and p must be
estimated from local records, observations, and conversations with local officials.

Contributions
This model provides great flexibility in assigning values to parameters by
allowing the analyst to consider local conditions and to consider factors not explicitly in
the equation, such as evacuation effectiveness and the quality of a flood warning system.
The model also recognizes the variation in hazard faced by people in different locations,
and the importance of subdividing Par without having to track individuals.

Shortcomings
The great shortcoming of the model is that the value of every parameter depends
on subjective estimates without empirical calibration. This is compounded by the fact that
a different fatality rate must be specified for each uniquely defined set of subPar.
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Table 4.

Values proposed by McCann et al. for r (adapted from McCann et al. , 1985 ,
Table 6.3, p. 6-9)

Typical Rural Area
Typical Residential
Area

No Warning System
I Good Warning System
Distance from the Dam (miles)
< 10
20
20
100
30
50
< 10
50
0.80
1.00
0.20
0.10
0.70
0.40
0.10 0.00
0.70
0.50
0.00
0.50
0.20
0.00 0.00
0.10

Moreover, how does one adjust a scale up or down when it is unknown whether the
original scale is high or low?
The model ' s creators suggested additional shortcomings. They acknowledged that
travel time is a more meaningful way of dividing Par than distance downstream, but they
chose distance out of convenience. Also, they recognized that life loss cannot be related
to flooding depth alone; flooding velocity is equally or more important. Velocity was
ignored, however, to simplify the model.
Significantly, like developers of the previous methods, the authors of the
Stanford/FEMA approach considered their model too simplistic to allow analysts to
predict loss of life with high confidence or accuracy. In fact, they offered it only as a
simplified, preliminary tool for those who had not yet developed procedures of their own.
Subsequently, this model was slightly refined by the Institute for Water Resources
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as is described later in this chapter.

Pate-Cornell and Tagaras 1986

The model
Pate-Cornell and Tagaras ( 1986) suggested a general method for predicting life

35
loss based on adjusting a base casualty rate according to the efficacy of a warning system.
Once again, the five main elements of most models can be identified: determination of
the probability of a failure , mapping the flood inundation area, identification of the Par,
application of a loss function, and modification of Par, that function , or its prediction
based on temporal , spatial, or local conditions.
They proposed that analysts use the average historical rates of darn failures unless
local conditions and expert judgment allow more refined estimates. They give no
guidance on routing the dam break, but they assume it is possible to distinguish two
zones: the wave path (zone 1) and the inundation area (zone 2). These are not defined, but
the distinction is important to their model since the loss function assumes a 50% casualty
rate in zone 1 and no casualties in zone 2, making zone 1 the only region containing life
loss or a population at risk, depending on your perspective. The loss function is pseudoempirical in the sense that it is an intuitive estimate based on a review of failures like the
one at Malpasset. 4
They suggest that Par in zone 1 should be reduced according to the quality and
timeliness of any early warning system. Again they give no guidance, leaving the
reduction up to the judgment of the analyst.
This model bears cons iderable similarity to that first developed by Ayyaswamy et
al. ( 1974). Here, instead of assuming a 100% fatality rate at depths of I 0 ft and 0%
elsewhere, the assumption is a death rate of 50% in the main path of the flood and 0%

4
Malpasset had a fatal ity rate of 50% only if zone I is defined so as to force this resu lt; taking Par
more broadl y, a Par of about 6,000 people was inundated. In any case, the loss function appears to have
been derived as a first-cut, intuitive estimate, and rates much higher than 50% have been observed in other
failures, such as the failures of Vaiont or Stava Dams in Italy.

36
closer to the peripheries. Both models allow Par to be reduced through evacuation.
However, rather than calculating separate losses for day and night, Pate-Cornell and
Tagaras suggest averaging Par over the two time frames.

Contributions
The model emphasizes the importance of an early warning system in facilitating a
timely and effective evacuation effort and in reducing the risk associated wi th a dam. The
thrust of their work was to increase the benefit-cost ratios in econom ic analyses to justify
the construction of dams and to support darn safety remediation projects.

Shortcomings
Like Ayyaswarny ' s model, this model relies on intuitive estimates of life-loss
rates without true empirical support. The authors were not, however, attempting to offer a
refined model. Rather, they were demonstrating the importance of incorporating risk
when calculating benefit-cost ratios, thus providing justification for future model
development and the implementation of early-warning systems.

Institute for Water Resources ' Revision of the
Stanford/FEMA Model 1986

On pages 23-28, Lee at al. ( 1986) summarize and illustrate changes made to the
Stanford/FEMA model by the Institute for Water Resources (!WR) within the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. In brief, IWR replaced river miles as a surrogate for warning time
with warning time itself.
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Lee et al. (1986, p. 23) refer to the source as the !WR wi th the reference,
"Institute for Water Resources (l986a)," under the apparently truncated title " Interim
Procedures," but their draft report does not include a bibliography so no additional
reference information is provided. According to personal conversations with Dr. David
Moser ( 1998) at IWR, any changes made to the Stanford/FEMA model were made by
Lee et al. (1986), and are contained in their report. The Australian National Committee
on Large Dams ( 1994) supports this assertion when they mention 1986 risk assessment
procedures under development at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that fell short of
providing a life-loss estimate.
Regardless of the source or nature of these historic model modifications, current
practice within the Corps of Engineers is to estimate Par, but to stop short of making
specific loss of life estimates 5 While loss of life is referred to in Corps policy documents,
it is completely omitted in practice.

Brown and Graham: United States Bureau of Reclamation
(Brown and Graham 1988· U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation 1986 1989)

The model
An official presentation of the methods developed within the USBR was

5

The cu rrent Corps practice of omitting loss of life calculations was explained at a meeting in Los

Ange les on August 14, 1998. The purpose of the conference was the second-stage of a demonstration risk
assessment in volvi ng members ofrhe Los Angeles District, IWR, observers from other Corps offices

around the country, and personnel from Corps headquarters in Washington D.C.
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published as a technical memorandum in 1986. 6 Subsequently, Brown and Graham
published "Assessing the Threat to Life from Dam Failure" in 1988 and the method was
formally repeated in 1989 with the publication of the 1989 interim guidelines, "Policy
and Procedures for Dam Safety Modification Decisionmaking" [sic]. Reclamation
intentionally "tried to build upon the Stanford/FEMA model ... by considering
additional factors, and by developing an empirical basis for model coefficients" (Brown
and Graham, 1988, p. 6).
The method presents a five-step procedure: I) develop inundation maps for each
combination of loading and dam-safety alternatives to quantify Par, 2) estimate
corresponding warning times, 3) apply life-loss equations to generate baseline projections
of life loss for each failure scenario, 4) adjust these baseline estimates using site-specific
characteristics, and 5) compare each scenario 's life-loss estimate to that for the "no
action" alternative to produce an incremental life-loss projection.
In 1989, the incremental comparison was changed from "fix vs. no fix" to "failure
vs. no dam" to reflect the difference between losses given a dam failure and those that
would result were the dam not present at all. To minimize the number of separate failure
analyses that are required, it is recommended that loading conditions and dam-safety
alternatives should be grouped together or combined into a single increment whenever
their disparate consequences are expected to show little difference.
Several things suggest the importance of using local experts to help in the
analyses:

6

Lee eta!. ( 1986) apparently found the same information in a 1985 USBR report. but their

bibliography was never included in their draft document so no further reference information was provided .
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1.

Accurate estimation of Par in step 1 requires knowledge of dynamic

recreational activities below the dam, fluctuations in Par with time, and other variations
not necessarily captured in census data.
2.

Estimates of warning time require not only knowledge of wave trave l time

but also the routines of the dam keepers, the nature of the early warning system. possible
pitfalls in the emergency action plan, and the accessibility of subPar for warning
notification.
3.

Adj ustments to the baseline life-loss estimates require subjective judgements

based on loca l conditions.
The life-lo ss equations rely on two independent variables: Par and warning time.
Par should be subdivided into subPar whenever warning time is expected to vary
significantly with distance. In this way, the river is divided into reaches of varying length
based on judgments about the distribution of Par. For example, a fi sh hatchery at mile I,
followed by a YMCA camp at mile 3, a popular fishing reach along miles 7-10, and a
town at miles 20 through 2 1 would suggest four subPar, each with its own warning time .
To account for seasonal or diurnal fluctuation s in these subPar, each important
time frame is assigned an average sub Pari value and associated with a P, value
representing the probability that the failure mode will occur during the designated
category of time. Notice that the P, value is not merely the proportion of the year
represented by a time category, but represents the likelihood that the failure will occur
during that time category. For example, if hydrologic failures are more likel y during a 3month summer thunderstorm season, those 3 months will be assigned a P, value greater
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than 0.25. The weighted Paru are then the product ofP1/Paru, where subscript i indicates
the subPar in question and j identifies the time category in view.
Warning time is the next important variable to quantify. Schematically, the
conceptualization of the inputs to life loss can be presented in a flow chart like Figure 2.
The calculation of warning time involves estimating the flood wave travel time to the
midpoint of each Par; and adjusting that value upward or downward based on estimates of
whether the breach is anticipated or detected after its development, and the time it takes
to warn the Par; after detection. Together, this entails those parts of Figure 2 that lead up
to "warning time for Par."
In determining warning time, it is important to consider the processes of
detection, notification of the proper authorities, decision-making, mobilization, and
dissemination of a public warning on an event-specific basis. Is there a chain of
command? Can each link be reached at a moments notice at all times? Does the darn
owner have authority/responsibility to notify the public directly, or must that decision be
passed on to local authorities? Is the failure mode under consideration likely to become
evident hours or days prior to actual breach development? Will communication systems
remain functional? Are means available to warn fishermen , campers, isolated residents,
or other members of the Par cut off from mainstream communication channels?
To calculate the baseline loss of life, each weighted Ptj*Par;i is entered into one of
three empirical functions, and then all Lu are summed together. Equation BG-1 a is for
warning times less than 1.5 hr and equation BG-1 b is for warning times greater than 1.5
hr. Equation BG-1 c was not originally part of the model, but it was added in 1989 for
cases with warning times less than 15 minutes and depths greater than 3ft. It makes no
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Threatening Event
Monitoring Systems
ij
ij
Threat Recognition Decision Process
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ij
Decision to Warn Warning Capabilitv
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ij
Par Characteristics Warning Time/Characteristics Environmental Conditions
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ij
ij
Par Decision to Evacuate
Ease of Evacuation
ij
ij
Convergence
Number of Par Evacuated
ij
ij
Par after Evacuation Flooding Lethality
ij
ij
Flooding Loss of Life
Figure 2.

Flow chart of variables affecting loss of life (reformatted from U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, 1989, Figure l , p. lll-28).

difference whether the P,i val ues are applied to the subPar directly or to the unadjusted Lu
results, so the functions are presented here without the P1 factors as Brown and Graham
present them (Brown and Graham, 1988; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989):

Warning < 1.5 hours: LOL, = PAR;06

(BG-1a)

Warning<: 1.5 hours : LOL, = 0.0002 *PAR;

(BG-1b)

Warning <15 minutes (depth > 3 ft): LOL;

=0.5 *PAR,

(BG-1c)

These relationships were developed by analyzing 23 cases of dam failure or flash
fl ood that occurred since 1950 in North America or Europe and that were judged to be
large-scale events for which relatively complete documentation was available. The
specific events are li sted in Table 5. DeKay and McClelland (1993b) added Allegheny

Table 5.

The data set used by DeKay and McClelland in 1993 , estimations using equations DM-2d, DM-3b, and DM-4 and the
root mean square errors of each (includes material from DeKay and McClelland, 1993b, Table I, p. 197)
Hours
Warning
(Wt)
Brown&

Locations
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

a

Allegheny County, PA, 1986

Austin, TX, 1981
Baldwin Hills Dam, CA, 19b3
Bear Wallow Dam, NC, 1976
Big Thompson, CO, 1976
Black Hills, SO, 1972 (Canyon Lake Dam)
Bu alo reck Coal Waste Dam, WV, 1972
Bushy Hill Pond Dam, CT, 1982

Centralia, WA, 1991
D.M.A.D. Dam, UT, 1983
Denver, CO, 1965 (South Platte River)

Kansas City, MO. 1977
Kansas River, KS , 1951
Kelley Sames Dam, GA , 1977
Laurel Run Dam, PA, 1977

Lawn Lake Dam, CO, 1982
lee lake Dam, MA , 1968
Little Deer CreeK Dam, UT, 1963
Malpasset Dam, France, 1959
Mohegan Park Dam, CT, 1963
Northern NJ , 1984
22 Prospect Dam, CO, 1980
23 Shadyside, OH, 1990
24 Stava dams, Italy, 1985
25 Swift and (Lower} Two Medicine Dams, MT, 1964
26 Teton Dam, ID, 1976 (Dam through Wilford)
27 Teton Dam, ID, 1976 (Rexburg to American Falls)
28 Texas Hill Country, 1978
29 Vega De Tera Dam, Spain, 1959
Root Mean Square Error
Not used in equation derivations (omitted as outliers)

Par
2,200
1, 180
16,500
8
2,500
17,000
5,000
400
150
500
10,000
2,3 80
58,000
250
150
5,000
80
50
6,000
1,000
25,000
100
884
300
250
2,000
23 ,000
2,070
500

Predicted Loss of
Hou rs
Warn ing
(Wt)

Graham Continuous
---0

---1.5

0 .0
< 1.0
< 1.0
< 1.0
2-3

----

1-12
2 .33-4
<1.0
>2.0
<0.5
0.0
0.0-1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
>2
>5

--··
0.0

<1.5
<1.5
>1.5
<1.5
0.0

I
1.5
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
2.5
0
6.5
3.17
0.5
3
0.25
0
0.75
0
0
0
0
3
7.5
0
0
0.75
0.75
2.25
0 .75
0

Actual
Flooding

Loss of

Force

Life

0
I

I
I
I
I
I
0
0
0
0
I
I
I
I
0
I
0
I
0
0
0
I
I
I
I
0
I
I

9
13
5
4
144
245
125
0
0
I
I
20
II
39
40
3
2
I
421
6
2
0
24
270
28
7
4
25
150

Life Eq. DM-4
Predicted
Predicted
(Variables Used
Loss of life Loss of life
By Brown&
Eq. DM-3b
Eq . DM-2d
Graham)
II
6
109
9
7
12
9
6
20
5
II
5
47
59
61
174
184
129
91
87
67
0
0
0
I
2
26
0
0
0
I
I
0
45
57
59
0
0
2
31
37
22
40
63
26
43
5
9
26
44
19
I
I
14
406
527
185
4
7
72
2
3
I
0
0
127
176
67
64
95
38
7
8
8
25
23
26
4
5
6
25
24
27
89
127
50
76
50
53

Average
Prediction
Eq. DM-2d
and
Eq . DM-3b

8
8
8
8
60
179
89
0
I
0
I
58
0
34
52
7
35
I
467

5
2
0
152
79
7
24
5
24
108
50
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County, Pennsylvania; Austin, Texas; Shadyside, Ohio; Stava, Italy; and Centralia,
Washington.' Brown and Graham divided the Teton failure into an upper and lower
subPar. They considered the upper Teton subPar and Lawn Lake to be outliers and
omitted them from their data set.
The authors treated warning time dichotomously and then trichotomously because
they did not believe that warning time could be estimated with sufficient accuracy to
justifY a continuous treatment. In both the dichotomous and trichotomous approaches, the
cutoffs in warning time were not based on rigorous statistical analyses, but rather on what
appeared to be reasonable divisions of the data set.
According to Brown and Graham, equation BG-la has an R2 value of0.6,
indicating that as warning time decreases, other factors besides the size of Par and length
of warning time influence life loss. For greater warning times, equation BG-1 b has a
reported R2 value of0.87, indicating a decreasing influence by other factors. The
exponential nature of the first curve suggests that there are aspects of larger population
centers (advantages in terms of warning dissemination and public safety resources, for
example) that decrease the proportion oflives lost when warning time is less than 1.5 hr.
Beyond 1.5 hr and when warning times are less than 15 minutes, these advantages
disappear because evacuation either nears completion or has insufficient time to progress.
The baseline estimates of L are meant only to represent a first cut. Central to the
USBR method is the subjective adjustment of these values for each Paru based on the
remaining elements in the flow chart of Figure 2. A summary of each variable subsequent
to warning time follows. The reader is referred to the source documents for more details.
7

Teton Dam failure was divided into 2 subPar.
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I.

Warning characteristics: Warning time is defined globally as the elapsed time

between initiation of a public warning within Par; and the onset of flooding at that Par;,.
Warning characteristics go further to describe the rate, extent, and believability/urgency
of the warning dissemination.
2.

Par characteristics include descriptors such as age, mobility, prior awareness,

experience, knowledge of how to respond, information networks, degree of family
di spersion, attitudes, and prior false alarms or misinformation.
3.

Environmental conditions are local conditions such as heavy rain, darkness,

earthquake damage or the like.
4.

Par decision to evacuate refers to the public response .

5.

Ease of evacuation is the combined effect of environmental conditions,

distance to safety, availability of transportation, and the likelihood that bridges or
bottlenecks will become impassable.
6.

Number of Par evacuated are those who escape prior to the arrival of the

7.

Convergence is the movement of people into the flood zone, including safety

flood.

officials, curiosity seekers, and those who return to help others or retrieve belongings.
Convergence-related deaths are usually few in number, but are not uncommon.
8.

Par after evacuation quantifies the number present when the floodwaters

arrive, either due to convergence or to evacuation shortcomings.
9.

Flood lethality is the potential of a flood to cause deaths, based on its depth,

velocity, temperature, and debris load.
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Adjustments to the baseline loss of life figures based on these additional
considerations are left to the judgment of the analyst. However, the analyst should "lower
the fatality estimates substantially if the floodwaters will be less than two feet deep and
moving at less than three feet per second" (Brown and Graham, 1988, p. 15). At the other
extreme, estimates should be raised to as high as a 90% fatality rate if warning time is
near zero (less than 5 minutes) and the flood wave will destroy virtually every structure
in the flood plain.
In all cases, the results are presented as a range of likely outcomes. When no
dominant variable suggests the direction in which a baseline estimate should be adjusted,
the baseline estimate is taken as the expected value, and a high and low estimate are
predicted based on the 95% confidence interval for each equation. For equation BG- I a,
the confidence limits are found by changing the exponent to 0.5 and 0. 7. For equation
BG- I b, the coefficient is changed to 0.00014 and 0.00022. Brown and Graham do not
suggest confidence limits for equation BG-1c (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989).
When one or more critical variables can be identified and significant uncertainty
surrounds the variable(s), high and low estimates are derived based on selecting high and
low estimates of each variable and performing a sensitivity analysis. When estimates of L
appear to be extremely high or low, a most likely estimate can be displayed along with
historic minimums and maximums from the data set for those cases which most closely
resemble the one in question.

Contributions
There are many strengths to the USBR method. To begin with, it attempts an
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empirical cali bration based on historic failure events. In this process, there is recognition
that the historic cases are heavily influenced by factors beyond warning time and Par
alone, creating a large variance about the expected values generated by the regression
functions. Rather than claiming more confidence in the baseline estimates than is
warranted, the method seeks to make reasonable adjustments to these estimates based on
a case-specific consideration of other variables. Even then, the results are displayed as
ranges or envelopes, rather than a single value, thus reducing any bias introduced by
individual analysts. Perhaps the greatest strengths are the identification of pertinent
factors that had previously been overlooked and the accrual of a data set upon which
future work could be built.

Shortcomings
There are at least six shortcomings to the USBR method. First, although
recognizing that warning time is critically important, the trichotomous treatment severely
limits the precision with which loss of life can be explored.
Second, the regression equations themselves lack sophistication. For example, it
would be desirable to refine equation BG-1 a by including a multiplicative coefficient,
and equation BG-lc appears to be an "eyeball" estimate based on very few data points
with no formal statistical analysis. The use of round numbers for both coefficients and
exponents makes it clear the estimates are not intended to be precise, although this is not
unreasonable given the large variance in life loss, and given that the equations are
intended only to yield a first-cut estimate.
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Third, there is some question as to the basis for the reported R 2 value for equation
BG-1 a. A visual perusal of the graphs in the source documents might leave some readers
feeling uneasy. Feeling uneasy themselves, another group within the USBR attempted to
d~plicate the results to test the accuracy of the R2 value. According to the internal

memorandum, using the same data and excluding the same outliers, they generated the
2

following refined equation with an R value of only 0.47 (Hyatt, 1985):

LOL = 0.51* PAR062

(BG-2)

They suggested that perhaps the reported value was an R value instead ofR 2 , or was
based on a transformed variable, rather than L itself. In any case, even the reported R2
value of 0.6 presents an incentive to this researcher to develop a more refined function.
Fourth, while the equations are meant to be applied on a subPar basis, the only
historic case that was subdivided was the Teton Dam failure, and then one of the two
subPar was omitted as an outlier. This raises questions regarding whether the sum of the
parts of an analysis is the same as a single application to the whole. In the case of
equation BG-1 a, this is clearly not the case, since the life-loss relationship to Par is not
linear.
Fifth, the data set, while an excellent beginning, is noticeably small-especiall y
after it is subdivided to form two or three distinct data sets for two or three different
equations. As this set is appropriately expanded, it should generate more confidence in
any resulting regression equations. Significantly, the USBR practice was to use the
subsequent relationship developed by DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b) until
recently, when another approach was developed by Graham ( 1999). Supported by USBR
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funding, DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b) advanced Reclamation's work by
expanding the data set and applying a more rigorous approach to regression analysis.
Graham himself recommends the use of the DeKay-McClelland equation over the ones
he helped develop, although he also recommends going beyond Dekay-McClelland and is
actively developing new procedures (Graham, 1998, 1999).
Sixth, the use of weighted Par;i should only be adopted if estimated life loss is
linearly related to Par, which, for equation BG-1 a, it is not.
A final comment bears mentioning that applies to any approach that seeks a mean
estimate of annualized life loss rather than a probability distribution of life loss: The
model yields only a point estimate of an average value that is itself uncertain and subject
to confidence limits. Also, if estimated life loss (lives) is needed, as is the case if societal
risk is to be characterized using charts that relate the frequency of events to the number of
lives lost (F-N curves), then weighted Paru should not be used.

Lee and Others for the Institute of Water Resources
U.S. Army Corns of Engineers 1986

The models
Lee et al. (1986) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S . Department of
Energy, prepared three methods for predicting loss of life from floods. Their focus
included flash floods and dam failures, but was not limited to catastrophic events. The
authors compiled additional information shedding light on the mechanisms resulting in
life loss. For example, summarizing a variety of studies, they suggested the following
circumstances for life loss:
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I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

being trapped in a structure by rising water
being swept out of a structure
being in a structure that fails
attempting to cross flood waters
being caught in flood water while in the floodplain
attempting to rescue others in flood waters
attempting to drive across a flood-way
attempting to boat or raft on flood waters. (Lee et al. , 1986, p. II ,
capitalization omitted)

To these were added four reasons people drown: the flood stage is life-threatening,
people receive inadequate warning time, they respond too slowly, or they do the wrong
th ing.
In addition to their three models, Lee et al. also extended the US BR model ,
though their extension does not appear to have been adopted (or even recognized) within
the USBR. Reintroducing the outliers Brown and Graham (U .S . Bureau of Reclamation ,
1986) excluded from their data set (Lawn Lake and Upper Teton), they estimated the
case-study warning times to the nearest 15 minutes instead of dichotomously. Where
insufficient data existed to estimate these directly, they set " less than 1.0 hour" to 45
minutes and "more than 1.5 hours" to 75 minutes. The reason for reducing the values
greater than 90 minutes to 75 minutes is not explained. Formulating a new approach to
regression, they generated the following equation:

log(L) = 0.671og(Par)- 0.014(Wt)

(L-la)

which reduces to

L = e 067 1og( /'ur )-00 14 ( Wl)

(L-Ib)
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where L

=

li fe loss

Par = population at risk, and
Wt = warning time (Lee et al. (1986) used P and W in place of Par and Wt).
2

This equation has an adjusted R value of 0.89, which is significant at less than the
0.0001 level.
For their own regression equation, Lee et al. assembled a new data set consisting
of 4 7 floods , most of which resulted in loss of life, and all of which occurred in the
United States between 1963 and 1985. When consistent with these selection criteria,
cases from the USSR data set were included. Their approach was to compile a list of
factors that might affect either the size of the threatened population (those remaining in
the flood zone when the flood arrives) or the lethality of the flood; record these along
with data on life loss and Par for the aforementioned floods; identify general trends,
outliers, and lack of data within the data set; formulate alternative life-loss equations and
calibrate them to the data; analyze each equation statistically to select the best one; and
compare the results with those for the Brown and Graham (U.S . Bureau of Reclamation,
1986) equations and the IWR adaptation of the Stanford/FEMA model (Lee et al., 1986).
The form of the equations was limited in each case to

(L-2)

where the subscripts refer to reach i and flood zone j after the two-part division of
subPar in the Stanford/FEMA model;
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L = loss of life,
P = population at risk,
p = the probability of life loss of an individual in reach i and flood zone j, which
is a function of vectors ~and

y,

~ = a vector of variables affecting the ratio of deaths to the threatened population
(indicated with a bold x in Lee et al., 1986), and

y= a vector of variables affecting the size of the threatened population relative to
P (indicated with a bold yin Lee et al., 1986).
This equation is an adaptation of the Stanford/FEMA equation

L, = ¢(d,) • r; • P,

in which the variables

~(d;)*r;

or

;, =¢(d,)*r,

(SF-I a)

are replaced by an individual probability of survival, p, and

subd ivision by both reach (i) and zone (j) are made explicit.
The variables considered for vector x were:
I.

number of residences damaged and the extent of economic damages

2.

depth of the flood (data available for only about half of cases)

3.

velocity of the flood wave (data generally unavailable)

4.

discharge (cfs; data available for about half of cases)

5.

breach of dam (I =breach, 0 =no breach)

6.

topography of the inundation area (I =wider floodplain, 0 =narrow canyon)

7.

special characteristics of the Par, such as very young or old

8.

unique facilities: hospitals, retirement homes, schools, recreation areas, etc.
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9.

type of structures (data unavailable, not used)

I 0. number of roads and bridges crossing the river in the inundated area (data
unavailable, not used)
The variables considered for vector y were:
I.

warning time

2.

experience or knowledge of flooding in the local area within 10 years (I =

yes, 0 = no)
3.

existence of hospitals, retirement homes, schools, recreation areas or other

unique facilit ies (each dichotomous, I = existence of such a facility , 0 =not present)
4.

day or night (I = day, 0 =night)

5.

time of day

6.

proportion of elderly and young (data unavailable, not used)

7.

effectiveness of the evacuation plan and system (coded after Sorensen and

Neal in Lee et al. ( 1986) as needs improvement, fair, or good)
8.

evacuation traffic (data unavailable, not used)

9.

size of population

I 0. urban vs. rural situations
After preliminary analyses, onl y six variables were found to be statistically
significant at the 0.05 level when regressed individually against Land in stepwise
refinements: L, Par, warning time; and dummy variables indicating previous experience
with flooding within the last I 0 years, whether or not the area was urbanized, and the
depth of flooding at peak stage. Lee et al. suggested several reasons why the others were
not found significant: the sample was small; the variables affected L, but not sufficiently
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to be significant when dummy coded and used apart from the more dominant variables;
multicolinearity may have hidden their affect when used in stepwise regression analysis
with the dominant variables; and a variable sometimes had a significant impact on one
case, but not on the cases as a whole.
Using these six remaining variables and experimenting with many different
approaches, Lee et al. developed two regression equations, each based on a logi stic (also
called logit) equation.
In general, the logit relationship can be expressed as follows :

p =

where p

exp(/3)
I + exp(/3)

I + exp(- fJ)

where

ln( ___f!_J =
l-p

p

(L-3a and L-3b)

= a fraction between 0 and 1.0 (notice the use of lower case p here to
distinguish it from P =Par used by Lee et al.), and

fJ

= a function of zero or more variables, their transformations and their
coefficients, including a possible constant. This is sometimes designated
by /]' x . In the text, the function's constant will be represented by
subsequent coefficients sequentially by
indicated by

Po. the

Pi. and the entire function will be

p in bold type.

Equations L-3a and L-3b are equivalent following manipulation; the left side of
equation L-3b is called the logit transformation, while the middle and right side of
equation L-3a are equivalent expressions for the inverse transformation, yielding the
value of the proportion p directly .
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The logit transformation is used most often when p represents the probability that
an individual outcome will be a "success" during independent trials of a binomial
experiment (Agresti, 1996). In the treatment by Lee et al., p was defined as LIP,
representing the probability that an individual at risk dies given the conditions defined by
the function

~-

Put another way, LIP is the proportion of lives that would be lost in a

given flood if each life were an independent Bernoulli trial.
The two equations making the final cut are quite similar, except that the first
omits urbanization as a dummy-coded variable and the second omits depth. The reason
depth was not included in the second regression is that only 22 out of 4 7 cases in the data
set provided sufficient information upon which a regression could be performed.
Equation L-4 proved to be the equation Lee et al. recommended for use out of the two, in
part because of the intuitive value of including a description of the flood, and in part
because it slightly outperformed equation L-5 when applied to the data set in a semiBayesian manner (see below). Notice that these two equations fulfill the requirements of
equation SF-la, as desired.

L

p

1
0
0
exp{-6.2 + 3.1[- - ]- 0.00034(Wt* P) ' -0.0077? ' + 1.4£ +0.0039D}
I +Wt
(L-4)
1
I +exp{- 6.2 +3.1[- -] -0.00034(Wt* P) 0 ' -0 .0077? 0 ' + 1.4£ + 0.0039D
I+Wt

L
p

exp{- 0.18 +

1 .7[~] -0.00044(Wt * P)

0
'

-0.0092P

0
'

+ 0.26E- 0.18U}

1
I + exp{- 0.18 + t.7[- - ] - 0.00044(Wt * P) 0 ' - 0.0092P 0 ' + 0.26E -0.18U
I+Wt

(L-5)
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where L

loss of life

p

Par

Wt

warning time in minutes (Lee et al. used W)

E

experience with floods in the last I 0 years (I

D

depth of flooding at peak stage (feet above flood stage)

u

denotes an urbanized area (I

= yes; 0 = no)

= urban area with pop. 2: I 0,000; 0 =

otherwise)
As with any treatment of historical data, the model-developers were forced to
quantifY many variables using "a considerable degree of subjective judgement" (Lee et
al. , 1986, p. 51). Like the regression by Brown and Graham, only the Teton Dam failure
was divided into subPar, although it was intended that subPar be used in application. The
model coefficients were determined using maximum likelihood methods. The
corresponding !-statistics and levels of significance for each coefficient are presented in
Table 6.
The implications of using a logit transformation will be explored in detail in
Chapter IV when critiquing the approach developed by DeKay and McClelland ( 1991 ,
1993 b). A few observations will be sufficient at this point.
First, the logit transformation has the reasonable characteristic of restricting the
proportion of life loss to values between 0.0 and 1.0. In contrast, using L or LIP directly
in a regular least-squares regression without the transformation of LIP or

p would permit

values of life loss to exceed the Par or drop below zero in extreme cases.
Second, Lee et al. treated the ind ividual as the fundamental dependent variable,
effectively increasing the number of observations from 47 floods to 459,234 members of
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Table 6.

Regression !-statistics and levels of significance for the coefficients in
equations L-4 and L-5 (Lee et al. , 1986, p. 58-60)

Variable
Coefficients in
Sequence

Po
PI
P2
Pl
P4
Ps

Equation L-4
Level of
Significance
!-Statistic
-31.5
0.0000
20.7
0.0000
-6.6
0.0000
-7.4
0.0000
9.9
0.0000
2.6
0.0099

Equation L-5
Level of
!-Statistic
Significance
-1.8
0.0624
15.3
0.0000
-8.3
0.0000
-10.6
0.0000
3.2
0.0014
-1.86
0.0624

Par. This has two dangers that were pointed out by DeKay and McClelland (1 991). By
increasing the sample size in this manner, it increases the power of the statistical tests,
allowing statistical significance to be discovered for variables that have very little realworld impact. More fundamentally , such an analysis presumes independence and
Bernoulli similarity for each individual encountering a large-scale flood event. Clearl y
this is not true, as the threat to life posed by a flood varies dramatically with space, time,
the event, and the individuals involved. Fatalities are often clustered in a way that defies
independence. On a practical level, the proportion of lives lost in events involving large
Par will statistically dominate the proportion of lives lost in events threatening small Par.
The fact that each individual is treated as a statistical observation means
that past flood events with greater populations at risk are statistically more
important when estimating the empirical function than flood events in which there
were few people at risk .. . . Computationally, each individual, rather than each
flood event, would carry equal statistical weight. (Lee et al. , 1986, p. 61)
Lee et al. see this as a benefit, since every individual is treated equally. DeKay
a nd McClelland (1993b), however, rightly point out that we are not distinguishing
between indi viduals but between the unique mix of variable values that detine each event.
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The event offers the critical information for evaluation, not each individual. Furthermore,
it is important to accurately predict L in events involving both large and small Par.
The implications of equations L-4 and L-5 are similar to those for the USBR
formulations: L is nonlinear with respect to Par, L decreases with increasing warning
time, and the influence yielded by the magnitude of Par decreases as warning time
increases. Statistically, warning time is the most significant factor affecting L. Advancing
the USBR method, several considerations which were used to adjust Brown and
Graham's baseline estimates have been formally incorporated into the equations: prior
flood experience within I 0 years can retard a community ' s response during evacuation
due to overconfidence; the greater the urbanization, the more efficient the warning and
evacuation procedures; and the deeper (more lethal) the flood waters, the greater the loss
of life. Interestingly, urbanization was not found significant when depth of flooding was
included.
Lee et al. (1986) applied both of their equations to their data set, along with the
US BR best estimate and upper and lower bounds, and the IWR version of the
Stanford/FEMA model. This has been duplicated in full in Table 7 since it demonstrates
the performance of each approach, and it identifies the complete data set under question.
Though Lee et al. did not include a list of sources cited, they did include an appendix
li sting sources for every case in this data set.
In all fairness , several biases should be pointed out regarding the values reported
above. First, only two of the three USBR equations were available to Lee et al. in 1986
and no subj ective adj ustments were applied, so the estimates represent only a first cut.
Likewi se, the Stanford/FEMNIWR estimates were produced using the unadjusted tables
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Table 7.

#

Comparison of loss of life predictions as calculated by Lee et al. usi ng their
own data set (Lee et al., 1986, p. 68; column headings have been modified,
their order has changed, and the final row represents a calculation of the
RMSE based on the data presented here and found in Lee's report)

b>cation

Teton (to Wilford)
Teton (Rex-Amer Falls)
Gainesville, AL
Jackson, MS
5 Buffalo Creek, WV
6 Big Thompson, CO
7 San Francisco, CA
8 Little Deer Creek, UT
9 Pike Co, KY
10 Toccoa Falls, GA
II Austin, TX
12 Bear Wallow, NC
13 SW Virginia
14 Cheyenne, WY
15 Hill Country, TX
16 Big Country, TX
17 Mohegan Park, CT
18 Denver, CO
19 Millard Co, UT
20 Schuylki ll River Basin
21 Potomac River, D.C. area
22 Wilkes Barre, PA
23 Harrisbu rg, PA
24 Johnstown, PA
25 S. California
26 Santa Barbara, CA
27 S. California
28 Kansas City, KC, MO
29 Old Creek Canyon, AZ
30 Phoe nix, AZ
3 1 Tri-Cou nty area, PA
32 Connecticut F lood, CT
33 Baldwin Hi lls Dam, CA
34 Hono lulu
35 Four Mile Run (Fairfax), VA
36 Tekamah Creek, NE
37 North Hills, PA
38 Black Hi lls (Rap id City), SD
39 Tonto Creek, AZ
40 James Rive r, VA
4 1 Brushy Hill Pond, CT
42 Lawn Lake, CO
43 Northern New Jersey
I
2
3
4

Actual L

7
4

5
4
139
139
9
I
3
38
13
4
4
II
27
6
6
6
I

5
27
I
I
85
18
20
18
12
3
10
9
II

5
4
I
3
8
245
23

5
0
3
2

Lee ct

Leeet

USBR

al . Eq.
L-4

al. Eq.

Lower
95%

3
10
2
10
120
4
47
2
38
38
16
0
2
0

8
2
I
37
I
14

8
3
29
49
10
3
28
6
4
18
8
17
9
7
4
16
33
37
9
9
I
21
18

L-5

15
34
7
27
142
18
43
3
18
18
21
0
8
2
13

45
3
0
3
63
50
173
7
16
16

55

5

2
0
14
0
0
0
3
0
I
0
14
I
224
I
0
I
71
22
I
0
I
2
32
22

25
38
39
13
4
4
31
13

100
2
39
7
0
I
3

8
4
35
4
13
II
I
33
39
II
5
33
22
7
23
14
26
30
9
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USBR
USSR

E:<pcctect

Upper
95%

96

205

5

5

0

0
6
332
239
1361
15
48
48
272
3
0
41
0
0
0
5
0
2
0
22
2
1947
I
0
2
388
77
I
0
I
4
126
77
272
631
4
167
II
0
I
6

5
145
109
486
10
27

27
122
2
0
24
0
0
0
4
0
2
0
20
2
660
I
0
2
166
42
I
0
I
3
63
42
122
251
3
80
10
0
I
5

Stanford
/FEMA
(IWR)

1360
39 10
2
43
3400
1700
6375
43
2 13
2 13
128
3
68
68
5
3
2
37
2
0
0
0
17
17000
0
0
12
750
340
0
4
102
140
213
106
255
2125
2040
3 19
0
10
850
0
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Table 7.

Continued
Leeet
al. Eq.

#

Location

44
45
46
47

Phoenix, AZ
Harrison Co, WV
Lee Lake, MA
El Dorado, NV
Root Mean Square Error
RMSE using data in !able

ActualL

0
2
2
9

----

L-4

22
12
0
16
22
39

Leeet

USBR

USBR

Stanford

al. Eq.
L-5

Lower

USBR

Upper

/FE MA

95%

Expected

95%

(IWR)

27
19
I
7
25
39

I
45
9
10
47
55

I
96
14
16
133
127

I
205
21
25
374
363

10
170
7
35
2810
2792

provided with that model. Second, equation L-4 cannot be applied directly to 25 of the
cases since they were missing adequate information on depth. For these, Lee et al.
arbitrarily assigned the mean depth found by averaging the depth over the 22 cases that
could be quantified. For equation L-5 , in those cases where data were unavailable to
dummy code the degree of urbanization, the equation was applied sequentially using a I
and a 0 and then averaging the two results. Finally, since equations L-4 and L-5 were
developed from this identical data set, they would be expected to show a reasonably good
fit; if the USBR data set were used for testing instead, or an entirely new data set, a
different equation might prove the better predictor. Significantly, the USBR equations
were developed specifically for dam failures and flash floods that closely imitate dam
failures; the types of flooding included by Lee et al. are broader, restricted to floods that
are life-threatening but not necessarily localized or resembling a dam failure.
The final row is the root mean square error (RMSE) calculated using the data
presented in the report by Lee et al. and duplicated in Table 7. The likely exp lanation for
the difference between the calculated values and those reported by the authors in the
preceding row is that Lee et al. inadvertently misreported one or more values. Notice, for
example, that cases 9 and I 0 (Pike County and Toccoa Falls) give identical estimates for
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every method, despite the large contrast in actual life-loss values. In any case, the relative
magnitudes remain unchanged: those reported by Lee et a!. will be presumed to be the
correct RMSEs.
With these caveats, the RMSEs indicate that equations L-4 and L-5 make
comparable predictors and both surpass the performance of the USBR equations and the
Stanford!FEMNIWR model. Interestingly, the lower bound of the USBR confidence
interval made a far better predictor than the best estimate, indicating a tendency to vastly
overestimate L in some cases. Without question, the Stanford!FEMA/IWR model is
miscalibrated, allowing overestimation by up to three orders of magnitude.
Despite the relatively low root mean square errors, Lee et a!. point out
shortcomings of their own estimations. The variance in L from their equations (cr = 20)
was much less than for the actual case histories (cr = 45). In their words,
Loss of life in many of the more lethal floods, such as the Big Thompson,
Colorado flood ; the Johnstown, Pennsylvania flood; and the Black Hills, South
Dakota flood, was significantly under-predicted by the empirical function .... On
the other hand, the empirical function over-predicted some of the less lethal
floods such as those in Denver, Colorado; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; North Hills,
Pennsylvania; Lawn Lake, Colorado; Northern New Jersey; and Phoenix,
Arizona. (Lee eta!., 1986, p. 71 , semicolons have been added for clarity)
To these could be added several more cases of dramatic overestimation, such as San
Francisco, California; Pike County, Kentucky; and Tekamah Creek, Nebraska. These
were balanced by 4 cases where actual life loss was in the twenties while the estimated
life loss was less than l 0.
Significantly, a similar pattern emerges to that found using the logit procedure
developed by DeKay and McClelland (1993b): persistent overestimation when actual loss
of life is less than I 0, a balance of over- and underestimation in the midranges of life loss
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(I 0 to 40) and persistent and dramatic underestimation when L is high. There are reasons
for this built into the logit transformation itself, as will be explored in Chapter IV.
Finally, Lee eta!. proposed three models for calculating L, two of which depend
on equation L-4 or L-5, with L-4 being recommended. To support these models, they
provided detailed guidance on how to model the flood waves and calculate Par, Warning
time, flood depths, and the other variables used in the model. Going beyond previous
guidance, they also explored evacuation modeling. An overview summary looks like this,
receipt of evacuation warning=> mobilization time=> vehicular travel time and
queuing delay time=> time between clearance and hazard arrival
where the middle two components comprise clearance time.

The aggregate-empirical model
The simplest model is the aggregate-empirical model. By way of overview, it
entails:
1.

Establishing flood inundation scenarios using DAMBRK;

2.

Relating these to census tracts, enumeration districts, or data on individual

3.

Calculating a weighted average flood depth for each reach based on the

blocks;

proportion of Par inhabiting each flood stage within that reach (using automated
software, if possible);
4.

Estimating warning time by using a rough estimate or by summing the times

for hazard detection, hazard appraisal, threat determination, notification of officials,
decision to warn, and completion of the first warning; and then using this sum to adjust
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the wave travel time (the difference in time between the peak stage at the dam and the
peak stage at the centroid of the population distribution);
5.

Estimating the remaining variables in equation L-4 or L-5; and

6.

Applying the loss of life function of choice (either L-4 or L-5).

The distinguishing characteristics of this model are that Par is subdivided only to the
level of sequential reaches along the river and variables are applied to each reach as a
whole, weighted according to the population distribution within each reach.

The empirical-flood-travel model
The empirical-flood-travel model distinguishes Par; more finely by identifying
separate inundation zones within each reach based on five land elevations and defining
the model variables uniquely for each. This is consistent with the divisions used in the
Stanford/FEMA model. Note that unless the flood wave rises rapidly, each zone will have
a different warning time. To facilitate this more detailed analysis, the model anticipated
software that had not yet been written. To this author's knowledge, the software was
never developed.

The flood-travel-evacuation model
The flood-travel-evacuation model also depends on proposed software. Unlike the
previous approaches, this model explicitly considers evacuation rates and avoids use of
the empirical life-loss equation. Instead, zones are identified by choosing representative
cross sections within each reach and plotting their elevations. By outputting flood
hydrographs at each cross section, the flood wave travel time to each zone can be
determined for each reach . The elevation and location of each road link and origin node
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must also be determined by manually inspecting topographic maps. This transportation
grid is entered into a traffic simulation network database, in particular the MASSY AC2
traffic evacuation simulation model. Next, the traffic simulation program is run fo r a
short increment, say 15 minutes. Checking each hydrograph for each cross section and
each zone, any roads which lie below the levels of inundated at that point in time are
closed. With these closures, the traffic model is again run on an incremental basis, and
the hydrographs are again checked for additional road closures. This continues until the
evacuated population reaches some asymptote, implying that, due to flooding, no more
individuals can escape. Some will have been trapped at the origin nodes while others will
have become blocked en route. Those who remain in the flooded zones as they are
inundated constitute the threatened population. Life loss is estimated subjectively by
multiplying this threatened population by a reasonable fractional coefficient. The flood
event in question is then compared to a reference flood to determine the incremental
losses.
Since considerable guidance is provided by the authors for each of these model s,
the interested reader is referred to their report for more details. It is important to
remember, however, that Lee et al. did not propose a single model, but three models, two
of which required additional software development and one of which was independent of
their regression equations.

Contributions
Overall , their contribution to the field of dam safety life-loss estimation was
monumental, being solidly built on the pioneering works by McCann et al. (1985) and
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Brown and Graham (1988). They completed the most rigorous statistical analysis of
empirical evidence to date and introduced the less commonly understood approach of
using a logit transformation. They attempted to explore Par on a scale small enough to be
easily understood and to which values of characterizing variables would apply with
reasonable accuracy. It is likely that their method did not gain prominence primarily
because it depended on undeveloped software.

Shortcomings
Despite their pioneering work, the models developed by Lee et al. (1986) had a
number of shortcomings:
I.

They treated the individual as the unit for regression, causing events with

large populations to dominate the results.
2.

Some of the floods in their database were slow-rising, widely dispersed

events, atypical of dam failures, although these may be useful for estimating incremental
life loss by comparing the life loss from a dam failure to the life loss from non-failure
flooding.
3.

Current definitions of warning time do not describe the average warning

time, the extent to which a warning is propagated, the effectiveness of the message at
mobi lizing a timely evacuation, informal types of warnings like sensory clues and shouts
from neighbors, the time required to evacuate, or the excess evacuation time above the
time required to evacuate. As such, it is a point estimate that says little about a particular
event.
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4.

Since the events were treated globally, and since the equations are nonlinear

wi th respect to population, estimates of life loss will be different when summed over
subpopulations and will depend on how the global population is divided.
5.

The equations can misestimate by a large margin, even within the original

data set.
6.

The equations have a built in bias to underestimate when loss of life is large

and to overestimate when loss of life is small (see Chapter IV).

Department of Water Affairs
Natal South Africa 198 8

This committee report summarized an investigation into the damage from dam
breaches caused by September 1987 floods . The goal was to enable predictions regarding
the probability, magnitude, damages, and life loss of a future dam failure. Among private
dams, those breached included 199 shorter than 5 m and 187 taller than 5 m. Another 449
dams were damaged . Apparently, 11 breached dams and 15 damaged dams were selected
as a sample to survey. "Surprisingly, no significant downstream damage or loss of life
was caused by any of the breached dams observed" (Jordaan et al., 1988, p.25). The
report concludes:
The damage to be expected due to the breaching of farm earth dams,
caused by flooding , up to 12 meters high is negligible and no loss of life can be
expected. There can, however, expected to be a potential for significant damage
and loss of life for a medium sized dam for the flood conditions like those
encountered here [sic]. (Jordaan et al., 1988, p. 30)
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In light of the small sample examined, the report concluded that the remaining cases
should be reviewed when resources became available in order to form a probabilistic
model for potential loss of life and damage from the failure of small dams.

Abt and Others 1989

The toppling experiment
Though not strictly an effort to quantifY life loss, the team of Abt, Wittler, Taylor,
and Love (Abt et al., 1989) sought to define the envelope of depth*velocity relationships
(called product numbers) that would topple individuals overrun by floodwaters. Since
feeble individuals could not be safely tested in a flume, the lower curve of the envelope
was defined using a cross-shaped, 5 ft tall, 117 .5 lb, rigid-body monolith constructed of
concrete-coated Styrofoam. The rectangular base was I ft wide and 6 in. thick, and it was
placed broad-side into the current.
The upper limits and body of the envelope were defined using 20 test subjects, all
healthy, ranging in age from 90 to 201 lb, in height from 5 to 6ft, and in age from 19 to
54. Fifteen subjects were under 31 years old and only two were female. No subjects wore
loose clothing likely to trap the current.
A recirculating flume was fitted with four surfaces: simulated turf, smooth
concrete, steel, and a mixture of sand and pea gravel. Subjects were secured in the flume
with a safety harness attached to a hoist. They were allowed to first acclimate themselves
in flows of2 to 3 feet and a depth*velocity product number of about 6. The flows were
then gradually increased while the subjects periodically tried to walk upstream, face
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downstream, or walk crosscurrent. When they indicated a loss of stability, the experiment
was terminated and repeated within I to 2 hr.

Conc lusions insights and shortcomings
A wide range of product numbers defined individuals ' tolerance limits: low of
7.56 and high of22.84 for healthy adults; low of2.32 and high of4.21 for the monolith.
Testing for a range was complicated by the fact that an infinite number of depth*velocity
combinations are possible. Several conclusions from the study are presented here. along
wi th commentary.
I.

Stability was not found to be a function of surface type for the four surfaces

tested, but several surfaces common to floodplains and rivers were not tested: slippery
clay, tall field grass, uneven surfaces, deep mud which either traps the foot or
disintegrates on contact, river cobbles or boulders, or slippery coatings like moss and
algae.
2.

Even in a controlled laboratory experiment, human stability in flood settings

is difficult to quantify. The results from one individual to the next varied tremendously.
Nevertheless, among the 20 subjects tested, there was a general trend toward larger
individuals withstanding higher product numbers than those who were smaller. In an
attempt to quantify this, the following regression equation was proposed:

P.N. = {exp(0.222( wt • hr / I 000) + 1.088]

where wt = weight and
ht = height.
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However, the R val ue was only 0.48, indicating that the relationship explains less than
half of the observed variability. There was even substantial variation when a given
subject was tested two to four times within 2 hr, something the proposed equation cannot
explain without considering factors such as fatigue, practice, and random moments of
imbalance. As a broad generalization, it is safe to say that most subjects lost stability
when flows were 4 to 5.5 fps while depths were 2.75 to 3.5 ft deep (hip deep to midabdomen). Higher velocities toppled individuals at lower depths-less than 2 ft for flows
over 8 fps-and almost halflost stability in waist-deep water moving at 3 mph 8 or less,
the speed of a leisurely walk.
3.

Project bias was substantial. Seven areas were identified by the original

authors. They are summarized here along with additional commentary.
a)

Subjects were willing to take higher risks in light of the safety harness.

b)

Practice improved performance.

c)

Fatigue may have negatively impacted subsequent tests.

d)

The tests did not simulate debris flows or poor lighting. Floods rich in

mud would prove much denser, increasing the flood's momentum and increasing
the subjects' buoyancy. Large floating debris can readily·knock waders into the
current.
e)

Subjects carried nothing and tended to splay their arms wide fo r balance

as water depths rose. An adult carrying a child might not perform nearly as well.
Even if the adult did not fall , the child might be washed away by depth/velocities
less than needed for toppling.
8

3 mph

=

4.4 fps.
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f)

All tests involved water temperatures of 68-78°F. Performance would

likely drop quickly in winter temperatures.
g)

All subjects were in good health, and most were near the age of their

athletic prime. Additionally, only two subjects were women, one of which scored
the lowest product number. No subjects wore clothes likely to billow.
h)

The study did not test stability for those of very short stature. especiall y

children.
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that this study more closely represented
the outer envelope of human stabi lity for average-sized adults than the middle. While the
adrenaline that would accompany a real flood could improve performance, it is likely that
the accompanying mud, debris, uneven ground, uncertain lighting, extra burdens. greater
distances. and other handicaps wou ld more than offset this effect for many individuals.
It bears repeating that this study was not intended to directly suggest conditions
that would lead to loss of life, but rather the conditions that would make a flood
potentially dangerous. There are numerous examples of people being swept downstream ,
clinging to trees, climbing upon houses or floating propane tanks, or otherwise being
swept some distance without perishing. On the flip side, if one is swept under branches,
caught in a deep eddy, or trapped in some other manner, even an otherwise slow and
shallow flow can tum deadly.
Perhaps it is safe to say that, as a rule of thumb, a flow should not be considered
life-threatening to most adults until it exceeds 2 ft deep and moves faster than a slow
walk. For those of low mobility, such as the elderly, however, even this could prove
dangerous: the monolith toppled in flows just under 2 ft deep when velocities ranged
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from I fps to about 2 fps. Also, none of this is meant to imply safe flows for automobile
crossings-a leading hazard in flash floods.

DeKay and McClelland for the United States
BureauofReclamation 1991 1993b

The model
Under funding by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, DeKay and
McClelland 9 (1991) added the failure ofStava Dam in Italy to Brown and Graham's
(1988) data set and attempted a more rigorous regression analysis similar to that
employed by Lee et al. (1986). The equation they developed in 1991 for life loss was
merely one component of a broader goal: determining when dam failure warnings should
be issued to minimize costs when a "reasonable" dollar value is assigned to human lives
(DeKay and McClelland, 1991 , p. 15). 10 Since estimation of L has value apart from
warning strategies, they presented a revised life-loss equation independent of the larger
model in 1993. The revision followed the same regression procedures used in 1991 , but
four new floods 11 were added to the data set, and certain values in the original data set

9

To my knowledge, Duane McClelland is not immediately related to Professor Gary H.
McClelland who oversaw the work of Michael L. DeKay within the Department of Psychology at the
University of Colorado. At the time of this writing, Gary McClelland and Duane McClelland have never
met.
10
Recognizing that many take offense at the notion of putting a dollar value on human life (this
author included), DeKay and McClelland (1991) distinguished between the immeasurable value of an
identified life, and the value to society of reducing "the probability that any individual within the
population at risk will live or die": what they termed a "statistical" life. Nevertheless, they stated that "any
decision threshold that is established implicitly places a value on human life" (DeKay and McClelland,
1991 , p. 9; italics were in the original), argued that this value should be made explicit, and went on to value
a statistical human life at between $3 million and $5 million dollars.

"In addition to Stava Dam which was added in 1991 , they added Allegheny County, PA, 1986;
Austin, TX, 1981; Shadyside, OH, 1990; and Centralia, WA, 1991.
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were updated in light of new information. 12 Until recently, this revised equation has
generally been accepted as the best regression attempt to date, displacing the equations by
Brown and Graham in recent practice within the USSR and overshadowing the work by
Lee et al. (see, for example, Graham, 1998).
DeKay and McClelland 's (1991) cost-minimization approach to warnings is not
central to this study, so only their regression equations for estimating L will be presented.
Chapter IV explores their model in detail, so only a brief summary is necessaty at this
point. Table 5 presents the complete data set underlying their regression, including the
specific variable values assigned to each case.
As with Lee et al. ( 1986) a certain degree of subjectivity lies behind most variable
estimates. This is most prominent with respect to warning times (Wt). When more
specific estimates were not available, they modified those values reported by Brown and
Graham (U .S . Bureau of Reclamation, 1989) in the following manner: when Wt was
reported as less than a certain number (Wt < I hr), they divided the upper limit in half:
when only a lower limit was reported (Wt > 2 hr), they added 50% to that lower bound;
and when a range was reported, they chose the midpoint of the range. Another subjective
variable was flooding lethality, renamed flooding forcefulness or Force in 1993. It was
coded dichotomously: a I indicated that more than 15-20% of the structures that were
inundated were destroyed or seriously damaged by the flood. Because damages were not

12
The reasoning and sources underlying each revision is not included in their paper. but can be
obtained upon request from the authors and is entitled "Appendix: Additions and Changes to the Bureau of
Reclamation Data."
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always known with great precision, DeKay and McClelland (199 1, 1993b) relied heavily
on the expert judgement of Wayne Graham, who was most familiar with the data set. 13
Like Lee et al. (1986), DeKay and McClelland chose a logit transformation to
preclude the predic:ted levels of L from being negative or greater than I 00%. Unlike Lee
et al. , however, they did not allow each individual to carry equal statistical weight.
Instead, each case was considered a single data point, as in traditional least squares
regression . From this perspective, p = L!Par represents the proportion of fatalities for a
given failure event, rather than the probability of an individual dying in a binomial
experiment.
The forms of their final 1991 and 1993 logistic equations were, respectively,

L(p) = ln( _p_) = - 1.650- 0.513ln(Par) -0.822(Wt) + 4.012(/etha/ity)- 3.0 I6(Wt)(lethality)
1- p

(OM- I; 1991)

L(p) = ln( _p_) = -2.586-0.440 ln(Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)
1-p

(DM-2a; 1993b)

where L(p) = functional notation for the logit transformation of p,
p =(loss of life)/Par
Par= population at risk (DeKay and McClelland used PAR and Lee et al. used P) ,

13
It is likely that Wayne Graham has the most voluminous data tiles on U.S. dam failures
resulting in loss of life of any ind ividual or institution in the world. My gratitude bears repeating for his

willingness to allow me to copy those parts of his files I considered pertinent to my own research. Without

his cooperation , this thesis could not have been developed in its current form.
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Wt = warning time (), and
lethality= Force, as defined above (represented herein by the symbol Fd).
An effort has been made to preserve the notation chosen by DeKay and
McClelland while introducing common symhols proposed later. It is later proposed that P
replace p to conform to a convention in which all variables begin with a capital letter.
Subsequent letters in a multi-letter symbol should be lower case so variables can rest side
by side without confusion. Hence, Par has been chosen in preference over PAR; it is later
suggested that Fd (dichotomous forcefulness) replace the terms lethality and Force; and
Wt has replaced DeKay and McClelland's symbol WTp., (DeKay and McClelland, 1991)
and WT (DeKay and McClelland, l993b). L also replaces the symbol LOL for loss of
life.
Using the right-hand form of equation L-3a to accomplish the inverse
transformation, and multiplying through by Par to isolate L, equation DM-2a becomes

L _

exp[- 2.586- 0.440ln(Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)]

Par -I +exp[- 2.586- 0.440ln(Par)- 0.759(Wt) +3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)]

(DM-2b)

which in tum simplifies to

L=

Par
(DM-2c)
I+ exp[2.586 + 0.440 ln(Par) + 0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)]
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Choosing an alternate form, this equation can be modified by pulling the first two terms
in the exponent out front as (e 2 586)(e0·4401n(P"')) and simplifying to yield their final 1993
equation:

L=

Par

I+ 13.277(Par 04 40 )exp[0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)]

(DM-2d)

The corresponding equation based on the 1991 data set is

L=

Par

I + 5.207(Par 0 "' )exp[0.822(Wt)- 4.0 12(/etha/ity) + 3.016(Wt)(/ethality)]

(DM-1d)

Although the 1991 equation has a higher R2 value than the 1993 version (0.9357 vs.
0.840), equation DM-ld has been superseded by equation DM-2d since equation DM-2d
is based on the same data set with four additional cases and updated values.
Finally, if desired, equation DM-2d can be expressed as the following two
separate equations for a Force of 1 and 0, respectively.

Par

1+ 13.277(Par 0440 )exp[2.982(Wt)- 3.790]

Par

1+ 13.277(Par 0440 )exp[0.759(Wt)]

(DM-2d.1)

(DM-2d.2)

Equation DM-2d can also be transformed for comparison to other equations.
Recognizing that 1 in the denominator is almost always small compared to the other
terms in the denominator, the I can be dropped, allowing the following simplification:
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L"' 0.075(Par 0560 )exp[- 0.759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)] (DM-2e)

The main value to the approximation in equation DM-2d.l is that it reveals the close
similarity between the results obtained by confining L to positive values not greater than
Par (logit procedure) and the best equation DeKay and McClelland developed for their
1991 publication using non-logit, least squares linear regression techniques, as follows:

L "' 0.!39(Par 0572 )exp(- 0.895(Wt) + 3.26~Jetha/ity)- 2.404(Wt)(lethality)]- 0.5 (DM-3b)

This equation DM-3b was rejected because it could produce impossible estimates.
It should be noted that the underlying form of equation DM-3b is

ln(L + 0.5) =a+ bIn( Par)+ c(Wt) + d(lethality) + e(Wt)(lethality)

(DM-3a)

The reason for adding 0.5 to the dependent logarithm is to avoid the dilemma that the
logarithm is undefined when L = 0.
The significance of this logarithmic form is that the regression equation will
attempt to closely match life-loss values when losses are comparatively small while
allowing greater variance when life loss is large. To illustrate this, consider that Jn(200)Jn(\00) and ln(20)- Jn(\0) are identically equal to 0.7. In least squares analysis, these
residuals of I 00 and I 0 lives, respectively, would be considered equivalent, generally
leading to poor predictions whenever L is large.
Incidentally, since the Jogit method also involves a Jog transformation, similar
consequences hold for it as well. The full implications of the Jogit transformation will be
explored in Chapter IV.
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To explore the relationships used by the USBR, DeKay and McClelland also
developed what they felt was "the best expression for loss of life that can be derived via
standard regression techniques using only population size and warning time as
predictors" (DeKay and McClelland, 1991 , p. C ll ). Like DM-3b, it was based on a log
transformation of L.

L = l.896(Par 0 "') exp[ -l.8l9(Wr)]- 0.5

(DM-4)

In their 1993 work, they derived an equation using the same variables and a logit
transformation, producing what they believed to be "the best expression for L(p) that can
be derived using only WT and Par as predictors" (DeKay and McClelland, l993b, p.
198).

L(p) = 0.146- 0.478ln(Par) -l.5 l8(Wt)

(OM-Sa)

or

L

Par
I+ exp[-0. I 46 + 0.478ln(Par) + l.518(WI)]

(DM-5b)

At no time did DeKay and McClelland offer a regression equation based on using
L as an untransformed dependent variable.

Contributions
DeKay and McClelland are to be commended for producing the best empirical
equation to date . Since their approach makes the event the basis for regression rather than
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the individual , they are using variable estimates consistently with the manner in which
they were measured . This is a legitimate theoretical improvement over the assignment of
global variables to the individual (see Lee et at., 1986).
Although the equations by Brown and Graham (Brown and Graham 1988; U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 1986, 1989), Lee et at. ( 1986), and DeKay and McClelland
( 1991, 1993 b) were all based on global Par rather than subPar, and although they all
produced exponential and/or complex forms that are nonlinear with respect to the size of
Par, DeKay and McClelland were the first to caution that the application of their equation
to subPar would violate the principles under which their equation was developed. Since,
proportionately, fewer deaths occur as Par increases, the more Par is subdivided, the
greater the sum of all lives lost will become. Also, the regression assumes a high level of
heterogeneity found in large Par 14-something lost when subPar are delineated based on
homogenous traits. These issues and others are addressed in Chapter IV.
DeKay and McClelland (1993b) recommended omitting Par with more than 3 hr
of warning time and subdividing the remaining Par into a maximum of two groups if the
groups can be distinguished by a significant change in flood forcefulness (i.e., changing
from a canyon to a wide floodplain) . They also cautioned against applying their equation
to cases outside the range of the data set, such as those considered by Ayyaswamy et at.
(1974).

14
Not only is L nonlinear with respect to Par in all three fonnulations, but the only case in any of
the three data sets that was subdivided prior to regression analysis was the Teton Dam failure. In many
cases, these floods swept through many distinct communities and Pari, causing great life loss in one area

and very little in others as the warning time and nature of the flood/Par interaction changed.
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Shortcomings
Shortcomings to the development by DeKay and McClelland will be treated in
Chapter IV.

The Australian National Committee on Large Dams
Recommends the USBR Method 1994

As of 1994, the Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD)
recognized that life-loss estimations are an important part of dam safety risk analysis, but
that "generally the Joss oflife issue has been avoided" (Australian National Committee
on Large Dams, 1994, p. 5). In this historic review of dam safety risk assessment, they
briefly cover the methods already developed by McCann eta!. ( 1985), the 1986 methods
proposed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that stopped short of predicting the
number of Jives lost (Lee eta!., 1986), the USBR procedures (U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, 1989), and the DeKay and McClelland (1993b) improvements to the USBR
procedures.
Although they recognized that DeKay and McClelland (l993b) had improved
upon the USBR equations, they recommended that the 1989 USBR approach be used and
they included the key portions of that report as an appendix. The basis for this
inconsistency is not clear, except perhaps that DeKay and McClelland offered only an
equation, while the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's 1989 report outlined an entire set of
procedures in great detail. In any case, it appears that AN COLD would not have been
opposed to substituting the logit equation developed by DeKay and McClelland for the
equations suggested by the USBR.
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They make no mention of the models developed by Lee et al. (1986).

B.C. Hydro 1995

Recognizing that the current empirical developments rely on relatively small
databases, Hartford and Kartha (1995) cautioned that j udgment must be used in applying
any equation to a specific dam that has yet to fail. This said, they recommended the use
of the logit equation developed by DeKay and McClelland (l993b) using the general
variable estimation methods outlined by the USBR. Following DeKay and McClelland,
they would not allow more than two subPar, they subdivided Par only when there was a
significant change in flood forcefulness or warning time, and they excluded from Par any
individuals with more than 3 hr of warning time. They made a conservative deviation
from both DeKay-McClelland and the USBR in their calculation of warning time,
however, by assuming it is equal to the travel time of the flood. They also allowed further
subdivision of Par in exceptional cases when they attempted more detailed risk analyses.

B.C. Hydro 1997 1998

The model
The B.C. Hydro approach represents an attempt to move beyond the current
regression equations and develop a model that tracks individuals in the flood via
personalized probability distributions. Although "B.C. Hydro currently uses the methods
of Brown and Graham and DeKay and McClelland to obtain an initial estimate" for life
loss, "the existing methods of Brown and Graham and DeKay and McC lelland were
judged to be inadequate for B.C. Hydro ' s needs." From the authors' perspective,
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"predicting how people are going to react under conditions of dam break flooding is not
simply a matter of putting a few numbers into a generic equation (appealing as it might
be to engineers)" (Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998, p. 4-17). Underlying this
sentiment is a desire to produce not just an average or expected value for life loss, but a
probability distribution and a confidence description for that distribution.
It should be recognized that the B.C. Hydro approach is still under development,
especially with respect to variable estimation, but the essential framework is in place. The
method was developed under the assumption of a seismically induced dam breach, but
applies to any failure mode. The following pieces of information are needed:
I.

hydrographs, inundation maps, and velocities for each dam breach scenario;

2.

Par;

3.

approximate distribution of Par with time, distance, and elevation;

4.

effectiveness of the local warning systems;

5.

effectiveness of emergency response plans for industrial plants, schools,

hospitals, individuals, etc. ;
6.

delay times due to shock or disbelief; and

7.

evacuation rates by car and by foot along known evacuation routes and

distances (adapted from Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998).
Essentially, the method breaks Par down into subPar that are located in individual
buildings or locations called units. Each unit is quantified using census data. Average
occupancy rates can be used, but specific estimates are preferred and are required for
specialized structures like hospitals and schools. Using a computer algorithm, each Par; is
then tracked based on a representative individual who experiences delay in awareness of
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the approaching flood, must overcome shock and confusion once informed, must
mobilize and begin to evacuate, and either makes it free of flooding or encounters flood
waters while en route. If free of the flood , there is a certain probability of surviving based
on traffic accidents and the like; if met by flood

wat~rs,

there exists a probability of being

toppled, and if toppled a probability of surviving, based on the depth and velocity of
flood waters at that location. Calculations continue until the flood wave reaches its peak
along any given evacuation trajectory. Life loss is determined probabilistically for each
Par; and summed over Par.
Using the symbols presented by Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach ( 1998) Pari at
each unit are defined by equation BC-1 .

(BC-1)

PARUNIT = TNRUNIT . OAFUNIT/11)WY

The associated loss of life for each unit is defined using equations BC-2 and BC-3.

(BC-2)

P,IIRVIVING = (1- Pr ) * P, ," + Pr • Ps 1c

P,

= 0

Pr =I

WD-LTD
HSD-LTD

(BC-3 )

ifWD < LTD

(BC-3a)

ifWD>HSD

(BC-3b)

if LTD < WD < HSD

(BC-3c)
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where LOLUNIT

=expected loss of life at a given unit (building or area),

PARUNIT

=number of people residing at the unit at the time of the flood,

? sURVIVING

=probability of surviving the flood,

TNRuNIT

= total number of residents occupying a unit,

OAFuNITrrowv =expected occupancy of the unit during the particular day, week,
and season of the dam failure,
Pr

= probability of being toppled by the flood,

Ps1E

= probability of surviving given that the individual successfully
retreats to safe ground,

Ps1c

= probability of surviving given that the individual was caught by
the flood.

WD

= water depth,

LTD

= lowest toppling depth, and

HSD

= highest safe depth.

Currently, key variables are quantified based on distance from the dam, a poor
surrogate, but the modelers hope to change this over time. Notice that the probability of
toppling is defined linearly between those depths that are known to be too shallow to
topple anyone (Pr = 0) and those which will topple everyone (Pr = I). Theoretically,
these depths will vary with flow velocities and the physical capabilities of the fleeing
parties, both of which should be considered when selecting HSD and LTO. In this early
stage of model development, however, HSD and L TO are varied only with distance from
the dam. They are selected with the help of human stability curves presented in U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (1989). Ps1c theoretically describes the probability of surviving
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flood waters as a function of flow velocities, individual physical abilities, and the
efficiency of rescue operations, but like HSD and LTD, at this stage of model
development it currently increases only with distance from the dam .
Modelers simulate a unique evacuation chronology for each PARUNIT in order to
dynamically track the temporal interplay between the location of individuals along their
evacuation route and the presence or depth of flooding . The Time to First Awareness of

Flooding (T FAF) and any subsequent Time Delays (T DELAYS) prior to leaving a unit are
combined with the subsequent Rate of Escap e (REsCAPE; measured as a rise in elevation)
to place the PARUNIT at the appropriate depth when the flood arrives. If the representative
person never leaves his or her unit (t < T FAF + L(T DELA vs), then

(BC-4)

otherwise,

(BC-5)

= the moment of time being considered,

where

EL V PAR@UNIT = the elevation of the units representative member at time, t, and
EL V UNIT

=elevation of the unit calculated from a topographic map and
confirmed using GPS equipment during site visits.

The only variable needed to relate this evacuation process back to the life-loss
equations presented above is the depth of water through which the representative member
of PARuNIT is wading [WD(t)] . This is the difference between ELVrARUN n(t) and the
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River Stage Level (RSL(t)] obtained from dam breach simulation using a program like
DAMBRK.

WD(t) = RSL(I)- ELVI'AR@UN/1' (1)

(BC-6)

Running the model using discrete increments of time from t = 0 to t = (the time ofpeak

flooding at the unit) , RSL(t) is compared to ELEVPAR@UNIT at each time increment. The
comparisons are terminated when ELEVPAR@UNIT rises above the peak RSL. If the
representative person never wades through water deeper than LTD, she is assumed to
escape floodwaters and has a PsrE probability of surviving. If she wades through waters
greater than HSD, her PsuRvJVJNG drops to Psrc using the maximum depth ever
encountered. However, since Psrc currently varies only with distance from the dam, not
with depth, the maximum depth is irrelevant until the model is upgraded. If the maximum
depth encountered falls between LTD and HSD, depth will be considered using equation
BC-3c.
Finally, the model formally recognizes the uncertainty involved in variable
estimates by using a Monte Carlo simulation approach. There are two levels of
uncertainty: the average value assigned to each variable and the specific value that holds
true for a give unit on the day of the failure event. Though this was not done in sample
variable tables in the article, Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach ( 1998) recommend
producing either a range of possible values for each variable or a probability function for
each. A probability distribution of life loss can then be produced for each type of failure
event by rurming Monte Carlo simulations with the assigned distributions.
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The distributions produced for each type of failure event can be combined into a
single life-loss probability function by first weighting each event distribution by its
frequency of occurrence and then summing them all together. Failure events differ by
time of day, week, and year, as well as by the loading magnitudes leading to breach and
the subsequent nature of the failure itself. The entire procedure entails assigning
individual probability distributions to each branch of a life-loss event tree, running a
separate Monte Carlo simulation on each event pathway that leads to life loss, and
summing these terminal life-loss probability distributions. Typically, the terminal
distributions will be weighted according to their frequency of occurrence through the
structure of the event tree.

Contributions
There are obvious strengths to the approach proposed by B.C. Hydro , despite the
fact that it is still under development. Theoretically, the model accounts for most of the
elements affecting life loss, circumventing the nonlinearity problems inherent in applying
equations developed for global Par to subPar. In this case, the sum of the parts should
certainly equal the whole. Also, there is a certain emotional confidence or satisfaction
that can be derived from using a model that evaluates life loss on a scale approaching the
individual. Although census data do not allow modelers to track individuals with their
unique psyche and physical capabilities, choosing individual buildings as units is much
more refined than applying regression equations to entire cities or a series of
communities for which many variables represent gross averages at best. Moreover, the
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detail and time required to run the B.C. Hydro model can potentially satisf'y those who
share the sentiments of Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach:
The criticism that the model is too complex and has too many variables is, we
feel, unreasonable. The logic structure is very straightforward and it has withstood
expert review. We are confident that we can put the logic structure forward "with
moral certainty" as the best way presently available to deal with this component
of a risk analysis . . .. Dam safety is a serious business . .. . That risk management
for dam safety doesn' t come cheaply or easily should not come as a surprise.
However, we are duty bound to do the best that we can under the circumstances
and demonstrate due diligence in making decisions about public safety. (Assaf,
Hartford, and Cattanach, 1998, p. 4-24, 4-25)

Shortcomings
This said, there are serious shortcomings to this approach that have yet to be
overcome. Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach believe the predictions currently lack
credibility due to the large number of variables that must be estimated subjectively. They
hope that this can be overcome through more detailed studies about the important
variables and through calibration with historical case studies in order to back-test the
model. They also recognize that the model explicitly accounts only for drowning deaths,
ignoring deaths due to heart attacks, road accidents, and convergence losses from people
not originally located in one of the units under study. Their response is that such deaths
are likely random. This element could also be included to a certain extent through Ps!E·
Apart from the concerns of the model ' s authors, there are shortcomings in the
logic of the model itself. First, variables like Ps1c, LTD, and HSD are heavily dependent
on the physical capabilities of the individual. Yet, the individual is never in view, only a
representative individual assigned to each PARUNIT· Is LTD based on an infant, a small
child, a healthy adult; those who are more feeble or immobi le due to age, illness, or
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disabilities; or a representative composite of these? Since life loss is not based on degrees
of death, it is highly unlikely that "average" or "representative" members of PARUNIT
would topple or perish at the same rate as that found by combining the fates of the
smaller or less capable with those of the larger or more capable. One solution might be to
distribute characteristics of age, mobility, health, and size to the unit representatives
according to the proportions in the real population. Unfortunately, this still neglects the
dynamics found in families and among neighbors: the more feeble are likely to receive
assistance, while the more able are often slowed or handicapped by the need to carry
children or to help others.
Second, notice that an error in estimating a probability is different than a random
error. When summed across a large number of units, an erroneous probability distribution
skews every result in the same direction. When distributions are multiplied together,
errors can compound exponentially. Hence, the more complex the model (the more
di stributions that must be considered) the greater risk there is for amplification of errors.
Estimates that are based on regression using larger-scale units avoid this because the
regression accounts for variance among individuals rather than assuming a skewed
distribution and then summing the same error across a large number of units.
Third, it will probably never be possible to provide dependable estimates for
many of the variables needed for the model. This is because realistic field conditions
cannot ethically be duplicated in the laboratory and many distributions (i.e.,
velocity*depth curves) are highly specific not only to each event, but to each location
within each reach.
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As an example of the coarse level at which variables must be estimated, the
values Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach (1998) used for LTD and HSD, which lie behind
PT, were loosely based on a human-stability curve presented in U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation (1989, seep. 111-112). This, in turn, was derived from the study conducted
by Abt et al. (1989) described above. The USBR took the lowest velocity*depth product
number found in that srudy (7.56 for a 90 lb female) and used it to plot a velocity vs.
depth curve for which every coordinate pair has a product of 7.56. Presumably, this curve
represents the boundary for L TD. 15 While not plotted by the USBR, the highest product
number they reported ("over 22" for a 20 1 lb male) presumab ly underlies HSD. As
mentioned before, these values presume ideal conditions: a uniform flume with no
sudden waves, no eddies, the reassurance of safety equipment, no billowing clothing or
shoes, no mud or debris, good lighting, no panic or fear, no need to carry children or
precious belongings, warm water and weather conditions, no wind, solid ground with
good traction that is free from dips or holes or obstacles over which one might trip, and
healthy adults over 5 ft tall. Such conditions would not be expected in the field , nor
would conditions be consistent across events or for every unit. One could not ethically
duplicate true field conditions in a laboratory, and historical data are not likely to be
sufficiently detailed or accurate to allow a refined analysis in the narrow range between
LTD and HSD.

"Although LTD is only a depth, it has been assumed that B.C. Hydro derived it based on first
routing the flood to detennine the depth vs. velocity re lationships for the flood and then back-calculating
the depth that yielded a product number of7.56 at each cross section downstream.
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Even if one could know the true toppling-death distributions for every unit,
current evacuation models cannot place people in sufficiently refined estimates of depth
and velocity to make the distributions useful. This level of refinement would require that
REsCAPE have a unique function for each PARUNIT· !fa custom equation is to be
developed for each unit, the trajectory of escape must be estimated for each residence, a
detailed chronology of elevations must be recorded, and a dynamic rate of progress along
the path must be described. This, in tum, must be uniquely coded into a computer as a
function of physical geography, human psychology, prior experiences with flooding,
evacuation experience, the direction children will run and whether or not their parents
will give pursuit, the paths residents know and travel, bottlenecks, the amount of warning
time, environmental conditions, prior flooding, traffic accidents, and many other factors.
If an individual must complete an evacuation by wading, a reduced rate of progress must
be assumed from that point on. This also becomes a function of depth and velocities,
requiring that very small time steps be used and that the evacuation function is updated
with every time step. If a more generic function were developed that described only
elevation changes (Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach used a uniform rate of 50 m per hour),
it completely ignores the fact that most terrain does not rise at a uniform rate, residents
may have to scramble down into gullies in order to gain elevation on the other side, and
the rate of evacuation will vary dramatically along the length of the floodplain.
Even if both toppling distributions and evacuation functions could be refined,
current dynamic flood routing models cannot provide more than a coarse estimate of the
depths and velocities at any particular location-far too coarse to target the narrow range
between LTD and HSD. To complicate matters further, catastrophic floods are
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characterized by unpredictable waves, pathways, and extreme variations in depth due to
their turbulence, momentum, and debris load.
Fourth, if the third point is true with respect to the range between LTO and HSD,
then equation BC-3c can be discarded, equation BC-3b can be set equal to a value less
than I to include all depths in which people might topple, and the entire method can be
reduced to the flood-travel-evacuation model proposed by Lee et al. (1986). Since the
B.C. Hydro model offers no new empirical relationships and no improved method for
modeling evacuations, it would offer no advancements .
Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach ( 1998) do depart from the flood-travel-evacuation
model in one important respect. The entire B.C. Hydro model rests on the assumption
that every member of Par evacuates on foot. Pr implicitly assumes an individual must be
toppled to perish, and that this in turn is a function of human stability when standing in a
flood. This is contrary to both intuition and history. When warning time is more than a
few minutes, many individuals choose to evacuate by automobile; when warning times
are so short that people do not expect to reach the hillside, they usually seek shelter inside
of buildings, especially when there is an upper floor or access to the roof (insight from
Appendix B). This leads to shortcomings five and six, below.
Fifth, fatalities involving occupants of automobiles constitute an important source
of deaths in flash floods and dam failures. To recognize this, the model would have to
include REsCAPE for motorists and the probability that each PARUNIT would seek to
evacuate by automobile. These probabilities would be specific to the circumstances of
each unit. Motorists that did not clear the flood zone would be subject to a
depth*velocity*PrRAPPED IN AN AUTOMOBILE*Ps1c relationship. If it were desired to calcul ate
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these types of relationships on the detailed level of LTD, HSD, and PT, the probabilities
would have to be specific to each type of vehicle and to each setting (truck, RV , bus,
compact, 4-wheel drive; off-road or on-road; bridge, intersection, elevated street, etc.).
All of the concerns expressed under the third shortcoming again come into play.
Sixth, while the B.C. Hydro model allows for people to be caught in buildings, it
assumes they attempt to evacuate as soon as they can. When people are caught in
buildings, the buildings are assumed to offer no shelter: the datum for flood depths
remains the ground (ELVrAR@UNIT(t) = ELVuNrr) and Ps1c is applied as if the
representative member ofPARUNIT is standing in the full force of the flow. There is no
mechanism for determining whether it is safe higher in the building, whether occupants
are likely to seek such havens rather than risking an open-water encounter, whether the
building walls diminish the depths and velocities, or whether a building remains standing
or is destroyed. Based on historical evidence, such considerations dominate life-loss
dynamics in many floods, making the depth*velocity dynamics among waders a
peripheral issue.
Seventh, in real floods PT depends not only on the severity of the flood, but on the
nature of the floodplain. Are there trees, telephone poles, rooftops, floating debris, or
other aspects that might provide sources of refuge until emergency help can offer rescue
ass istance? Although PT theoretically includes such considerations, Assaf, Hartford, and
Cattanach omitted such factors when making their preliminary estimates.
Eighth, the model currently has little empirical foundation, so there is no basis for
accepting it in favor of the empirical equations it attempts to replace.
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Ninth, the model is likely cost-prohibitive. Expensive research would be required
to estimate uncertain variables with the accuracy needed for the model. The modelers
also require analysts to confirm the elevation of every unit through site visits, presumably
though the use ofGPS equipment. If the cost of risk assessment surpasses the costs of
the most stringent, standards-based fixes, a life-loss model becomes mute.

Conclusions
Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach ( 1998) seek to improve confidence in life-loss
estimates by proposing a more detailed approach to analysis. Unfortunately, in seeking
greater detail without regard for historical trends or the reliability of key distributions, say
by refining the concepts surrounding evacuation as described above, the increased
complexity of the model is more likely to propagate errors and increase uncertainty than
to improve predictions, defeating the purpose for the model. It is likely, with the
mounting levels of uncertainty, that an application of the model to a portfolio of dams
must either sacrifice detail or consistency.

Graham and USBR Presently: DeKay and
McClelland 1993 and Graham 1998

As mentioned earlier, the recent practice of the U.S . Bureau of Reclamation was
to use DeKay and McClelland 's logit equation DM-2d in place of those by Brown and
Graham (U.S Bureau of Reclamation, 1989). The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has
recently started to use a new method developed by Graham ( 1999) that was not available
when this review was prepared.
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Tabular Comparison

The methods for estimating loss of life have evolved not only with respect to their
methodology and the level of detail considered important, but also with respect to the
variables considered most influential or useful. Table 8 attempts to provide an overview,
listing the variables identified by each set of authors, the ones they selected for use in
their models, and the ones used for secondary refinement following an initial estimate.
Since most of the models do not allow for subjective refinement, the latter category
applies only in limited cases. Graham ( 1998) has not proposed a new model, but he
continues to refine our understanding of the life-loss mechanisms, so key variables he has
identified in recent publications are listed in the final column.
A degree of interpretation was necessary in describing each variable since authors
often use different words to describe quite similar or identical concepts. It is also easy to
overlook a variable briefly mentioned by an author but omitted from his or her model.
Every effort has been made to be complete and accurate, but this list should be viewed as
a representative overview that has not been confirmed by the authors themselves.

Summarv: Major Existing Aporoaches to
Life Loss and Their Limitations

Stanford/FEMA model
(modified by the Institute
for Water Resources)
This approach uses an irregular grid to divide the inundation zone into
subpopulations based on land use, warning time, and depth of flooding. Individual

Tab le 8.

Predictive variables recognized as important by the authors of existing life-loss model s in dam safety
Brown and
Graham

McCann etal
• I = identified by the author(s), M = used
di rectly in lhe mode l, A= used to adj ust the

model estimation

Variable
dam/reservoir/breach sizes
inundation mapping
depth of flooding
velocity of flow
peak discharge
force exerted by flow
flood lethality

Ayyaswamy
et al. (1974)

I' M' A'

•
•
• •

Fried man

Petak and
Atk isson

( 1985)
Stanfo rd/

( 1975)

(1 982)

FEMA

I

M

•
• •

damage to structures

types of structures
floating debris
water temperatures

environmental conditions
adjusted for flash flood
Par
subPar by time of day
subPar by time of week or year
subPar by distance
subPar by depth
subPar by travel time
subPar by warning time
subPar by flood forcefulness
subPar by unit (residence, etc.)
a lerts
warning time

rate event threatens dam

• •
• •
• •

• •

A

I

M

• •
•
•
• •
• •
•

••
•

•

• •

•

A

I

M

A

Pate-Come\\

( 1988)

and Tagaras
( 1986)

( 1986. 1989)

I

M A

• •
• •
• •
•

••

• •
• • • •
• •
• • •
•• • •

•
•

• •

U.S.B.R

I

M

A

Lee et al.
( 1986)
Corps of
Engineers

I

• • •
•• •
• • •
• • •
•
• • •
• •• ••
•
• •
• ••
• •
•• •
•• •
•• •
•
•
•
• • •

• • •
• •

M

•
•
•

A

DeKay and
McClelland
( 1993b)
U.S.B.R

I

M

•

•
•
• •
•

A

Assaf,
Hanford, and
Cattanach

Graham

( 1998)
B.C. Hydro

U.S. B.R

I

M

• •
• •
• •

•

A

( 1998)

I

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• •
• •

••
• •
• •

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
••
•
••

••
• •

•
•
•

•

Table 8.

Continued
Brown and

• I = iden1ified by the aulhor(s}, M = used
directly in the model, A = used to adjust the
mode l estimation

Variable
monitoring capabilities
threat recognition time
decision process to warn
flood warning system
warning rate , extent, effect
prior awareness
psychological impress ions
personal mobilization time
vehicular travel time
queuing delay time
evacuation rate
rate of elevation gain
ease of evacuation
success of rescue attempts
convergence
topography
zoning
# of bridges crossing river
future development
urban vs. rural
demographics in floodplain
age
mobility
special facilities or groups
experience in floods/evacuation

Ayyaswamy
et al. (1974)

I* M* A*

Friedman
(1 975 )

I

M A

Petak and
Atkisson
( 1982)

I

M A

McCannet al
(1 985)
Stanford/
FEMA

I

M A

•

Graham
Pate-Cornell
and Tagaras
(1986)

I

M A

• •

•
•

• •

•

• •

•

• •
•
•

•

•
••

••
••

• •

(1 988)
U.S.B.R
( 1986. 1989)

I

M A

Lee et al .
(1 986)

Engineers

DeKay and
McClelland
(199Jb)
U.S.B.R

I M A

I

Corps of

• • •
•• •
•• •
• • • •
• • •
• • •
• • •
• •
•
•

• •
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

• •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
••
• •
••
• •

•
•
•
•
•

I

M A

I

••

•

••
••
••
• • •

M A

Assaf,
Hartford, and
Cauanach
Graham
(1998)
(1998)
B.C. Hydro U.S.B.R

•
• •
•
•
•

• •

• •
•
•
•
• •

•

•
•

• •

•

Table 8.

Continued
Brown and

McCann ct a1
• I = identified by the author(s), M = used
directly in the model, A = used to adjust the

Ayyaswamy

Friedman

model esti mation

eta!. ( 1974)

( 197 5)

Variable

I* M' A* I M A

Stanford/
FEMA

I M A

I M A

(198 5)

Pate-Cornell
and Tagaras
( 1986)

I M A

Graham
(1988)
U.S.D.R.
( 1986, 1989)

I

•
•
•

know-h ow
in fo rmation network s

fa mily di spersion
anitudes
fa lse alanns/misinfonn ation
availability of sensory clues
antecedent depths & ve locities
act ivities of Par

Petak and
Atkisson
( 1982)

•
•
L

M A

Lec et al
(1986)
Corps of

DeKay and
McClelland
( 199lb)

Assaf,
Hartford, and
Cattanach
( 1998)

Engineers

U.S.B.R.

B.C. Hydro

U.S.S.R.

I M A

I M A

I M A

I

• •
• •
••
••
• •

•

Graham
( 1998)

•
•

•
•
•
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structures are marked on a map. A fatality rate is then assigned to each unique
combination of depth, warning time, land use, warning effectiveness, and other variables.
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows:
1.

Rates of life loss must be subjectively estimated without an empirical basis.

2.

The number of life-loss rates that must be estimated is equal to the number of

uniquely defined subPar, which grows exponentially as more characterizing variables are
considered.
3.

Historically, life loss has not been primarily a function of depth in isolation

from velocities.

Brown and Graham CUSBR)
Empirically based life-loss equations are a function of the size of the population at
risk and a trichotomous division of warning time. Initial estimates can be adjusted based
on subjective considerations.
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows:
1.

Their trichotomous treatment of warning time risks subjective

oversimplification.
2.

The regression equations lack refinement.

3.

The equations are intended to be applied to subpopulations but were

developed using global populations. Since one of the three equations is nonlinear with
respect to population size, the resulting life-loss estimates may vary depending on how a
population is subdivided.
4.

These equations were based on only 23 flood events, each quite unique.
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5.

The equations can misestimate by a large margin, even within the origi nal

data set.

Lee and others (Corns of Engineers)
Using 47 flood events, Lee et al. (1986) developed a logit relationship in which a
logit transformation of the fraction of lives lost was regressed against the warning time,
the peak depth of the flood, and dichotomous treatments indicating whether or not the
population was urbanized and had experience with flooding.
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows:
I.

They treated the individual as the unit for regression, causing events with

large populations to dominate the resu lts.
2.

Some of the floods were slow-rising, widely dispersed events, atypical of

dam fai lures.
3.

Since subpopulations were not considered separately, the peak depth of

flooding did not pertain to most people in the flood.
4.

Current definitions of warning time do not describe the average warning

time, the extent to which a warning is propagated, the effectiveness of the message at
mobilizing a timely evacuation, informal types of warnings like sensory clues and shouts
from neighbors, or the time required to evacuate.
5.

Since the events were treated globally, and since the equations are nonlinear

with respect to population, estimates oflife loss will be different when summed over
subpopulations and will depend on how the global population is divided.
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6.

The equations can misestimate by a large margin, even within the original

data set.

DeKay and McClelland CUSBR)
After adding four new cases to the data set used by Brown and Graham (U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Dekay and McClelland (1993) developed a regression
equation using a logit transformation of the fraction of lives lost against the population at
risk, warning time, and a dichotomous description of high or low flood forcefulness.
Until recently, this was the most widely accepted and applied equation.
For shortcomings see Chapter IV and the last three shortcomings under Lee et al.
above.

B.C. Hydro (under development)
This model assigns a representative individual to every structure in the flood zone
based on census data and specifies the elevation of every structure and every unique path
of evacuation by foot. Using a computer algorithm and time steps, representative
individuals are tracked as they try to evacuate on foot until they either encounter the
flood or escape. If the flood overtakes them, probability distributions determine whether
or not they are toppled and, if toppled, whether or not they drown based on the depth and
velocity at each location. These probability distributions are incorporated using Monte
Carlo techniques and subsequently summed across the population.
Shortcomings can be summarized as follows:
I.

The model accounts only for deaths due to drowning.
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2.

People who do not have average physical capabilities (children, elderly,

disabled, etc.) do not have the same probability distributions as a representative
individual.
3.

The model assumes all deaths occur by toppling while fleeing on foot.

Mo~t

historical flood-related deaths do not fall in this category.
4.

The model does not allow for evacuation by automobile. Inclusion of this

component would only exacerbate other shortcomings of the model.
5.

Buildings are treated no differently than unsheltered areas in the open

floodplain , ignoring their critical historic role in providing shelter.
6.

The model currently ignores the benefits of trees and other refuges in the

floodplain.
7.

The model potentially propagates errors exponentially by multiplying highly

uncertain probability distributions and then summing across a large number of
individuals, progressively increasing bias.
8.

The model requires unobtainable details. One must have confidence in a

unique evacuation pathway and rate curve for every residence, toppling distributions for
every combination of depth and velocity, and drowning distributions for every flow
pattern downstream of someone who topples. Such statistics are currently unavailable,
cannot be duplicated in the laboratory, and are highly case-specific, varying with such
things as the warning time, warning effectiveness, sensory clues, terrain, ground cover,
turbulence, sediment load, debris load, and experience with evacuation. Moreover, the
dynamics of a catastrophic flood wave are highly unpredictable, especially away from the
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channel center, undermining the precision assumed for toppling and drowning
distributions.
9.

The model does not use historic rates of life loss to validate its results.

I 0. The model is cost prohibitive.

Global Insights from Historic Models

To date, a truly satisfying theoretical model has not been proposed. A consistent
level of refinement has been attempted in empirical models, but they have not yet reached
the point where they can be used to predict life loss with high levels of confidence.
The summary of major existing approaches, above, provides a good global
critique of current model shortcomings. As for contributions, every useful dam-failure
life-loss model addresses the following components:
I.

The probability of failure given assorted loadings. It is preferable to consider

every conceivable loading, breaking the loadings into ranges with similar consequences.
2.

Flood routing that yields credible estimates of travel times, depths, and

velocities. It is preferable if these can be approximated at every point and not merely as
large-scale averages.
3.

Quantification of Par. It is preferable to be able to subdivide this into subPar

with common attributes, describe the distribution of Par in the flood zone, and assign
different values to Par according to temporal variations in the time of day, week, and
year.
4.

Warning time. It is preferable if this accounts for the detailed chain of events

that must occur before a message can first be disseminated on a mass scale. It is also
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preferable if the analysis describes not only the difference in timing between the first
warning and the arrival of the flood, but also the rate of warning propagation, the extent
to which the warning penetrates a community, and the ability of the message to mobilize
an evacuation without causing panic.
5.

Evacuation. It is preferable to identify not only the number of people who

escape flooding based on the warning time, but where the remainder are located when the
flood arrives and whether or not those locations provide a degree of safety.
6.

Loss functions that describe the rate of life loss in every unit that has been

defined, whether this is on the level of Par, subPar, or locations within subPar. It is
preferable for these functions to be validated empirically so that they can be used with
confidence. Chapters IV and VII present desirable and undesirable characteristics of a
life-loss estimation model.
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CHAPTER IV
A DEEPER LOOK AT THE DEKAYMCCLELLAND MODEL

The DeKay-McClelland Equation

Equation DM-2d is popularly referred to as the DeKay-McClelland equation, or
the D-M equation, for short. It was first presented in Chapter lll using a combination of
symbols originally used by DeKay and McClelland (1991, 1993b) and symbols used in
Chapter V. In like manner, equations L-3b and L-3a, the logit transformation and the
inverse transformation, respectively, were introduced using symbols favored by DeKay
and McClelland (1991 , 1993b) or Lee et al. (1986). To avoid confusion and to prepare the
reader for the modeling ideas presented herein, symbols justified in Chapter V will now
be used exclusively.
Hence,

L(P) = (Transformation of P) =

p =

L=

exp(p)
I + exp(p)

=InC~ p)

P

= ln[
1

~~~

]

(L-3b)

Par

(L-3a)

I + exp(- p)

Par

I +exp(2 .586 + 0.440 ln(Par) + 0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Fd) + 2.223(Wt)(Fd)j

(DM-2d)
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where P
L

=proportion of lives lost= L!Par,
=number of lives lost,

Par = population at risk,
Wt = warning time, and
Fd =dichotomous forcefulness (0 or I, with Fd = I meaning that 15-20% of the
buildings in the flood zone receives major damage or is destroyed).

A comparison of approaches
Table 5 presents the data set used by DeKay and McClelland in 1993 after they
updated the variable estimates supplied by Brown and Graham (1988). Columns 7, 8 and
9 contain the life loss predicted using equations DM-2d, DM-3b, and DM-4, respective ly
(see Chapter III). Most of the remaining data come from DeKay and McClelland ( J993b.
Table I, p. 197). As a reminder, equation DM-2d is the equation DeKay and McCle ll and
( 1993b) offered to compute life loss-their final equation based on a logit transformati on
(equation L-3b). Equation DM-3b was the best equation DeKay and McClelland ( 1991 )
could develop using least-squares linear regression techniques without using a logit
transformation. They produced the equation in 1991 before the case values were updated
and before they added the final four events to the data set. Equation DM-4 was the best
equation DeKay and McClelland (1991) could develop without using a logit
transformation and while limiting themselves to the two independent variables used by
Brown and Graham ( 1988)-population at risk and warning time. It was also developed
using the truncated 1991 data set. The final column is the average of columns 7 and 8.
The purpose of including the final three columns is to assess the relative benefits
of using a logit transformation. The root mean square error (RMSE) for each equation is
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reported at the bottom of the table. As can be seen, even though equation DM-2d is the
only equation based on this exact set of data, its RMSE is little better than that for
equation DM-3b. A casual perusal of the individual estimates also makes the equations
appear comparable. Clearly the poorest equation is equation DM-4, indicating that Force
is an important concept to include in an equation. The conclusion is that the logit
transformation offers little inherent benefit apart from constraining P to fall between 0
and 1.0, the primary purpose for which it was chosen (DeKay and McClelland, 1991 ,
1993b).

Duplication of results
As an exercise, a logit regression was performed on the data set in Table 5 using
Excel. As expected, the same equation was obtained as was reported by DeKay and
McClelland (1993b). A derivation of the equation DM-2d is presented later in this
chapter.

Implications of the oredicted
life-loss curves
To understand the trends in life loss predicted by equation DM-2d, it is helpful to
graph P against Par for Fd = I (Figure 3) and Fd = 0 (Figure 4) while holding Wt
constant. Graphing P against Wt while holding Par and Fd constant produces a second set
of graphs (Figure 5 and Figure 6).

P as a function of Par
Considering the figures sequentially, Figure 3 demonstrates a sharp nonlinearity
of P with respect to the size of Par at any given value for Wt, especially when Par is less
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than 100. Figure 4 demonstrates the same pattern when Fd = 0, only with less than onetenth the life loss. Conceptually, these curves suggest one or more implications:
I.

Warnings are disseminated more effectively when Par is large (unlikely,

since small Par are often clustered closely together and for a large Par it takes more time
to knock on more doors).
2.

Evacuation is more efficient when Par is large (unlikely, since small Par tend

to be closer to the hillside and do not need to worry about traffic congestion).

3.

The effectiveness of rescue efforts is proportionally superior in larger

population centers (true, but not a dominant historical factor, as noted in Chapter VI).
4.

Large Par tend to include areas that are either more distant from the river or

more distant from the dam than small Par with the same Fd value, resulting in longer
average warning times for a given initial warning time and lower average levels of flood
forcefulness that are masked by the dichotomous treatment of Fd. This frequently takes
the form of a relatively wide floodplain, where inundation is shallow and velocities are
smaller, located some distance from a dam up a canyon.
Based on this analysis, the last reason appears the most reasonable and bears
greater scrutiny. Essentially, it claims that the shape of the curves follows from
limitations in the variables rather than from any inherent property of Par size. If a Par is
small-a house, a campground, or a small canyon community-two things are likely to
be true. First, the hillsides are likely to form a steep, narrow valley causing the general
level of flood forcefulness to trend toward destruction over mere damage and toward the
upper limits of Fd = 0 or Fd = I. Second, the warning time is likely to closely
approximate the average warning time (Wtavg). If a Par is large-a series of small
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communities over many miles of narrow valley or a larger city subject to dispersed
flooding across flat terrain-and the warning is disseminated more rapidly than the
flood ' s rate of travel, opposite trends are likely from those above. Wtavg will be notably
greater than Wt, a higher percentage of buildings will escape destruction than for small
Par, and flood forcefulness will trend toward the lower limits ofFd = 0 or Fd = I.
The significance of these insights should not be underestimated. Among those
events used to develop equation DM-2d, only the Teton failure was divided into subPar,
and these subPar were still not very homogenous. In light of the extreme nonlinearity in P
vs. Par and the method underlying development of the equation, DeKay and McClelland
( 1993b) cautioned that their equation should not be applied on a subPar basis (see
Chapter lll).
A simple illustration will demonstrate why. Assume that a dam at the head of
long, narrow valley fails , destroys phone cables, prevents word from getting out for
nearly an hour, and blocks access to the upper two-thirds of the valley. Wt = 0 minutes,
Fd = 1, Par= I ,000 across six small communities in I 0 miles, and L = ISO. Deaths are
concentrated in the first 3 miles because passing motorists and sensory clues propagate
informal warnings down the valley, making Wtavg > 0 minutes. Also, virtually every
structure is destroyed in the first 3 miles, a larger percentage of structures are subject to
only major damage in the center of the valley, and the wave has attenuated to a 100-year
flood in the wider tail of the valley, causing widespread but minor damage s. According to
Figure 3 and equation DM-2d, P = 0.138 and L = 138 as long as at least 15-20% of the
people live in houses that are destroyed or experience major damage and the centroid of
Par is above the lowest third of the valley.
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Now let us treat the six small towns as separate subPar, assuming Wt = 0 for the
first four communities that are inaccessible, but Wt = l hr and 2 hr for the final two
communities moving downstream. Fd = l for the first four communities and Fd = 0 for
the last two.
l.

If the size of the communities, moving downstream, are Par 1 = 25, Par2 = 75,

Par3 = 450, Par4 = 50, Pars= 200, and Par6 = 200, then L = 139.
2.

If, instead, Par 1 =50, Parz = I 00, Par3 = 350, Par4 = 150, Pars = 150, and Par6

= 200 , then L = 16 1.
3.

If, instead, Par 1 = 200, Parz = 200, Par1 = 450, Par4 = I 00, Pars= 25 , and Par6

=25, thenL =2 12.
4.

If every two communities were treated as a subPar, then life loss in the final

example would beL = 172.
5.

If every town in the final example were divided exactly in half based on

upstream and downstream neighborhoods, then the 12 subPar would yield L = 266.
6.

If the subPar were estimated based on each residence in the final example,

life loss would approach 700.
7.

If Par barely qualifies for Fd = l because 75% of the residents live

downstream where damages are uniformly minor, then one distribution might be Par 1 =
50, Par2 = l 00, Par3 = 50, Par4 = 50, Pars= 500, and Par6 = 250, resulting in L = 88.
8.

If this final redistribution is analyzed as a single, global Par, the greater

damage upstream still results in Fd = I, but based on the distribution of Par, Wt = l hr,
resulting in L = 8.
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This example is telling. Depending on the size of the units to which equation DM2d is applied and the distribution of the population, the predicted value of L can range
from about 8 to about 700, or 0.8% to 70% of Par. Given the third distribution of Par
presented above, the estimate ofL can range from 138 to 700 (14% to 70% of Par),
depending exclusively on how an analyst chooses to group Par into subPar. In the final
distribution, the estimate of life loss was increased I I fold simply by dividing Par into 6
subPar.
As these examples illustrate, the estimate of L will increase dramatically as Par is
broken into smaller subPar, and L will change with identical numbers of subPar
depending on how the analyst groups the population. The impact of these changes varies
depending on the size of Par, on the size of the subPar, and on the impact any divisions
have on the various Wt; and Fd;. It follows that it is impossible to stipulate a standardized
use of subPar that impacts every dam in a portfolio in a consistent manner; and for a
single dam, estimates can clearly be grossly inaccurate.
Moreover, the equation itself cannot be used with confidence on events that do
not closely resemble the dominant patterns in the original data set. Returning to our
original example, equation DM-2d will estimate L = 138 when it is applied to a 1000member subPar with Wt = 0 and Fd = I. But what if, instead of six villages spread over
I 0 miles, there was a single town immediately below the dam? What if every structure
was instantly destroyed, with no major damages and no minor damages? Would life loss
still be 138, or would it approach 1000? Historic failures like the ones at Vaiont Dam and
the Stava Dams in Italy demonstrate the latter.
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DeKay and McClelland (1993b) recognized these shortcomings and suggested
that Par should not be divided unless population centers are dramatically different, and
then no more than 2 subPar should be adopted. They also cautioned that the equation
should not be applied to situations without representation in the data set.
Returning to the initial assertion that the problem with non-linearity is an artifact
of the way the variables for Wt and Fd are defined, a model that defines subPar
homogeneously with respect to concepts of warning and flood forcefulness would avoid
these problems. If so, such a model could be applied to any size of subPar the analyst
found convenient and to any type of failure for which representative subPar existed in the
data set. This has been attempted in Chapter VII.

P as a function of Wt
Figure 5 and Figure 6 demonstrate that equation DM-2d produces a relationship in
which Pis also nonlinear with respect to Wt for any given size of Par and a fixed value
for Fd. The figures are nearly identical except that the proportion of lives lost is an order
of magnitude higher when Fd = I.
The general pattern shown in these graphs makes sense. Rates of life loss will
follow the rates at which people are trapped by the flood . This rate drops as people
successfully evacuate. Evacuation rates will generally begin in a semi-linear fashion and
then decrease with time since those who remain are those who find evacuation most
difficult.
Historically, there are often a few stragglers who refuse to evacuate, so it is
appropriate that the curves converge slowly toward 0 (see Chapter VI). However, it is
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likely that the curves generated by equation DM-2d converge toward 0 too slowly. The
basis for this assertion is historical research and recognition that DeKay and McClelland
did not quantify Wt with high precision.
As recorded in the fourth column of Table 5, Brown and Graham (1988)
estimated Wt using half hour increments or larger ranges. These estimates were
necessarily vague based on the sparseness of the historical record and the difficulty in
representing Wt for spatially diverse Par. For this reason, Brown and Graham chose
regression equations based on only three increments of Wt. DeKay and McClelland
( 1993a) modified some values of Wt based on their own research, but for the most part
they mechanically subdivided the ranges provided by Brown and Graham so they could
treat Wt as a continuous variable. When Wt was reported as less than a certain number
(Wt < I hr), they divided the upper limit in half; when only a lower limit was reported
(Wt > 2 hr), they added 50% to that lower bound; and when a range was reported, they
chose the midpoint of the range.
An attempt has been made during the current research to refine estimates of
warning time, including the average warning time (Wtavg), the warning provided by
sensory clues (Sc), and more precise estimates ofWt. The results are presented in
Chapters VI and VII and in Appendix C.

Comparing P as a function of
Wt for Fd = 0 and Fd = I
Figure 7 reminds us to distinguish between a model and the real-life situations it
is attempting to predict. When Wt exceeds about l. 7 hr, equation DM-2d predicts lower
rates of life loss when the flooding is more severe (Fd = 1) than when it is less severe (Fd
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0). However, the differences are minor and both curves converge to essentially the

same values. If viewed from this perspective, the model implies that after 1.7 hr,
evacuation approaches a standstill and fatalities occur among the holdouts, through
convergence, or due to unusual circumstances that are largely unrelated to flood
forcefulness.

Confidence intervals
Michael DeKay computed 95% confidence intervals for each of the data points
the equation produces when applied to the underlying data set. These were reported by
the ANCOLD Working Group on Risk Assessment (Australian National Committee on
Large Dams, 1998) and are presented in columns 6 and 8 of Table 9. Figures 8, 9, and
Figure I 0 present the intervals graphically according to the size of each range. As can be
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Table 9.

Table of flood wave events underlying equation DM-2d, variable values,
historic life loss, estimated life loss using equation DM-2d, and 95%
confidence intervals for each estimate (Australian National Committee on
Large Dams, 1998)
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seen, the intervals are extremely large and often exceed I 0 times the size of the life-loss
estimate itself.
These confidence intervals suggest that the predictive authority of equation DM2d is small. In most cases, the true mean life loss for a given event has a 95% chance of
falling anywhere between about 0 and a value 10-20 times greater than the estimate
produced by the equation. The sensitivity ofP to the size of the range is greatest when Fd
=

l ; i.e., when life loss is typically of greatest concern. Clearly, a model with smaller

confidence limits would be desirable, but in the absence of such a model , it may be
preferable to express the expected value from the DeKay-McClelland equation as a
range, or as a probability distribution, rather than as a point estimate.
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Implications of the DeKay-McClelland
Logit Transformation

Derivation

It is helpful to review and expand upon the derivation of equation DM-2d in
Chapter III. The linear form underlying this equation is

L(P)

= In(_!_)= a + bln(Par)+c(Wt) +d(Fd) +e(Wt)(Fd)

(DM-2)

1-P

Following a standard least squares regression on the data set used in 1993 and fitting
equation DM-2 with the resulting coefficients produces equation DM-2a.

L(P)

= In(_!_)= -2.586- 0.4401n(Par)- 0.759(Wt) + 3.790(Fd)- 2.223(Wt)(Fd) (DM-2a)
1- P

To isolate P, one can take the exponent of both sides,

-

p

1-P

= exp[-

2.586- 0.4401n(Par) -

0.759(Wt) + 3.790(Fd)- 2.223(Wt)(Fd)]

multiply both sides by 1-P, isolate terms with P on one side of the equation, and factor
out P to yield equation DM-2b:

P= L
Par

exp[- 2.586-0.440 ln(Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)] (DM-2b)
I+ exp[- 2.586-0.440 In( Par)- 0. 759(Wt) + 3.790(Force)- 2.223(Wt)(Force)]
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Recognizing that

DM-2b reduces to

L

Par

I
I + exp(2.586 + 0.440 1n(Par) + 0.759(Wt) - 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)]

Isolating L leads to equation DM-2c

L

Par

I+ exp(2.586 + 0.440 In( Par) + 0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)]

(DM-2c)

This equation can then be modified by pulling the first two terms in the exponent out
front as (e2586 )(e 0·4401" (Par)) and simplifying to yield the final equation DM-2d.

L=

Par
(DM-2d)
I+ 13.277(Par0 440 )exp[0.759(Wt)- 3.790(Force) + 2.223(Wt)(Force)]

Logistic regression

Targeting L(P), not P or L
1

While the DeKay-McClelland equation has a R2 value of0.840 (DeKay and
McClelland, 1993 b), it is important to remember that this value measures the fraction of
the variability explained by the regression equation for the transformed variable,

1

The R2 value for the corresponding regression equation derived using the shorter, unmodified

1991 data set was: 0.9357 (DeKay and McClelland, 1991).

120
L(P) =In(_!_)

1-P

(L -3b)

where P = L!Par. This R2 does not address the ability of the equation to predict life loss
itself or the proportion of lives lost. The implications are important because during
regression, as Par grows, the equation can overestimate or underestimate the loss of life
by ever greater amounts with minimal impact on the final choice of equation coefficients.
To explain this, pretend for a moment that the left-hand side of equation DM-2 is
P instead of L(P). During the least-squares analysis, it is not the absolute magnitude of
life loss that is considered but the ratio of life loss to population at risk. The regression
algorithm seeks to minimize the sum of the squares of the residuals, which are here
defined as the difference between the ratio L/Par predicted by the equation and the true
value in the data set. A large residual in terms of L might be a very small residual in
terms of P if Par is large. When comparing two cases, it is possible for one to have a
smaller residual with respect to P while having a much larger residual in terms of L,
shifting the resulting predicted value in the opposite direction than it would go if L were
the dependent variable.
Using an example from the data set, consider the two cases presented in Table 10.
Bear Wallow Dam had Par= 8 and L = 4, resulting in P = 0.5. Equation DM-2d predicts
a loss of life of 4.574, resulting in P = 0.572. The residual in terms of L is 0.574 and the
residual in terms ofP is 0.072. Now consider the Big Thompson flash flood . Par was
considered 2,500, the actual L = 144, and the predicted L =59. The actual and predicted
P-values are 0.0576 and 0.0236, respectively, producing a P-residual of -0.034. Ignoring
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Table 10.

An example of the effect of using the ratio Pas the dependent variable in the
regression equation in place of L when one Par is large and another is small

Actual Estimated
Failure Event
Par
L
L
Bear Wallow
8
4
4.574
Big
2500
144
59
Thompson
By what percent does the abso lute value of
the larger differ from the absolute value of
the smaller?

Residual Using P
4.574/8-4/8 - 0.072
59/2500-144/2500 =
-0.034
112%

Residual
Using L
0.574
-85
14,700%

the sign of the terms, the residual based on Pis actually better than that for Bear Wallow
by about half (0.034 vs. 0.072), but the residual for Lis 85, or nearly !50 times that for
Bear Wallow (85 vs. 0.574).
The actual regression dynamics are more complicated than this because the left
side of equation DM-2 is not P but a transformation or function of P. This can potentially
make the residual s with respect to L even less important.
Consider two Par of comparable size presented in Table II. On paper, the failures
of Lee Lake Dam and the connected dams at Stava were quite similar in the sense that Wt
=

0 and Fd = I for both of them and their Par values were close enough for the nonlinear

effects in Figure 3 to be relatively small. In reality, however, the failure at Stava was one
of the worst dam disasters on record while the failure at Lee Lake was unexceptional
among floods with life loss. Hence, the actual loss of life in each case was very different
from the predicted value and in opposite directions.
What is important is the impact of choosing L(P) instead of P or L as the
dependent variable. In order to minimize the sum of squared residuals, the regression
algorithm seeks to balance high and low misestimates in a way that the majority of their
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Table 11 .

An example of the effect of using the ratio Pas the dependent variable in the
regression equation in place of L when Par are comparable, but L have
different orders of magnitude

Actual Estimated
L
Failure Event
Par
L
80
2
26
Lee Lake Dam
270
64
300
Stava Dams
By what percent does the absolute value of the larger
differ from the absolute value of the smaller?

p

L(P)
Residual
-2.933
-3.503

Residual
0.30
-0.69

L
Residual
24
-206

19%

130%

758%

absolute values tend to cluster in the same range. As indicated in the last row of Table 11 ,
this has been accomplished with respect to the dependent transfonnation, L(P). The
residuals differ in magnitude by only 19%. However, this is at the expense of balance in
P, which differs by 130%, and almost total disregard for the values ofL, with one
residual being 7.58 times larger than the other. As a consequence, rather than a true
difference of268 fatalities between the events, the equation predicts a difference of only
38 without sacrificing a high R2 value in the transformed domain.

Basis for error in ranking risk
within a portfolio of dams
The logit transformation will be explored in more detail shortly, but for now it
should be noted that the biases generated by the form of equation DM-2 have serious
ramifications for dam safety risk analysis. The cost to save a (statistical) life is the
difference between the annualized cost of a safety remediation measure and the
annualized economic benefit of risk reduction to property, divided by the incremental
reduction in the annualized risk of life loss brought about by the safety remediation. As
such, it is a measure of the cost-effectiveness of a risk-reduction alternative that can be
used to prioritize remedial measures across a portfolio of dams. Assume for a moment
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that the Stava Dams and Lee Lake Dam had equal probabilities of failure and that the cost
of remedial measures and economic risk reduction to prevent these failures would have
been identical. Furthermore, ignore for a moment alternative failure scenarios and safety
measures to reduce life loss during a failure event, such as early warning systems and
emergency action plans. Under these constraints, the comparative cost to save a life
between these two dams would have depended solely on the number of fatalities expected
from each failure. Based on the logit model as illustrated in Table 11 , the dams at Stava
might have been prioritized for safety improvement just ahead of Lee Lake Dam within a
portfolio of dams: only 2.5 times as many people would have been expected to die at
Stava, rather than the 135 times as many that actually perished.
One can take this a step further and consider the more realistic case where the
probability of failure is different for each dam in a portfolio. If the Stava dams had a
probability of failure of2* 1o- 5 per year, and Lee Lake Dam was just slightly more likely
to fail at 6* I o- 5 per year, their respective annualized life-loss risks would be:
Stava dams: (2*10- 5/year)•(64lives) = 0.00128lives/year
Lee Lake Dam: (6•J0- 5/year)•(26lives) = 0.00156lives/year.
Such levels of annualized life-loss risk are generally considered 'unacceptable, but Lee
Lake would be concluded to have a higher annualized life loss than Stava even though
the true annualized life-loss risk was 45 times greater, as indicated below:
Stava dams : (2•I0. 5/year)•(270 lives)= 0.0054lives/year
Lee Lake Dam: (6* 10"5/year)•(2lives) = 0.00012 lives/year.
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To show that this is not an isolated danger, consider the Shadyside 2 flash flo od in
1990. As for the Stava dams and Lee Lake Dam, Wt = 0 and Fd = 1. With a Par three
times larger than at Stava (Par= 884), the predicted life loss at Shadyside rises to 127,
but L was actually only 24. With an L-residnal over 100, this is the largest overestimation
in the data set. Treating Shadyside as a dam failure, the probability of fai lure at the Stava
dams would have to be twice as great as for Shadyside before Stava would get ranked as
an equal hazard . Given twice the annualized life-loss risk of failure, the true historical
annualized life-loss risk at Stava would have been 2,250% greater than at Shadyside:
(2 *270/24)* 100%.
Significantly, given eq ual probabilities of failure , Shadyside would also be ranked
ahead of the Buffalo Creek coal waste dam failure, the Big Thompson flash flood , and
the Vega de Tera Dam failure in terms of annualized life-loss risk. In each case, the true
historical annualized life-loss risk for these events was an order of magnitude greater than
at Shadyside. The five cases under discussion are summarized in Table 12, where they
have been ranked in ascending order based on predicted annualized life-loss risks. The
relative historical annualized life-loss risks are presented in column 5, where the
annualized risk under equal probability of failure is given as a percentage of the dam
perceived to be most at risk.3 Notice that the true annualized life-loss risk of the fifthranked dam would be 6 times greater than that of the first-ranked dam. The annualized
risk for the fourth-ranked dam would be more than 11 times greater. Par is shown in the

2
There we re actually flash fl oods on three watersheds that caused loss of life. Two of the ri versPipes Creek and Wegee Creek near the town of Shadyside, Ohio--were combined by DeKay and
McClelland !993a into a single event with a single Par.

3

In this case, a flash fl ood.
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Table 12.

Selective comparison of perceived annualized risk based on estimated L and
true annualized risk based on historical L

Failure Event
Shadyside
Vega de Tera
Buffalo Creek
Stava
Big Thompson

Rank
I
2
3
4
5

Estimated
L
127
89
87
64
59

Actual
L
24
150
125
270
144

Historical
Armualized Risk
Given Equal
Likelihood of Dam
Failure Compared
to Top Ranked
100%
625%
521%
1,125%
600%

Residual
Using L
103
-61
-38
-206
-85

Par
884
500
5.000
300
2.500

final column to demonstrate that this danger holds across the spectrum of population
sizes.

Bias due to the nonlinearity of
L(P) with respect to P and L
Now that the importance of the form of the regression has been demonstrated, the
mechanics of the logit transformation should be explored. Figures II and 12 illustrate the
general behavior of the function L(P); ln[P/(1-P)].
As illustrated in Figure II, the function L(P); ln[P/(1-P)] is synunetric about 0.0.
approaching

-<Xl

as P approaches 0 and

<XJ

as P approaches 1. This logaritlunic shape

grows rapidly in the tails with the result that a very small change in P will result in a very
large change in the residual,

L(Pest ima~ed)-L(Phiswric) ,

when Pis very small or very large.

This is demonstrated in the relatively parabolic shape to the curve in Figure 12. There,
the residuals of the transformations L(P 2)-L(P 1) are graphed against the midpoint of
uniform increments ofP 2-P 1• The arms increase arbitrarily fast depending on the size of
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the ?-increment chosen, but for a given increment, the rate of increase steadily increases
nearer P = 0 and P = I. Thus, events for which the ratio L/Par is very small or very large
dominate the the regression as the algorithm seeks to minimize the sum of the squared
residuals. The result is a biased regression equation.
Consider two data points with Par of I ,000. Event A had L = 2, P = 0.002, and
L(P)

= -6.2126; Event B had L = 150, P = 0.150, and L(P) = -I. 7346. Now let us say the

regression equation predicts L = I for Event A, resulting in P = 0.001 and L(P)

= -6.9067.

Thus, the residual for Event A, based on L(P), is -0.694.
Now the regression algorithm seeks to "balance" residuals-allowing some to
grow in order to reduce others- to minimize the sum of their squares. In the name of
balance, what predicted L value will yield the same residual of 0.694 for the second event
with P = 0.15? There are two options, since squared residuals are insensitive to sign. It
can underestimate the life loss by 69 or it can overestimate life loss by Ill : L = 81 and L
=

261. Both yield logit residuals with absolute values of 0.694.
Of course, it is unlikely that exactly balancing these two residuals will minimize

the sum of squares from a larger data set, but notice two things. First, an underestimate in
L of 69 has the same effect on the L(P)-residual as an overestimate of Ill . As illustrated
in Figure 12, for a given change in L(P), one will always have a larger change in P when
moving toward P = 0.5 than when moving toward P = 0 or P = I. This becomes more
pronounced the closer P comes to 0 or I. Hence, L = 3.99 also yields a residual of0.694
for Event A, even though it is twice as far removed from L = 2 as L = 1.00 is from L = 2.
Second, the variance in L balloons asP approaches 0.5. The range I < L < 4 for
Event A is bounded by the same residuals as is 81 < L < 261 for Event B.
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Contrary to the independence of a single data point, when a data set is dominated
by values that fall on one side of 0.5 or the other, prediction of P-values between 0.5 and
this dominant set will tend to be skewed in the direction of the set. The reason for this is
that near 0 or l , a small error in P produces a very large error in L(P). Thus, to minimize
the overall deviations in L(P), the regression algorithm biases the equation to predict the
most extreme values ofP the most accurately, even if this requires skewing less extreme
estimates in the direction of the most extreme values. The extreme values, in tum, will
tend to skew toward 0.5, although these deviations will be small.
lt is important to remember that "extreme values" near 0 or l and " less extreme"

values closer to 0.5 are relative concepts: lt is their relative magnitudes that matter, not
their absolute magnitudes. Also, the magnitude of L matters only as it relates to Par
through P.
Consider events number l , 16, and 27 in Table 13. Bushy Hill Pond Dam had Par

= 400 and L = 0. Because the log of 0 is undefined, by convention L is set equal to 0.5
and P = l /(2*Par). In this case, P = 0.0013 and equation DM-2d estimates L = 0.32,
resulting in P = 0.0008 and an L(P)-residual of 0.44.
In contrast to this excellent estimate of L, equation DM-2d underestimates L by
71 people for the Black Hills flash flood. Nevertheless, the L(P)-residual is actually
smaller in this case (0.35) because the P-values are an order of magnitude larger (Phistoric =
0.014, Ppredicted = 0.010). The absolute magnitude of the P-values is still small-despite
the fact that this event had the third largest life loss in the data set-because Par is very
large ( 17,000).

Table 13.

DeKay's and McClelland's data set, arranged in ascending order of historical L (adapted from DeKay and McClelland,
1993b, Table I, p. 197)
I

2

4
Actual L
When

When
Predicted
Event Locations

Pa<

s

3
Actual L

High

6

7

8

9

Predicted Loss

Predicted

Actual Loss

of Life

Low

of Life

(Rounded)

•Residuals

Predicted L

Residuals
Using L

Using L(P)=
ln[P/(I·P)J

I

Bushy Hill Pond Dam, CT, 1982

400

0

0

0

Eq. DM·2d
0.3

2

Centralia, WA, 1991

ISO

0

I

1.2

1.2

0.91

3

100

0

0

0.003

0.0

-5 01

4

Prospect Dam, CO, 1980
Denver, CO, 1965 (South Plane River)

0
0
I

1.2

0.2

0.17

D.M.A.D. Dam, UT, 1983

0

0.018

-1.0

-4.04

6

Little Deer Creek Dam, UT, 1963

50

I
I
I

I

s

I

0.7

-0.3

-0.42

7

Lee Lake Dam, MA, 1968

80

2

2

26

26.1

24. 1

2.94

8

25,000

2

2

2

2.2

0.2

0 .11

5,000

3

3

5

6.1

3.1

0 .70

8

4

4

s

4 .6

0.6

0.29

4

4

3.8

-0.2

-0.06
0.56
-0.52

9

Northern NJ, 1984
Lawn Lake Dam, CO, 1982

10

Bear Wallow Dam, NC, 1976

10,000

I
I

500

II

Teton Dam, 10, 1976 (Rexburg to American Falls)

12

Baldwin Hills Dam, CA, 1963

13
14

Mohegan Park Dam, CT, 1963
Teton Dam, to, 1976 (Dam through Wilford)

2,000

IS

Allegheny County, PA, 1986

2,200

23,000
16,500

4

-0.44

5

9

8.7

3.7

6

6

4

3.6

-2.4

7

25

24.8

17.8

1.27

9

9

6

5.6

-3.4

-0.48

5

1,000

0.3

7

16

Kansas River, KS, 1951

58,000

II

II

0

0.2

-10.8

-4 .00

17

Austin, TX, 1981

1,180

13

13

9

8.8

-4.2

-0.39

18

2,380

20

20

57

57.0

37.0

106

884

24

24

127

127.4

103.4

1.80

2,070

25

25

25

25.3

0.3

0.01

22

Kansas City, MO, 1977
Shadyside, OH, 1990
Texas Hill Country, 1978
Swift and [Lower] Two Medicine Dams, MT, 1964
Kelley Barnes Dam, GA, 1977

23

Laurel Run Dam, PA, 1977

24

Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam, WV, 1972
Big Thompson, CO, 1976

19
20
21

25
26
27

Vega De Tera Dam, Spain, 1959
Black Hills, SO, 1972

250

28

28

8

7.6

-20.4

-1.39

250

39

39

31

30.6

-8.4

-0.28

40

40

40.3

0.3

0.01

87

86.9

-38.1

-0.37

150

40

5,000

125

125

2,500

144

144

59

58.6

-85.4

-0.93

500

150

ISO

89

89.0

-61.0

-0.68

17,000

245

245

174

173.8

-71.2

-0.35

Table 13 .

Continued

Event Locations
28

Stava Dam, Italy, 1985

29

Malpasset Dam, France, 1959

• P - I/(2•Par) if deaths"' 0 (Dekay and McClelland, 1991)

Par
300
6,000

Actual L
When
Predicted
High

Actual L
When
Predicted Loss
Predicted
AciUal Loss
of life
Low
of Life
(Rounded)
270
270
64
421

• Residuals

64.0

Residuals
UsingL
-206.0

Using L(P)=
ln[P/(1-P)]
·3.50

405 .7

·15.3

-0.04

Arithmetic Mean L· Residual for L > 120:-

-79.5

Arithmetic Mean L-Rcsidual for L > 25: -

-56 .2

Arithmetic Mean L-Rcsidual for L <- 25:-

8.5

421

406

Predicted L
Eq. DM-2d

Arithmetic Mean L-Rcsidual for L < 10

2.2

Mean overestimation ofL:-

13.7

Mean underestimation ofL:-

-35.2

w

0

13 1

If P were a less extreme value near 0.5, L would be allowed to vary even more.
Specifically, ifL = 8,500 while Par= 17,000, such that P = 0.5. L could be estimated
anywhere between 6,660 and I 0,340 without exceeding the L(P)-residual of 0.44 for
Bushy Hill Pond. More to the point, the algorithm treats a life-loss range of 0.32-0.78
when Par= 400 and L = 0.5 as equivalent to a life-loss range of 6,660-10,3 40 when Par =
I 7.000 and L = 8,500: The L(P)-residual for every endpoint has magnitude 0.44.
By contrast, when Par is very large and L is small such that Pis very small , the
L(P)-residuals grow rapidly with small changes in L. Equation DM-2d underestimates
life loss for the Kansas River flood by less than II fatalities . However, a very large Par
(58,000) combined with a small number of deaths (II, estimated at 0.2) produces very
small values for P (Ph;stodc = 0.000189, Ppredkted = 0.000003). The L(P) residual in this
case is 4.00, more than 5 times greater than for Bushy Hill and the Black Hills combined.
To emphasize the previous points, the smaller P becomes, the more likely L will
be overestimated. For Kansas River with Par = 58,000, L = II , and P = 0.00019, the
ranges 0.2-11 and 11-594 are both bounded by an L(P)-residual of 4.00. Also, asP
becomes smaller, the regression algorithm tolerates less and less deviation in L. At P =
0.000 I 9 and an L(P)-residual :5 4.00, Kansas River allows 0.2 < L < 594, or a spread of
nearly 600. Under identical conditions except P = 0.5, Kansas River would allow 1.043 <
L < 56,956, or a spread of nearly 56,000.

Bias due to trends in the data set
Considering the values in Table 5, P-values are generally less than 0.5 (o nl y Stava
Dam has a P-value greater), dan1 failures with low life loss tend to have very low P-
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values, and failures with large L-values tend to have P-values relatively closer to 0.5.
Thus, based on the reasoning above, one would expect equation DM-2d to predict events
with small L-values fairly accurately but with a bias towards overestimation. Events with
L-values in the midrange might defy an easy trend, but events with large L-values would
most likely show a clear trend toward dramatic underestimation.
One might also expect equation DM-2d to predict P more accurately when Par is
large than when Par is small. This follows from the tendency in the data set for large Par
to have the smallest values for P- the basis for the nonlinearity displayed in Figure 3 and
Figure 4. This also leads to a tendency to put the greatest weight on those events that are
least hazardous (large Par and small expected life loss). As such, equation DM-2d is least
credible when applied to high-hazard events or to small Par, either of which is likely to
produce relatively large values for P.
Not surprisingly, all of this describes the pattern reflected in the residuals with
respect to Lin the data set. Indeed, without undergoing a rigorous analysis of variance
(AN OVA), clear trends are readily apparent from a perusal of Table 13. The events are
sorted in ascending order by the number of lives that were lost, as shown in column 5.
Columns 3 and 4 duplicate these values, but column 3 lists only those events for which
the equation ' s estimates are high (P moves toward 0.5), and column 4lists only those
events for whi ch the equation' s estimates are low (P skews toward the most extreme
values). Co lumns 6 and 7 list the estimates for L produced by equation DM-2d. Columns
8 and 9 present the residuals with respect to Land L(P), respectively. Various footnotes
and mean values are found at the bottom of the table.
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Columns 5, 7, and 8 indicate that prediction levels generally fall within a few
lives of the true value when historic fatality rates were less than I 0 4 Of the 15
predictions in this range 67% are overestimates, skewing P toward 0.5. Of the 12 flood s
with L s; 5, 75% are overestimated. The magnitude of prediction error in these ranges is
small--often indiscernible after rounding . The arithmetic average error is 2.2 over the 15
cases that comprise the lower half the data set with respect to histori c life loss.
Predictions for floods with L = I 0-40 show a fair bit of scatter. There are eight
floods in this range. L is overestimated for half and underestimated for hal f, though the
magnitudes of the over-predictions dominate. Unlike failures with L below I 0, in this
mid-range the L-residuals are characterized by large variance . While the arithmetic mean
L residual is 8.8, the average absolute magnitude of the residual (ignoring signs) is 23. 1.
There is no way to judge the transition point between dam failures within the mi drange and hi gh-range of life loss since no data exist for failures with 41 < L < 124.
However, the six remaining failure events all fall within the high range and L is
underestimated in every case, usually by a large margin. Considering all events with
actual L greater than 25, the arithmetic mean L-error is -56. Thi s increases to -80 for the
six worst catastrophes. For these six, only 59% of the actual life loss is recognized by
equation DM-2d.
A quick perusal of the largest and smallest Par indicates that errors in P are
generally much smaller when Par is large. Likewise, P and L are most accurate when

4
A va riation of at least 1-3 might be expected at all levels of life loss due to convergence deaths or
other isolated fatal ities which migh t be considered unique or random in nature.
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these values are smallest, meaning the equation is least accurate in predicting L when
large numbers of people are expected to die.
As a global summary of the entire data set, 14 cases overestimate loss of life by
an average of l3.61ives while 15 cases underestimate loss of life by an average of35.2
lives. There are two cases in which an overestimation ofL reflects an underestimation of
the logit variable L(P). In both cases the actual L was zero and the value used for P is
calculated by convention asP= l/(2*Par) (DeKay and McClelland, 1991).
All of the characteristics discussed in this chapter would be expected to hold true
when the equation is used to estimate future outcomes.

Shortcomings of the DeKay-McClelland
Model as Currently Applied

Before discussing the shortcomings in detail, it bears repeating that the DeKayMcClelland model represents the most rigorous empirical approach to date. As such, it
was the preeminent life-loss method until recently and its authors should be commended
for their contributions to the state of the art.
The model's most problematic shortcomings arise not from any error in statistical
analysis, but from a misunderstanding of life-loss dynamics and misuse of the model by
dam safety risk professionals. Neither author had a background in fields related to dam
safety, hydraulics, hydrology, or emergency management. In their words, "our approach
is primarily data-driven rather than theory driven. We try to be reasonable in our choice
of variables and the forrn in which we express them, but we adhere to no particular theory
regarding the causes of flood fatalities" (DeKay and McClelland, l993b, p. 193).
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The most obvious contradiction between the model and true life-loss dynamics is
that the model treats an entire Par as a single entity with a single warning time and a
consistent mix of damages to structures. Recognizing the logical dissonance that this
causes, dam safety risk professionals have tended to apply the equation to more
homogeneous subpopulations, isolating canyon communities from valley communities
and those far from the dam from those close to the dam. However, the more the model is
applied to homogeneous subpopulations, the more the approach violates the assumptions
governing its derivation and the more suspect the results become.
This and other foundational weaknesses have been explored in great detail in the
preceding sections. Hence, this section is intended only as an outline summary, with
additional insights that were derived through historical analysis and reasoning. To keep
the following comments brief, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the contents of
this chapter and the section on the DeKay-McClelland model in Chapter III. Support for
additional insights is provided in the subsequent chapters and appendices.

Life loss is nonlinear
with respect to Par
l.

An application of the model to subPar increases the estimate of L.

2.

Every unique division of subPar will yield a different estimate ofL.

The model was developed using
heterogeneous Par rather than
homogeneous subPar
I. The current practice of applying the model to subPar applies the equation to
populations unlike those in the data set. This, in tum, produces unreliable results.
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2. Wt and Fd do not represent the average conditions experienced by individuals
within a global population. As such, Wt and Fd have limited value when one compares
two or more dissimilar events.
3. Wt and Fd do not represent or quantify those who are most at risk.
4. Making assumptions about evacuation rates based on the interplay between a
point value like Wt and L is potentially misleading and can make it appear that
evacuations proceed slowly when, in fact, Wt; may be very small or nonexistent for those
who perish.

The model uses Wt rather than
excess evacuation time (E)
I.

Wt is generally larger than Wtavg and takes no account of the dissemination

rate or the percentage of people reached .
2.

Wt does not describe whether those who receive a warning are most at risk or

least at risk.
3.

Wt takes no account of the urgency or believability of the message. A NWS

scrawl at the bottom of a sitcom does not have the same potential to mobilize an
evacuation as a fireman at the door or the fearful sight and sound of an approaching wall
of water.
4.

Wt takes no account of the time of day or night, whether families are together

or separated during work hours, and other facto rs that affect a population's response
patterns.
5.

Wt is independent of the time required for evacuation.
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6.

In summary, it is the excess evacuation time (E)-the time required to clear

the flood zone minus the time available to clear the flood zone-that determines whether
people are likely to escape a flood. Wt is independent of the distance to safety, the
mobility of the population, the time of day or night, the urgency of the message, and
other factors that determine the representative time needed for evacuation. As such, Wt,
by itself, has limited usefulness when comparing dissimilar events.
7.

Together, these factors mask the benefits of improved warning dissemination

and urgency while emphasizing only the timing of the first notification.

The model makes no distinction
between day and night
Darkness and sleep can dramatically hinder the ability of a population to detect
sensory clues, share them with neighbors, and prepare their families to run for safety.
This is most important when Wt is small. Since the data set underlying the model is a mix
of day and night events, the regression equation cannot be fully trusted to apply to either.

As a dichotomous variable
Fd is too coarse for refined
estimates of life loss
I.

It is unrealistic to expect the same rate oflife loss regardless of whether 20%

or 100% of the buildings receive at least major damage. Indeed, life loss is likely to grow
faster than the rate of damages because a higher damage rate implies a flood with greater
depths and velocities at every structure.
2.

Based on the events used in developing the equation, the model implicitly

assumes that every Par is sufficiently heterogeneous to force the rate of housing damages
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toward the lower limits of Fd

~

0 and Fd

~

I. As such, the model " fits" only a limited

type of event/population.
a)

The model does a poor job of predicting life loss for its own data set

when a case falls outside of this expected range- that is, when damages are
extreme.
b)

The equation is unsuited for application to Par or subPar with

homogenous damages. This is in direct contradiction to the way analysts prefer to
use the equation, since they tend to isolate communities closest to a dam from
those downstream.
c)

The equation is unsuited for application to the most lethal flood events,

such as the failure at Yaiont, Italy.

According to Fd the same number oflives
should be lost when a building receives
major damage as when it is destroyed
The model obscures the large difference in life loss when buildings are obliterated
compared to when they retain a form of haven. Historically, this difference is so
pronounced that this oversight may be the model 's greatest shortcoming.

Sometimes Par is aggregated
across many watersheds
I.

This kind of flooding is atypical of a dam failure.

2.

Life loss is usually limited to the most dangerous reaches or watersheds, but

because Par is expanded to include watersheds with milder flooding, housing damages
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tend toward the lower limits ofFd = 0 or Fd = I and estimates ofP conform accordingly
(see above).
3.

Examples from the data set (see Table 13): Allegheny County flash floods ,

Black Hills flash floods, Kansas City floods, Northern New Jersey flash floods , Texas
Hill Country flash floods, and Shadyside flash floods (although for Shadyside, Wegee
Creek and Pipe Creek were so similar they could be combined with no dilution offd).

Sometimes L has little
relationship to Par
I.

By combining subPar into a single Par, Par can be quantified in a way that

has little or no relationship to the number of people who are most at risk and the nature of
the flooding they experience.
2.

Examples (see Table 13):
a)

All nine deaths in Allegheny County occurred among a small band of

motorists traveling on a single stretch of road along Little Pine Creek.
Nevertheless, DeKay and McClelland ( 1993a) quantified Par based on the number
of residences that were damaged in every watershed in the county.
b)

During the Austin, Texas, flash floods in 1981, II out of 13 deaths

occurred to motorists at low water crossings. The crossings were located in five
different watersheds, they were mostly distant from areas with housing damages,
the motorists were not evacuees, and in many cases the victims did not even live
in the state. Nevertheless, DeKay and McClelland (1993a) quantified Par based
on the number of residences that were damaged-residences that were mostly
evacuated before the flooding reached lethal proportions.
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c)

None of the 25 deaths during the Kansas City floods involved people

trapped in buildings because the water rose slowly enough for people to walk
away without hurrying. The victims were those who faced the flood after it
reached dangerous proportions-motorists, pedestrians, people who came to
watch the flood, and people who experienced fatal medical emergencies like heart
attacks. Nevertheless, DeKay and McClelland (1993a) quantified Par based on the
number of residences that were damaged across many different watersheds.
3.

Examples like this argue for the importance of treating different categories of

Par or subPar uniquely. That is, subPar in campgrounds, automobiles, boats, homes, or
other locations may not all share the same traits with respect to warning dissemination,
evacuation, flood exposure, and life loss.

Some variables were assigned values
inconsistent with the best evidence
This is a matter of judgement and the availability of relevant historical
documents . It is likely that future researchers will refine estimates made as part of this
study, as well. However, Table 14 shows the most important differences between the
values used by DeKay and McClelland (1993b) and those chosen as part of this study
after careful research and full documentation in Appendix B.

The logit procedure is biased
I.

Due to the nature of the logit transformation and the values in the data set, the

regression algorithm seeks to predict P most accurately when P is smallest and least
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Table 14.

Values used by DeKay and McClelland (1993b) (D-M) and those indicated
by current research (M) in which Wt was quantified only for subPar, but the
symbols > and < indicate if the global value is at least 15 minutes higher or
lower than the value used by DeKay and McClelland. The co lumn for Wt in
minutes reflects the subPar most representative of Par as a whole. The most
significant differences are highlighted in bold

D-M M

I

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10*
II
12
13*
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22*

23
24
25

26
27
28
29

Event
Allegheny County, PA, 1986
Austin, TX, 1981
Baldwin Hills Dam, CA, 1963
Bear Wallow Dam , NC, 1976
Big Thompson , CO, 1976
Black Hills. SO, 1972 (Canyon Lake Dam)
Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam, WV, 1972
Bushy Hill Pond Dam, CT, 1982
Centralia, WA, 1991
D.M.A.D. Dam, UT, 1983
Denver, CO, 1965 (South Platte River)
Kansas City, MO, 1977
Kansas River, KS , 1951
Ke lley Barnes Dam , GA, 1977
Laure l Run Dam, PA, 1977
Lawn Lake Dam, CO, 1982
Lee Lake Dam, MA, 1968
Little Deer Creek Dam, UT. 1963
Malpasset Dam, France, 1959
Mohegan Park Dam, CT, 1963
Northern NJ, 1984
Prospect Dam, CO, 1980
Shadys ide, OH, 1990
Stava dams, Italy, 1985
Swift and [Lower] Two Medicine Dams,
MT, 1964
Teton Dam, ID, 1976 (Dam through
Wilford)
Teton Dam, 10, 1976 (Rexburg to
American Falls)
Texas Hill Countty, 1978
Vega De Tera Dam, Spain, 1959

L

D-M

Par
9 2,200
13 1.180
5 16,500
4
8
145 2,500
237 17,000
139 5,000
--- 400
--- !50
--- 500
--- 10,000
25 2,380
--- 58,000
39
250
--- !50
--- 5,000
80
2
50
----- 6,000
1,000
--- 25,000
--- 100
884
24
270
300
L

9
13
5
4
144
245
125
0
0
I
I

20
II
39
40
3
2
I

42 1
6
2
0
24
270

---

M
Par
1,700
1, 196
16,500
4-7
2.500
12,375
3,171

D-M
Wt
(h r)
0
I

547
300

1.5
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
2.5
0
6.5
3.17
0.5
3
0.25
0
0.75
0
0
0
0
3
7.5
0
0

---

------3,000

--140

----123

-----

-------

M
subPar D-M M
M
Wt Wt
(hr) (min) Fd Fd
0
0
0
0
<
I
30
I
>
I
105
I
0
I
I
0
0
I
I
0
I
I
I > 45

-----------

-----------

I

I

0
0
0
0

-----------

<

IS

---

---

I
I

I

<

0.33

I

I

-----

---

I

---

---

0

0

0

I

--- 1
I I

---

0

-----

-----------

0
0
0

-----------

0
0

0
0

I
I

I
I

>
>

I

28

---

250

---

0.75

---

---

I

---

7

---

2,000

---

0.75

---

---

I

---

4

--- 23 ,000

-----

2.25

-----

-----

0

-----

0 I

0

25 --- 2,070
!50 !53
500

• Not used in equation derivations (ornined as out liers).

0.75
415 0

1

I
I

I
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accurately when Pis largest. Also, P will tend to skew high when it is smallest and skew
low when P is largest.
a)

Within the data set, the model tends to predict L with high precision and

a slight bias toward overestimation when L < I 0.
b)

Within the data set, the model consistently underestimates L by wide

margins (an average of 80 fatalities for the six worst cases) when L > 125.
c)

There is no distinct trend in underestimation or overestimation in the

mid-ranges of life loss, but the precision falls in between that for (a) and (b)
above.
2.

These trends occur because the data set is dominated by cases in which P <

0.5. If it were dominated by cases in which P > 0.5, the direction of bias would reverse.
3.

There is a tendency to predict P most accurately when Par is large because in

such cases P is usually small.
4.

During regression, the regression algorithm thus tends to put greater weight

on those events that are least hazardous (large Par and small expected life loss) . As such,
equation DM-2d is least credible when applied to high-hazard events or to small Par,
either of which is likely to produce relatively large values for P.

The data set is biased
I.

When compared to flash flood deaths during a given year, the USBR found

that their data set was biased toward the most extreme cases, thus tending to overestimate
L when applied to less extreme cases (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989).
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2.

When compared to the most extreme historical events such as the failure at

Vaiont, Italy, the data set is biased to underestimate L by assuming Fd reflects a mix of
major damage, destruction, and up to 80% minor damages.
3.

As long as heterogeneous Par are treated globally and in a marmer for which

L is nonlinear with respect to Par, there is little basis for selecting a data set free of bias.

Moreover, the direction of the bias depends on the event to which the equation is applied .
4.

Using the current approach, this can be avoided in only one of two ways:
a)

by reducing Par to homogeneous subPar and then developing a unique

life-l oss equation for each class of subPar that can be compared across events; or
b)

by dividing the existing data set into homogeneous subsets and then

developing a unique life-loss equation for each class of Par that can be applied
on ly to Par with the same traits.
5.

Ln both cases (4a and b, above), more variables than Wt, Fd, and Par would

need to be considered. That is the burden of Chapters V-VIII and the Appendices.
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CHAPTER V
CHARACTERlZA TION OF CASE HISTORIES

Introduction

Pumose for characterizing events
A great many variables theoretically influence life loss from a dam failure.
Undoubtedly, any model which included as many of these as could be conceived (and
their thousands of corresponding interaction terms) would be unwieldy in the extreme.
Moreover, the number of data points necessary to calibrate such a model or for a complex
statistical regression to be meaningful grows exponentially with each new variable that is
considered. Due to the limited number of catastrophic floods that have occurred and the
still more limited information that is available on these floods, any regression involving
more than a handful of variables appears doomed from the outset.
Nevertheless, there is great value in seeking to identify as many variables as
possible and to quantify them for as many historic flood events as possible when
sufficient information is available. Not only does this help a researcher to identify the
handful of variables that are most useful for prediction, but the process itself forces the
researcher to think in new ways and to explore new kinds of information that can
potentially shed light on the dynamics that affect life loss in catastrophic floods.
Several potential benefits follow:
I.

As was indicated in Chapters III and IV, those variables that have been most

popular in the dominant life-loss models-in particular the DeKay-McClelland (1993b)
variables Wt, Fd, and Par--have serious shortcomings when comparing dissimilar flood
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events. It might be possible to define new temporal relationships, exposure terms, subPar,
or other variables that could prove more useful as comparative and predictive tools.
2.

The use of new variables may provide insight into traditional variables. For

example, Brown and Gratunn (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Lee et al. (1986), and
DeKay and McClelland (1991, !993b) all developed life-loss relationships that are
nonlinear with respect to the size of the population at risk. Yet, intuitively, if every
individual in a population faced threats that were identical in every way (same depth and
velocity of water, identical locations, same warning time, same time needed to evacuate,
identical rescue assistance, etc.) one would expect a consistent percentage of individuals
to perish, regardless of whether I 0, I 00, or 1,000 individuals were in that population.
Granted, the threat to individuals is likely to vary with population size, both favorably
(rescue resources may be more readily available) and adversely (evacuations may take
longer), but it may be possible to define new variables that minimize these differences
based on the size of the population alone. Likely reasons for the nonlinear trends that are
nearly eliminated by focusing on homogeneous subPar are presented in Chapter V.
3.

Even if variables cannot be used directly in a regression equation, perhaps

because of a paucity of diverse data points, key variables or combinations of variables
may help an analyst to adjust an estimate upward or downward based on reasoning and
historic precedence.
4.

Uncommon variables may prove useful in distinguishing among failure

categories; in suggesting more than one regression equation based on these failure
categories; in suggesting order-of-magnitude probabilities to use as a check against the
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results of a regression equation; and in suggesting a reasonable range for confidence
limits.
5.

By fully characterizing each event, it is possible to gain an intuitive feel for

each event. This helps an analyst determine when a new event falls outside of the
experience of the data set, which events a new event is most likely to resemble, and
where the range of life loss is most likely to fall. This provides a reality check for an
estimate produced by a regression equation. As an alternative approach, it also allows an
analyst to select a handful of events that are most similar to the one in question and to
customize a new regression equation based on this select group or to use the select group
to craft a representative probability distribution.
6.

Modern GIS, census data, and flood inundation modeling allow for

increasingly refined estimates of Par and subdivision of Par by community, location,
distance, depths, velocities, housing damages, and other distinctions, making many
variables potentially useful. This contrasts with the problems associated with the use of
global Par by Brown and Graham (1988) (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Lee et al.
(1986), and DeKay and McClelland (l993b) (see Chapter IV).
7.

Some risk analysts are more familiar with the application of an equation to

hypothetical events than they are with the historical events from which the equation was
derived. By presenting event characterizations with full written support, it presents an
immense quantity of source material in a more readily digested package.
8.

Past characterizations have not been readily accessible to future researchers,

making it difficult for others to evaluate or build on their work. By fully documenting
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each characterization, it allows other researchers to dispute the characterizations or to
refine them as they see fit.
9.

Detailed characterizations may prove useful for research into aspects of

catastrophic floods other than life loss and far improving the effectiveness of emergency
warning and evacuation procedures.
I 0. Empirical approaches based on regression or calibrated parametric models
are preferable to purely analytical equations because their validity is founded on historic
reality and patterns oflife loss are sufficiently complex that they defy uninformed
intuition.

Method of collecting event histories
As indicated in the introduction to Chapter VI, source material for dam failures
and flash floods is not always easy to obtain. As such, the best source of information is
those who have dedicated many years to building files on such events. The majority of
the documents examined in this study were copied from the personal files of Wayne
Graham in the Denver office of the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Additional
source material was obtained from a branch of the National Performance of Dams
Program called the Center on the Performance of Dams at Stanford University. These
files covered more events, but contained less material than Graham 's. In some cases,
information was obtained from other sources.
Every event for which at least a passing reference was obtained is listed
alphabetically in Table A. I of Appendix A. This table includes the name and location of
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every event, its date, an approximate magnitude of life loss, and the nature of the flood
(i.e., dam failure, dyke failure, flash flood, broad flooding, sea surge, etc.).
There was not time to characterize every event for which files were gathered, so
Table A. I also indicates which events have been characterized in Appendix B, which
files are lacking enough information to be useful, which files are likely to be useful for
characterization in their current form, which events are likely to prove useful following
additional research, and the manner in which certain events were used by DeKay and
McClelland ( 1993a).
Since the files gathered were dominated by dam failures, and since flash floods
are much more common than dam failures, flash floods remain a largely untapped
direction for future research. Indeed, within a one-week period of the current composition
(August 1999) news has been obtained of two flash floods . One was in Utah and one was
in Switzerland that killed at least 18 people.

Characterization of events

Characterizing variables
The first step was to define as many characterizing variahles as was practical that
describe a flood event or that might have a direct bearing on life loss. Initially, there were
about 55. It should be emphasized that it was never intended that all of these variables
would be used for prediction. Rather, it was hoped that they might provide a fuller
understanding of the dynamics of life-threatening floods-especially the life-loss
dynamics-and that by exploring new avenues, a narrower set of characteristics might
prove useful as predictive aids.
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As events were analyzed, it became apparent that those characterizing variables
that might prove most useful for prediction had yet to be defined. Through an iterative
process, the number of characterizing variables under consideration grew to nearly I 00.
The characterizing variables most relevant to loss of life were originally broken down
into five broad categories: populations at risk, flood characteristics, spatial and temporal
relationships between Par and the flood, and circumstances that attend the flood . For
clarity, there was value in dividing the fourth category into circumstances that are
temporary, delivered by nature, and those that are human in origin and thus typically
more permanent. Those variables that were late additions have been included as a sixth
category since they were not fully characterized for every event. This also flags them for
special consideration.
Some of the variables, like those that describe the type and dimensions of a dam,
were included primarily to paint a picture of the event and to provide information on the
failure itself, with their predictive potential being secondary. Such information might
facilitate research into the probabilities of failure and the likelihood that such failures will
be detected in a timely manner as the data set is exam ined and expanded over time.
The 55 variables that fill the five categories must be characterized in one of four
ways: by assigning a quantitative value (such as velocity), by designating a relative rank
(such as degree of urbanization), by selecting a category (such as dam type), or by
recording a description (such as the location of fatalities or a description of the housing
damages). The last type of variable is a means of record keeping to assist in
characteri zing one or more variables in the other categories.
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In the language of statistics, the second and third type of variables are called
categorical variables, with the second being known as ordinal variables and the third
being known as nominal variables. Once placed in a regression equation, statisticians
sometimes call the dependent or Y variable the response variable and the independent or
X variable an explanatory variable (Agresti, 1996). In this text, all variables will be
called characterizing variables or simply variables, to indicate that they characterize an
event. As subsets, a variable becomes a predictive variable if it is later found useful for
that purpose, or a dependent variable if it is the basis for regression. L(P) is an example
of a dependent variable described in Chapter IV.

Nomenclature
To facilitate the unambiguous use of symbols in equations and in the text, each
variable is signified using a single capital letter or a capital letter followed by one or more
lower case letters. In some cases, letters or numbers can be written as subscripts if it
makes a symbol easier to read. For example, Par; refers to one or more specific subPar
(Par can be singular or plural, based on context). Par3 is the third subPar defined for a
spec ific event.
Generally, an ordinal variable is assigned one of the following levels: N =.!'{one,
L = l,ow, M =Medium or Moderate, H =High, V = Yery High, orE= Exceptionally
High. The precise nuance or meaning of each of these gradations is specific to each
variable. Indeed, "low," "medium," or the other words associated with the symbols listed
above are often poor grammatical companions to the variables that follow, so they are
defined more thoroughly in each case. Nevertheless, to avoid the need to memorize or
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reference a separate set of symbols for every variable, gradations are limited to these six
symbols. Most ordinal variables use only part of this range, but the sequential hierarchy
of the symbols is maintained to minimize confusion.
Every nominal variable has a unique set of symbols. The reader should consult the
sections that follow whenever the precise nuance, criteria, or definition of the coding of a
variable is in doubt.

Comprehensive List of Characterizing Variables
Their Coding and Their Definitions

Populations at risk

Population at risk (Par)
Technically, Par should identify the number of people for whom a dam failure is
hazardous in the sense that their lives are truly in jeopardy. Recognizing this, the
Australian National Committee on Large Dams (1994, p. 114) defined Par as "all those
persons who would be directly exposed to floodwaters within the dam break affected zone
if they took no action to evacuate" 12£}. The italicized phrases were the key
modifications to previous definitions. By using "directly," they excluded those who
might be safe from calm waters due to the elevation of their property or perhaps a second
story. They also excluded those who might be injured by evacuating motorists after they
cleared the flood zone. By including " within the dam-break affected zone" they were
referring to another teclmical definition:
Dam break Affected Zone: That zone of flooding where the changes in
depth and velocity of flooding due to darnbreak are such that there is potential for
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incremental loss of life [sic]. [They then refer to depth-velocity charts such as
might be developed using study results from Abt et a!. ( 1989) discussed in
Chapter III of this thesis.] The Dambreak Affected Zone is in any case limited to
those areas where dam break causes a rise in level of floodwaters greater than 300
mm [about I ft]. (Australian National Committee on Large Dams, 1994, p. II 0)
As reasonable as such a definition might appear, it is impractical for several
reasons. First, as any fisherman who has waded a stream soon discovers, the momentum
of floodwaters has a direct bearing on his threat to life. Most healthy adults could safely
wade through stagnant water several feet deep, while less than a foot of rapidly moving
water can sweep a car from a road and plunge it into fatal waters downstream. Since the
depth and momentum of water changes rapidly based on local variations in slope, contour
maps are inadequate tools to define hazardous regions on this scale. Second, the hazard
posed by water varies among individuals. Small children or infants, the elderly, those
who are disabled or physically disadvantaged, those who cannot swim, or those with fear
of water might perish in situations posing little threat to others.
In light of these uncertain factors , the term Population at Risk becomes somewhat
misleading and challenging to define . In order to include all hazardous regions, the
population must be defmed so expansively that only a portion of the Par would truly be at
risk of death in most cases; given sufficient warning and evacuation, none of the Par
would risk death apart from the dangers inherent in emotionally charged situations and
the evacuation itself. Traditionally, Par has been defined as broadly as possible to include
all those who, given no warning and without moving, would get their feet wet from the
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flood (i.e., Dekay and McClelland, 1993b; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989 1 ; Lee et al. ,

"Get their feet wet" has usually neglected any increase in elevation provided by
buildings (Lee et al., 1986, made this explicit; see footnote). If such elevations are
included, one can face dilemmas: A woman who is gardening is swept away by 2 or 3 ft
of water while her husband remains dry cooking dinner in the elevated kitchen and her 5year-old daughter scrambles to escape the torrent of water pouring through the open
basement window. If such elevations are neglected, there is still the risk that people will
enter the flood zone from outside or while crossing it from an island inside. Moreover,
dam break studies cannot fully account for the effects of channel scour, debris dams,
variations in channel geometry, bridge failures, road and berm washouts, dispersion, or
other vagaries on the direction and pattern of a dynamic flood wave, making even the
most refined analysis lacking.
Identifying historic Par is no easier. Without the aid of GIS or detailed census
data, Par must often be estimated using evacuation figures, statistics on housing damages,
by viewing aerial photographs, by counting dots that represent structures on maps, or by
other forms of approximation. However, for historical floods these methods generally
rely on the actual dimensions or affects of the flood and so they may provide better
estimates than a computer simulation of inundation.

1
" All individuals who, if they took no action to evacuate, would be exposed to nooding of any
depth" (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989, p. 11!-25).

'"A person is at risk if he or she wo uld be touc hed by the nood water at peak stage if he or she
were to stand outside" (Lee et al., 1986, p. 6).

154

What we want is a definition of Par that when used predictively is most likely to
match the definitions implicitly used for historic events. DeKay and McClelland ( 1993b,
p. 196) defined this as "the number of people that were evacuated or the number of
people that would have been evacuated had there been any warning. " However, this is
highly subjective and may include areas much larger or much smaller than the flood
itself. Also, Par has seldom been quantified in this manner; most of the Par in Appendix
B are quantified based on the number of buildings with at least minor damage . Such
damage is a function of the depth and velocity of a flood near its peripheries.
By way of a solution, Par can be defined using a trichotomous approach to
flooding and a modification to the ANCOLD definition. The three categories recognize
the diverse nature of flooding, defining it in a manner that reflects the likely patterns
underlying the calculations of Par in the case studies. In general terms, the definition by
Lee et al. (1986) should be adopted for Par inhabiting terrain that is steep or close to the
dam: "A person is at risk if he or she would be touched by the flood water at peak stage if
he or she were to stand outside" (Lee et al., 1986, p. 6). At the other extreme, in areas
where a flood consists of a nearly stagnant backwater, Par should include only those who
would be exposed to flooding greater than or equal to 1.5 ft in depth. When flood
characteristics fall between these extremes, Par should include only those exposed to
flooding greater than 6-12 inches deep, based on a convenient contour. The depths
surrounding a single Par should vary according to all three of these criteria as the area 's
topography and relationship to the river change.
To standardize these criteria and give them justification, the divisions can be
refined with the help of depth-velocity curves that indicate the conditions needed to
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sweep away humans and automobiles; and with assumptions regarding the depths likely
to mobilize a voluntary evacuation. The sections that follow convert the three general
guidelines in the preceding paragraph to three standardized rules, each followed by
supportive reasoning.
In flooded areas where the lateral slope exceeds 0. OJ and the velocity at depths of
I ft exceeds 3 fps, a person is a member of the Par

if they would be touched by the flood

while standing outdoors on the ground prior to evacuation. If the lateral slope is greater

than 0.01 , a one foot rise in flood depths will not encompass a new row of houses, but
those houses within the flood will extend to depths of I ft. At velocities of 3 fps, these
depths would likely inspire evacuations and cause minor housing damage.
For perspective on these relationships, as water nears 2 ft deep, a monolith
simulating a feeble adult can be consistently toppled in flow velocities ranging from 1.18
to 2.16 fps (less than half of walking speeds). At the other extreme, wearing safety
harnesses in a laboratory flume, very healthy adults can be toppled in water between 1.6
and 2.0 ft deep with velocities ranging throughout the 4.5 to 8.5 fps range (see Abt et al.,
1989, or Chapter III). Including all ages and all levels of health, it is likely that many
people-especially children--could be toppled between these extremes in the far less
ideal conditions of a sudden flood surge. Once toppled, people can be swept toward the
center of the channel. Thus, flows as shallow as I ft deep can be dangerous if they
approach I 0 fps and flows that are 2 ft deep are potentially lethal to an important fraction
of the population even when velocities are moderate.
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Safety officials who do not know how high a flood will rise would probably
include all such areas in an evacuation plan 3 Moreover, depths in this range will pile
mud and debris in yards and possibly flood ground floors, causing minor housing
damages. In both cases, such areas would likely be included in historic Par.

In flooded areas where velocities are less than I fps at depths of 2ft, a person is a
member of the Par

if they would stand in water greater than 1.5 feet deep while standing

outdoors on the ground prior to evacuation. In contrast to the high velocity, narrow flood
anticipated above, a leisurely flood crossing a wide floodplain will form backwaters that
pose little hazard to li fe. Two questions arise: At what depth are lives endangered and at
what depth are houses damaged?
The answer to the second question might be the point when an automobile can be
carried toward treacherous water. The U.S. Bureau Reclamation (1989) presents a graph
derived from a study conducted by Simons, Li, and Associates, Inc. (1984) for the City of
Boulder Co lorado. The study attempted to determine the depth-velocity combinations
necessary to move an automobile downstream. Interestingly, the graph of such a
relationship is almost vertical: at a depth of 1.25 ft, a flood must travel at I 0 fps to move
a car, while at a depth of 1.9 ft, a car can be moved by the slightest current. At walking
speeds (4-5 fps), the depth is close to I .5 ft.
Even where average depths and velocities are low, a flood can generate an
unexpected current across low spots that funnel the water. Motorists who are swept away

3
Remember that Par includes far more people than are likely to die, except in the most extreme
events. In order for a regression equation to apply to future estimates of life loss, current definitions of Par
must be as expans ive as historic definitions. Evacuation plans wou ld be particularly expansive for fast.

vio lent floods, probably extending to the limits of flooding or beyond.
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while attempting to cross a road with seemingly minor flooding is a leading cause of
death in fl ash floods. Thus. quiescent fl oods with depths of about 1. 5 ft have the potenti al
to endanger lives in select locations. At these same depths, houses would be damaged
even in stagnant water. Hence, Par should always extend to depths of 1.5 ft, no matter
how calm the flood.

in flooded areas where velocities fall between the extremes of the two previous
rules, a person is a member of the Par

if they would stand in water greater than 1 foot

deep while standing outdoors on the ground prior to evacuation. These floods fall
between the extremes of a quiescent backwater and a raging torrent. Many people would
not evacuate if water did not enter their homes or rage swiftly across their yard. Nor
wo uld they be at measurable risk. As such, only those who have water lapping at their
door should be considered-somewhere between about 12-18 inches. Based on the
scale of most flood maps, any contour that sets fl ooding close to I ft would be
sati sfactory.
In summary, when the lateral slope exceeds 0.0 I and the veiocity at depths of I ft
exceeds 3 fps , the geographic boundaries of the Par extend to the edge of the fl ood. When
velocities are less than I fps at depths of 2 ft, the geographic boundaries of the Par extend
inland to points where the flood drops below 1.5 ft. In all other flood conditions, the
geographic boundaries of the Par extend inland to points where the fl ood drops below 6
to 18 inches, or I ft for convenience. Par includes all those present in the geographic
boundary after the dam fails and prior to the arrival of a warning.
Although these rules are intended to standardize analysts' approaches and
conform them to the definitions most likely to underlie the quantification of Par in the
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present study, they can be violated if such violation will more closely conform to the
patterns in this present study. For example, if a long, public building had a second or
third story entrance high above a flood. but the first floor was far down slope where it
faced high-velocity flooding , the analyst might want to exclude those on the second or
third floors from the Par if the structural integrity of the building was not expected to be
threatened.

Threatened population (Tpar)
Recognizing that Par includes many individuals who will never be threatened by
flood waters due to evacuation-and conversely that convergence of curiosity seekers
and safety workers on a floodplain can increase counts beyond the members of Par- the
threatened population is defined as all those present in the flood inundation area when the
flood wave arrives.
The same depth and velocity relationships apply for Tpar as for Par. That is. in
general, once flooding exceeds about a foot, anyone trapped in a building or wading
across the floodplain becomes part ofTpar, but the first 6-12 inches of flooding can be
ignored.

SubPar (Par;)
Par should be subdivided whenever there is a clear change in a major
characterizing variable and there exists sufficient historical evidence to characterize Par;
individually. The exact information required will depend on the components of any
proposed model , but information regarding the size of the subPar, the life loss within that
subPar, some measure of the warning time applicable to that subPar, and a description of
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the flooding characteristics or damage characteristics within that subPar are essential. It
is also highly desirable to know how many people successfully evacuated prior to the
flood's arrival, the average time required for evacuation, and the circumstances or
locations where individuals either perished or survived the flood. Most variables must be
characterized anew for every subPar and may be subscripted for ease of reference. The
goal is to produce subPar that are as homogenous as possible and that can then be
grouped with like populations from diverse events to obtain a historic frequency
distributions for key variables like L.

Threatened sub Par (Tpar;)
Tpar; is the same as Tpar, but it is specific to a subPar (Par;).

Life loss (L)
L refers to the number of deaths of any kind and at any location that can be
attributed directly or indirectly to flooding, without regard to whether or not the deaths
would have occurred had the dam not failed under the same loading.
In some cases, flood victims are never recovered and are listed as missing rather
than dead. When victims remain on the list of missing in the most recent reports. they are
included in L under the assumption that they most likely perished; if not confirmed
fatalities, they perished in the minds of all who knew them, with comparable local effect.

Expected life loss (Le) and
historic life loss (Lh)
In predictive applications, L refers to the expected life loss (mean life loss) as
generated by a predictive model, without adjustment. When predictive models are applied
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to historic case studies, the historic L can be distinguished from the expected L by using
Lh and Le, respectively. In such cases, Lh or Le should be substituted for L in the
definitions below (Lha, Len, etc.). When the context is clear, Lalone should be used.

Adjusted life loss (La)
When making an estimate, if the investigator finds reason to adjust the expected
value of L. this adjusted value has the symbol La.

Natural channel (never a
dam) life loss (Ln)
This is the expected L given that the dam had never been built and the same
loading (earthquake, storm) occurs. Unless the dam that fails is relatively new, Ln
generally assumes less flood plain development and different recreational patterns than
after a dam has been in place for many years. Ln is a construct that is counter-historical.
except in the case of flash floods on dam-free rivers.

Life loss given dam removal (Ldr)
Dam removal is often considered as a risk mitigation option. This variable
assumes the dam is removed, sediment issues are resolved, and the channel through the
reservoir is restored shortly before the failure loading occurs, using the then-current level
of flood plain development and channel geomorphology.

No failure life loss (Lnf)
Lnf indicates the number of deaths that would have occurred had the dam not
fai led given the same initiating conditions. In the event of internal failures with no
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unusual loading conditions, Lnf is always zero. In other types of failures, it may be
difficult to quantify Lnf from the case descriptions themselves, so it must be estimated in
some other manner. In some instances, case studies or established methods involving
flash floods or earthquakes may prove useful.

Incremental life loss (Li =Lin or Lidr or Linr)
Despite our best flood mitigation efforts, floods claim many lives every year. ln
some cases, such as where a downstream channel constriction creates an elevated
tail water, a dam failure may add little height to the ensuing flood wave, thus contributing
little to the ensuing life loss. 4 The incremental loss of life (Li) is limited to those deaths
that would not have occurred without the failure.
Even after a failure determining the incremental life loss is often challenging and
sometimes impossible, since it is difficult to known how many lives would have been lost
without a failure. There are, however, several possible baseline cases against which to
compare.
If Lin= L-Ln, Lin discounts the fact that the existence of a darn, historically ,
probably lead to increased recreational activity and its flood control benefits likely
promoted flood plain development. Indeed, it may be the irrigation benefits that allowed
a community to develop in the region at all. Such a comparison contrasts quite dissimilar
scenarios, making the darn owner responsible for the growth in downstream population.
but ignoring both the many benefits the darn provides and the lives the dam potentially

'For example, when Rapid City in the Black Hills of South Dakota flooded in 1972. flooding was

so severe that when Canyon Lake Dam fai led, the reservoir pool was only about a foot higher than the
tail water. It has been suggested that of the 245 fatalities. perhaps only 33 can be directly attributed to the
extra flooding caused by failure of the dam (Graham, 1998).
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saved during previous flooding events. When comparing developed nations with dams to
less developed nations without dams, one could even argue that the relative prosperity
that dams have helped bring about has saved lives by reducing poverty and disease.
On the other hand, if a dam has not yet been built, comparing L to Ln seems to be
the most natural approach to a dam's hazard potential.
For existing dams, if Lidr = L-Ldr (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989),
comparisons are more direct, since standards of living, past benefits, and levels of
development are the same in each case. One has a useful measure to help determine
whether the dam should be kept or removed. It should be noted that the number of
fatalities might actually be lower given a dam failure over against the same event rushing
through the valley without a dam in place. While a dam failure will unleash a wave of
larger volume, if the failure does not progress rapidly, the peak may be dampened
compared to a natural flash flood. Also, if monitoring of the dam may allow adequate
warning time and the dam delays the onslaught of flooding , lives can potentially be saved
through evacuation.
One drawback to this definition of Li is that it ignores the future affects on
recreation and flood plain development caused by removing the dam. Even if Ldr were
redefined to be a current removal with a future population at risk, there is no way of
knowing how far into the future a failure might occur, making it difficult to adequately
define any growing disparities between L and Ldr in terms of Par. Also, like Lin,
comparing L and Ldr for a future event ignores the lives potentially saved through flood
abatement and economic development due to keeping the dam prior to failure.
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The third possible definition is Linr = L-Lnf. This definition is useful in
comparing the status quo against various versions of the dam following proposed
improvements; or in comparing various designs of a dam yet to be built. This comparison
may be used to guide future decisions or to evaluate past decisions. Like Lid,, Linr cancels
the shared historical benefits or harms of the two scenarios, focusing attention on the
isolated event of interest. It has the advantage that any differences in flood protection or
floodplain development are likely to be minor. A tremendous practical benefit is that the
two scenarios depend on similar hydrologic data.
None of these definitions prove adequate for every purpose. Clearly, if
rehabilitation alternatives are being considered, the Linr has many advantages for existing
dams, but in any risk assessment or liability investigation, removal of the dam must be
included as one of the policy alternatives. In that case, the Lid, seems imperative. !fa dam
has yet to be constructed, Lin is the only increment that gives due consideration to not
constructing the dam at all. For some dam owners, the choice of analysis may hinge on
legal liability considerations, in which case any or all three may prove important.

Proportion of lives lost (P)
P, like the other variables, can be specific to a global population at risk (Par) or to
a subPar, with the latter relationship designated by a subscript: P = L/Par and Pi= L/ Pari.

Fatality type (Ft)
Ft helps define the manner in which a flood proves lethal. It categorizes the
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dominant types of death according to their nature or locality. Ideally, the associated
number of deaths should accompany each symbol.
N

none .

C

campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river.

W

those in the river when the flood wave appears: waders and swimmers.

B

those on the river when the flood wave appears: rafters and boaters.

L

those in or on a lake when the flood wave appears: boaters and swimmers.

E

employees of the dam owner who are at the dam for construction, repairs,
monitoring, failure prevention, etc. Note that this category will overlap
with some of the others.

Af = automobile occupants killed by flood waters.
Aa = those killed in an automobile accident during evacuation.
D = general drowning deaths in areas with buildings. Note that it may be
impossible to distinguish deaths in buildings, automobiles, and on the
floodplain here.
Sf = slope failure at or very near the dam itself.
0

= other= non-drowning deaths other than auto-related or slope failure near
the dam: mudslide associated with the flooding and not the dam failure
itself, suicide, heart attack, exposure, disease, etc.

U

Unknown mix.

Locations of deaths
The location of a death is generally considered the place where an individual was
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overcome by flood waters, in contrast to the location where the body was recovered. In
general, it associates the death with a particular Par;. When more detail is available, it
locates the victims in buildings, in automobiles, in the open, etc.

Flood charactenstics

Flood type (Fit)
Fit is the source of the flood. In some cases, more than one source is involved.
D = dam failure.
Dy = failure of a dyke-whether it be a sea dyke or a levee-thus being similar
in some respects to a long dam.
Ff

a flash flood, meaning the flood wave is sudden and fast rising or a wall of
water.

F

flood, meaning a widespread event that crumot be described according to
the other categories in this list.

Ts = a tsunami or tidal wave.
S

a sea surge.

H

flooding caused by a hurricane and distinguished from F or Ff in that the
deaths are not necessarily a result of the flooding .

Gb = a glacier burst.
0

=

other types of flooding difficult to categorize, such as when a storage tank
or water tower bursts.
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Peak velocity (V)
V is the peak velocity for a given Par;. It may require an approximation based on
eyewitness accounts of the approaching flood wave or an average value based on postfailure flood routing or known travel times.

Maximum depth (D)
Since rivers vary greatly in depth, the maximum depth in the center of the channel
has little comparative value from one case to another. Dis thus the maximum depth on
land for a given Par;. D should be the greatest flooding depth that could have been
witnessed by any member of Par;, whether or not they were present or survived. This
would generally be estimated using high water marks on buildings or trees, or the height
of a wall of water (variable Ww). The datum will be somewhat subjective, but should be
the lowest point at which a member of Par; might have originally occupied.

Peak volumetric flow rate (Qp)
Qp is the maximum volumetric flow rate experienced at the location of a specified
Par or subPar during the duration of the flood .

Bankfull volumetric flow rate (Qb)
It is desirable to quantify the magnitude of a flood in a way that discounts the
flow in the main channel to quantity the rate at which water actually flows across the
floodplain. A flow of 30,000 cfs in a very large river might never top the banks, while
such a flow in a tiny mountain creek would likely cause considerable damage to
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bordering communities. This normalized measurement is found by subtracting the
bankfull flow rate from the peak discharge (Qp-Qb).
While a simple concept, Qb is not so easily defined. Floodplains are rarely flat
with a clear channel rim. Superelevation can cause the outer bank to flood before the
inner bank. Quite often, communities are constructed on surrounding hills, terraces , or a
higher floodplain created during an earlier flow regime, which can make the narrow
floodplain directly next to the river difficult to discern. In mountainous areas, V-shaped
valleys can obscure the floodplain altogether. Compounding this, there can be natural
levees or low spots produced by previous channels that crisscross a river valley (Leopold,
1997).
Physically, the geomorphology of streams are governed by their flow regimes.
Hence, "nearly all stream channels, whether large or small, will contain without overflow
approximately that discharge that occurs about once a year. Higher flows" occurring once
every 2 to 5 years, will overflow onto the floodplain (Leopold, 1997, p. 64). Generally
speaking, Qb is equaled or exceeded 2 to 4 days per year, with a return period of about
1.5 years. This holds true whether the high flows are from rainstorms or spring snowmelt
(Leopo ld, 1997).
This suggests several methods for estimating Qb. The ideal method is to use a
known stage-discharge relationship at a low point within the subPar. Short of this, a
reasonable estimate for Qb can be made be interpolating the 1.5-year return flow off a
flood-frequency diagram for the area in question. Since the mean annual flood has an
average recurrence interval of2.3 years (Leopold, 1997), the mean annual flood would
provide a reasonable approximation. If flows for only a few specific return periods are
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already known-say the 5 and 10 year floods-these place a boundary on Qb from which
reasonable estimates may be possible. Similarly, a few stage-discharge values may
suggest a reasonable range for Qb. Even typical or average flows for a river suggests
something about its size, pointing toward an order of magnitude for Qb.
The preceding discussion highlights that it is generally not critical to calculate Qb
with high precision. This holds true because there is already great uncertainty as to what
multiple of Qb is needed to reach the first person, there is great variation between subPar
as to the general steepness of slopes beyond the riverbank, and, most importantly, since
Qb is often one or two orders of magnitude smaller than Qp, a rough estimate is all that is
needed to refine Qp-Qb. In light of this, Qb can usually be estimated without extensive
hydrologic calculations .

Maximum width (W)
Qp, Qb, and Ware necessary to compute Dv for a given Par;. An alternative to W,
also designated Wmax, is to use the minimum width (Wmin) or some representative average
width (Wavg)· When W alone is used, it is assumed that it is Wmax·

Destructive velocity (Dv)
5

The variable Dv was first proposed by Graham ( 1998). Graham did not provide a
name for the variable, but the symbol was derived from the relationship depth*velocity.
By definition, Dv =(Discharge above bankfull)/(width of flooded region)= (QpeakObankrull)/width. This has units of (distance) 2/time or depth*velocity .

' Graham ' s symbol was DV, meaning depth*velocity, as explained in the text. The name
·'destructive ve locity" was chosen here because the variab le combines an average depth with an average
velocity to describe the destructive potential of the flood wave and this preserves Grahams general symbol.
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Since velocity alone tells little about the potential of a flood wave to cause
destruction, the flow ' s depth is a critical component. By using the entire volumetric flow
rate and dividing it by the flood width, the resulting variable automatically averages
across variations in depth and velocity, providing a description not only of the entire
flood wave, but also of its interaction with Par;. In general, since populations tend to
spread further from the river as a valley widens, the more dispersed Par;, the wider the
flood and the smaller Dv becomes compared to the same flow rate in a narrow canyon. If
one were to use (maximum depth)*(velocity) instead, it would provide only a point
estimate at the center of the channel, describing little about the flood's total magnitude
and how it interacts with Par;.
Since no temporal variation is included in this variable, it should be quantified
using maximum values, whether or not the maximum width corresponds with maximum
flow. Since depth and velocity are indirectly included in this variable, they need not be
treated separately, except as they vary with time. This is the purpose of Rand Ww below.
Nevertheless, D and V are included in case Dv cannot be adequately quantified.
Since one could use Wmax, Wmin, or Wavg to quantify Dv, Dvmin corresponds toW.
max (because maximum W minimizes Dv), Dvmax corresponds to Wm;n, and Dvavg
corresponds to Wavg·

Maximum rise rate (R)
Flood waves that cause common sorts of fatalities must generally rise fast enough
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to trap people unawares or overtake them as they seek to flee 6 R refers to the steepest
portion of the rising edge of the outflow hydrograph.
Quite often, floods resulting from darn failures or severe flash floods rise
instantaneously as a wall of water. Since this peak rise rate is infinitely fast and thus not
quantifiable in the same way, "Ww" should be entered to indicate that the next variable
applies instead.
R should also be treated as an ordinal variable as follows:
M

moderate (can walk away from the flood waters if not lingering).

H

high = rapid (requires immediate, rapid action to avoid being trapped).

V

very rapid (difficult or impossible to outpace waters, even with immediate
evacuation on foot or by automobile).

Ww =wall of water (indicates the rise rate is instantaneous and can only be
quantified by measuring the height of the wall of water).

Wall of water (height of) (Ww)
Ww is usually based on eyewitness accounts and/or flood routing. When more
than one value is suggested, those figures which are deemed most credible should be
averaged. In cases where the flood wave does not pile up in a wall , one should enter a
"0," indicating that it must be described using the variable R above.
Often, eyewitness accounts of Ww are based on the in-channel depth of Ww,
which may exceed Don the bank. Hence, Ww ~D.

6
An exception to this might be when water crossing a road appears safe, but subsequently sweeps
an unsuspecting motorist downstream. Even in this case, however, fatalities are more likely when the water
rises unexpectedly during the crossing.
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Damage and destruction (Dd)
The number of structures destroyed, seriously damaged and damaged to any
extent should be recorded by category of structure and degree of damage, when avai lable.
Note that this variable is essentially a detailed record for quantifying F and Ls.
Forcefulness (F = Fp, Fd, F 5, or Fpar)
Dekay and McClelland (1991 , 1993b) developed F. Originally, it was intended to
represent the proportion of Par actually subjected to potentially lethal flooding 7 by
dividing the number of residences destroyed or seriously damaged by the sum total of all
residences experiencing any damage at al l. This is defined here as Fp for proportional
forcefulness.
As reasonable as Fp may at first appear, it is not easy to define in a consistentl y
meaningful way. The force required to damage or destroy shacks, mobile homes, frame
dwellings, brick houses, and large commercial buildings is quite different. Even within a
given category, it will vary across centuries and countries depending on the building
codes.
In contrast to a the forcefulness of a flood, its potential lethality may be better
captured by including all occupied structures, 8 since a structure that experiences little
harm generally provides a safer haven than one that is damaged.

7
Forcefulness was originally called Flooding Lethality or lethality for short (DeKay and
McC lelland, 199 1). Presumably, since the variable measures the force of the flood on buildings and does
not take account of the temporal considerations that influence lethality, the more accurate tenn was adopted
in 1993 (DeKay and McClelland, 1993b).

8
i.e., exclud ing barns, outhouses, chicken-coops and the like, but including RVs in campgrounds.
mills, businesses, power plants, and other structu res occup ied for many hours each day.
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The importance of each structural category varies with occupational cycles and
with the relative proportion of each type of structure in the flood zone. This point
becomes critical when considering Pari located at a campground or along a stretch of
river frequented by rafters or fishermen; in such cases, there may be virtually no
significant structures at all!
For consistency, this study will follow Dekay and McClelland (1991, 1993b),
focusing exclusively on residences. Not surprisingly, Dekay and McClelland found Fp
difficult to quantify using historic data, so they turned to Fd.
Fd is dichotomous forcefulness wherein forcefulness is high (1) or low (0). To fill
in historical gaps, Dekay and McClelland (1991 , 1993b) relied heavily on the expert
judgment of Wayne Graham. Fd is conceptually identical to Fp, with the dichotomous
dividing line between about 0.15-0.2. To update the Dekay and McClelland definition. Fd
=

1 is definitively set at Fp <! 0.2 based on all available evidence and, in the case of Pari

without buildings, the destruction that would have been likely if frame residences were
physically present.
F5 goes a step further, subjectively dividing Fp into five even ranges:
L

low (0-0.2).

M

medium (0.2-0.4).

H

high (0.4-0.6).

v

very high (0.6-0.8).

E

exceptionally high (0.8-1.0).

Fpar is the number of habitable structures of any type that are damaged severely
or destroyed, divided by Pari.
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Height of the dam (H)
Ideally, His measured from the streambed and not the bottom of the foundation.

Height of the reservoir pool
at failure (Hp)
Ideally , Hp would be measured from the tail water of the dam, but this is unlikely
to be available historically, so it is defined in relation to the dam height. Sedimentation
within the reservoir is ignored, since it is the distance of fall that is of most interest.
Given overtopping, the depth of overtopping is added to the height of the dam. In the
absence of overtopping, the distance to the reservoir pool below the dam crest is
subtracted from the height of the dam.

Breadth of the dam (B)
B is the distance between abutments at the dam crest.

Volume of release (Vol)
Vol is the volume of impounded water at the time of failure that is subsequentl y
released during the failure event. It does not include additional inflows into the reservoir
after failure has begun in earnest.

Rate of failure (Rf)
Not strictly a rate, Rf is the number of minutes it takes until at least 80% of the
breach has developed from the time failure begins in earnest. The reason 80% is used is
to distinguish the main breach from the residual erosion which may continue throughout
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the failure event and the minor erosion which precedes catastrophic failure . Rf may be
thought of as the "most rapid" 80% of the failure.
To help standardize eyewitness accounts, when a failure is described as nearly
instantaneous (i.e., "as an explosion," "quicker than you can write these words"), Rf
should be assigned a value of0.5 minutes. If the failure is a very rapid erosion or slope
failure but falls short of near-instantaneous, it should be assigned 5 minutes unless
evidence suggests a more precise value.

Area of final breach (A)
A is measured perpendicular to the direction of flow when the breach is fully
developed. For consistency, it is measured to the top of the original dam crest unless the
breach does not extend to the top.

Spatial and temporal relationships
between Par1 and the flood
Summary of month/day/year, hour,
and day of the week (T)
The variable T is simply a designation for the complete textual record of the time
of failure. Aspects ofT are coded symbolically to facilitate analysis using Td, Tw, Ty,
and Ts, described in the subsequent sections.

Time of day (Td)
Code Td as follows:
N = night (most people are asleep; II :30 PM-6:00AM).

175
S

separation (most families are separated by school or work; 8:00 AM-6:00
PM on weekdays).

H

home (most families are together; 6:00-8:00 AM, 6:00-11:30 PM;
weekends, holidays, and when Par; is dominated by recreationists and it is
not night).

Notice that this variable says something about the lighting conditions, the ease of
warning notification, the time required to begin an evacuation, and whether or not
families are together.

Time of the week (Tw)
Tw is coded dichotomously:
Wend = weekend
Wday =weekday.

Time of the year (Ty)
Ty is simply the month, coded as 1-1 2, beginning with January and ending with
December.

Time of the season (Ts)
Ts indicates the season of the failure . It has relevance to environmental
conditions such as the temperature of the air and water, the lighting conditions. and the
will ingness of people to leave their homes. Here. the variable is coded dichotomously:
S

summer (May-October).

W

winter (November-April).
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Warning time (Wt)
Wt (also known as the initial warning time) is defined as the difference in time
from when the first warning is given of a dam break or of an impending dam break and
the time when the leading edge of potentially lethal flood waters first arrive at the leading
edge of Par; from the failure. "Potentially lethal flood waters" are described under Par,
above. A flood is generally considered potentially lethal once it exceeds l-2 ft in depth.
''First warning" is the warning that first reaches a member of Par;, is intended for
dissemination, and encourages evacuation. As such, contrary to previous definitions of
Wt (i.e. , U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1989), Wt does not necessarily begin with a public
safety official.

Individual warning time (WI;)
Wt; is the increment of time from when an individual first receives news that the
condition of the dam warrants evacuation and the floodwaters gain lethal potential at the
location where the individual was when the news was received. The news can come from
any source, official or otherwise, human or environmental.
This is the same as Wte below, except Wte can be extended as one tries to outrun
the flood.

Individual escape time
(warning time for escape) (Wt,)
Wt, is the increment of time from when an individual first receives news that the
condition of the dam warrants and the floodwaters reach lethal potential at the place to
where the individual has fled or the location where the individual exits the flood zone.
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This is the most meaningful definition of warning time because it is the only one that
measures the full time it takes to be overrun by the flood wave. Unfortunately, unless it
can be accurately estimated on a case-by-case basis, it has little practical value.

Average warning time (Wtavg)
Ideally, the Wtavg would rely on Wt, in place ofWt;, but realistically Wtavg must
be the lesser of Wt; and Sc averaged across the population. In practice, it will be an
approxi mate estimate of the average interval members of Par; have from the time they
first become aware of the danger until the time the flood waters reach the ground above
which they occupied at the time of awareness.
Wtavg is based on warnings from any source, including sensory clues, and so Wtavg
is never less than Sc, but it can be more than Wt. Wtavg includes informal warnings from
passing motorists or neighbors, but it considers warnings only after they are clearly
understood and viewed by the general population as credible. For example, motorists
honking their horns might alert people that something is happening, but it would not be a
warning until shouts or sensory clues made the danger comprehensible. Likewi se,
officials might advise a population that a dam is in danger of failing (making Wt long)
but if there has been a history of false alarms, the population might not mobilize until a
more credible warning is initiated (making Wtavg much shorter).

Building types by percent (Bt)
Bt represents a community profile within the flood zone. It is coded as follows:
N

none.

T

tents .
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Sh = shacks or flimsy buildings.
M

mobile homes or RVs.

R

residential homes.

C

one story commercial or corrunercial ofunknov:n height.

H

commercial over one story.

Lm = structures with less mobile populations (hospitals, nursing homes, schools).

Development (Dev)
Along with Bt and Gf, Dev helps profile a community. Dev measures the degree
of urbanization, and is coded as follows :
N

none (rural, communities under I 00).

L

low = small town.

M

medium = suburban.

H

highly urbanized; large city, densely populated, potentially tall buildings.

Goodness of fit (Of)
Of is a spatial variable that describes the variance in exposure faced by members
of Par; by indicating their spatial homogeneity or heterogeneity with respect to the river.
It is called goodness of fit because it suggests the degree to which other variables
accurately represent individual members of Par;. A low (poor) Gf implies that many
individuals are exposed to a lower degree than group variables imply and a high (good)
Of implies that the entire Par; is well represented. Note that Gf provides a measure of
development/urbanization, proximity to the river, and uniformity within a communityissues also addressed by variables E, We, Dev, and Schvq. Gf is coded as follows:
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L

low= poor (a large, urban area; multiple communities over a long reach of
river; wide flood plain; mix of canyon and open plain; variable va lues
would suggest excessive danger more often than not if applied on the
individual level).

M

moderate= satisfactory (a typical small town or mountain community with
some residences near the river and some on higher ground or in the hills; a
series of small communities with similar warning time; a wide flood plain
with urban/suburban development among which the flood rises slowly).

H

high= good (all of Par; reside within a narrow flood path; small canyon
community clustered along the river; campgrounds; very small Par in a
similar location, such as a few cars at a flooded road).

V

very high= very good (a huge wave which submerges an entire community
without warning; a wave which annihilates virtually every structure wi thin
the area of Par;; no basis for saying some members of Par; are less exposed
or safer than others and no time to escape before the flood arrives).

Outdoors (0)
0 is a dichotomous variable, defining whether or not at least a significant
minority of persons are outdoors. This has bearing on when sensory clues might be
picked up, the rate at which people are likely to run for high ground, the rate a short
warning might spread, and the level of protection available if escape cannot quickly be
obtained. Tents are considered outdoors. A fairly subjective variable, guidelines would
suggest:
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indoors (winter, work hours, night).
0

outdoors (summer, recreationists, campgrounds).

One would expect this variable only to have relevance when warning time is
extremely short.

Sensory clues (Sc)
Even without an official warning, individuals might have several minutes notice
of an approaching flood wave if there are visual or auditory clues, such as breaking trees
or the sound of thundering water. Using testimony of survivors, the average length of this
warning should be quantified in minutes, using zero when virtual ly everyone was
surrounded before the flood was detected (this is more likely at night).

Preparedness (Pr)
Pr defines the degree to which a Par; is prepared to evacuate at least half an hour
before Wt officially begins. The scale ranges as follows:
N

none (not aware of the potential for danger 0.5 hr before Wt begins).

L

low (aware the safety of the dam is in question, but it is not considered
serious).

M

moderate (alert to the potential for evacuation or experienced in
evacuation).

H = high (expecting to evacuate and concrete steps toward that eventuality).
This variable considers qualitative factors like previous news reports regarding
the dam, false alarms, evacuation rehearsals, alerts that fa ll short of warnings, experience
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of the community with flooding, and other aspects of testimony to define how quickly a
community would likely respond to an official warning.

Warning effectiveness (We)
We describes how effectively a warning campaign mobilizes a community for
evacuation. Ideally, it would include the percentage of Par; receiving a warning, the rate
the warning propagates, and the effectiveness of the warning in initiating prompt
evacuation (its believability and urgency). However, since these aspects are not readily
quantifiable, We often resembles a categorical form of Tpar:
N

no official warning.

L

low (fewer than 50% receiving or believing a timely warning).

M

moderate (up to 90% receiving and believing a timely warning).

H

high (virtually complete evacuation before the flood wave arrives).

Evacuation subPar (Eparj)
Epari are subsets of Par; in which the subsets are characterized by the same
representative evacuation time (defined next). These Eparj need not have equal numbers.
and the number of groups can be one or more depending on the degree of heterogeneity
within a given subPar.

Representative evacuation time (Retj)
Defined for use in calculating E (below), Reti is a categorical variable used to
typifY the number of minutes it would take to evacuate each Epari without the evacuation
being interrupted by the arrival of the flood. It does, however, take into account the
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degree of urgency felt by the evacuees. Reti does not include warning delays as a warning
propagates through a community, but it does include the time required for a warning to
propagate through a given building. For example, if a mother is awakened by the sound
of an approaching flood or an official knocking at her door, Reti includes the time
required for her to recognize the danger, awaken her husband, throw on minimal clothing,
gather her sleeping children, decide what possessions to grab and where to go, warn a
neighbor or two if she feels there is time, and run with her family across the floodplain to
the safety of the hillside. Since E is based on Wtavg, each building leader in Epari
theoretically receives a warning at the same moment.
Reti are based on the likely choices of individuals, even if those choices are not
the most expedient. For historic events, Reti considers actual evacuation times and delays
among Tpar. Retj extends when individuals reenter the flood zone to retrieve a belonging,
to reach their family , or to help others. Important considerations include Td (whether
people are asleep or awake and whether families are together or separated), the distance
of buildings from the edge of the flood zone, barriers such as fences or streams, the travel
distance to safety by road, the likelihood of congestion or transportation bottlenecks,
whether prior flooding has blocked roads or bridges, the availability of personal or mass
transportation, the time individuals will take to gather important possessions and warn
others, the urgency of the warning and the perceived threat of the approaching flood, the
anticipated time remaining before the flood arrives, and the general mobility of the Eparj.
Are there nursing homes, hospitals, schools, retirement communities, populations with
language barriers or high levels of distrust, or other populations in the flood path that
might need extra time to evacuate?
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The section on evacuation rates in Chapter VI provides many insights regarding
the factors that have influenced Reti during the events characterized in Appendix B. Still
greater detail is provided under Reti for each of the events in the unpublished version of
Appendix B. Table 15 provides a starting point for estimating Reti.

Excess evacuation time (E)
(ease of evacuation)
When an individual's evacuation time is less than Wte, he or she escapes the
flood . !fan individual's evacuation time is greater than Wt.,, he or she must find a refu ge
or fi ght the flood to survive. The margin of safety reflecting the average excess
evacuation time is the ease with which a population can evacuate. It can be positi ve or
negative. Hence, E is the difference between the time needed fo r evacuation (Retj) and
the time available (Wtavg). both of which are averages.
For practical reasons, E should be defined using a larger scale than the individua l.
It can be normalized as follows :

:t Epar * (Wtm•g - ReI)
1

E, = -''"- ' - - - - - - - - -

Par,

Reti and Epari were previously defined. When Epari is equivalent to a homogeneous
subPar, the equation reduces to Wtavg-Reti. When E is negative, it means the average
evacuation time needed was greater than the time available.
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Table 15.

Representative evacuation times (Retj) for a single household on foot,
neglecting the effects of barriers like fences and streams
Range of
Evacuation Times
for a Family
(minutes)
Day
Night

Width
of the
Flood
(ft)

Outdoor
Distance
to Safety
(ft)

Dev
(N, L,
M,H)

Sense of
Urgency

Mobility
(L, H)*

1,000

300

N-M

High

H

0.5-3

1-6

l

2

1,000

300

N-M

High

L

2-10

4-15

4

6

2,500

1,000

N-L

High

H

3-6

4-10

4

7

2,500

1,000

M-H

High

H

3-10

4-15

6

8

2,500

1,000

N-H

High

L

3-10

5-15

6

8

5,500

2,500

M

High

H

5-20

5-30

10

15

5,500

2,500

N-M

High

L

10-30

10-30

15

20

High

L-group
home

20-180

30-180

45

60

5,500

2,500

M-H

Ret;
(minutes)
Day Night

*L implies one person with limited mobility living with one or more others with nonnal (H) mobility. The
final row is an exception, where a nursing home or similar facility is in view.
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Natural circumstances that
attend the flood

Failure mode (Fm)
Fm can be coded using the following symbols:
I = internal.
lp = piping.
le = embankment failure: sliding, overturning, foundation failure , or blowout
with normal water levels.
F = flooding.
F

flooding (dam failure not present or not relevant).

Ff

flash flood (no dam failure).

Ff/D = dam failure contributes little volume to a dominant flash flood.
Fo

failure due to overtopping or spillway washout.

Fe

embankment failure: slumping, sliding, overturning, foundation
failure, or blowout during overtopping or reservoir elevations
significantly higher than those for which the dam was designed to
ordinari ly operate.

S = seismic failure .
Sp = piping or other gradual development fo llowing an earthquake.
Se = a rapid embankment fai lure during or shortly after an earthquake.
G = gate failure not leading to dam breach.
L = landslide not leading to dam breach.
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Attendant circumstances (Ac)
Ac refers to conditions that attend a flood, the presence of which can increase the
fatality rate of the event. Examples include an earthquake, extreme weather conditions
such as snow or ice, hurricane-force winds, extreme prior flooding, or a downed radio
tower.
It should be noted that power failures , darkness when Td = N, and rain are
common features of many floods , and the latter two are already noted in the variables Td
and MI. As such, they should only be included under Ac if their impact was exceptional.
Attendant circumstances should first be described, then corporately assigned a
subjective rank based on the impact the circumstances had on variables like Wt, E, and R.
These ranks are:
N

none.

L

low impact.

M

moderate impact.

H

heavy impact.

Magnitude of loading (M)
M is a description of a storm over the watershed, the magnitude of an earthquake
as experienced at the dam site, the size of a flood wave from an upstream dam failure, or
some other narrative description of the loading which leads to darn failure. Descriptions
including peak rainfall rates and depths and their return period would be typical.
Although most hydrologic failures are likely to be coded as E, internal failures during fair
weather are more likely to fall in one of the other categories. Also, one purpose of M is to
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provide a baseline against which Ml can be compared to determine whether local
residents experienced the severity of rai nfall that led to a hydrologic failure . M should
then be coded as follows:
N

no external loading (i.e., an internal failure).

L

low = small (loading is common; could be expected every few years).

M

moderate (loading is infrequent; once every 5-15 years).

H

high = large (loading is uncommon; could be expected once every 15-50
years).

V

very large (loading is quite rare; could be expected once every 50-1 00
years).

E

exceptionally large (loading is difficult to imagine; more rare than 1/ 100
years) .

Magnitude of local loading (MI)
Ml is coded in the same manner as M, but it pertains to the local conditions
experienced by Par prior to the flo od wave arrival.

Human circumstances that
anend the flood

Darn type (Dt)
It is possible that Dt can be combined with variables like H, V, Fm, and Rfto
categorize the potential lethality of a reservo ir or to fac ilitate future studi es into the
likelihood that a particular type of dam will fail. Dt should be identified as follows:
N = none (i.e. , a flash fl ood or other Fit).
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E

earthen.

R

rock fill.

M

masonry.

c

concrete gravity.

A

concrete gravity arch.

Rescue resources (Rr)

Rr include such things as rescue helicopters, the availability of the National Guard
or another branch of the military, paid or volunteer firefighters or police officers located
close to the Par;, emergency management and evacuation personnel, communication
systems not dependent on utilities susceptible to damage or network overload, earthmoving equipment, utility vehicles, and boats.
Sometimes a community can prove extra heroic, with volunteer rescuers either
increasing or decreasing the rate of life loss. Due to its mixed implications and difficulty
of measurement, heroism should not be included as a separate rescue resource. However,
rescues often involve simple tools like garden hoses and human chains, and these should
be recognized as rescue resources . Rr provides a way of normalizing failures , whether
they were in remote or readily accessible areas, and whether they occurred before or
during the modem era.
This variable is probably most relevant when floods are expansive in large,
metropo litan areas. It is significant that the evacuation plan for the City of Sacramento.
California, which is below Folsom Dam, indicates some areas as "evacuation areas" and
others as "rescue areas. "
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R can be categorized as follows:
N = none (rescuers are prevented from assisting until the next day; victims are
overwhelmed so quickly that no rescue attempts are feasible).
L

!ow= limited (rescuers are able to help some people, but they are mostly
limited to hand tools: ropes, rowboats, floating debris, human chains, etc.).

M

medium= modem (modem communication, transportation, and rescue
resources are available locally, at least in moderate supply; generally
reflects the state of development present in urban areas of the USA after
1950).

H

high = exceptional (large numbers of military or rescue workers stationed
nearby, immediate access to many local helicopters, an abundance of boats
in the community; plenty of floating debris, trees, tall buildings, or hills to
sustain victims until they can be rescued; modem wireless communication
systems; state-of-the art early-warning and evacuation system).

Detectability (Det)
Det ranks the extent to which there are signs of imminent failure more than 3 hr
before the dam begins to breach or the degree to which the breach could be predicted by
monitors at the dam.
N

no signs of trouble.

L

low (one or more minor changes at the dam, but would not lead the typical
dam monitor to anticipate failure).
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M

moderate (sufficient changes to consider altering the reservoir operation as
a precaution, but would not lead a typical monitor to expect failure within
the year).

H

high (evidence demanding immediate attention, as it suggests a dam failure
is not unlikely if no action is taken).

V

very high (darn failure appears probable or imminent and can not be readily
avoided).

Striking characteristics and
valuable quotations (Schvq)
Schvq is a narrative summarizing those aspects of the failure which stand out,
might be fairly unique, or are not adequately described in the variables above. This might
include eyewitness descriptions of the event.
To code this variable, it should be viewed as a general description of how well the
overall set of variables describes the event:
L = low= poor (existing variables do a poor job of fully capturing the unique
attributes of this flood event).
H

high= good (existing variables do a good job of fully capturing the nature
of this flood event).

Important variables brought to light
during characterization of events

Pre-failure warning time (Wtpf) and
post-failure warning time (Wtpof)
Wtpf indicates the full length of Wt when it begins prior to failure. Wtpof does
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not start until failure begins. Hence, if Wt begins an hour before failure and the fl ood
travels for 30 minutes, Wtpf = Wt = 90 minutes and Wtpof = 30 minutes.

Wall of water weighted
by the ri se rate (Wwr)
In order to combine events with and without a wall of water, the depth can be
weighted according to the ri se rate. Hence, Wwr = Ww or, if Ww = 0, Wwr =aD when R
= V, Wwr = bD when R = H, and Wwr = l ft when R = M. In these equations, a and bare
constants less then l that reduce D appropriately to account for extra evacuation time
during slower rise rates. Their values should be specified, but they may be adjusted if it
improves the usefulness of Wwr.

Basis of Par (Bpar)
When warnings proceed fa ilure, or people anticipate a failure, evacuation can
proceed in two distinct phases: part of Par evacuates as a precaution and part of Par
remains behind to see what happens. In such cases it is sometimes convenie nt to treat
those who remain behind as Par, since more is known about this group, and to
characterize every variable accordingly. For example, Wtavg would be based on the
warnings that the second group takes seriously and Retj would measure the time needed
to evacuate once they chose to do so. Bpar indicates whether the true Par; is in view or
whether Par; is redefined to include only the remnant who delay to see what will happen .
Bpar is coded as follows:
Pre = pre-evacuation, meaning before any evacuations have begun.
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Post = post-evacuation, meaning Par is based on those left behind after the first
group leaves and Tpar is based on those who become trapped in the flood .

Par type (Pt)
Pt refers to the physical environment surrounding a given subPar or fraction of a
subPar. When recording the codes for Pt, each symbol should be listed separately and,
when possible, tagged based on its percent of Par;. When the components of Par are not
known, Pt should be designated U.
C

campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river.

W

those in the river: wade fishermen, swimmers, rescue workers, etc.

B

those on the river: boaters and rafters.

L

those in or on a lake: boaters and swimmers.

E

employees who are at the dam for construction, repairs, monitoring, failure
prevention, etc. Note, it may be desirable to reclassify this Pt as D, W, or
another overlapping category for purposes of analysis .

Af = automobile drivers or passengers.
T

people occupying a train.

D

those who, prior to evacuation, are in or near buildings. This corresponds to
general drowning deaths in town. These people might encounter the flood
while indoors, while evacuating on foot, or while evacuating in a vehicle,
but generally speaking, they were quantified based on structural damages
and the mode or place of death may not be known.
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U

unknown mix. Whenever possible, subPar should be broken down into pure
Pt (C, W, B, L, Af, or D) to faci litate characterization and analysis.

Proportion of the threatened
population (Ptpar)
Ptpar is similar toP, except that it is the ratio L/Tpar.

Evacuation nonsuccess factor (Ef)
Efi s the proportion of Par remaining in the flood zone when the flood arrives: Ef
=

Tpar/Par. Tpar and "flood arrival" are defined in such a way as to ignore trivial

flooding that does not greatly hinder free movement (generally 6-12 inches for waders
close to the hillside and lesser depths for those evacuating by automobile) .

Havens: safe havens (Sh), chance havens
(C h), pseudo-safe havens (Psh),
aerated havens (Ah), and
compromi sed havens (Co h)
Havens are discussed at length in Chapter VI based on historical insights. Each
variable is described below.
Safe havens CShl. Sh may or may not be flooded, but they represent places of
shelter in which deaths have historically been extremely rare. When deaths occur, th ey
generally involve young children or persons of limited mobility who cannot swim and are
trapped in an area without another person of average abi lity to assist them . Safe havens
include the following:
I.

An upper story with sufficiently shallow flooding that occupants are not

washed out a window and can float on a bed or stand freely. These conditions are
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generally maintained when the flow does not rise more than one foot above the
windowsills in the highest story (about 3 ft above the floor) and the building is not
destroyed.
2.

Quiescent flooding that does not trap people without air. When flooding is

relatively quiescent, people readily keep their heads above water by treading water,
standing on stationary platforms such as counters, floating on beds, or by clinging to
floating furniture . If such flooding does not persist to the point where it would lead to
extreme hypothermia or exhaustion, a relatively safe haven is maintained even when
waters come within I ft of a flat ceiling or 2 ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling, whether or
not the ceiling is elevated.
3.

An attic that is accessible from within a house or trailer home.

4.

A rooftop: The important point is not that safe havens in buildings are

equally easy to reach, but that if some people can reach them, they preserve a means of
shelter that is likely to reduce life loss across a subPar compared to situations in which
every building is obliterated. Means of access might include an internal or external fire
escape, a roof door, or a dormer window. During 191h century floods, there were many
examples of people using a bedpost or other sturdy object to poke a hole in a ceiling or
wall to reach shelter. Similar access to a roof might be possible through many attics
today. People have also been kno"'n to climb objects like drainpipes or trellises, or to
intentionally use the current to float up to the roof while they cling to such objects.
However, when rooftops must be accessed through highly unreliable means and people
must apparently rely on chance to be successful, they should be treated as chance havens.
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5.

A stout tree that is easy to climb, taller than the flood , and not toppled.

6.

Any island or region that experiences shallow flooding during the peak of the

flood, such that depths are easy to resist while standing or clinging to convenient anchors
like telephone poles or lampposts (depths of l-5 ft, depending on the velocity) .
7.

The hillside beyond the flood if a member ofTpar; can readily drive or wade

to it while the flood is still shallow, or if they can reach it directly from the roof or an
upper story.
Chance havens CChl. If debris does not crush or fatally wound flood victims, it
can provide a means of floatation that has saved many lives. Debris is defined as a chance
haven rather than a safe haven because its availability and pathway cannot be readi ly
predicted, its benefits are unreliable, and it can directly cause life loss when not a benefit.
Ch are refuges in the flood , including other types of havens, that are reached
primarily by chance or whose benefits are highly unreliable. As such, they contribute
significantly to the variance in fatality rates across si milar events.
Ch fall into at least five categories:
I.

Rafts and floatation aids: severed rooftops, mattresses, propane tanks, logs,

2.

The roofs of floating buildings: Because it is both more difficult and more

etc.

dangerous to reach and remain on a rooftop after a building begins to drift, lurch, spin. or
sink, roo ftops should be treated as chance havens whenever a building drifts more than
I 00 yards. Although somewhat arbitrary, choosing I 00 yards seeks to standard ize the
approach o f ana lysts in a way that seems to reflect the trends in the historic events
analyzed in this study. Based on historic damage patterns and life loss, buildings that drift
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less than I 00 yards are more appropriately considered pseudo-safe havens most of the
time. This is explored more in Chapter VI.
3.

Stationary structures: any immobile refuge that is reached while drifting ,

including rooftops, upper-story windows, aerated havens, treetops, overhanging branches,
debris dams at bridges that allow victims to walk to dry land, and the shore itself. If
people must rely heavily on chance to reach a largely inaccessible roof, this would also
constitute a chance haven.
4.

Aquatic havens: any location from which shore can be easily reached, such

as a lake or a quiescent backwater, without fighting high velocities.
5.

Wading havens : These are rare, falling in the narrow range of depths and

ve locities that are too high to be considered safe havens and too low to consistently
sweep people away. Due to debris, waves, and unpredictable turbulence, such chance
havens would not typically last long (see Figure 13 shown later).
Pseudo-safe havens CPshl. Psh are safe havens on or in buildings that become
reclassified once the building begins to drift. They are a hybrid between safe havens,
wh ich are static and predictable, and chance havens, which depend on the whims of the
current and the debris load. They exist only among a subset of buildings with major
damage (see Loss of Shelter). As indicated above and in Chapter VI, rooftops are
considered chance havens (Ch) rather than pseudo-safe havens when a building drifts
more than 300 ft .
Aerated havens CAhl. Ah are typically found only when parts of stationary
buildings are torn away (the upper end of Ls = M). They are those pockets of protection
formed by the remaining walls, floor, counters, etc., that provide a place for survival if
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the occupants are fortunate enough to have been located in that portion of the building.
They are not safe havens because their locations depend in part on chance, and great
strength, stamina, and good fortune may be required to resist being swept away in the
face of increased exposure. However, they are not chance havens because they are most
likely to form in locations where people are most likely to seek shelter-that is. in the
most protected sections of temporary safe havens. For those who occupy an Ah, survival
would generally be more likely than for those already in the open current and less likely
than for those in a safe haven.
Comoromised havens CCoh). This simply places Psh and Ah in a single category.
These two havens are likely to be highl y variable with respect to life loss, wi th rates
similar to safe havens when the haven is modestly compromised and with rates
approaching that in the open flood when the haven is severely compromised.

Loss of shelter (Ls)
Ls apportions Par; based on the loss of safe havens (Sh) , pseudo-safe havens
(Psh), and aerated havens (A h) in or on buildings. As such, it is a refinement of
fo rcefidness (F) and similarly relies on damage and destruction (Dd) for guidance.
However, unlike F or Dd, Ls records the proportion of Par; associated with four levels of
shelter loss:
L =low loss of shelter= no structural damage or minor structural damage limited
to flooding on the first floor.
M =major loss of shelter= major structural damage.
H = high (complete) loss of shelter= total destruction.
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Mh

= highly uncertain whether Ls = M or H.

To expound on each of these categories, it is important to realize that Ls is not the
same as economic damages. Lives are lost within buildings when occupants fall into
water in which they cannot swim; become trapped underwater as a room fills to the
ceiling; get struck by large, external debris penetrating from outside; get struck or trapped
underwater as the building breaks apart; or get washed through a wall or out a door or
window into open water. As such, the critical question is not the degree of economic
damages or whether a building should later be condemned, but whether or not a structure
maintains an accessible safe haven, pseudo-safe haven, or aerated haven for the duration
of a flood.
It follows , that loss of shelter is not synonymous with the definitions used by the

American Red Cross or other agencies to define housing damages. Ls = L implies
relatively safe havens on every floor, Ls = M implies complete loss of a safe haven on the
first floor, and Ls = H implies complete loss of all safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, and
aerated havens, including any accessible rooftop. Since loss of a safe haven is generally
accompanied by structural damage, traditional categories of minor and major damage
generally agree with Ls = L and Ls = M when they are based on structural damages and
not mere water damage. By contrast, Ls = H only if no accessible, aerated pockets of
protection remain, regardless of whether a building floats off its foundation or is later
condemned.
The following refinements, based on historical observations, should be kept in
mind (largely copied from Chapter VI):
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I. Ls = L. Almost every room has a counter, desk, couch, table, chair, bookcase,
bed, dresser, piano, or other piece of furniture that can provide an elevated platform or a
floatation device during a flood. When a flood is relatively quiescent, with few
exceptions, these objects and a little swimming allow people to keep their heads above
the water surface even when the flood nears the ceiling. While elevated ceilings could
pose a special problem, a flood reaching such depths without causing major damage
would necessarily be very calm, making it easier to cling to floating furniture, tread
water, or hang onto rafters. This has been demonstrated in commercial buildings. Hence,
Ls = L when there is minor structural damage and the flood does not encroach within a
foot of the first-floor ceiling or within 2ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling.
2. Ls = M. If the highest accessible floor (including an accessible attic) is filled
with water beyond I ft of the ceiling, but the flood does not crest an accessible roof, Ls =
M rather than H because an accessible safe haven remains. If walls are ripped off but
portions of walls and floors or counters remain to shelter occupants from the main current
or to provide something to which they might cling, the loss of shelter is major; but if only
trivial structural members remain such that all shelter is lost, the dwelling is destroyed.
A building is destroyed any time it is torn apart and submerged in the flood .
However, if a building floats off its foundation and maintains an accessible pseudo-safe
haven for the duration of the flood, Ls = M.
3. Ls =H. !fa rooftop is inaccessible, a building is destroyed when the top floor
or accessible attic is completely submerged. If a rooftop is accessible, the building is
considered destroyed only if the flood or flood waves wash across the crest of the roof to
an extent likely to wash people into the flood. Since the momentum of the flood riding
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the slant of the roof will cause waves to run up, this elevation is generally on the order of
a foot or two below the roofs crest.
4. Ls

= Mh.

Ls

= Mh means that,

based on uncertainty, analysts view Ls

=M

and Ls = H as having roughly equal probabilities. lt is a category that applies primarily
when estimating Ls for hypothetical floods. Based on the current state of the art, it is
unlikely that analysts will be able to predict the boundary between Ls = M and Ls

=H

with great precision. Ls = Mh is a subset of the pseudo-chance zone defined below.

Wei ghted loss of shelter (Lsw)
Historical analysis is greatly facilitated when Ls is homogeneous-that is, when
Ls = H 100%, M 100%, or Ll 00%. When Ls is mixed, however, life-loss trends can still
be explored by placing the overall mix of damages on a scale from 0 to 1. The scaled
value is called the weighted loss of shelter. The weights assigned to each type of damage
(L, M, and H) should correspond to the relative historical lethality observed among
structures with each category of damage. These relationships can be determined from
cases for which Ls was homogeneous.
Theoretically, Ptpar; = L/ fpar; should tend to increase as safe havens are removed
by the flood. Thus, when every structure is swept away and destroyed, Ptpar; should be
greatest and such structures should be given full weight (WH = 1). If one relies on
average values across homogenous subPar, the correct weight for Ls
(avg. Ptpar; for Ls
weight for Ls

= M would be WM =

= MlOO%)/(avg. Ptpar; for Ls = HIOO%). In the same way, the correct

= L would be WL = (avg.

Ptpar; for Ls

= L!OO%)/(avg. Ptpar; for Ls =

HI 00%). A weight of zero applies if the average ratio oflife loss is zero.
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Lsw = l*(Ls =H)+ WM*(Ls = M) + WL *(Ls = L) where Ls = H, Ls = M. and Ls
= Leach represent the percentage ofTpar; (or Par; if the distribution ofT par; is unknown)
associated with structures in the respective damage categories.

Flood zones: safe zones (Sz),
compromised zones (Coz),
chance zones (Cz), and
pseudo-chance zones (Pcz)
When one includes the open current and depths in which successful wading is
highly dependent on chance, a flood can be divided into four zones with unique life-loss
distributions. Each zone is described below.
I. Safe zones (Sz). This includes all safe havens. These provide a high degree of
safety and a consistently low rate of life loss. Havens that have been only mildly
compromised have similar life-loss characteristics and so shou ld be included. The
proportional life-loss distributions in safe zones should closely approximate that for Ls =
L.

2. Compromised zones (Coz). That central portion of compromised havens that
have not been purposely classified as safe zones or pseudo-chance zones. Because the
tails are accounted for under pseudo-chance zones and safe zones, the proportional lifeloss distribution should closely resemble that when the severity of structural damage for
Ls = M is in the central 60%-80%.
~.

Chance zones (Cz). The places where people are submerged or face the open

flood, and all chance havens that might be reached while drifting. The proportional lifeloss distribution in chance zones should closely approximate that for Ls = H.
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4. Pseudo-chance zones (Pcz). There is a range of depths*velocities, unique to
each type of building, for which it is unclear whether a structure is most likely to be
destroyed, float far downstream, or experience severe damage that leaves only aerated
havens. In such cases, L = Mh, meaning L = M or L =H. Similarly, there is a range of
depths*velocity for which it is highly uncertain whether people will topple or be able to
wade . Combined, these locations comprise the pseudo-chance zones. The proportional
life-loss distribution for pseudo-chance zones should closely approximate a combination
of the relevant portions of the proportional life-loss distributions for Ls =Hand Ls = M.

Zone densities (Zd): safe zone density (Szd),
compromised zone density (Cozd),
chance zone density (Czd), and
pseudo-chance zone density (Pczd)
Density represents the distribution ofTpar; among flood zones based on
topographic, structural, and hydraulic considerations as they interface with flood routing
and the rise rate of the flood. The word "density" refers to the number of people who
have access to a category rather than to the physical dimensions of flood zones
themselves. Access includes the physical ability to move to a location and sufficient time
to get there before being cut off by the flood.
Density is predicated on the historic pattern that most members of Tpar; will seek
out the safest haven they can reach in the time available. A more expansive list of
insights and justifications can be found in Chapter VI. The result of these insights is that
we can apportion Tpar; among the flood zones its members are most likely to occupy by
apportioning the accessible physical havens and by associating them with the average
number ofTpar; likely to be nearby based on census data. Accessibility is cut off if the
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flood rises too quickly, but this is rarely a concern when Ls = M, the usual case in which
densities are widely distributed.
Thus, Szd, Cozd, Pczd, and Czd each represent the number of people expected to
be in each of the corresponding flood zones. People can be expected to choose Sz, Coz,
Pcz, and Cz in that order, as they are available. People should be assigned to the highest
level that persists for the duration of the flood, with the understanding that they are only
assigned to Cz if the haven they previously reached ceases to exist.

Life loss zones (Lsz, Lcoz, Lpcz, Lcz)
Zones oflife loss are analogous to L;, except that they are specific to the zones sz,
coz, pcz, and cz.

Proportion of lives lost in zones
(Prsz, Prcoz, Prpcz, and Prcz)
The proportion of lives lost in each zone is analogous to Ptpar;, except that it is
specific to one of the zones sz, coz, pcz, or cz. Note that "proportion" is designated with
Pr instead of the traditional P in order to avoid confusion between the pseudo-chance
zone (Pcz) and the proportion of lives lost in the chance zone (Prcz).

Tools For Researchers

Appendix D contains several tools that can help readers and researchers keep
track of the many variables presented above and some of their subtleties. Table D.l is an
alphabetical list of every variable in Chapter V. Table 0.2 is a summary table of every
variable, their names, their symbols, the codes used for nominal and ordinal variables, a
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brief description of each code, and the units. An abbreviated version of Chapter V and a
copy of the template used when characterizing events for Appendix B follow in
Appendix D.
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CHAPTER VI
INSIGHTS FROM HISTORlC FLOOD EVENTS

Modes of Death and Means of Survival

According to a thorough study of the unpublished subPar characterizations, deaths
have historically occurred in the overlapping contexts presented in Table 16. People have
survived catastrophic floods through the means presented in Table 17.

Pieces of the Life-Loss Puzzle

This section lists qualitative insights from historic case studies that have sufficient
support that they were evaluated to be highly reliable. Many but not all of the case studies
are thoroughly characterized in working documents that underlie the summary in
Appendix B. In those working documents, the observations are carefully supported by
reference to several hundred source documents, subsets of which are listed at the end of
each event to which they pertain.
Only a modest effort has been made to index these insights to the events
underlying Appendix B for the following reasons :
I.

Dozens of statements from survivors, eyewitnesses, and researchers from

many different events support most of the observations.
2.

While the working documents underlying Appendix B include careful records

of source materials, such statements were often not critical in characterizing the cases and
so they were only summarized or not recorded.
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Table 16.

Means by which people die in a catastrophic flood
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Mode of Death
Lethal blow when struck by or crushed between large/sharp
debris.
Trapped underwater within a stationary structure. Water pressure
often seals doors.
Pulled underwater by an undertow or sinking raft while riding a
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a •

H

H

mobilized house, vehicle, boat, roof, mattress, or other floating

H

refuge.
Mobilized home drifts, then disintegrates through collisions,
exposing occupants.
Pinned underwater after drifting against a tree, pole, house, fence,

H
H

rock, etc.

6.
7.
8.
9.
I 0.
II .
12.
13.
14.
15 .
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Held underwater by sw ift and violent undercurrents.
Insufficient strength to swim across swift and violent currents
before tiring.
Buried in sediment carried by the flood.
Overtaken by a wall of water wh ile driving out of a canyon instead
of climbing the slope.
Water-born plagues in countries lacking modern water-treatment
facilities.
Lethal blow from a collapsing structure.
Lethal blow when driven violently into a pole or other obstacle.
Baby or young child swept out of adult's arms while adult wading.
Fall off a raft (usually a roof, vehicle, or matTress) and unable to
swim adequately.
Motorists attempt to cross a flooded road/bridge and wash into
deeper water, where trapped.
Unexpected wall of water washes vehicle off a road or bridge.
Climb on top of a vehicle, only to be washed away as the water
nses.
After evacuating, return to the flood zone for a belonging and
swept away.
Enter flood to try to rescue or warn family, friends, or strangers.
Firefighters or other evacuation officials caught by the flood.
Delay evacuation to grab money, boots, pet, or other valuable.
Struck by debris while clinging to a pole, causing injury and
knocking loose.
Wading through shallow flood and step into a submerged creek,

H
H
H

H
H
M

M
M
M

M
M

M

•

M

•
•

M
M
M

L
L

culvert, etc.

24. Buried by a slope failure at/near the dam following drawdown.

•

L
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Table 16.

Continued
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Mode of Death
25 . Undercu tting causes roadway to collapse as veh icle passes

~ ~ ~

co

Cl

L

overtop.

26. Due to poor v isibi lity (night, rain, fog, sharp curve), drive into a
washout.
27. Weight of trai n causes bridge to collapse during flood conditions.
28 . Vehicle is moved down a street in shallow water. then washed into
a deep, water-filled pit.
29. Come to watch flood, then surrounded and swept away.
30. Trapped, lacerated, or strangled by flood-borne barbed wire,

L
L
L

•

•

L
•
•

•

financial security.

L
L

L
L
L

or capsize.
39. Heart attac k or other fatal condition caused by fear and exertion
during the fl ood.
40. Lethal shock after the flood due to lost family, community, or

L
L

etc.
34. Fall from a high window during evacuation.
35 . Electroc ution when live power lines break.
36 Swimmer pulled under by an unexpected undertow in a reservoir
following a flood.
37. A boat on a reservoir is capsized and pulled under at the mouth of
a tributary.
38. Boaters are washed downstream at great ve locity until they crash

L
L

powe r lin es, etc.

3 1. Hypothermia.
32. Explosions caused by boilers, transformers, smelters, etc.
33. Burned in fire caused by natural gas, broken power lines, lanterns,

•

L
•

L

•

L

41 . The depression associated with losses or the guilt associated with

"undeserved" survival causes a loss in the will to live and death
w ithin days, months, or years. This includes suicides, but also
marked changes in activity leve ls, rapid deterioration (especially
among elderly), and behavioral diseases like alcoholism, drug
add iction, and patterns of self-destruction.

• Relative Frequency is coded as follows: L ~ low (wou ld expect only in an atypical or extreme event), M
= medi um (com mon , but probably not a dominant mode if man y died), H ~ high (one of the dominant
modes if many died). These are subjective categories based on historical accounts of fatalities.
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Table 17.

Means by which people survive when faced with a catastrophic flood
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I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Run upstairs to a second or third story.
Stand on a couch, counter, piano, refrigerator, table, dresser, or cupboard.

Climb a tree before or after being swept downstream.
Washed into calm or shallow water, where can climb onto shore.
Grab an overhanging tree branch near shore and pull self to safety.
Ride a floating house until it lodges against the ground or another
structure.

8. Drive laterally out of the flood zone.
9 Outpace an advancing flood, driving down a narrow canyon.
10. Wash out into the relatively calm waters of a lake or reservoir and then
swim to shore.
II. Climb onto roof (via upstairs window or by poking hole through from
below).
12. Swim to a roof or drift there on a mattress, log, board, or propane tank.
13. Float indoors on a mattress or buoyant furniture, or stabilize someone less

capable on such a raft.
14. Cling to a telephone pole, lamppost, fence, etc. in water 6-ft deep or less.
15. Baby or small child thrown to someone on shore by wader who can't
move.

16. Ride a floating house, roof, or other raft until it piles up in a debris dam
behind a bridge, then walk across roofs and debris to dry land.
17 Rescued by a helicopter while on a roof, second story, tree, car top, or
island.
18. Rescued by boat.
19 . Pulled/carried to safety by a human chain, rope, or larger/stronger person.
20. Pulled ins ide a second-story window after drifting near there.
21. Baby or child passed or thrown out a window to someone in a safer
location.

22. Dug out of mud after wave passes, with help of dogs and rescue crews.
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Mode of Survival
Run up nearby hillside, keeping dry or splashing through early flooding.
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• Relative Frequency is coded as follows: L ~ low (wou ld expect only in an atypical or extreme event), M
(common, but probably not a dominant mode if many survived), H ~high (one of the dominant
modes if many survived). These are subjective categories based on historical accounts of survivors.
~medium
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3.

The most pertinent information was discovered iteratively as more and more

events were characterized.
4.

While reading through events to identify those most easily characterized,

insights were gleaned or reinforced from events not found in Appendix B.
5.

When an insight was recorded under Schvq or another variable because it

was considered significant, new, or particularly cogent, it was generally not repeated
under subsequent subPar for the sake of efficiency.
6.

This section is intended only as a summary and not as a substitute for the

unpublished subPar characterizations and the hundreds of source documents underlying
them.
7.

The volume and complexity of the presentation in the unpublished event

characterizations would make full indexing a daunting task.
When indexed to indicate a useful example, the citations take the form(#.#). The
first number indicates the number of the event and the second number indicates the
number of the subPar associated with that event. If only the first number is given, it refers
to a pattern found in more than one subPar during that event, or to notes recorded in an
introductory summary to the event as a whole. If an event rather than a number is
indicated (i.e., South Fork Dam, Johnstown, 1889), it simply means that the applicable
event was reviewed in detail, but was not formally characterized with a written record.
Each index number refers to a specific subPar named in Appendices B and C.
Appendix C provides a summary table of the values assigned to every characterizing
variable for every event formally characterized. Appendix B provides an alphabetical list
of those events. A common numeric code(#.#) accompanies the subPar names in both
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appendices for easy cross-referencing. The remainder of Appendix B provides examples,
excerpts, and bibliographic information from the formal characterization of each subPar,
focusing primarily on insights recorded under the category "Striking Characteristics and
Valuable Quotations (Schvq)."
Given that a life-threatening event has occurred, pieces to the life-loss puzzle can
generally be stored in one of the puzzle boxes presented in the first column of Table 18.
The second column in Table 18 indicates important questions or descriptions pertaining
to these topical puzzle boxes, and the third column indicates the variables from Chapter 5
that are most relevant to each box. Chapter VI opens each puzzle box in tum, lays the
puzzle pieces out in detail, and attempts to fit most of the pieces together using
qualitative and historically based observations. Because one of the goals for this chapter
is to help researchers understand which variables play the most crucial roles and how
these variables interact in complex ways, each section heading includes relevant variables
in parentheses from column three of Table 18.

Type of failure CFm M Dt Ty Ts)

Flash floods
Modem radar, combined with flood-prediction algorithms, are still imperfect in
consistently predicting major flash flood events before they occur, although significant
improvements have been made. Human operators are also prone to error or misjudgment.
In some cases, there is a reluctance to issue a warning because the computers frequently
detect fa lse anomalies (l.l).
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Table 18.

Issues influencing the rate of life loss
Description or Governing Question(s)

Category
I

Type of
Failure

2
3.

Delectability
Warning
Times and
Effectiveness

4.

Evacuation
Rates

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

Excess Evac.

Times
SubPar Type
and
Evacuation
Modes
Homogeneity
of SubPar
Flood
Dynamics
Loss of Shelter

a)
b)
c)
d)
Do

Breach - hydrologic, seismic, or internal
Uncontrolled Re lease = mechanical or human error
Drawdown ~ upstream slope failure
Displacement ~ landslide displacing the reservoir
people detect the likelihood of a failure?

How much time does each person have to evacuate after
becoming aware of the danger, and how mobilizing is the
message?

II. Flood Zones
and Zone
Density
12. Lethality Rate
Outside Safe
Havens
13. Lethality Rate
in Safe Havens
14. Lethality Rate
on Dry Land
15. Life-Saving
Interventions
16. Complications
or Aberrations

Det, Dt
Wt, Sc, 0, We, Td,
Wt"'' Pt, Ft, Fit

What proportion of people can clear the flood zone before
they are endangered or trapped?
How much extra time do people have to evacuate before
they are endangered or trapped?
Where are people located? What is significant about each
location and people's associated behavior?

Ef, Pr, Td, Tw, Ts,
Ml, Pt, Dev, Ret
E, Ef

Have the subPar been defmed in such a way categories 5I 0 apply homogeneously to each?
What are the hydraulic characteristics of the flood among
Tpari?

Par;, Pt, Gf, Ls, Fp,
F,, Schvq
Fit, V, D, Qp, Qb,
W, Dv , R, Ww; Dt;
H, Hp, B, Vo l, Rf, A
Bt, Ls, Dd, Sh, Psh ,
Fp, Fd, F,, Fpar, Pt
Sh, Ch, Psh, Ah,
Coh, Pt. Bt, R, Ww.
D1ocat. Vlocat. Sc,
Wt"''' E, Schvq

What are the structural damages and to what extent do
these expose Tpari to the flood dynamics?

10. Safe Havens,
Chance
Havens,
Pseudo-Safe
Havens, and
Ae rated
Havens

Variables
Fm, M, Dt, Ty, Ts

Safe Havens : How accessible are refuges in which Tpar;
can seek protection?
Chance Havens: How likely is it that debris and obstacles
will save lives rather than cause deaths?
Pseudo-Safe Havens: If buildings float, are they likely to
stay intact or be destroyed?
Aerated Havens: When a building has major damage, do
accessible pockets remain that are more dangerous than
safe havens, but that nonetheless facilitate survival?
Is there time to reach a safe zone? If so, what is the
distribution ofTpar; among flood zones that have unique
historic distributions of life loss?
When not protected, how many people can float to safety
on debris, wash to shore, walk across a debris dam , or
otherwise escape the flood?
Can this be equated with the lethality rate on land, where
damages are minor, or to some other function?
This wou ld include stress-related deaths of evacuees and
the relatives of vict ims.
How many members ofTpar; can be rescued? How does
this affect the rate of life loss?
Are there unique circumstances that increase or decrease
the life loss in this particular event?

Pt, Ft

Sz, Cz, Pcz, Coz,
Szd, Czd, Pczd,
Cozd
Ptpar;, Ls, Pt, Ft; L,
P;, Tpar;; Ln, Lnf,

Lin, Linf
Ls, Pt, Ptpar; Sh,
Psh
Ft, Schvq

Rr, Sh, Psh, Ch,
Ptpar
Ml, Ac, Td, Ts
1
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Table 18.

Continued

Category

Description or Governing Question(s)

Variables

Does the loss of friends, family, jobs, financial attainment, Schvq
Post-flood
or emotional peace of mind hinde r the ability of people to
psychological
trauma
live life in a healthy manner or cause premature death?
18. Applicability of Historic Events to Future Events: Logic Behind a Proposed Model
17

In many areas, flash floods and hydrologic failures due to intense thunderstorms
are much more likely during the summer. This is also when tourists are most likely to be
present-especially outdoor recreationists in or near streams.

Sabotage
Sabotage has not been common outside of wartime, but it has occurred often
enough to be an important source of failure. Dams breached through sabotage or wartime bombing include the following: Eastover Mining Company Sludge Pond, Kentucky,
1981 (20); Mohne Dam, Germany, 1943 (killed 1,200); Eder Dam, Germany, 1943; and
the Dnjeprostroj Dam, Soviet Union, 1941 (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1983).
Unsuccessful attempts at bombing or sabotage include the Peruca Dam in Croatia, blasted
by retreating Serbian forces, 1993 (Engineering News Record, 1993); and the Ordunte
dam during the Spanish Civil War. German forces visited the Aswan dam with the
intention of studying how to destroy it, but this was never accomplished (Gruner, 1963).
The most destructive intentional breach occurred in 1938 when Chiang Kaishek tried to
stop the Japanese army that was invading China. He dynamited a hole in the
southern levee of the Hwang-Ho River. The effect on the Japanese is not reported, but the
flood destroyed thousands of villages, half a million Chinese peasants drowned, and
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several million more died through famine following the destruction of agriculture
(Kovach, 1995).

Earthquake
Historically, there have been virtually no lives lost due to a dam failure caused by
an earthquake. Interestingly, failure by sabotage is usually ignored in dam safety risk
assessments (although it is sometimes included in a relative vulnerability assessment, it is
impossible to estimate the likelihood of initiation of sabotage) and failure by an
earthquake is often considered one of the greatest hazards, especially if a sudden failure
mode is plausible.

Importance of type of failure
The nature of a darn failure is irrelevant to life loss, except as it influences the
nature of the resulting wave, season, and the warning characteristics. There are two
exceptions to this:
I.

When people are killed by the failure of the slope itself (II). A dam can

threaten workers following a sudden drawdown if the drawdown results in a failure of the
embankment while workers are present (II. I).
2.

When the loading is also local. Examples include an earthquake that blocks

evacuation routes and traps people in buildings; and a severe storm that blocks
evacuation routes (South Fork Dam, Johnstown) or hinders the awareness of sensory
clues (29).
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Detectability CDet Dt)
Several insights are worth noting: In many cases, the Par near a dam has been
aware that the dam was unsafe (17). When a safety concern has been detected, there has
generally been a relucta.'lce to issue a warning until failure is viewed as highly likely or
inevitable. Based on modem improvements in dam engineering, monitoring, and safety
awareness, many clues that were not properly interpreted in the past would be recognized
as serious safety concerns if they manifested today, but still reluctance by public officials
and owners might result in delays.

Warning times and effectiveness
CWt Sc 0 We Td Wt~ Pt Ft Fit)
As the number of variables listed in the heading indicates, there are a large
number of possible perspectives one can take regarding the timing and effectiveness of
warnings. It is useful to examine historical insights for a number of these in detail.

Warning time
The following insights are worth noting:
I.

The initial warning time (Wt), whether restricted to official sources or

defined to include any human source, says nothing about the percentage of people
warned, the urgency or effectiveness of the warning, the rate of warning propagation, the
average time available for evacuation, or the time needed to evacuate. As such, it is
informative regarding the response rate of officials, but it provides little information
regarding the reduction of Par; to Tpar;. As an extreme example, Wt for the Bangladesh
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3.

Those who have prior experience with extreme flooding, other natural

disasters like tornadoes, or who have participated in evacuation drills, are more likely to
evacuate promptly and via a safe route (15.1)
4.

When the magnitude of an approaching flood is greater than officials or

residents expect, it can be difficult to get people to believe the seriousness of the danger
and to evacuate. This is especially true when the most severe events in memory caused
only nuisance flooding or when a flash flood is preceded by mild local weather (15.1 ,
16 .1).
5.

The likelihood that people will evacuate increases with the number of

warnings they receive and the number of different sources from which they receive them
(15.1 ).
6.

Even though a county or dam owner has an emergency action plan, few may

be familiar with it, fewer still may be able to relate it to the real-life dynamics of a
catastrophic flood, officials may be ill-prepared to actually put it into practice in a timely
manner, and the names and telephone numbers of key contacts may not have been kept
up-to-date. In some cases, a plan may depend on a single person or a small set of persons
who are unavailable or incapable of responding at the time of the disaster ( 16.1, 34.1 ).
7.

Those most difficult to warn are usually motorists and outdoor recreationists.

8.

Historically, NWS flash flood warnings appear to have had a limited ability

to mobilize evacuations when presented as a crawl across the bottom of the TV screen or
a brief auditory message. There are several reasons:
a)

Warnings often lack urgency or cover a sufficiently broad area that

listeners figure it pertains to other locations.
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b)

Readers of a crawl figure if a serious danger was imminent, it would not

be presented as a crawl.
c)

Recipients figure that if a true emergency existed, warnings would be

confirmed by other sources.
d)

Not everyone is watching TV or listening to the radio.

Sensory clues
All of the following sensory clues (Sc) have alerted people to danger:
I.

A loud roar, resembling an amplified version of thunder, ocean waves, an

earthquake, or a crashing airplane.
2.

The sight of an approaching wall of water, which can often resemble fire ,

smoke, or fog from a distance because of the way light reflects off the spray that rises.
This is usually covered in front and above by debris, including houses, logs, trees, and a
thick mat of earth. In some cases, the debris is so dense that it completely hides the water
from view.
3.

The sound of cracking trees and telephone poles.

4.

The sound oflogs, trees, and boulders bouncing off the canyon walls.

5.

The sound of houses exploding into a shower of boards as they are ripped

from their foundations and smashed one against another.
6.

The sound of a creek growing louder and louder when a flood rises slowly.

7.

The sight and sound of exploding power stations or transformers.

8.

The buzz of electricity from snapping power lines.

9.

Power lines swinging vio lently from upstream disturbances.
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10. Railroad tracks snaking violently.
II. An advance, fast-rising flood, filled with debris, that precedes a wall of water
by 2-30 minutes. The first warning might be shallow flooding in the house.
12. The sight of neighbors moving vehicles to high ground or congregating on
the hillside.
13. The obscure warning of motorists racing by while honking their horns.
14. Pets becoming agitated.
15 . Power outages.
16. Dead phone lines.
The following conditions can mask sensory clues:
I.

Heavy rain and hail tend to drive people indoors and mask both visual and

auditory clues (22, 29).
2.

A strong wind.

3.

No wall of water, but a fast-rising flood at night that rises with little sound

4.

The darkness of night can hinder visual clues and obscure auditory clues, but

(18).

floods are often loud enough to wake people at night. Nevertheless, even when there is a
loud wall of water, a fast-rising leading wave can surround a home before the greater
wave is perceived (I 6.2).

Average warning time
Individual warnings provide a basis for an average warning time (Wtavg)· These
individual warnings can arrive by any of the following modes:
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I.

sensory clues,

2.

telephone calls from neighbors or authorities before a flood nears the area

(i.e. , before the phone lines go dead),
3.

passing motorists honking their horns and shouting warnings out the window,

4.

shouts from fleeing neighbors,

5.

family or friends who stop by on foot or in an automobile,

6.

the radio,

7.

the TV,

8.

CB rad ios,

9.

fire fighters or police officers who drive through neighborhoods with

bullhorns or who go door to door, and
I 0. a self-appointed Paul Revere who races from door-to-door or business to
business delivering a quick warning with the intention that it be passed along.
The following insights and subtleties regarding the average warning time (Wtavg)
should be noted:
I.

In a long, narrow river valley, when a wall of water progresses slower than

people can drive, there will typically be motorists or residents who detect the flood
through sensory clues and who flee downstream in an automobile. If they can gain
distance, these motorists may stop along the way to warn residents or to pick up family
and friends. At the least, they will typically tum on their lights, honk their horns, and
possibly shout quick warnings out their windows. Such warnings do not always
communicate the approaching danger effectively, but they generally prompt a curiosity
that alerts other residents to sensory clues or alternate forms of warning. This allows
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many to run up a nearby hillside or to evacuate by automobile. Such actions generate a
chain reaction, as more vehicles evacuate, people warn their neighbors, or people notice
the swarm of unusual activity outside their windows. This contagious process can
mobilize the better part of a community, saving countless lives, even in the absence of
warnings by public officials. However, it is by nature much more random than a fo rmal
evacuation plan implemented by trained public officials. As such, when many houses are
rapidly destroyed, the chances that at least some people will remain ignorant of the
approaching danger and fall victim to the flood remains high (30). The Buffa lo Creek
dam failure provides an excellent example of this process as it worked itself out over 15
miles (see Wt, Wt, 8, and Sc in the unpublished working documents for event 17).
2.

Wired telephone service is quickly lost in virtually every catastrophic flo od

and so should not be counted on to propagate a warning at the last minute.
3.

Power is quickly lost or intentionally turned off in virtually every

catastrophic flood , eliminating the usefulne ss of most last-minute radio or TV broadcasts.
4.

No cases provided information on the use of wireless telephones in

disseminating a warning, but during disasters wireless exchanges can quickly become
overloaded, blocking communication traffic .
5.

Although Wtavg characterizes Wti more closely than does Wt, it does not

characterize those with the shortest Wti. As such, Wtavg may appear large even though a
significant percentage of the subPar receives little or no warning. This is especially true
when Par type are mixed: i.e., a river reach that includes residents watching the evening
news and those who are sleeping in isolated campsites (16.2).
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6.

Wtavg, like Wt and Sc, lasts only until the flood reaches a level of potential

lethality . This is defined conservatively such that only trivial flooding is permitted . Once
a house is surrounded by water or people in the floodplain have to wade, the stopwatch
on warning time is read. Evacuation after this point is defined as reaching a safe haven.

Evacuation rates CEf Pr Td
Tw. Ts Ml Pt Dev Ret)
The fo llowing list provides important historical observations and insights
regarding evacuation rates:
I.

When the inundated area is not more than about 1,000 ft wide, most houses

have a back door within 300ft of safety . If the danger is clearly understood, it generall y
takes 0.5-3 minutes for a family to evacuate during the day, and l-6 minutes at ni ght,
depending on how many people must be gathered, how quickly they expect the flood to
arri ve, how extreme the weather is outside, and whether or not they linger, get dressed,
grab possessions, or warn neighbors. These ranges must be extended sli ghtly when the
danger does not immediately register (6.1). Average values (the representative evacuation
time, Ret) are on the order of 1-2 minutes during the day and 2-4 minutes at night. During
the day, a large wall of water can provide a Wt.,g of 1-4 minutes based on sensory clues,
explaining why some very destructive floods have killed a small percentage of Par when
Wt = 0 minutes (30).
2.

Frequently, healthy individuals slow their evacuation to help others-

neighbors, strangers, aged parents, a disabled relative, babies, children. In some cases,
they all perish together (6.1).

222
3.

It is not uncommon for people to delay or tum back to grab a pocket book,

pair of boots, coat, clean clothes for a child, or some other valuable of minor importance.
Sometimes people will return after reaching high ground. They can also delay to grab a
pet orto release pigs or horses ( 17, 18, 18.25, 29). Many people have died due to such
delays.
4.

Strong rains, bitter cold, and other extreme weather conditions can slow an

evacuation, but people will quickly run outside if they expect a towering wall of water to
crash into thei r house at any moment.
5.

Spouses who work outside the flood zone may run or drive into the flood

zone to try to reach their families before the flood arrives, even if there is insufficient
time to reach home or to evacuate once there. This increases the Ret and can greatly
increase life loss (29).
6.

When workers are concentrated in a factory , warnings can often be

propagated within seconds or minutes with a high degree of credibility and urgency (29).
7.

Fences can prove formidable barriers to evacuation on foot, slowing escape

or preventing it altogether. In some cases, elderly adults have thrown children over fences
while they were forced to face the flood (6.1 ).
8.

There is a small percentage of people who refuse to evacuate, even in the face

of clear, urgent, door-to-door warnings (8 .1 , l8.3a).
9.

Evacuation warnings are generally less effective prior to dam fai lure since the

magnitude of the flood is not known and it is uncertain when or if a flood wave will
actually appear. Hence, the evacuation rate prior to failure can be much slower than after
failure(l7 ,23.l , 35).
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I 0. Sometimes people believe a dam might fail , or even has failed, but believe
the flood will do no more than nuisance flooding at their home. Under such
misapprehensions, even the sensory clues of a leading, fast-rising, debris-filled flood may
not produce a rapid evacuation (15, 17.12, 22, 29.9).
II. Evacuation rates will vary with the expected travel time of the flood. That is,
people who can evacuate in seconds or minutes may take much longer if they think they
have half an hour or an hour.
12. The last four points limit the effectiveness of many evacuations. causing the
trend line of E vs. Ef (Ef= Tpar/Par) to approach an asymptotic value slightl y above zero
as E increases (see Figure 14 for historic examples, shown later).
13 . Most people who evacuate on foot in narrow valleys choose a reasonably
direct route toward safety, moving laterally toward the nearby hillside.
14. When evacuees panic, they can freeze in their tracks, jump out of upper story
windows, or overlook the closest hillside and run parallel to the river, sometimes toward
the flood ( 17, 18, 26.2, 29). Some panicked individuals have run toward the river to cross
a bridge to run up the hillside on the opposite side. While cases of panic are uncommon,
they can infect an entire group, resulting in great, unnecessary life loss (29).

Excess evacuation times CE ED
Because the representative evacuation time (Ret) is based on escaping the flood
zone, and since warning times for Wtavg stop increasing once 6-12 inches of water crosses
the floodplain, the excess evacuation time (E) says something about the likely size o f the
threatened population (Tpar;) but it says nothing about the ability of people to reach safe
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havens ( 18). Likewise, E says little about the ability of people to wade to safety or escape
with the help of rescuers during the early stages of flooding (18.21 ).
When E is small or negative, safe havens provide the best alternative to
evacuation. For example, when people dwell on an island that is submerged by a fl ood.
there may be patches of relatively high ground that allow people to safe ly stand in
shallow water (a safe haven) while their houses are washed away. The same can hold true
fo r any location cut off from the edge of the flood by bridges, barriers, or distance. In
such cases, because people may seek shelter outside of buildings on higher ground. high
loss of shelter does not reflect the nature of the flood experienced by the residents.
Expecting Ptpar; to approach 1.0, one might be surprised to find the life loss approaching
zero (18.21).
E is the only measure of time that describes the likelihood that people will
successfully evacuate. Wt, Wtavg, and Sc say something about the time available for
evacuation and Ret describes the time needed to evacuate, but only E describes the
difference between the two. In the same way, Sc and Wtavg indicate whether peopie are
likely to reach a safe haven only when these values are compared to the time required to
get there.

SubPar type and evacuation
modes CPt Ft)
The rate of life loss varies significantly among Par type since it is a functi on of
where people are located when the flood reaches lethal proportions. Apart from where
people are located when they learn about a failure , the excess evacuation time, their
modes of evacuation, and the local loss of shelter also influence their locations. Issues
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affecting lethality are presented or expanded upon toward the end of this chapter. The
subsections below present insights specific to each Par type.

Residential vs. commercial vs . seasonal
Each of these words defines a type of community with unique temporal
characteristics.
Residential neighborhoods. During school, work, and commuting hours, the
population in residential areas should not be based on the average occupancy, since a
large percentage of both adults and children wi ll not be home. The same holds true during
camping holidays, weekends in the summer when people are likely to be away from
home, and popular shopping times.
Commercial districts. Depending on the nature of the local businesses,
commercial districts can be largely vacant outside of work hours and especially at night,
on Sundays, and on holidays.
Seasonal areas. In some cases, a subPar will consist almost exclusively of tourists
or recreationists. Examples include campgrounds (3), fishermen (2), and resort
communities (32). In such cases, the subPar will fluctuate in size based on the season and
whether it is a weekend or holiday, so the likelihood of a dam failure should also be
estimated on a seasonal basis.

Buildings
Those who are caught while running from a building toward the hillside benefit
from being among buildings only if the buildings shield them or provide a chance haven
as they are washed downstream.
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Automobiles
The likelihood of people being in a vehicle rather than at home or at work is much
higher during regular commuting hours and much lower at night.
People often choose to evacuate by vehicle when it is safer, shorter, and quicker
to run up the hillside. There are several reasons for this:
1.

A vehicle may have great monetary value, so there is a desire to remove the

vehicle from the flood zone. This is apparent when people risk their lives to drive a
vehicle a short distance up a hillside ( 17.14) or when they refuse to abandon a stalled
vehicle while it is still safe to wade (!).
2.

A vehicle is associated with speed, which is desirable during an evacuation.

3.

A vehicle provides a means by which a family can reach food and shelter

once their house is flooded .
4.

Many people are conditioned by habit to drive rather than to walk or run.

5.

A vehicle helps transport those with limited mobility.

Additional historical insights pertaining to motorists and their passengers are
enumerated below:
l.

Motorists who become stalled in water are usually reluctant to leave their

vehicles. While flooding is minor or moderate, they may decide to climb on top of the
vehicle or remain inside while it drifts. Thus, slow-rising floods that provide ample time
for evacuation can prove lethal: the window for evacuation is lost and the flood continues
to rise or a sudden wall of water sweeps through (1.1, 25.2).
2.

Water through which people can wade is often capable of washing a vehicle

downstream (9.3, 23.1). As sediment coats a road surface and the weight of a vehicle is
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reduced through buoyancy, friction between the tires and the road is reduced
considerably.
3.

Many automotive fatalities are a result of motorists choosing to cross a

flooded bridge or roadway, either because the flood appears shallow or because the
motorist does not realize what a small depth/velocity combination is needed to move an
automobile into deeper/swifter water (8). In the common scenario where a motorist
hesitates and then chooses to venture across a flooded roadway, the resulting subPar is a
form of convergence. In such cases, variables like Wt, Wtavg, and E have little or no
relevance (23 . I).
One does not see a steady stream of vehicles swept away at the same river
crossing because after the first vehicle begins to float, other drivers stay clear. However,
the same crossing can sweep more than one car away if it is isolated and the first
automobile disappears from view before a later motorist arrives (8.3).
4.

Variables like Dv and Qp only apply at bridges after a vehicle is swept into

the channel, since most of the water passes beneath the bridge.
5.

A unique danger exists to motorists who might plunge dozens of feet when a

section of roadway that has washed away is hidden by darkness, rain, fog, or a blind
corner (27.1).
6.

Excavations, ditches, canals, and other topographic depressions can turn an

otherwise shallow flood into a death trap by slowly washing motorists into a place from
which they cannot escape (9.3).
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Campgrounds
The size of subPar in campgrounds varies dramatically with the season, generally
swelling in the summer and peaking on summer holidays and weekends, so the comments
under seasonal subPar apply here . Campgrounds are somewhat unique in that official
warnings are especially difficult to deliver to outdoor recreationists and recreationists
may have fewer opportunities to find shelter than those in other surroundings may. See
the section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens.

In the river (waders and swimmers)
Few people wade or swim more than an hour after dark, so this type of subPar can
be ignored at such times.
See the section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens.

Along shore (hikers and the curious)
Few people hike or watch floods more than an hour after dark, so this type of
subPar can be ignored at such times.
See the section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens.

Boats
When on a river, boaters face increased risks due to the difficulty of delivering an
offic ial warning and the increased evacuation time most boaters would require. See the
section on the lethality rate outside of safe havens.
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Trains
Depending on the depth of flooding and whether or not a train is moving, a train
is most similar to either a mobile home (as was the case near Johnstown when South Fork
Dam fai led in 1889) or an automobile, though in both cases less buoyant. The impact of a
crash can cause deaths even when people stay dry ( 19).

Homogeneity of subPar CPar;,_f!,
CGf Ls Fp F1 Schvql
.
Descriptive variables are generally point estimates (i.e., D, V, Dv, and Wt) or they
are based on a representative average across a subPar (i.e., Sc, Wtavg, and E). The more
homogeneously each subPar is defined (i.e, with respect to Pt, Ls, location, warning
times, etc.), the more closely a point estimate or average value can characterize every
member of Par. That is, homogeneous subPar reduce the variance of characterizing
variables applied to each individual.
Although each flood is highly unique, it is possible to compare statistically
dissimilar Par using statistically simi lar subPar when those subPar are defined
homogeneously and one focuses on Tpar; to reduce temporal variations. These two
steps-reducing Par to homogeneous subPar and Par; to Tpar;....:...allows one to
characterize the hazard to a population primarily by variables like Ls, D, and V.

Flood dynamics CF!t V D Op Qb W
Dv R Ww· Dt· H Hp B Vol Rf Al
It is possible to make a large number of generalizations regarding the dynamics of
extreme floods. The following list enumerates those aspects of flood dynamics that are
most important:
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I.

Catastrophic floods are violently turbulent. They often strip the clothing off

both those who perish and those who survive. Victims can be so mangled and caked with
mud that friends and relatives do not recognize them. Sometimes bodies are dismembered
or so disfigured that it is impossible to tell the victim's sex (32.1). The main current
generally makes normal swimming difficult or impossible. Many people die because the
current pulls them under or prevents them from reaching the surface. If a person is driven
into an object such as a house, tree, rock, fence, or telephone pole, the current has
sufficient force to pin the person underwater and even bury them in sediment.
2.

l n open currents, people who die usually do so because they are held

underwater, tire trying to fight turbulence, or are injured through a violent collision with
stationary or mobilized objects-all functions of high velocities.
3.

The peak flow rate of a dam break flood wave typically follows the leading

edge by at least a minute, and floods often rise in progressive surges or waves. It follows
that fatal depths are often less than the peak depths and the depths encountered while
people seek out safe havens, including wading to shore, are usually much less than the
peak depths. It also means that those farther from the river may have precious extra
seconds to evacuate compared to those closer to the river (22.2).
4.

Depth is principally important as it works with velocities to provide the

needed moment and momentum to topple people and buildings, to allow high velocities
and turbulence to develop, and to trap people underwater by crashing down from above.
Thus, if people are able to swim, the velocity of a flood is more important to life loss than
its depth; velocity is the killer and the depth is the accomplice (18.13). As an example,
over 50% of the campers died when 3 ft of water raced across the Aras alluvial fan (3 ),

231
but all those who drifted free of currents in the depths of Lake Mohave were amazed at
how easy it was to swim to shore (22.4, Eldorado Canyon). In the same way, it is likely
that over half of the town of Rivadelago survived the total destruction of their homes,
without warning, at night, because the Vega de Tera flood was immediately dissipated in
the deep, quiescent waters of the lake just downstream (36).
5.

The ratio of serious injuries to deaths varies greatly by event, making

generalizations difficult. In some events, people either die or escape relatively unharmed
(22). In other events, the number of people admitted to emergency rooms might be
several times greater than the number of deaths ( 17). As a rule, if a flood is extremely
lethal, destroying all safe havens, there are few injuries because people either evacuate or
die (35).
6.

Extreme scour and deposition-on the order of a few feet to over I 0 ft-is

common in extreme floods. In some cases, the river channel may permanently shift to
flow where buildings once stood (3, 15, 18.3a, 36).
7.

In some cases, the flow forms vortexes that can drill deep holes into the

ground (18.3a, 12 ft deep).
8.

Catastrophic floods are characterized by an unusually large debris load: Earth

from the failed embankment and canyon walls, cobbles and boulders, forest litter, felled
trees, roofs and sharp boards from shattered houses, floating mobile homes, vehicles of
all shapes and sizes, barbed wire and boards from fences , telephone poles, propane tanks,
railroad cars, railroad ties, etc. Consider the following examples:
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a)

The Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood picked up enough dirt and gravel

from bare canyon walls that its leading edge sprayed out gravel and appeared to
have a viscosity comparable to freshly mixed concrete (22.7) .
b)

The Stava embankments had sufficient volume in relation to the

reservoirs that the resulting flood contained approximately 50% sediment (32.1 ).
Extremely high sediment loads are common when tailings dams fail (17).
c)

When the Bayless Pulp & Paper Company Dam failed , it picked up

700,000 cords of logs from the pulp mill, completely blanketing the floodwater to
the point that some observers high on the hillside could not see the water when
the flood passed through Austin, Texas (8).
d)

The Buffalo Creek flood was typical of a wall of water passing through

sequential communities. It was characterized by every conceivable item on the
floodplain, but it was dominated by automobiles, splintered boards, shattered
houses, and houses that were still intact, riding high above the flood and being
pushed before it by a wall of water that was black with mud from the
embankment (17).
e)

The Mill River Dam failure provided an example of a flood that passed

through forested valleys between communities. Consider the following quote
from a young boy:
A great mass of brush, trees, and trash was rolling rapidly toward
me. I have tried many times to describe how this appeared; perhaps the
best simile is that of hay rolling over and over as a hayrake moves along
the field, only this roll seemed twenty feet high, and the spears of grass
in the hay rake enlarged to limbs and trunks of trees mixed with boards
and timbers; at this time I saw no water. (Sharpe, 1995, p. 97)
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9.

If the flood is not slow rising and it passes through a canyon or narrow

va lley, debris tends to concentrate at the leading edge of the flood, slowing the wave and
causing it to pile up as a wall behind a loose, mobile debris dam.
I 0. A narrow constriction can also cause a surging wave to mount up into a wall
of water (22. I).
I I. A wall of water will tend to ride a winding canyon like a bobsled, sloshing up
one side and then another. Often it is described like a snake riding the canyon walls (6. 1,
17). Superelevation differences of 10-20 ft have been observed, representing roughly
30%-80% of the flood ' s peak depth ( I 7, 22.2). When a tributary enters another river at a
sharp angle, the flood can wash far up the opposite shore before moving downstream ( 17,
3 5). The turbulent nature of these behaviors can send a finger of water out to snatch one
house away from between two others or leave houses untouched at an elevation bel ow
houses that are destroyed ( 17, 22).
12. Because a wave must generally be slowed to pile into a wall of water and
debris, such a wall will often sweep a fast-rising, debris-filled flood before it as the
mobi le wall leaks and sections break away to travel at unhindered velocities. This can
provide an important sensory clue, giving residents precious seconds or minutes to run or
wade to safety before the wall of water arrives (I 7.6).
13. Debris dams tend to form behind bridges, reversing attenuation and causing
the wave to rise in height. If the bridge or dam fails catastrophically, the renewed wall of
water will be higher and the peak flow rate will be greater than if the temporary dam had
not formed. As debris dams form and fail , a flood wave can be slowed and renewed over
and over as it moves through many miles of canyon or narrow valley ( I 7).
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14. When a series of small dams dot a river (common when mills are plentiful
and factories depend on water power), the sequential dam failures increase the volume of
the flood and compensate for attenuation through valley storage.
15 . When a wave is renewed, valley storage forces the peal< flow rate to follow
an exponential decay pattern, approaching a limiting value (16, 18, 26, 29, 31, 35). As the
flow rate decreases, average depths and/or velocities will also decrease. Since Qp is a
functi on of the product of average depths and velocities, depths and velocities decay
much more slowly than Qp. Of course depths and velocities can increase at the expense
of the other if the average slope or cross-sectional area changes (26, 22.1).
16. Obstacles like train cars, buildings, and sturdy trees that support a debris dam
can divert a flood and protect regions behind them (17. 7, 18.8, 29.1). When the terrain is
reasonably flat, a debris dam or building can also turn a flood and send it in an
unexpected direction, such as down a side street between a row of buildings.
17. In a row of buildings or connected apartments roughly parallel to the
direction of flow, the leading units can buffer those downstream, resulting in
progressively less damage (18 .5).
18. A row of buildings will buffer buildings inland ( 18.8).
19. Parameters like Dv and Qp represent areas near the channel far better than
areas near the flood's fringes (18.Jb). Dv and Qp grossly misrepresent a subPar when the
subPar is a finger of the flood or a quiescent backwater (16.6, 18.13 ).
20. As Par; grow in size, W and hence Dv become less representative.
2 1. When Par; is heterogenous, point values like D and V generally describe only
those areas nearest the channel, even if those areas are a small fraction of Par;.
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22. Dt, H, Hp, B, Vol , Rf, and A are relevant to life loss only insofar as they
influence variables like Det, Wtavg, R, Ww, V, and D and the underlying probability that
a structure will fail. As such, they are at best surrogates in a life-loss equation and should
largely be ignored. They do, however, offer the possibility of checking or calibrating the
accuracy of flood inundation modeling .
23. When E is very small or negative, the rise-rate is a critical factor that
determines whether people are likely to be trapped or washed away. Slow-rising flood s
do not generally pose a threat to people in their homes since occupants can readily
evacuate, but motorists reluctant to leave a parked or stalled vehicle can linger to the
point that evacuation becomes impossible (25). An extremely fast-rising fl ood that does
not pile into a wall can trap more people than a wall of water if the former provides fewer
se nsory clues (18). However, once the flood has arrived, a wall of water is imposs ible to
avo id , but a fast-rising flood may provide the few seconds or minutes necessary to wade
to shore before it prevents wading.
24. Current definitions of forcefulness (F = Fp, Fd, F 5) mask the most important
factor differentiating rates of life loss by combining structures with major damage and
total destruction into a single category. When buildings are destroyed, most people
remaining in those buildings die, but when buildings have major damage, the fatality rate
varies widely depending on the frequency with which safe havens remain . On average,
the historical fatality rate in buildings with major damage has been closer to that observed
in buildings with minor damage (Ptpar
destroyed (Ptpar "' 0.8-1.0).

=0) than to that in buildings that have been
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As an example of how F masks this distinction, consider the contiguous subPar
18.12a and 18.12b. Every building in 18.12a was destroyed and every building in 18 .1 2b
had major damage, making Fp

= Fd = I in both cases. The fatality rates diverged

significantly, however, as expected, with P1&.J2a = 1.0 and P 1s 12 b = 0.013.
25. The following real-life behaviors of flood waves are difficult to model with
current software:
a)

The effects of debris dams in creating and renewing the depths of a wall

of water ( 17).
b)

The effects of debris dams in protecting areas from damage (29 .5).

c)

The effects of debris dams and buildings in changing the direction of

flow.
d)

The selective inundation of a crashing flood as it ricochets off

alternating sides of a canyon with superelevation differences exceeding I 0 ft ( 17,
22).
e)

The ability of a wave's momentum to carry it out of the channel and

along a new course when it encounters a bend.
f)

The ability of a wave to rocket out of a constriction like water from a

fire hose and miss adjacent areas that would be flooded if the flood had less
momentum (6.1, 26).
g)

The reduction in velocity caused by mobile and stationary debris ( 17).

h)

Differences in depth, velocity, and arrival time between a wall of water

and its leading fast-rising flood ( 17).
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26. The force of the current makes it extremely difficult to regain one' s footing
after being swept off one's feet. Consider the words of a rescue worker who fell while
wading under a safety rope : "I have a new respect for water. It was an incredible force .
Words can ' t describe it. .. . Your foot leaves the ground and you're gone." (Kaiser, 1995,
p. A I). Fortunately, his fellow firefighters grabbed him before he drifted away.
27. The type of failure (Ft) is relevant only insofar as it affects aspects of
warning and the dynamics of the flood wave itself. For example, the Vaiont failure (35)
was extremely unique. The dam itself did not fail, but a large portion of the mountain slid
into the reservoir and sent a massive wave 325 ft over the top of the dam. Despite the
source of the wave, a flood with simi lar hydraulic characteristics might be expected half a
mile below a tall, concrete gravity or arch dam that suddenly burst (31), or below an
earthen, rockfi ll, or mine-waste dam perched high on a very steep slope (32).
28. Given identical volumes and no warning, an expansive flood is safer than a
narrow flood for two primary reasons. First, as a flood spreads laterally, three factors
combine to greatly reduce the flood 's local velocities: a) Depths decrease through volume
spreading so that a wall of water cannot be sustained. b) A wide floodplain implies a
relatively flat downstream slope. As momentum carries the flood laterally, the slope
becomes even smaller. c) Buildings near the river absorb the flood's energy, buffering
each successive row of buildings. Second, as velocities and depths drop, loss of shelter
shifts from H to M, and then to L. This greatly increases the number of safe havens,
chance havens, and the survival rate ( 18).
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Loss of shelter CBt Ls Dd Sh
Psh Fp Fd F~ Fpar Pt)

Loss of shelter vs. economic damages
lt is important to realize that Ls is not the same as economic damages. Lives are

lost within buildings when occupants fall into water in which they cannot swim; become
trapped underwater as a room fills to the ceiling; get struck by large, external debris
penetrating from outside; get struck or trapped underwater as the building breaks apart ; or
get washed through a wall or out a door or window into open water. As such, the critical
question is not the degree of economic damages or whether a building should later be
condemned, but whether or not a structure maintains an accessible safe haven or pseudosafe haven for the duration of a flood .
It fo llows that loss of shelter is not synonymous with the definitions used by the
American Red Cross or other agencies to define housing damages . Instead:
I.

Ls = L implies relatively safe havens on every floor.

2.

Ls = M implies complete loss of a safe haven on the first floor.

3.

Since loss of a safe haven is generally accompanied by structural damage,

traditional categories of minor and major damage generally agree with Ls = L and Ls =
M when they exc lude damage to furniture from water and mud.
4.

Ls = H implies complete loss of all safe havens (including accessible

rooftops) and loss of every aerated pocket of protection. If an aerated pocket of protection
remains, L = M even if a building floats off its foundation or is later condemned.
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An anchored house may be tom apart, so a house that is securely anchored to a
chimney or foundation can provide a more dangerous refuge than one that is free to float
(17).

When a house floats off i:s foundation and is mobilized downstream, several
things can happen to it. It can sink or be sucked underwater by an undertow; waves can
break it to pieces; it can collide with a stationary object like a tree or the jutting end of a
house and break apart; the roof can sever off and form a raft; it can collide with another
floating house or a debris dam and explode in a shower of boards; it can jam in a debris
dam and form part of a bridge to safety, or it can drift a short distance and run aground.
It is useful to examine the three classifications of Loss of Shelter (Ls)
individually.

Ls = H: total destruction
A house can be destroyed in many ways. It can:
I.

be slowly battered to pieces by waves and debris,

2.

be obliterated in an instant by a towering wall of water,

3.

collapse on itself, especially if it is made of stone or brick,

4.

pop up like a cork and float off its foundation, then disintegrate through

collisions downstream, or
5.

float a while and then sink.

A building can be destroyed even if the water surface elevation is well below the
elevation of the top story (18.7, 29.2, 29.7). However, a house is destroyed only when all
safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, and aerated pockets of protection disappear during the
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flood. During or after destruction, any of the structural members, especially a severed
rooftop, can provide a chance haven.
If a rooftop is inaccessible, a building is destroyed when the top floor or
accessible attic is completely submerged. If a roof is accessible, the building is
considered destroyed only if the flood or flood waves wash across the crest of the roof to
an extent likely to wash people into the flood. Since the momentum of the flood riding
the slant of the roof will cause waves to run up, this elevation is generally on the order of
a foot or two below the roofs crest ( 18.10).

Ls = M: major damage
1fthe highest accessible floor (including an accessible attic) is filled with water
beyond 1 ft of the ceiling, but the flood does not crest an accessible roof, Ls = M rather
than H because an accessible safe haven remains (18.15).
People have survived by huddling in a back corner, sitting on a counter, or hiding
in a cupboard when two walls and most of the floor have been washed away ( 18). Hence,
if walls are torn off but portions oftbe structure remain to shelter occupants from the
main current or to provide something to which they might cling, the loss of shelter is
major; but if only trivial structural members remain such that all shelter is lost, the
dwelling is destroyed .
A building is destroyed any time it is torn apart and submerged in the flood .
However, if a building floats off its foundation and maintains an accessible pseudo-safe
haven for the duration of tbe flood , Ls = M.
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A building just inside the edge of the flood can experience major damage when a
leading wall of water or sudden surge tosses large debris such as logs or millstones
through the walls. These, in tum, can injure or kill those that are inside (6: 1) .

Ls = L: minor damage
Almost any room has a counter, desk, couch, table, chair, bookcase, bed, dresser,
piano, or other piece of furniture that can provide an elevated platform or a floatation
device during a flood. When a flood is relatively quiescent, with few exceptions, these
obj ects and a little swimming allow people to keep their heads above the water surface
even when the flood nears the ceiling. While elevated cei lings pose a special problem, a
flood reaching such depths without causing major damage is necessarily very calm,
making it easier to cling to floating furniture, tread water, or hang onto rafters. This has
been demonstrated in commercial buildings with two-story ceilings (18). Hence, Ls = L
when there is minor structural damage and the flood does not encroach within a foot of
the first-floor cei ling or within 2ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling.

Safe havens chance havens pseudo-safe
havens and aerated havens (Sh Ch Psh
Ah Coh Pt Bt R Ww. Dlocal.....Ylocal,
Sc. Wt~,E.Schvgl
---

Safe havens
Havens that are safe for most people under most circumstances can be predicted
based on flood mapping, a survey of building heights, and estimates of which trees and
buildings will remain standing. Safe havens include the following:
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I.

An upper story with sufficiently shallow flooding that occupants are not

washed out a window and can float on a bed or stand freely . These conditions are
generally maintained when the flow does not rise more than one foot above the
windowsills in the highest story (about 3 ft above the floor) and the building is not
destroyed (18.23, 18 .24).
2.

Quiescent flooding that does not trap people without air. When flooding is

relatively quiescent, people readily keep their heads above water by treading water.
standing on stationary platforms such as counters, floating on beds, or by clinging to
tloating furniture. If such flooding does not persist to the point where it would lead to
extreme hypothermia or exhaustion, a relatively safe haven is maintained even when
waters come within I ft of a flat ceiling or 2 ft of the peak of a sloped cei ling, whether or
not the cei ling is elevated. Although it would be highly variable by context, the safe
haven would be lost after the flood remained at such high elevations for more than 0.25-2

hr, the general range in the historical record ( 18).
3.

An attic that is accessible from within the bouse or trailer (26) .

4.

A stationary rooftop, if it is accessible from the bouse and wave s do not wash

over the top (18).
5.

A stout tree that is easy to climb, taller than the flood , and is not toppled.

6.

Any island or region that experiences shallow flooding during the flood ' s

peak, such that depths are easy to resist while standing or clinging to convenient anchors
such as telephone poles or lampposts (depths of 1-5 ft, depending on the velocity: 18 .2 1,
18.25).
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7.

The hillside beyond the flood if a member ofTpar; can readily drive or wade

to it while the flood is still shallow, or if they can reach it directly from the roof or a
window(l8.2 , 18.13, 18.21).

Chance havens
If debris does not crush or fatally wound flood victims, it can provide a means of
floatation that has saved many lives. Debris is defined as a chance haven rather than a
safe haven because it cannot be readily predicted, its benefits are unreliable, and it can
directly cause death by wounding flood victims or trapping them underwater. Chance
havens can contribute significantly to the variance in fatality rates across similar events.
Beyond floating debris, given the right circumstances, chance havens also include
safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, aerated havens, and areas of low velocity within
swimming distance of shore. Chance havens thus fall into four categories:
I.

Rafts and floatation aids: Severed rooftops, mattresses, propane tanks, and

logs are the most commonly mentioned in stories about survivors (18. 7).
2.

The roofs of floating buildings: Because it is both more difficult and more

dangerous to reach and remain on a rooftop after a building begins to drift, lurch, spin, or
sink, rooftops should be treated as chance havens whenever a building drifts more than
I 00 yards. As indicated above, if people must rely heavily on chance to reach a largely
inaccessible roof, this would also constitute a chance haven.
3.

Stationary havens: Any immobile haven that is reached while drifting,

including rooftops, upper-story windows, treetops, overhanging branches, debris dams at
bridges that allow victims to walk to dry land, and the shore itself.
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4.

Aquatic havens: Any location where shore can be easily reached without

fighting high velocities, such as a lake or a quiescent backwater.

Pseudo-safe havens
Pseudo-safe havens are safe havens on or in buildings that become reclassified
once the building begins to drift. They are a hybrid between safe havens, which are static
and predictable, and chance havens, which depend on the whims of the current and the
debris load. They exist only among a subset of buildings with major damage (see Loss of
Shelter).
As indicated above, rooftops are considered chance havens (Ch) when a building
drifts more than the length of a football field. Predicting whether a floating structure will
maintain a pseudo-safe haven or be destroyed requires an estimate of its trajectory, the
duration over which it can float, and the likelihood of a high-velocity collision. While
these apparently depend in part on chance, some useful historic patterns generally hold
true. Since pseudo-safe havens only apply in the narrow range of depths and velocities
between the lower-end of major damages and the point where buildings are destroyed by
the currents themselves, the following scenarios are comprehensive:
I.

Currents capable of destroying anchored houses have usually destroyed

floating houses or eliminated the safety of their havens. Very few people have survived
by riding a house more than a short distance.
2.

Mobile homes tend to float in modest depths and velocities, but being sing le

story, a pseudo-safe haven is maintained inside only until water rises more than a foot
above the windowsills. In swift water or depths over 6 ft, this condition will generally not
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last long as the water pressure bursts open windows and doors and waves and debris
batter holes in the walls.
3.

Houses and mobile homes near the edge of a flood that float only a foot or

two off the bottom tend to travel less than 300ft before they run aground or stack t:p
against other houses, trees, or barriers. In such cases, the safety of the haven is generally
preserved and the survival rate is comparable to that for stationary safe havens.
4.

Those who have survived after riding a house or mobile home more than a

few hundred yards have usually scrambled onto the roof or lodged in a debris dam where
they could walk across the shattered roofs of former houses to dry land. In both cases, the
pattern required chance havens and should be treated as such.
5.

Concrete, stone, and brick structures do not generally float, at least for long.

The same would hold true of most large, commercial buildings.

Rooftops as havens
To reiterate and to clarifY, rooftops fall into one of the following three categories,
depending on circumstances.
Safe havens. When accessible and dry, rooftops are safe havens. The important
point is not that safe havens in buildings are equally easy to reach, but that if some people
can reach them, they preserve a means of shelter that is likely to reduce life loss
compared to situations in which every building is obliterated. Means of access might
include an internal or external fire escape, a door to the roof, or a dormer window. During
19'h century floods, there were many examples of people using a bedpost or other sturdy

object to poke a hole through a ceiling or wall to reach shelter (18). Similar access to a
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roof might be possible through many attics today. People have also been known to climb
obj ects like drainpipes or trellises, or to intentionally use the current to float them up to
the roof while they cling to such objects. However, when rooftops are generally
inaccessible and people must rely on chance to reach them, they should be treated as
chance havens.
Chance havens. A rooftop is a chance haven any time a person washes there from
upstream, access depends largely on chance, the rooftop severs from the underlying
building, or the building drifts more than 300ft downstream.
Pseudo-safe havens. A rooftop is a pseudo-safe haven if a person reaches the roof
through an access largely free of chance and the building floats off its foundation and
travels less than 300 ft without being overtopped.

Aerated havens
An aerated haven can remain when part of a stationary building is torn away and
the fl ood does not rise more than a few feet above the floor or the highest counter (Ls =
M). The following types of events can reduce safe havens to aerated havens:
I.

when another building floats past and tears of an ell or smashes a wall (29).

2.

when a log or trees crashes through a wall (6.1).

3.

when a house at the edge of a flood is cut in half by a wall of water ( 17, 35 .1)

4.

when a house is well-anchored and progressive waves break apart the wall s

most upstream or closest to the channel ( 18).
5.
floor ( 18).

when a central chimney or other anchor supports an attached portion of the
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Aerated havens are not safe havens for the following reasons: Their locations
depend in part on chance, making them more difficult to target in advance by building
occupants. Great strength, stamina, or good fortune may be required to overcome the pull
of the current. Since they are open to the current, people must cling to fixed objects like
counters and doorframes rather than floating furniture.
Aerated havens are more dependable than chance havens because building
occupants are likely to gravitate toward them before the building is tom apart. That is,
aerated havens are most likely to form where temporary safe havens appear safestdownstream or inland from the battering currents and debris.
For those who occupy an aerated haven, survival would be more likely than if
they were trapped underwater or swept downstream, but less likely than if the safe haven
had not been tom apart.

Flood zones and zone densities ISz Cz
Pcz Coz Zd Szd Czd Pczd Cozd)

Flood zones
Recalling that dry land is considered a safe haven or a chance haven after the
flood arrives, there are three types of havens in which members ofTpari survive floods:
safe havens, compromised havens (pseudo-safe havens and aerated havens), and chance
havens . People have also been known to survive after being buried in mud (32.1 ), but
such cases are rare and can probably be neglected. When one includes the open current
and depths in which successful wading is highly dependent on chance, a flood can be
divided into four zones for the purposes of life-loss estimation: safe zones (Sz), chance
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zones (Cz), pseudo-chance zones (Pcz), and compromised zones (Coz). Each of these is
discussed below.
Safe zones include all safe havens. These provide a high degree of safety and a
cor.sistently low rate of life loss that approaches or equals zero. The distribution of life
loss should closely approximate that for Ls = L.
Such locations should be relatively easy to predict based on flood mapping except
in the uncertain range where safe havens may become compromised havens . Fortunately,
havens that have been only mildly compromised have similar life-loss characteristics to
safe havens (one is still on the far left of a curve like Figure 13 shown later), so one need
not be overly conservative when making estimates. For example, if one is not sure
whether a building will float or not, but it is reasonably certain that it will at least
maintain a pseudo-safe haven by quickly running aground, it should be treated as a safe
zone .
Chance zones include the places where people are submerged or face the open
flood , and all chance havens that might be reached while drifting. This set includes places
where Ls = H, campgrounds, and the floodplain when it is not a safe haven. The
distribution of life loss should closely approximate that for Ls

=

H.

Like safe zones, chance zones should be relatively easy to predict, except in the
narrow range where buildings might be severely damaged or drift far down stream
without being destroyed. These are dealt with next.
Pseudo-chance zones fall in that narrow range of depths* velocities for which it is
unclear whether a building is likely to be destroyed, float far downstream, or maintain
aerated havens.

2-19

One approach to estimating life loss in pseudo-chance zones would be to combine
the most relevant portions of the life-loss distributions for Ls

= H and Ls = M. Thus , the

inherent uncertainty underlying the zone prediction is recognized by using a distribution
that incorporates that uncertainty into its form ulation. This topic will be approached in
more detail in Chapter VII.
Compromised zones are that central portion of compromised havens that have not
been intentionally classified as safe zones or pseudo-chance zones. Thus, omitting the
portions likely to be classified elsewhere, the life-loss distribution should closely
resemble the central60%-80% of the distribution for Ls

=

M.

Zone densities
Zone density (Zd) represents the di stribution of flood zones among Tpar; based on
topographic, stntctural , and hydraulic considerations as they interface with fl ood routing
and the rise rate of the flood. The word "density" refers to the fraction of people who
have access to a category rather than to a spatial measurement. Access includes the
physical ability to move to a location and sufficient time to get there.
While it is not possible to predict the exact pathway of an individual, history
suggests that most Tpar; will seek out the safest haven they can reach in the time allowed.
While some will reject a safe haven in a building only to be swept away whi le crossing
the flo odplain, this occurs primarily when E is positive and the vast majority of buildings
are destroyed (29). That is, those fleeing must believe that their building will be
destroyed and that there is enough time to reach the hillside when , in fac t, there is not
enough time. This is a very specific set of circumstances that inherently limits the number
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of such cases. More importantly, the cases are most likely when a wall of water is large
enough to destroy most buildings, making them a small fraction of the total life loss in
the event. As such, it is not critical to treat them separately.
Generally, it takes far less time to reach an upper floor than to evacuate the flood
zone for several reasons: there is little need to get dressed or to grab belongings, the route
is a matter of habit requiring little planning, one can avoid extreme weather conditions,
one can continue moving after flooding blocks escape outside, people most often sleep
upstairs, and the trip takes only about 5-30 seconds to complete for an entire family. Even
when a flood is rising in the first floor, the walls often provide adequate shelter to allow
people to wade, swim, or ride the current to the top of the stai rs (18). As an indirect
examp le, although the trailer homes in subPar 26.3 were swept off their foundations and
often destroyed within minutes of the flood's onslaught, the numerous descriptions by
survivors indicate that there was a short window of time when families gathered together
and sought shelter before the trailer walls were destroyed.
The result is that most people reach the safest zone that is accessible and temporal
considerations apply primarily to reducing Par; to Tpar;. This author is aware of only four
historic contexts in which people have not reached a safe haven when it existed on an
upper floor of the house they occupied:
1.

They chose to attempt to evacuate and were washed away in the open

floodp lain (29).
2.

They were asleep or awake while downstairs at night. Without any sensory

warning, the flood burst through the windows, walls, or doors with such turbulence that it
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made it impossible to wade or swim to the stairway before they were swept away or the
room was flooded to the ceiling ( 18.20).
3.

A flood similar to the one just described but with slightly less violence and

speed overcame someone with limited mobility, such as an invalid, a young child, or a
baby that was swept out of its parent's arms. It should be noted that adults and children
with limited mobility are more likely to sleep downstairs, placing the most vulnerable in
the place of greatest danger ( 18.18).
4.

The ground floor had no ready access to the floors above (18 .23).

In some cases, people open a door, begin to run or wade for the hillside, or try to
climb into a car in an attempt to evacuate. When they realize the flood is rising or
approaching too quickly to make it, they turn around and run upstairs (17, 18.1).
We can apportion Tpar; among the flood zones its members are most likely to
occ upy by apportioning the physical havens that are accessible. As indicated above,
access to a haven is rarely limited by temporal consideration when the haven is in the
building that people are occupying, so temporal considerations can often be ignored.
When a region includes buildings, the subPar should be defined homogeneously with
respect to evacuation times so that Tpar; can be distributed according to the average
occupancy rate in each type of structure present. Each flood zone is exclusive of the
others such that the safe zone density (Szd) + the compromised zone density (Cozd) + the
pseudo-chance zone density (Pczd) + the chance zone density (Czd)

=

1.0.

As an example of the assignment of zone densities, if a subPar consists entirely of
two-story buildings that will sustain major damage or be destroyed and half of those
buildings are on ground high enough to maintain a safe haven, then Szd"' 0.5. This value
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might increase if an additional row of mobile homes was located in a buffered backwater
where they were expected to float a short distance inland. This value would decrease if
the flood was expected to rise so quickly and with so little sensory warning that a portion
of Tpar; would be unable to reach the second story. If some of the buildings were frame
houses and 30% of the buildings were expected to either float more than 300 ft
downstream, lose second-story walls, or flood 4-6 ft deep in the second stori es with hi gh
velocity currents, Cozd"' 0.3. If it was thought that half of this 30% might be destroyed.
then Cozd"' 0.15 and Pczd"' 0.15. That leaves Czd"' 0.2 for buildings that are almost
certai n to be destroyed.
Since rooftops are much less accessible than upper floors , one would want to treat
them accordingly in a model. One way to do this is to first estimate how many rooftops
are accessible using emergency means, then estimate the times needed to reach the
rooftops and eliminate any rooftops that cannot be reached before wading is prohibitive
on the highest floor. As a simplified approach, any rooftops that cannot be reached within
2 minutes from the ground floor or within 5 minutes from an upper floor should be
eliminated. Those eliminated but not flooded become chance havens instead.
Attics should be treated as described above for rooftops, except that they do not
generally provide chance havens.
When safe havens consist of high ground, they provide a convenient alternative to
pre-flood evacuation when E is small or negative. For example, when people dwell on an
island that is submerged by a flood , E may be quite negative due to the length of time
required to get off the island. However, there may be patches of relatively high ground
that allow people to safely stand in shallow water (a safe haven) while their houses are
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washed away nearby. The same can hold true for any location cut off from the edge of the
flood by bridges, barriers, or distance. In such cases, the loss of shelter does not reflect
the nature of the flood experienced by the residents, since the residents are not located
arnong the structures(l8.2l).It should only be assumed that residents evacuate to such
locations when E is small or negative, Ret is greater than a couple minutes, and houses
have more than minor damage or are single story.
Trees are probably the most difficult safe haven to predict. However, people do
not generally climb trees unless they are in the open and there is insufficient time to reach
a building or the hillside. As such, trees generally play a significant role only in
campgrounds and other outdoor settings, where their concentration should be given due
consideration (3). People occasionally climb trees when a flood overtakes them while
they are running across a floodplain, but the flood must rise in the very narrow range that
prevents wading but does not cause toppling. Hence, more often than not, trees play an
important role among dwellings only as chance havens, as people are swept off the
floodplain or out of buildings and they pull themselves into trees as they are swept
underneath.
The value of trees as chance havens depends on their density in an area, their
ability to withstand the flood, and the velocity of the current. As the depth and velocity of
a flood increases, trees are more likely to topple, provide a dangerous object against
which people are killed, or become impossible to grasp and hold onto without being
submerged or tom away. Generally speaking, if houses are destroyed, trees provide no
refuge except where they overhang near shore. Where housing damage is minor, trees are
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not needed for shelter. Where houses have major damage and upper-stories are not
plentiful, trees can play an important role along with rooftops and other floating debris.

Lethality rate outside safe havens
CPtpar; Ls Pt Ft- L;,_E;,
Ioill:r -Ln Lnf LiuJdn£1
Life loss is a function of distance from a dam only as it is affected by warning
times, depths, velocities, widths, loss of shelter, or other variables that are themsel ves
indirect functions of distance from the dam. As the original wave increases in depth and
magnitude when Wtavg = 0, life loss can be extended indefinitely until the wave itself
looses lethal potential.
As testimony to the high lethal potential outside of safe havens, whole families
often perish together when houses are destroyed or they are overcome while crossing the
floodplain (17 .1). Atypical events that cost lives and atypical events that save lives are
both common (6, 17). This is due in part to the dual nature of chance havens: they can
either kill or save. The following sections examine the lethality rate outside of safe
havens on a location-specific basis.

In wading depths
Waders in catastrophic floods are much more likely to be swept away than waders
in a laboratory channel exposed to the same average depth/velocity combination. The
following historic examples indicate why:
1.

Real floods often generate surges or waves that greatly exceed the average

flow conditions, sweeping people into deeper water.
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2.

Real floods hide holes, logs, curbs, ditches, side stream channels, bushes, and

other obstacles that cause waders to fall into deeper water or trip unexpectedly.
3.

Real floods contain up to 50% sediment, increasing the flood's momentum

and increasing a wader's buoyancy, both of which promote toppling. In extreme cases,
the sediment can also trap a wader' s feet or legs, hindering or preventing movement and
possibly burying him or her.
4.

Catastrophic floods often arrive as a wall or a sudden surge against which it

is difficult to brace, especially while running.
5.

Real floods are highly turbulent, making bracing and balancing much more

difficult.
6.

Real floods typically carry a lot of large debris, which can easily knock down

a wading adult.
7.

Real floods often increase in depth over time, so any delays such as

stumbling can eliminate the opportunity to complete a crossing.
8.

In real floods, a wader may not be wearing shoes and natural surfaces or mud

may hinder traction.
9.

An adult may be able to wade, but it is common for babies and young

children to be swept out of their arms by the rising current, by a sudden wave or surge,
when struck by debris, or when the adult falls.
I 0. Among waders, strength and stamina are key factors, so size, age, gender,
and general health are all important variables.
II. If the individual is wearing boots or waders, these tend to fill with water and
catch the current, pulling the person downstream and toward the stream bottom. Modern,
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tight-fitting neoprene waders, however, are less susceptible to this and increase a person's
buoyancy.
Imagine an experiment in which I 00 identical individuals are placed on a
floodplain, the depth or velocity is held constant at each location, and the other variable
(depth or velocity) is varied over many repetitions of the experiment. The flood is
allowed to behave like a typical, historic, catastrophic flood . Now plot the parameter that
is allowed to vary (depth or velocity) against the average lethality rate.
The resulting plot, a cumulative distribution function, is likely to follow a steep Scurve resembling a graduated step-function. When flooding is minor, Ptpar approaches
zero : virtually everyone manages to wade to dry land or a safe haven. When flooding
becomes challenging to the point that movement is slow and the chance of falling and
regaining one's footing is high, shorter or weaker individuals risk being swept away. If
the waders are carrying babies, young children, or helping those with limited mobility,
many of those being carried or assisted will be swept away. If there is an abundance of
large debris, it will knock the weak and the strong alike into the flood . As conditions
worsen, approaching the limits of wading, the number swept away will rise exponentially
as they teeter, slip, get hit by waves, step into depressions, get hit by debris, get
temporarily released by someone carrying them, or otherwise stumble. The fatality rate
for those swept away will be high, because momentum will make it difficult or
impossible to regain their footing and they will be swept into deeper and swifter water
with greater turbulence. Survival will depend to a large extent on chance. The currents
must keep them at the surface, preferably sweep them near a large floating object, steer
them clear of fatal collisions, and ultimately deliver them to a place where they can exit
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the flood-overhanging tree branches, the roof of a stationary building, a backwater near
shore, etc.
The likelihood of a flood providing the conditions needed for survival decreases
exponentially as the flood increases in velocity and depth since both of these conditions
are accompanied by an increase in turbulence. This turbulence pulls people and debri s
underwater, renders swimming ineffective, forces air out of peoples ' lungs, and causes
direct physical harm.
Historically, the vast maj ority of people who have been swept away have died.
Among the cases studies, the lowest characteristic depth fo r a high-velocity flood passed
through the campground on the Anis Alluvial Fan in Spain. The maximum depth was
about 3.3 ft, with a characteristic depth around 3 ft. Of the ISO campers present, 58%
perished. Most of the survivors climbed trees or found shelter in buildings, so 80-100%
of those swept into the current drowned. In events with greater depths, nearly everyo ne
has drowned who has been swept away.
These dynamics suggest the pattern of life loss found in Figure 13 for those in the
flood zone without shelter. The flat portion to the left represents flooding through which
it is easy to wade. The initial gradual rise accounts for mishaps, followed by less capable
waders and babies or young children swept out of adult' s arms. Life loss then increases
rapidly as healthy adults of various strengths and sizes begin to be swept away. Survivors
are primarily limited to those who do not lose their footing or who manage to cling to a
pole, wall , roof, tree, or other anchor. As the force of the flood makes it impossible to
hold onto stationary objects, people in open water are at the mercy of the flood and life
loss rapidly approaches 100%. The ones who survive are those that are immed iately
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Figure 13. An illustrative distribution of average fatality rate based on the peak
depth*velocity a heterogeneous group of people encountered above an open
floodplain . This graph applies to wade fishermen, those camping in tents,
those overtaken while evacuating on foot, and those swept out of a building
or other refuge into the flood.
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carried by a wave toward shore, manage to use debris for flotation, or are washed to a
tree or rooftop. At some point, a flood becomes sufficiently violent to pull even large
debris beneath the surface, making survival extremely improbable (29, 31, 32.1 , 35). In
such cases, the only survivors are those who are tossed onto land or into buildings at the
edge of the flood where depth*velocity values are smaller (35 .1), and those dug out of
mud when a flood passes in less than 5 minutes (32.1 ).

In drifting depths
Catastrophic flood waves are violently turbulent (see the previous section on
flood dynamics). As such, even strong swimmers are tossed about like debris. Where
velocities are high and depths prohibit wading, most of those swept away drown or
experience lethal injuries, with some experiencing dismemberment or extreme
disfigurement. When velocities are high and depths exceed an event-specific cutoff of
about 6 to 20 ft, the fatality rate generally approaches l 00%.
In light of how difficult it is to reach or stay at the surface in a turbulent flood , it
is generally safer to be swept off a roof or out an upper-story window than to be
overtopped by a wave while on the floodplain or in a lower story. Those who reach the
surface can survive if they can reach a permanent chance haven, such as a rooftop or a
tree top; or if they reach a drifting chance haven that they can ride until they are rescued,
they wash to shore, or they climb to safety across a debris dam.

In buildings
Death in a building typically involves one or more of the following: l) being
trapped underwater when the flood rises to the ceiling, 2) being struck by debris driven
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through the wall, 3) being struck as the structure collapses, or 4) being washed out of the
building to perish downstream.
Because structural members are more buoyant in water than in air, the risk of
being killed by falling members appears to be greatest on floors where the flood is least
deep. When a structure is rapidly tom apart by a flood wave, the occupants are often
driven into the open current while still alive (17.3, 26).
In buildings with major damage CLs = Ml. When damages are major, the internal
env ironment in the building is usually a mix of areas that are highly lethal and relatively
safe. As in buildings that are destroyed, lives are lost when occupants are injured by the
building itself or by passing debris; when they are washed through a window, door, or
wall; and when they are trapped underwater. As in buildings with minor damage,
flooding on an upper story or on the roof can be sufficiently shallow or quiescent to make
survival virtually certain (18.10). Hence, the elevation of the top story in relation to the
peak elevation reached by the flood is the single most important determinant of the rate
of life loss in buildings with major damage.
The rate of life loss will follow a sharp S-curve resembling a step function when
graphed against depth*velocity (see Figure 13). The dynamics are similar to those for
waders, except that people are wading on an elevated floor instead of the floodplain and
there are more items on which to float , stand, or cling. This will shift the graph toward
the right and flatten the curve.
When water rises behind a door, the pressure can make it difficult or impossible
for an average person to overcome the pressure and open it ( 17, 18). Survival for an
occ upant of a building who is not swept into the current occurs in only three places: Safe
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havens, pseudo-safe havens, and aerated havens. Every other location is completely
submerged or destroyed.
Conditions in safe havens and pseudo-safe havens are comparable to when Ls =

L. The historic rates of life loss have approached zero when the safe haven or pseudo-safe
was not eliminated.
In aerated havens, occupants require more strength, stamina, and good fortune to
survive than in a safe haven since the occupants have a higher degree of exposure to the
flood. Nevertheless, there is a higher survival rate than in the open current. Chance plays
a large role in whether or not an aerated haven remains or is destroyed.
In buildings that are destroyed CLs = H) . Life loss approaches 100% for Tpar
occupying buildings that are destroyed. Survival largely depends on chance havens
(I 8:7).

In automobiles
l fa flood sweeps a passenger vehicle into water more than 4 ft deep, those inside
the vehicle are virtually guaranteed to drown unless they are rescued while the vehicle is
still floating (9.3, 17.4). There were no exceptions in the historical events that were
examined. Consider the following obstacles: External water pressure makes it difficult or
impossible to open a car door or a car window while underwater. If a window is opened
or broken, the flow of water and confining nature of the vehicle make it very difficult to
ex it the vehicle until it is completely filled with water. By then, the occupants will be
disoriented and nearly drowned. If someone escapes the vehicle, the turbulence of the
water will make it extremely difficult to reach the surface. Throughout, the flood wi ll be
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dark with sediment, making it nearly impossible to see once submerged. Combined, these
factors make it extremely difficult for passengers of a vehicle to survive after being
submerged.
The following are all contexts in which occupants of vehicles can die during a
flood:
l.

When a flood undermines a section of road or weakens a bridge, causing it to

collapse as an unsuspecting motorist passes overhead. Similarly, the road can collapse at
a distance too short for stopping (14).
2.

When a motorist drives onto a flooded bridge or stretch of road before they

see the danger. Drivers are most vulnerable to this at night during driving rain or fog
(34.2).
3.

When a section of roadway (perhaps across the dam crest) erodes away at a

blind spot (due to darkness, mist, rain, a sharp comer, etc.) and motorists subsequently
drive off the cliff and crash into the ground or stream (27.1).
4.

When people attempt to drive out of a long canyon instead of climbing the

hillside and the flood overtakes them (15).
5.

When a road follows a stream and a walt of water catches motorists by

surprise or travels faster than the vehicles (31.6).
6.

When a road follows a stream and motorists become stalled in incipient

flooding, remain with their vehicles too long, and are swept away as the flood rises or
suddenly surges (I).
7.

When a sudden surge of water sideswipes a vehicle on a dry or mildly

flooded road or bridge (23. l, Nix Lake Dam failure).
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8.

When a motorist decides to cross a submerged river crossing or a flooded

intersection near a canal, gully, or flooded drainage ditch, and the flood sweeps the
vehicle into swifter and deeper water (8).
9.

When an evacuee attempts to move a parked vehicle out of harms way and

the flood rises too quickly (there have been many close calls of this nature in driveways).
I 0. When an expanse of city streets is inundated slowly or quickly ( 16.1, 25.2).
II. When a driver has a fatal accident while evacuating (I found no historical
examples).
12. When an employee is driving on a darn while it fails , either to examine it or
attempt repair work while driving heavy equipment (I found no deaths but, but several
close calls).
See automobiles under the section on subPar type and evacuation modes for
additional insights that pertain to motorists and their passengers.

In trains
Depending on the depth of flooding and whether or not a train is moving, a train
is most similar to either a mobile home (as was the case outside Johnstown when South
Fork Dam failed in 1889) or an automobile, though in both cases a train is less buoyant.
The impact of a crash can cause deaths even when people stay dry (19).

In campgrounds
Campsites are often located near a river where valleys are steep and narrow so
recreationists can readily be exposed to any combination of high velocities, great depths,
and a wall of water (3). Survival largely depends on evacuating, climbing a tree, or
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reaching a sturdy outbuilding (3). Safe havens persist only if the flood does not topple the
trees and buildings. If there is not time to climb a tree before the flood arrives, the flood
must have sufficiently low velocities that someone can grab a tree while in motion
without being tom away.
Unfortunately, campgrounds can be one of the most difficult areas to reach with
an official warning (16.2). Many campsites are informal and isolated, away from
estab lished campgrounds; established campgrounds often have no telephone or ranger onsite; it may take a long time to drive to a campground; and campers are less likely to
li sten to mass media reports than those in residential areas or automobiles ( 16.2, 16.3).
While sensory clues often give a warning in the quiet of a campground (Little
Deer Creek Dam, Utah, 1963), the warning may be very short if there is no wall of water
to cause trees to crash (3). Even with a wall of water, if the flood travels quickly, is of
great depth, or people are asleep, Wtavg may be less than the time needed to evacuate
( 16.2, 16.3 , 31.4, 31.5). This said, there are two factors that make evacuation easier:
I.

The representative evacuation time (Ret) is often quite short if the valley has

steep hillsides-on the order of 0.25-2 minutes during the day and slightly longer at
night.
2.

Due to proximity, shouting can be readily heard, and so a warning can

propagate very rapidly through a campground, even at night.

In rivers (waders and swimmers)
Waders and swimmers are more vulnerable than recreationists on the bank are
because their evacuation is slowed and they are more likely to be caught in deeper water
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without a refuge. Due to the popularity of tail water fisheries below dams, it is dangerous
when a gate fails, a gate is opened very quickly (2), or when water levels rise during
hydropower peaking or startup. Few people wade or swim more than an hour after dark,
so thi s type of subPar can be ignored at such times.
Along shore (hikers and the curious)
Although there were no subPar in the data set consisting of hikers, reasoning
suggests that this subPar would be nearly identical to campgrounds except for the
following:
l.

There is little chance of delivering an official warning, unless Wt is more

than 2-3 hr.
2.

Hikers may climb canyon wa lls or reach other places from which a rapid

evacuation is impossible.
3.

This subPar can be largel y ignored more than an hour after dark.

There have been several examples of onlookers watching a flood who were
subsequently trapped or killed (25.2, 29. \8 ). This can be a form of convergence.

In boats
Due to its density, a flood wave entering a lake will generally plunge toward the
bottom, creating a powerful, choppy undertow near shore. By contrast, it may cause on ly
a small swell at the surface more than a few hundred feet from shore. The exact dynamics
depend on the depth, size, density, and orientation of the reservoir in relation to the
incomi ng flood . Where the described pattern holds, boaters are likely to be capsized and
pulled underwater near the mouth of the river, but not greatly endangered elsewhere.
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Boaters in a reservoir above a dam that fails are also in danger, especiall y if they
are near the dam.
Regardless of their location, boaters increase their chances for survival
dramatically when they wear life jackets (22.5) .
In high velocities, boaters on a river risk capsizing or colliding with an object in a
violent manner. A craft's high profile and streamlined shape can cause it to become
airborne in ways that are less likely among those riding rooftops or logs. Consider the
following eyewitness account (16.1 ):
There was [this] boat [that) came down the creek with three or four people
in it, moving at a tremendous speed, totally out of control and about the time it got
to where the water fountain was, the boat shot 30 or 40 feet straight in the air.
This was the last time we saw the boat or the people. (Natural Disaster Institute,
1976, p. 371)
As with hikers, this subPar would be very difficult to warn. The evacuation rate
would almost always be longer than for any other recreational category. Fortunately, this
subPar is not likely to exist when a single dam fails by overtopping as the result of a
flood , since boating is uncommon during extreme weather. Sunny-day dam failures
would, however, pose a particular risk to boaters. The popularity of guided fi shing trips.
river rafting, kayaking, and personal drift boats has increased dramatically over time.
Many rivers experience boats year round. As such, this type of subPar may become more
relevant to future failures than to historic ones.

In the cold
During failures in the western world, where flooding usually passes w ithin 5
minutes to 3 hr and people reach shelter within 0.25-8 hr, deaths attributed solely to
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exposure are rare, but they have happened (6. 1, 18). However, it would be difficult fo r
researchers to distinguish deaths due to drowning and deaths due to hypothermia when
both sets of bodies are found in the flood and detailed causes of death are not listed. In
theory, if a flood were at extreme winter temperatures, one might expect those unable to
escape the water and find warmth to become unconscious or perish within 5-20 minutes.
For some, the immediate shock would make breathing difficult and drowning much more
likely.

Lethality rate inside safe
havens (Ls Pt. Ptpar1}
Since most safe havens are found in buildings, this discussion is limited to that
co ntext.

In buildings with minor
damage (Ls = L)
Life-loss rates are essentially zero when Ls = L. Death can result when the first
floor is fl ooded to the ceiling, but regardless of the structural damages, such cases shou ld
be considered major damage in light of the loss of shelter.
When buildings experience minor damage, debris and high velocities do not
endanger the occupants. Generally, a safe haven remains on the ground floor. [f depths
are shallow, the flood has little lethal potential. If depths exceed 4 or 5 ft, the water must
have low velocities to avoid causing major damage. In such situations, deaths are quite
rare. They result when someone is trapped on the ground floor and the water ri ses to the
ce iling or when a child who cannot swim falls off a bed or other perch while no adult is
in the room. Those who have limited mobility usually survive if someone is present to
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balance them on a floating mattress or other elevated surface. Even when a safe haven is
lost and water comes within a foot of the ceiling, the water is sufficiently quiescent to
allow most people to survive by treading water or by standing on furniture. As such,
deaths are usually caused by limited mobility, an inability to swim, or other anomalies
like electrocution.
Death by exposure, disease, or starvation is possible if the flood traps people for
prolonged periods or the flood contaminates food and water supplies in less developed
regions. Such was the case when the Banqiao and Shimantan Dam failures stranded
people for many days amid very expansive flooding, although these deaths were excluded
to make the subPar more pertinent to the west (I 0).

In buildings with major
damage (Ls = M)
The most consistent factor governing the death rate among occupants of buildings
is whether or not there is a safe haven on the highest floor. This follows from the historic
pattern that very few people die in safe havens and most people die when exposed to the
fu ll force of the flood (see the section on lethality rates outside of safe havens) .
When a building has one or more upper stories and major damages are limited to
the lower stories, those in the upper stories remain dry or experience the flood as if it
causes only minor damage. When velocities are not high enough to sweep people out of a
room, 3-4 ft of flooding above the highest floor produces a death rate comparable to that
in buildings with only minor damage. This rate is usually zero, except in anomolous
cases, such as when young children are trapped alone in a room and one or more falls into
the water off a floating bed.
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If velocities are low, people can survive even when flooding is nearly two-stories
deep by staying near a second-story ceiling for air, either by treading water or by standing
on furniture (18.9, 18.1 0). Such flooding exceeds the cut off for a safe haven, but it is still
more shclt<:rcd and much safer than the open current.
A wooden house will most likely float away before the water reaches the secondstory ceiling, maintaining a pseudo-safe haven until the building sinks or is tom apart.
When houses have more than one story, the bedrooms are usually on the upper floors.
This can significantly reduce life loss at night when a flood may fill the lower floor
before the occupants are aware of the danger ( 18).

Lethality rate outside of the
flood zone (Ft Schvq)
Deaths outside of the flood zone fall into five categories:
I.

Those who are injured in the flood , but who wash to shore while still alive

and die within hours or days from inhaling water and mud, exposure, internal bleeding, or
other traumatic injuries (6.1 , 17.6), or appear to have injuries from which they can
recover, but die days later from a brain hemorrhage or other complication of an injury
(17.3) .
2.

Those who die of a heart attack, stroke, or other complication brought on by

fear for one's personal safety.
3.

Those who die of a heart attack, stroke, or other complication shortly after

learning that their loved ones have perished (17).
4.

Those who commit suicide during or after the flood (Teton Dam, 1976).
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5.

Those who lose the will to live and rapidly deteriorate or die in their sleep

within a few days, weeks, months, or years (17).
The percentages of deaths in categories 2 and 3 are small to the point of being
negligible, especially since deaths of this nature are most likely when a large number of
people die in a flood from other causes. Heart attacks while drowning or being swept
downstream would be difficult to identify and should be considered general drowning
deaths.
Note that many of these deaths are omitted from the official lists of flood-related
fata lities. In some cases the individuals may not have been a part of Par or the
surrounding community.

Life-saving interventions

CRr Sh Ch Psh Ptpari)
For many, rescuers must reach them by helicopter, crane, or other extraordinary
means within minutes if they are to be saved. Consider the helplessness of an eyewitness
firefighter ( 16.1) :
The water was chest high and the front of the truck was floating from time
to time. From the rear of the fire truck we could see with the aid of large
spotlights . .. ; people were clinging to anything that would float. Roofs and walls
from damaged homes all had people clinging to them, floating refrigerators, cars
and propane tanks. People were hanging in trees, the roar of the water was terrible
and the sounds of screams [for] help were even loader than that. People floated by
just out of reach and we couldn't get to them . ... The screams died down as
people fell from the trees and rooftops and were swept away. (Natural Disaster
Institute, 1976, p. 30)
The floods with the greatest life loss have generally claimed their victims before
professional rescuers were able to arrive. The task of the professionals was to search for
the dead and injured after the flood had receded.
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When people can reach treetops, housetops that are not moving, or islands,
hundreds or thousands of people can be rescued by helicopter or boat over several hours,
but in such cases most of the individuals are not at high risk of drowning and could
survive while waiting for the flood to pass (9).
People have rescued flood victims by forming human chains to reach stranded
motorists, waders, or those already adrift; by pulling a drifting swimmer through a
second-story window; or by holding them on a floating mattress while waiting for the
water to subside inside a building. Overall, however, the most common rescues have
involved those who risk their lives to provide early warnings or to assist weaker
individuals to shore while it is still possible to wade.
When a flood passes quickly, lives can sometimes be saved by digging victims
out of the mud and by rushing those with serious injuries to nearby hospitals (17, 32).
Since such quick floods are uncommon, however, those in the most danger are least
likely to be rescued because they are swept out of reach or they are submerged. Thus,
often those who are rescued could have survived had they not been rescued and the rate
oflife Joss is reduced Jess than (number rescued)ffpar;.
As a sidebar related to the relative ineffectiveness of modem rescue resources at
reducing life loss, one should not assume that modernity in general necessarily decreases
fatalities during flooding . Consider that automobiles do not necessarily enhance survival,
for the following reasons:
I.

Horses and buggies could transport people quite quickly.

2.

A horse can be a superior means of evacuation to a car since it is not

dependent on roads and can run up steep hillsides.
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3.

Historic evacuees were less likely to get stuck in traffic gridlock.

4.

It is the modem addiction to automobiles that often leads to fatalities. A high

percentage of deaths during flash floods accrue to motorists who voluntarily try to cross
flooded roadways or bridges. During the Big Thompson flash flood, those at greatest risk
were those who attempted to drive out of the canyon, and those least at risk were those
who chose to climb the canyon walls on foot (Gruntfest, 1977).
Other considerations include the following : In narrow floods , the fastest way to
evacuate is on foot. It can even be quickest for those with limited mobility, since family
or neighbors are usually willing to assist them. Even in wide floods, evacuation on foot
can be fairly rapid. The average adult walks 3 miles per hour and can jog much faster. A
healthy adult empowered with adrenaline should be able to clear even a very wide
floodplain in 30 or 40 minutes. Finally, evacuation warnings do not necessarily propagate
more rapidly today. People were more familiar with their neighbors in the past and
shouting readily penetrated into poorly insulated buildings.
There are, however, modem advantages: Warnings can be delivered via
loudspeakers on police cars or helicopters. Modem rescue equipment, especially
helicopters and trucks with cranes, provide distinct advantages. Modem building codes
preserve havens more readily. Wireless communication has the potential to facilitate
warnings even when wired systems are destroyed, although cellular phone systems can
quickly become overwhelmed during emergencies. Detailed census and GIS databases
and trends toward registration at campgrounds and wilderness areas may improve our
ability to warn and to identify missing persons.
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Overall, increased casualty rates prior to the modem era can probably be
attributed to these main causes:
I.

The l 00-year floodplains were often developed.

2.

High hazard d3.11ls were more likely to fail.

3.

Warning time was often less due to limitations in monitoring and detection

systems, and limitations in communication pathways over long distances.
4.

Dam owners were reluctant to issue timely warnings.

5.

Mass communication was not possible.

It follows that older cases of dam failure can be studied alongside modem cases,
so long as these difference are kept in mind.

Complications or aberrations
CMI Ac Td Ts)
What follows is a list of historic or readily conceivable complications that could
be repeated in future events to increase the likelihood of life loss:
I.

As suggested in Chapter II, if an earthquake impacts a community as well as

a dam, it can conceivably block evacuation routes, start fires, trap people in buildings,
and disrupt communications before a flood arrives, all of which could increase life loss.
2.

The nature and concentration of a debris load influences the likelihood that

someone can drift to safety while avoiding being crushed or pierced. Examples of
particularly lethal debris loads include 700,000 cords of logs from a paper mill (6) and
miles of barbed wire.
3.

An irony of floods is that they sometimes start fires when lanterns are tipped,

gas mains rupture, power lines break, transformers or electric substations explode, or
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furnaces are damaged. If floating debris such as a house catches fire, the fire can spread
to other houses or to a debris dam . This greatly increases the danger to the occupants of
the houses and to victims who are still alive but who have been swept to the debris dam
(15, 16.1, 18.25; and South Fork Dam, in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, in 1889).
4.

Although power companies typically shut off the power to flooded

neighborhoods to protect victims and rescue workers, while broken wires are live they
pose a threat of electrocution to waders or those who come in contact. Deaths of this
nature are rare.
5.

Lives can be lost in hospitals when flooding does not impact the patients or

personnel directly if the flood prevents essential medical professionals from reaching the
building or eliminates critical power sources. Natural gas lines and electric power lines
are generally shut off to flooded regions to prevent leaks, fires , and electrocutions.
Propane and gas tanks can readily float away. Combined, this can render both the main
power and all backup generators inoperable. Such was the case in subPar 16: I, but there
is no historical record of actual deaths due to this type of event in the sources examined.
6.

Invalids are dependent on others for evacuation. When Wt; is short, increased

life loss can result as more mobile individuals linger to try to help the less mobile
evacuate (16.1).
7.

Both summer and winter floods sweep snakes out of riverside haunts, adding

them to the hazards in the water and leaving them behind in inhabited areas. This
increases the likelihood of poisonous snakebites during and after the flood, although the
frequency and fatality rate of such bites is still low ( 17, 22).
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8.

Apart from drowning, prolonged floods or floods in winter can cause fatal

hypothermia (18.28), but deaths specifically identified as such have been rare.
9.

Convergence deaths result when onlookers come to watch the flood and

inadvertently become trapped and swept away (25.2).
I 0. Certain characteristics of floods can make an accurate accounting of the death
toll difficult or impossible:
a)

Often, whole families perish together, sometimes with their neighbors,

so no one remains who can identify them or tell how many people were in the
home at the time of the flood .
b)

Floods can so mangle bodies as to make identification impossible.

c)

Floods can wash victims dozens of miles downstream or bury them in

mud, making recovery difficult.
d)

It is difficult to dig for the dead using power equipment, since there is a

reluctance to tear bodies apart.
e)

It is difficult to know how many tourists, transients, motorists, or visitors

were in an area.
f)

When homes are destroyed, people can scatter all over the country to

stay with relatives. This makes it difficult to equate a list of missing with people
who died .
g)

Usually no records are kept of those who die weeks or months after the

flood due to indirect causes.
h)

Death records can be county-specific with no master list.
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i)

In many cases, companies and foreign governments have not been eager

to fully account for the dead and missing due to issues of culpability and liability.
j)

When a flood enters the center of a reservoir at an orthogonal angle, the

dense, sediment-laden flow will sink, generating strong, spiraling currents near
shore. This can create or enhance dangerous undertows many miles away that
persist for some time. In this manner a flood can kill an unsuspecting swimmer
the following day without being attributed to the flood (22. 7).

Post-flood psychological
trauma (Schvgl
When homes are obliterated, people die, and people are relocated, it destroys
social networks and a highly valued sense of community and belonging. This can
generate and prolong extreme and debilitating psychological scarring ( 17).
The trauma of a flood with large life loss includes seeing a large number of naked,
muddied, and mutilated corpses, including friends and relatives. They are first seen
floating by, sticking out of the mud, tangled in debris piles, or washed into homes. They
are then viewed again as people search rows of bodies in temporary morgues, searching
for familiar faces, hoping for the best and fearing the worst.
Traumatic symptoms include an irrational fear of storms, even when relocated far
above a river; recurring nightmares; a desire to withdraw from social contact; an inability
to return to work; lethargy; drug or alcohol abuse; suicidal tendencies; chronic depression
and apathy; marital conflict or divorce, including blame for warning one set of relatives
over another or failure to save a child; guilt for surviving when others died; guilt for
failing to save others or viewing oneself as a coward; and early death after giving up the

277
wi ll to live (16 .1, 17). Disillusionment and a sense of personal violation can also follow,
as there is almost always widespread looting following a destructive flood (17).
The tendency of floods to kill people in clusters increases the emotional trauma
and life-sty le disruptions. As an extreme example, only one woman survived from a
family group of 55 (35). A strong faith in God, His sovereignty, and in heaven, can help
people cope with the death of loved ones and move forward with healthy living patterns
(26).

Applicability of historic events to
future events: logic behind
a proposed model

Logic behind a proposed model
A flood is like a chemical element. While highly unique, each element is
composed of a small set of subatomic particles that are indistinguishable from the basic
building blocks of every other element. In isolation, the behavior of a single particle is
impossible to predict: The behavior of electrons is governed by their own motionconstrained by preferences for certain energy levels and orbital configurations-and the
random motion of other particles. However, while one cannot predict the behavior of any
individual particle, elements behave predictably on a macroscale.
In the same way, every flood is startlingly unique, but by progressively breaking
each Par down into more and more fundamental units, homogenous base units can be
defined that share remarkably similar traits. Similar to the random motion of electrons,
the o utcome for each base unit (a homogenous group of one or more persons) depends on
human motion and the random motion of the flood. While one cannot know the outcome
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of any one base unit, it is possible to describe its probability distribution. One can then
sum across the base units using a Monte Carlo simulation or the statistical means, in
conjunction with their deviations, to estimate the likelihood of various rates of life loss
for a specific event.
Fundamental base units are homogenous with respect to the larger environment,
temporal considerations, and the hydraulic characteristics to which they are exposed.
Delineating subPar according to Par type (Pt) neutralizes differences in the environment.
Reducing like subPar to like Tpar; neutralizes temporal variations. Dividing each Tpar;
into homogenous bins based on degrees of exposure neutralizes hydraulic differences.
Among buildings, this can be done by classifying Tpar; according to the loss of shelter
(Ls). When Ls = M, Tpar; should be further distributed among flood zones (Szd, Cozd,
Pcad, and Czd). Since some of these zones share the same homogenous characteristics as
when Ls

= L or Ls = H, they are truly base units.

Role of historic events
Historic events are used to determine the probability distributions for each type of
fundamental base unit. Naturally, these distributions can be refined as more and more
homogenous subPar are analyzed.
Since fundamental base units are homogenous with respect to the surrounding
environment, temporal considerations, and the nature of the hydraulic exposure; it is not
surprising that their distributions during 19th and 20th century floods appear comparable
(26). This suggests two important insights. First, if modem rescue equipment is not
immediately available, loss of shelter is based on historic reality rather than a uniform
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construction standard; modern dam safety standards are mute by assuming a failure; and
the benefits of modern warning technologies and transportation systems are neutralized
by focus ing on Tpar; and actual E; life-loss patterns should be consistent across the
centuries. Second, one can similarly mix ancient and modern failures when comparing Ef;
=

Tpar;/Par; toE in one of three ways: l) exclude expansive floods for which automobiles

or horses provide a distinct advantage, 2) include only floods for which Wtavg is
sufficiently short that only evacuation on foot is possible, or 3) adjust Ret; to account for
the forms of transportation that are/were available. One or more of these conditions is
met for every event characterized in the unpublished working documents and
summarized in Appendix C, so the current study can be used to predict future outcomes.
Since life-loss distributions can be expected to be consistent across time, they can
be used to predict statistical life loss in dam safety risk assessment.

Limitations to historic events
While the death rate in a given level of hydraulic exposure is not likely to change
across the centuries, several things are likely to change and must be explored separately
from the current mix of events: l) Since warning effectiveness is improved with
advancements in communication equipment, monitoring equipment, monitoring
procedures, early warning systems, and emergency action plans, Wt will not produce a
uniform value for Wtavg across the centuries. 2) Since building codes change with time
and country, Ls is specific to the structures at a site. The likelihood of a flood to cause Ls
=

L, M, or H can only be explored coarsely using the present database. 3) If one explores

the delectability of a failure or the likelihood of a particular failure mode, the present
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database should be used with great caution since dam safety engineering is an evolving
science.
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CHAPTER VII
A PROPOSED MODEL UNDER DEVELOPMENT

A Brief Review

It is useful to review the topics that have been covered in previous chapters.
Chapters I and II present the nature of dam safety ri sk assessment, the important role lifeloss estimates play within that field, theoretical considerations relevant to model
development, and the difficulty of selecting an unbiased data set for regression analyses.
Chapter III presents every important, flood-related life-loss model that had been
developed or proposed up to 1998. The chapter describes the contributions and
shortcomings of each model in detail and concludes with a summary of essential model
components and considerations for representing those components.
Until recently, the DeKay-McClelland regression equation DM-2d was the
dominant life-loss equation in use. However, it has often been used in a manner
inconsistent with its development and in violation of the assumptions that must be
satisfied fo r its estimates to be considered reliable. Hence, Chapter IV explores this
equation at length, raising important questions about its credibi lity and its usefulness.
Chapter V provides an extensive list of variables that pertain in some way to life
loss associated with dam failures or catastrophic flood waves. Although many of these
variables were identified in some form by previous researchers (see Table 8 in Chapter
III), this is the first time that most of them have been given specific names, symbols,
definitions, and categories by which they can be coded. Other variables, especially those
that show the greatest promise for estimating life loss, have been defined for the first time

282
and play a critical role in the proposed model presented below. All the variables are
summarized in easy-to-use reference guides in Appendix D.
Chapter VI provides the historical and theoretical foundations on which one or
more new models can be developed. Table 16 details the ways in which people perish
during floods and Table 17 details ways in which people survive floods . Table 18 then
offers a way to break issues that affect the rate of life loss into 18 logical categories. The
remainder of the chapter catalogues numerous historical insights that are useful for
gaining a good understanding of the real-world dynamics within each category. These
insights are supported by event characterizations fully recorded in unpublished working
documents that underlie the examples and summaries in Appendix B and the master chart
of characterized values in Appendix C; as well as by other failure events that have been
studied but not yet characterized.
The final category in Chapter VI describes the relevance of historical research to
predicting life loss in future or hypothetical events. This should be reviewed carefully,
since it presents the logic behind the model outlined below.

An Overview of the Problem

By way of review, on the scale of large populations spread across the length and
breadth of a flood, every catastrophic flood event is startlingly unique. When one
considers that Chapter V and Appendix D present over 90 characterizing variables that
affect life loss in interdependent ways, and that most of these variables can be described
using four to six different ranks, up to 14 different categories, or any number of different
quantitative values, it is difficult to conclude that any three or four variables can
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reasonably account for the variance in life loss across events. This is highlighted by the
fact that Brown and Graham (1988) and DeKay and McClelland (1993b) both chose to
omit certain cases as "outliers" even though those cases represent historical reality and
not experimental error.
Moreover, given the relatively small number of available data points--one for
each hi storical flood event-the statistical significance of a regression involving
numerous variables is necessarily unsatisfactory. Even with only three independent
variables, the very broad confidence limits displayed in Table 9 and Figures 8-10
illustrate this problem.
Generally , analysts have felt uneasy assuming that point estimates like Wt and Fd
co uld full y capture the uniqueness of a large, heterogeneous population. It is hard not to
fee l uneasy if Par includes a small canyon community just below a dam , campgrow1ds
along the river, popular fishing holes or reaches for rafting, bridges or stretches of
highway that follow the river, a metropolitan community on the open plain. and perhaps a
marina in the reservoir below. To reduce the leve l of cognitive dissonance, analysts have
o ften attempted to select Wt; and Fd; that are specific to more homogeneous subPar and
then to apply equations on that basis. Unfortunately, as described in detail in Chapter IV ,
the more homogeneous Par or subPar become, the less they resemble the original data set,
the more the nonlinear relationships distort the results, and the less credible the results
become in many cases.
More fundamental than questions about statistical validity are questions about
human confidence. Unless human decision-makers can have confidence in the
reasonableness of an approach to life-loss estimation, the results of any dam safety ri sk
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assessment will be viewed as suspect. Indeed , in the absence of confidence, statistical risk
assessments will be forgone altogether. Chapters III and IV have raised some serious
questions that should give any risk assessor pause before continuing with the current
models, at least without making some attempt to factor in the wide uncertainty in
predictions.

Goal s for a Solution

Shortcomings in current models suggest traits that would be desirable for the next
generation of models and the accompanying benefits of these traits:
I.

A model should be intuitively transparent and logically satisfying to engender

confidence in its use and acceptance of its results.
2.

A model should be empirically tested or empirically grounded to validate its

predictions.
3.

A model should focus on homogeneous subPar or smaller units that maintain

similar characteristics across events. There are at least four reasons for this. First, the use
of subPar increases the number of data points in a data set. This in tum allows more
variables to be considered in a model , primarily through the separation of data points into
distinct bins. Second, life loss within homogeneous units is less dependent on the
uniqueness of a given event than are global Par; homogeneous units should provide a
more consistent basis for prediction and comparison across events. Third, by focusing on
homogeneous subPar, events are broken down into their most basic, shared components.
These components could then, theoretically, be recombined to represent events that are
quite different on a macroscale. As such, a limited data set can be used to make
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predictions regarding hypothetical events that are unlike those in the data set. Fourth. as
noted in Chapters II and IV, it is difficult to select a data set free from bias, especially
when L is nonlinear with respect to Par; however, by basing regression on homogeneous
units, each equation or probability distribution becomes relatively free from bias.
Moreover, events with greater life loss can still reveal the conditions (homogeneous
units) under which life loss is expected to be small or 0.
4.

A model should first reduce Par; to Tpar; before applying life-loss

relationships so that these relationships are independent of warning times. This allows
one to eliminate Wt from a regression equation and apply life-loss functions derived from
events with Wtavg"' 0 or known values for Tpar; to events with different warning times.
5.

Ideally, Tpar; should first be distributed among approximately homogeneous

flood zones before applying life-loss functions to reduce variance based on levels of
exposure. These flood zones are aptly called homogeneous units.
6.

A model should rely on a variable like E that describes the interaction

between warning time and evacuation time, rather than one in isolation from the other.
In its simplest form, E = Wtavg-Ret (average warning time minus representati ve
evacuation time). Wtavg is estimated subjectively based on historic descriptions. It
accounts for the source of warnings (human and environmental), the time remaining
before flood arrival, and the fraction of a population that gets warned. It produces an
average value, considering both representative values (Sc, Td, Tw, Ts) and point
estimates (Det, Wt, Wte, Wt;).
Although Wtavg has been assigned a single value for each historic subPar in
Appendix C. the value of Wtavg will likely be known with less precision when attempting
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to predict its value for a hypothetical, future event. To capture this uncertainty, it is
desirable to express Wtavg as an estimated probability distribution, specific to the event
under consideration.
Ret is a subjective estimate based on historic accounts of individual evacuation
times under various conditions and logical assumptions about the rate at which people
can move in an emergency. As such, Ret considers important psychological variables (the
urgency of individual warnings, prior flood experience, the tendency of a message to
cause or prevent panic), important physical limitations (the mobility of a population,
physical barriers like streams and fences, the distance to safety, the available modes of
transportation), whether families are together and their general preparedness to evacuate
(Pr, Td, Tw), climatic hindrances (Ts, Ac, Ml), and the nature of the population under
consideration (Pt). Like Wtavg, Ret can be expressed as an event-specific probability
distribution.
Whether warning time is described as a point estimate like Wt or an average value
like Wtavg, it transcends a single event only when related to the width of the floodplain ,
the mobility of the occupants, the urgency of the warning, the time of day or night, and
other factors that affect the amount of time required to successfully complete an
evacuation. E captures this interplay. Also, by quantifying E based on subjective, logical,
and empirical factors, E is able to represent a complex function of dozens of other
variables that could not readily be analyzed using traditional statistical methods without
an extensive data set. To explicitly capture the uncertainty there is in knowing the true
value of E before an event occurs, it can be expressed as an event-specific probability
distribution to reflect the distributions of Wtavg and Ret.
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7.

A model should be linear with respect to Par so that differences in the

proportion of lives lost do not vary with size but with the value of the variables that
characterize each homogeneous unit. In that way, the model can be applied to any size
Par or to any size subPar without skewing the estimated life loss. Analysts who assess :he
same hypothetical event should obtain similar estimates, regardless of how they divide
Par into subPar. The model would also make comparisons between dams in a portfolio
more reliable. To assist in this process, explicit guidelines should be prepared for model
users.
8.

A model should use average values for homogeneous subPar-preferably

probability distributions of average values for homogeneous subPar-rather than point
estimates for heterogeneous Par. Average values, while harder to quantify, more closely
represent the experience of each individual. This is more closely assured when subPar are
relatively homogeneous with respect to the characterizing variable under consideration.
Conversely, point estimates, like Wt, D, and V, do not necessarily represent more than a
tiny fraction of a subPar, making comparisons across events problematic.
9.

One should be able to upgrade a model by refining past event

characterizations, by completing new event characterizations, or by performing
experiments to improve estimated distributions.
10. A model should either be simple to use or have the potential to be automated
so that results can be produced in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
11 . A model should be versatile, able to produce a quick estimate for preliminary
analyses or a refined estimate more detailed analyses. It should also be able to yield the
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expected life loss (an estimate of the mean) or a range of possible lives lost in the form of
a probability distribution.
12. A proposed model may be under development and thus depend on
distributions or data that are not adequately known at this time, but only if there is some
reasonable hope of estimating the needed information in the near future.

A Proposed Model Its Variations
and Supporting Topics

Introduction
The next section presents a comprehensive overview of a proposed conceptual
model for estimating life loss associated with catastrophic floods . The model incorporates
each of the six components essential to a useful dam-failure life-loss model presented at
the end of Chapter III, but goes beyond them in an attempt to be responsive to the many
insights presented in subsequent chapters. Although still under development, this initial
conceptual overview and the automated and simplified versions that follow it, once fully
developed, tested, and refined, will attempt to meet each of the twelve goals proposed in
the previous section.
The first section below-a comprehensive overview of the proposed conceptual
model-provides a step-by-step method for characterizing those aspects of a hypothetical
flood event that are pertinent to life loss as accurately as time and resources allow. A less
detailed approach can be distilled from this detailed algorithm, and would be necessary if
the goal were to quickly characterize the expected life loss without providing a refined
estimate. One such distillation follows the detailed presentation as the third section
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below. During further model development, it is planned to continue to explore both of
these levels of detail in tandem to produce the most flex ible and practical life-loss models
that are consistent with analysts' objectives. A subsequent section addresses the critical
need to automate the model, if it is to reach its potential as a practical tool. Interspersed
among these three model versions-the detailed conceptual model, the simplified model ,
and the automated model-are sections that clarify or elaborate on important aspects of
these models: flood zones and homogeneous base units, sensitivity to key model
components, estimating loss of shelter, important empirical relationships, and
customizing Joss distributions. The chapter continues by exploring the potential
usefulness of key variables defined in Chapter V through an examination of empirical
trends in Table C. I of Appendix C. Chapter VII ends with a short discussion of how to
estimate incremental life Joss.

A comprehensive overview of
the proposed conceptual model
This section presents a 12-step algorithm for characterizing those aspects of a
hypothetical flood event that are pertinent to life Joss as accurately as time and resources
allow. The end goal of the procedure is a credible and defensible estimate oflife Joss.
Simplifications to this procedure are possible, and one such simplification is presented
later in the chapter.
By way of a preview, the model seeks to reduce the population at risk (Par) to
logical, homogeneous base units that have consistent life-Joss distributions across events,
much like subatomic particles are consistent across elements and compounds. By first
characterizing historic flood events in this way, it is possible to derive empirically based
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life-loss functions or distributions that can then be applied to homogeneous base units in
any future or hypothetical flood event.
Conceptually, the model reduces each Par to subPar that are homogeneous with
respect to Par type (Pt), excess evacuation time (E), and loss of shelter (Ls). Each subPar
is then reduced to a threatened subpopulation (Tpar;) through the use of an empirical
evacuation function. This function is unique in that it is based on E. As such, the model
takes into account several dozen variables that affect the average warning time (Wtavg) or
the representative evacuation time (Ret).
Members ofTpar; are distributed into four flood zones-three with distinct
physical attributes and one that represents a zone of uncertainty between the two most
lethal flood zones. These zones rely heavily on the loss of shelter (Ls). The appropriate
life-loss distribution is then applied to each zone.
The detailed steps to estimating life loss are as follows:
I.

Develop failure scenarios and construct event trees. A group of experts

should determine the ways a given darn might fail and the type ofloadings that would be
associated with each failure mode (hydrologic, seismic, landslide, debris, mechanical,
human error, internal, other). Analysts then determine the range of loading magnitudes
that should be evaluated (for example, up to the PMF 1 and MCE 2), the possible timing of
such loadings, the likelihood that each loading magnitude will lead to failure, the rates at
which a breach might develop, and the ultimate dimensions of a breach.

1

probable maximum flood

2

maximum credible earthquake
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This progression suggests a complex pattern of possible failure scenarios that can
be explored best using event trees. Each branch of the event tree is assigned a probability
of occurrence that when multiplied along a given pathway provides the probability that
the pathway will materialize. To keep the number of pathways manageable, analysts may
discard those for which the likelihood of failure clearly falls below some minimum
threshold. They will also approximate continuous functions by breaking them down into
ranges likely to produce similar flood results and then using the values at the midpoints
of the ranges . In conjunction with preliminary flood routing, sensitivity analyses can be
useful in setting the limits of each range.
To capture the inherent uncertainty behind each of the estimates above, event-tree
analysis can use probability distributions in place of single-valued best estimates. In this
case, a Monte Carlo simulation or related technique is required to multiply the
distributions along the branches of the event tree . In a detailed analysis, this approach is
preferable as it makes the uncertainty involved in dam safety risk assessment and life-loss
estimation explicit and quantifiable.
The timing of the failure is important because Par;, E, and weather patterns all
show strong diurnal and seasonal trends .
2.

Route failure scenarios. It is impractical to route every conceivable failure

scenario, but scenarios should be routed whenever the depths downstream are expected to
differ enough to significantly impact the quantification of Par, the values for Ls, or the
anticipated wading depths. Typically, failure scenarios should be routed when depths are
expected to differ by I ft or more . This may require uncertainty analyses, or at least
sensiti vity analyses and iteration.
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When exploring a particular failure scenario, experts should use detailed
topographic maps and a dynamic flood wave model such as DAMBRK or FLOW A V to
route the flood with sufficient detail to yield credible estimates of travel times, depths,
and velocities on a scale that can be related to individual buildings. The timing of a
failure is not usually important for routing.
3.

Begin to establish subPar by characterizing regions by Par type (Pt). Maps,

field recognizance, and records of various kinds are needed to characterize Par within the
flood zone. This process can be expensive and time consuming if high levels of accuracy
and detail are desired. The first step will typically be the easiest, however, requiring only
that analysts divide the flood zone into tentative Par; based on homogeneous Par type
(Pt).
The following are examples of terrain unique to Pt: (C) campsites near the river,
either isolated or part of a formal campground; (W) reaches popular for fishing ; (B)
reaches popular for drift boats, skiing, or rafting; (L) near the mouth of the river in a
reservoir or near the dam in the reservoir upstream; (At) bridges that cross the river,
roads that parallel the river, and roads that will be flooded, other than those in residential
or commercial districts; (T) train tracks or train stations that are flooded, undermined, or
washed away; and (D) residential or commercial districts, including their network of
roads.
A final regional category pertains to areas that are vacant. These do not
technically belong to Par and can be excluded from subsequent analysis unless they are
likely to provide a reliable haven during the flood.
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4.

Continue to refine subPar such that they are reasonably homogeneous with

respect to the excess evacuation time, E. This entails subdividing each regional Par type
into geographic units in which Wtavg and Ret show minimal variability when applied to
representative clusters of persons within the geographic boundaries. Drawing a loose grid
system may prove useful, but in many cases a more flexib le approach to subdivision that
follows natural physical boundaries, neighborhoods, roads, or other logical divi sions may
be desirable. It is important to remember, however, that in regions where there is
meaningful variability in the evacuation dynamics, such as across a wide floodplain , the
geographic units must be divided laterally as well as longitudinally down the stream
channel. If using a grid, strips on the order of 300-1,000 ft wide might be typical.
Ultimate ly, however, because the size and shape of the geographic units depend onE,
wl1ich in turn depends on Wtavg and Ret, step 4 is an iterative process. The paragraphs
that follow highlight those aspects of Wtavg. Ret, and E that should be born in mind.
As each Par type is iteratively subdivided, estimate Wtavg for distinct regions or
population centers (such as nursing homes or schools) within each geographic unit.
Continue iterating until every geographic unit is acceptably homogenous with respect to
Wtavg·
Recall that Wtavg is the average individual warning time (Wt;) from any source,
human or natural. It is never less than Sc (the average warning time provided by sensory
clues), but it can be either shorter or longer than Wt. The following subtleties should be
kept in mind:
a)

Wt must account for the detailed chain of events that must occur before

a message can first be disseminated on a mass scale.
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b)

Wt begins when the first formal warning is delivered that urges

evacuation and is intended for propagation through a community. Generally, a
representative of the darn owner, a public official, or a messenger from upstream
would initiate Wt. When a person sees a wall of water and shouts to his family or
knocks on his neighbor's door while running to the hillside, this does not satisfy
the definition of Wt. In the same way, a motorist who races by while honking his
horn is not initiating Wt.
c)

Such informal warnings, often initiated by those who first detect sensory

clues, do, however, shape Wt.,g. Wtavg considers every form of warning and the
rate at which a warning propagates through a subPar.
d)

Wt ends the moment potentially lethal flooding reaches the leading edge

of Par;. Wtavg is shaped by Wt;, however, which vary spatially and temporally
throughout the region of Par;.
e)

Wtavg > Wt when Wt < Sc or when Par; is large and the warning fully

penetrates a population as it propagates downstream faster than the rate of travel
of the flood wave.
f)

Wtavg < Wt when the flood travels more swiftly than the warning

saturates a population. This is usually the case.
As with Wtavg, as each Par type is iteratively subdivided, estimate Ret for distinct
regions or population centers (such as nursing homes or schools) within each geographic
unit. Continue iterating until every geographic unit is acceptably homogenous with
respect to Ret. Recall that Ret is the representative evacuation time or the average time
required for each individual within a population to clear the floodplain. Ret considers
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many important variables listed under goal number 6 presented earlier in Chapter VII.
Guidance on estimating the representative evacuation time (Ret) is provided under its
definition in Chapter V and Appendix D.
Delineate subPar that are homogeneous with respect to region, Pt, and E. Recall
that E is the excess evacuation time, defined by Wt,v 8-Ret when Ret; are consistent across
a subPar.
It is important to understand the concepts behind Wtavg and Ret, presented above,
but it should not be forgotten that the goal of step 4 is homogeneity with respect to their
interaction: E. Despite the fact that E is influenced by dozens of variables that shape the
values for Wtavg and Ret (see goal 6 earlier in Chapter VII), some generalizations can
greatly speed the iterative process of delineating homogeneous geographic units.
Generally speaking, the length of a reach and the longitudinal dispersion of the members
o f Par; dominate the variance between Wtavg and its corresponding Wt; or Wt,. In
contrast, excluding those Par; with large populations of people with limited mobility. the
width of the flood zone and the lateral dispersion of Par; (goodness of fit, Gf) dominate
the variance among Ret;i. Thus, a subPar can usually be considered homogeneous with
respect to E when the following conditions are met:
a)

The flood peak should cross the contiguous region of Par; within a few

minutes, Wtavg should depend largely on Sc throughout the reach, or Wtovg should
be known to be homogeneous.
b)

If the reach is divided into lateral and longitudinal bands of several

hundred yards each, one enters a new Par; whenever an adjacent Ret; changes by
an amount likely to have a measurable effect on successful evacuation. Thi s
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depends, in part, on the length of Wtavg· Table 19 presents a possible standard,
although other standards are also possible.
5.

In regions with Pt = D, further delineate subPar by Ls. Buildings provide a

unique refuge, so in order for Par; to be homogeneous with respect to levels of exposure,
the buildings within Par; should have a reasonably uniform loss of shelter (Ls). At this
point in the model, the estimated depths and velocities become important and not just the
fl ood 's boundaries.
Using field reconnaissance, surveys, GIS databases, housing records, and/or
detailed topographic maps, buildings within Pt = D must be identified according to
structural endurance, height, and approximate location (depth and velocity). In some
cases, whole neighborhoods may be able to be classified as a unit; in other cases, a quick
drive through a neighborhood or a perusal of records by building inspectors may provide
sufficient information to classify buildings individually.

Table 19.

Possible criteria by which changes in Ret; indicate a region should be
subdivided into two or more subPar
When Wtavg :-:; X and Ret; :-:; 150% of Wtavg, then when moving across
Ret;, if the smallest Ret; differs from the largest Ret; by 20% of X or
more, a new Par; begins. Use the smallest value of X, below, for
which Wtavg <X.
X (minutes)
5
10
15
20
50
100
200
Any number > 200
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Using structural damage functions , the analyst should estimate which buildings
will have complete loss of shelter (Ls =H); which will have major damage without being
completely submerged, though perhaps being displaced as much as 300 ft (Ls = M); and
which buildings will sustain only minor damage (Ls = L).
6.

Distribute members within each subPar while quantifying the subPar. Once

Par; are fully delineated based on region, Pt, E, and Ls, the analyst should quantify each
subPar using the best available census data, GIS files, field surveys, interviews, historical
records, civic records, and reasoning.
Distribution of members of Par; follows experience and common sense. For
example, if Par; is a campground, the campsites nearest the river often tend to till up first
and those closest to the road last. If Par; is a residential community, an average
occupancy should be assigned to each house based on the demographics in the
neighborhood.
Values for Par; will vary according to the temporal considerations already
incorporated in step l (Td, Ts, Ty) and temporal considerations that do not affect the
probability of a failure scenario (Tw, holidays).
7.

Reduce each Par; to Tpar; based onE; and Ef. Evacuation rates are expressed

as Ef; = Tpar;/Par; =the evacuation nonsuccess factor . Values of E were determined
iteratively for each Pari in steps 5-7. Because E normalizes the differences in Wt,g and
Ret across events, one can expect the historical evacuation rates with various values for E
to hold approximately true in the future .
Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between Efand E derived for those
characterizations in Appendix 8 for which both Tpar; and Par; were known. The
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Figure 14. The evacuation nonsuccess factor vs. the excess evacuation time (E) when E
is close to zero.

uncertainty resulting from historic variability can be maintained by expressing Ef as a
probability distribution. Alternatively, one can draw a smoothS-curve through the figure
and treat Ef as a point estimate. The choice depends on whether life-loss functions are
expressed as mean values are as distributions.
8.

IdentifY flood zones within reach ofTpar;. Although we cannot know what

people will do or where they will go for certain, history suggests that most people find
the safest haven within the time allowed. Variations to this pattern can be accounted for
by using a probability distribution. For many, the safest haven that time permits is
complete evacuation from the flood zone. For Tpar, it is usually the highest floor in a
building, a neighbor's house on higher ground or with an upper story, a nearby island of
higher ground, a stout tree in a campground, or some other refuge. When no havens are
within reach, people are trapped underwater or swept downstream without assistance.
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Together, havens and the open flood form flood zones in which every member ofTpari
can be located, although there is not a one-to-one relationship between havens and zones.
The reminders and guidelines that follow should prove helpful in distributing Tpari.
Four categories of havens and four categories of flood zones are carefully defined
in Chapter V. If one includes the uncertainty of reaching a chance haven, these havens
become progressively more dangerous in the following order: safe havens (Ch), pseudosafe havens (Psh), aerated havens (Ah), and chance havens (Ch). Flood zones become
progressively more dangerous in the following order: safe zone (Sz), compromised zone
(Coz), pseudo-chance zone (Pcz), and chance zone (Cz). The reader should review the
definition of each haven and each zone if the subtleties of each are not clearly
understood .
The open flood indicates locations where people are trapped underwater or swept
downstream without the aid of chance havens (including the shore). As such, the open
flood implies a death rate of I 00%. Those who die while their haven remains intact
usually die in the open flood , but since historic distributions account for this fact, such
people should still be assigned to the haven and not the open flood .
Members of Tpari must face the flood inside of a building, inside of a train,
outs ide of a building on or above the floodplain, or in a boat. Flood zones for each of
these locations are described below.
Buildings are most relevant when Pt = D, but they are also found in campgrounds,
parks, and other locations. Inside of buildings, havens and flood zones are tied to
structural damages, flood depths, and flood velocities. Here are some helpful rules:
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a)

When Ls = L, safe havens always remain, even on the ground floor,

forming part of the safe zone.
b)

When Ls = M, safe havens, pseudo-safe havens, and/or aerated havens

always remain. Which are most likely will depend on the structural integrity of a
building, its height, the depth of the flood , the velocity of the flood, and the nature
of the debris in the flow. Flood zones are more important than havens, so analysts
should group buildings according to the safest zone expected to last throughout
the flood.
Safe zones are a safe haven or a mildly compromised haven such as might be
found when debris damages part of a safe haven's wall or a pseudo-safe haven
that drifts less than 300 ft without crumbling. The latter category would be
especially common with mobile homes and frame houses that are not bolted to
their foundation.
Compromised zones are pseudo-safe havens that drift less than 300ft, but
that are likely to experience significant structural damage along the way; and
buildings that are likely to lose walls or experience significant depths and
ve locities above the top floor, reducing safe havens to aerated havens .
c)

When Ls = H, only chance havens remain. It is not important to predict

whether people reach a chance haven or face the open flood since these are
combined to form the chance zone.
d)

Ls = Mh is used in predictive contexts when analysts have no reasonable

basis for assigning a building to Ls = M or Ls = H. Such cases belong to the
pseudo-chance zone.
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Although there was only one Par that included train passengers for the events
characterized in Appendix B (19), trains have been important in other floods (i.e.,
Johnstown, 1889) and should be included when relevant. Trains most closely resemble
mobile homes, but they also share characteristics with automobiles. If a train derails
while moving, either because it is hit by a wave or because the track has been
compromised, fatalities from the crash itself must be considered. When a train is standing
still , it should be treated as a category of building.
Those with outdoor Pt like C, W, and Afmust generally face the flood without the
benefits of protective walls. Outside of buildings, non-chance havens exist where shallow
water or structures such as trees or submerged hills provide the opportunity to stand in
the flow, climb above the flow, or hold one's head above water while in the flow. The
same zones apply outside of buildings as inside of buildings, differentiated by consistent
life-loss distributions. Examples follow:
a)

Safe zone: Safe wading depths, depths that cannot submerge a vehicle or

sweep it into deeper water for motorists, and trees that can easily withstand the
flood , are easy to climb, are easy to reach, and are easy to sit in for extended
periods of time.
b)

Compromised zone: Wading depths in which some people might be

swept away (especially children), but over half could stand for prolonged periods,
perhaps with the help of readily accessible trees, lampposts, fences, or telephone
poles. An abundance of less-dependable trees than those described above might
also form part of a compromised zone.
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c)

Pseudo-chance zones: Combinations of depth*velocity for which

analysts have no reasonable basis for concluding whether more or less than 50%
of waders will be swept away before they can be rescued. The basis for setting the
uncertainty threshold at 50% follows from the historical life-loss distributions for
compromised zones and chance zones. Except for the rarest of exceptions, 50%
was the largest rate of life loss found in a compromised zone, and 50% was the
smallest rate of life loss found in a chance zone (see Figures 40 and 41 , presented
where they are discussed later in the chapter).
d)

Chance zones: Any place where virtually all waders or motorists are

expected to be swept away or trapped underwater.
Boaters have the potential advantage of wearing life jackets, of riding a boat to
safety, or of being in a reservoir with slower velocities than in a river. They also have the
potential to launch into the air or to collide with objects at high speeds. Unfortunately,
little historic evidence exists to characterize subPar with Pt = B or Pt = L, although a few
subPar (23.5 , 23.6, and 23.7) and a few narrative descriptions (16) do shed some light
(see Chapter VI). Zones can be defined based on the level of exposure boaters are likely
to face, but these zones may not reflect the same loss functions as for previous zones with
the same name:
a)

Safe zone: Areas on a lake or reservoir above or below a dam at which

waves or a swell from the flood will not capsize a boat and where sufficient time
exists to reach shore before the craft is in danger of capsizing or going over the
dam. This time frame should be calculated generously to account fo r stalled
motors and the need to paddle or swim. Given a flood with high lethal potential,
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such as a dam failure , there are no safe zones on a flooded river unless the boaters
are far downstream where flooding is minor and inclusion in Par is questionable.
While boaters may be swept into quiescent waters that constitute a safe haven,
they must begin their journey in the main stream channel, where the flood's
greatest depths and velocities will typically manifest.
b)

Compromised zone: Any stretch of a river that catches boaters with a

fast-rising flood and that produces a rise slow enough to allow over half of the
boaters to reach shore without being capsized.
c)

Pseudo-chance zone: Any flood in a river or a reservoir for which it is

uncertain whether more or less than 75% of the boats will be capsized. In the
events characterized in the unpublished working documents underlying
Appendices B and C, the fatality rate among boaters who capsized was about
50% 3 As indicated previously, a 50% fatality rate also appears to be the cutoff
between compromised zones and chance zones. However, capsized boaters are
certainly in a chance zone if they are not wearing a life preserver (by definition),
and they are more likely in a compromised zone if they are wearing a life
preserver. To account for the added uncertainty of estimating not only how many

3
Among the historic subPar characterized, there were six reported boats that capsized by flooding:
fou r on Lake Mohave due to the Eldorado Canyon flash flood of 1974 (subPar 22.5 and 22.7 in Appendices
Band C); one on the rive r below Timber Lake Dam in 1995 (su bPar 34.1a in Appendices Band C); and
one on Rapid Creek afterthe failure of Canyon Lake Dam (subPar 16. I in Appendices Band C). Nine
people occupied the five boats in the first two events and three drowned, with (I ife- Ioss)/occupancy rates as
follows : 1/ 1, 1/3, III , 0/2, and 0/2. Generally, those who survived were wearing life jackets, and those who
drowned were not. On Rapid Creek, the boat had three or four passengers and shot 30 or 40 ft into the air
while travelling about 40 miles per hour. Witnesses did not see the boat or the passengers again after they
plunged under water, there was no indication the passengers were wearing life jackets, and the overall
death toll in this area was 171, so given the descr iption of witnesses, it is most likely the boaters drowned.
Taking the boat occupancy at three, that ' s an overall life-loss rate for all six occurrences of6/ 12 or 50%.
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boats will capsize, but how many boaters will be wearing a life preserve r. the
pseudo-chance zone extends the capsize rate down from 100% to 75%.
d)

Chance zone: Any area in a lake or in a reservoir for which it is highly

likely that 75%-100% of the boats will be capsized and/or pulled underwater.
9.

Quantify flood zone densities. Zone densities are simply the number of

people within each flood zone. This can be quantified globally or for each Tpar;
separately.
Historical patterns help in distributing Tpar; among flood zones. First, fami ly
members that are together when a flood arrives tend to get trapped in the flood together
or evacuate together (see, for example, the names of the fatalities associated with events
17, 18, 29, 3 1, 32, and 35). There are at least two reasons for this: I) Wt; will have very
little variance within a single group, and 2) family members tend to help one another,
often risking their own lives to do so.
Second, people will seek shelter in a neighbor's house if their own house is single
story and the neighbor's house has a second story or is located on much higher ground.
However, this is much less likely if their own house has an upper story to which they
mi ght flee (see, for example, events 17, 18, and 29).
These historic patterns suggest the following procedure for distributing T par;
among flood zones:
a)

Divide Tpar; into logical units based on demographics, families.

empl oyees, hiking companions, fishing groups, etc.
b)

Scatter these units proportionately among the objects on which they are

based: mobile homes, single-story residences, two-story residences, businesses,
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campsites, RVs, trails, fishing reaches, automobiles, boats, trains, etc. Paq will be
sufficiently homogeneous that an equitable distribution is fining even among
Tpar;.
c)

Assume that Wt; 2:0.5 minutes in buildings and Wt; = Sc outdoors,

raising both estimates if there is reason to believe they are longer among Tpar;.
Wt; is unlikely to be shorter inside buildings unless Ls = H, in which case it
doesn ' t matter. Outdoors, Sc should closely approximate Sc;. Wt;, as it pertains to
Tpar; , should be limited to warnings that are unmistakable and urgent.
d)

Sketch a circle around each location to which one or more members of

Tpar; have been assigned. This circle should represent the distance members can
travel given Wt; and a strong sense of urgency. The circles can extend across the
original boundaries of each Par;. These circles are called circles of accessibility.
e)

Identify the safest zone within each circle and assume the people to

whom the circle pertains reach that zone and either survive there or perish there
during the flood. If, however, the safest zone is in another building and the
original building has two or more stories, the group should not be placed in the
second building unless the building is more than 3 minutes away (i.e., the
floodplain is wide and the building is some distance inland).

f)

If there is a sufficient empirical or logical basis, take a justifiable

percentage ofTpar; from the second-most-dangerous zone and distribute them in
the most dangerous zone within reach of Tpar;. This accounts for the exceptions
to the rule, as explained next.

306
Although most people reach the safest zone that distance and time permit, there
are important exceptions. The first is when people leave a safe haven in a building that
will subsequently receive major damage in order to run into the floodplain. This occurs
when the people are convinced that the building will be destroyed and that their only
hope is to reach shore; and when people try to free livestock. The second is when people
leave the safety of the hillside in order to return for some possession or to help warn or
rescue others. The third is when people enter the flood zone to reach their family . While
such cases are a small percentage of Par as a whole, they can make up a larger percentage
ofL.
The percentage of people who chose to enter more dangerous areas is highly
variable and, to date, no empirical distributions have been developed. Here are some
guide lines, however, based on insights from Appendix Band other events. Regarding
such behavior:
a)

Remember that it will typically contribute a small percentage of L unless

L itself is small. Such behavior is the exception to the rule.
b)

It is largely irrelevant when Ls = L. In such cases, a large wave is

unlikely to catch people in the floodplain and history suggests that people either
find safe havens or do not perish under such conditions.
c)

It is irrelevant when Ls = H, because virtually everyone is already in the

most dangerous zone .
d)

It is largely irrelevant when people have no warning and a flood comes

upon them at night because there is not time to race ahead of an approaching
wave.
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e)

It is largely irrelevant when people have more than a few minutes to

decide what to do and where to go.
f)

For the most part, such fatal choices are relevant only when Ls = M.

Wtavg is on the order of 0-5 minutes, and E is < 3 minutes. In such cases, it would
be appropriate to move no more than 20-30% of the members in the second-most
dangerous zone to the most dangerous zone: Historically, under these unique
conditions, no more than this percentage of people made such fatal choices.
I 0. Apply a unique loss function, in the form of a probability distribution, to each
flood zone density. These loss functions should be based on historic levels of flood
exposure comparable to that expected in each flood zone.
A number of points should be kept in mind. Loss functions must have a linear
relationship to the size of Par. If the mean life loss is desired, these functions might be
simple proportions based on the average historical life loss under similar conditions
(Ptpar; = L;/Tpar;). If it is desirable to capture the known uncertainties. Ptpar; can be
expressed as a probability distribution. One can then use a Monte Carlo simulation to
generate a single distribution of Ptpar for the entire event.
Isolated segments of each flood zone can be treated separately or they can first be
combined and then the four flood zones can be treated separately. If the segments are
treated separately, it may be possible to identify other factors that indicate which portions
of the historic probability distributions are most likely to apply to each segment. Such an
effort seeks to identify a base unit more homogeneous than flood zones.
II. Sum all estimates of life loss across the event.
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12. Quantify risk. Risk is generally defined as the probability of an event and its
expected consequences. It is often expressed in an annualized form as an expected value,
but more generally as a probability distribution that takes into account uncertainty. Since
event trees can be used with either best estimates or probability distributions, the risk of
life loss posed by a dam is calculated by adding life-loss estimates to the event tree begun
in step I.

Flood zones and homogeneous base units
Homogeneous base units are the fundamental building blocks from which any
fl ood event can be constructed from the perspective of life loss, much like protons,
neutrons, and electrons are the fundamental building blocks from which any substance is
constructed. For floods, it is impractical to define a base unit that is truly homogeneous in
every respect, but the definition of flood zones central to the conceptual model are closer
to homogeneous base units than any unit proposed so far.
It is important to recognize that flood zones rely on categories of Ls and havens,
but zones are not synonymous with either. The essential criterion underlying a flood zone
is the level of flood exposure its occupants are likely to experience. This exposure should
be relatively consistent throughout a flood zone, so that variations in life loss are largely a
matter of chance. That is, the life-loss distributions are based on homogeneous statistical
populations. The unique capabilities and decisions of each occupant, the unique patterns
of damage rendered by debris, and random encounters with chance havens once
occupants are washed into the open flood will govern the variation. While it might be

309
possible to predict trends in any of these factors, they are not currently amenable to
refined estimation.
Thus, flood zones, as approximately homogeneous base units, attempt to define
conditions that have universal application in historic, hypothetical, and future flood
events. Through event-specific combinations and proportions, one should be able to
characterize the life loss in any event using life-loss distributions from comparable
historic flood zones .
Zones are not synonymous with havens for two reasons. Zones include every area
in the flood, whether the areas contain havens or not; and zones are defined to match
certain life-loss distributions, which vary more within havens than within zones, and
which overlap the transitions between havens.
Zones also accommodate our inability to accurately model some havens and
transition points. The transitions points berween Ls

= M and Ls = H for various kinds of

buildings and between wading depths and toppling depths are likely to remain uncertain.
Moreover, there will be uncertainty regarding the flood depths and velocities themselves
on the scale of buildings and evacuation pathways. To accommodate these uncertainties,
the pseudo-chance zone was defined and assigned a combined distribution from both
sides of the transition.

Ways to simplify the procedure
As indicated previously, the conceptual model has been presented in its most
detailed form. If less precision is required or justified fo r a particular application, the
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effort required to use the model can be reduced without sacrificing its underl ying log ic.
Here are several ways to reduce the workload at the expense of precision:
Step I : Reduce the number of failure modes to those most dominant and increase
their estimated likelihood of failure to account for similar failure modes that are
discounted. However, avoid combining failure modes when they can be expected to
result in significantly different consequences or their prevention requires different
remedial measures.
Step 2: With reduced failure modes, run fewer flood scenarios. For example.
rather than routing the flood every time the river rises by I ft , route it at 2-ft, 3-ft, or even
5-ft intervals instead. One could interpolate between final life-loss estimates to explore
the ranges in between.
Step 3: Combine similar Par type to reduce the number of categories. Fo r
example, the following pairs might be combined: campers (C) and waders (W); boaters
(B) and recreationists on lakes (L); motorists (At) and mobile train passengers (T): and
stationary train passengers (T) and residents (D).
Step 4 : Use larger geographic units. The impact of this diminishes when Wtavg >
I 0 minutes or when the geographic units transect the river. Reduce the effort expended to
quantify Wtavg and Ret;. Divide Par; based on larger changes in Ethan are recommended
in Table 19. Realize, however, that when E is close to 0, a very small change in E results
in a very large change in Ef. Hence, Steps 4-7 should only be simplified when E is
greater than ±7 minutes (see Figure 14).
Step 5: Rather than identifyi ng the height, location, elevation, and structural
nature of specific buildings within Par;, determine the rough percentage of buildings that
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fall within each category in the community as a whole . Then distribute these
proportionately or randomly according to the approximate number of buildings within
each Par;. An averaging process should reduce the error introduced by this procedure.
The uncertainty involved in distributing Tpar; also justifies this approach when less
precision is required. As for depths and velocities, make estimates at large intervals and
interpolate between.
Step 6: In distributing Par;, rather than choosing the six most common temporal
divisions [work hours (Td = S), home hours (Td = H), and sleep hours (Td = N) during
the tourist season (summer) and slumber season (winter)], select a single value for each
Par; based on an average across the year.
Step 7: One can maintain the uncertainty indicated in Figure 14 by using a
di stribution for Ef, or one can draw a smoothS -curve through the center of the data
points and use a point value for Ef. The latter is much simpler when working by hand but
does not account for uncertainty in Ef.
Step 8: It is difficult to simplify this step without violating the heart of the model,
but one's effort will be limited by the availability of dependable damage functions and
knowledge of the details in the flood zone. The simplest approach would be to limit
havens to their dominant members- floors in buildings that rise above the flood and
steep hills within the flood zone that are clearly visible on topographic maps .
Step 9: Assume that members of Tpar; do not leave their buildings unless they are
washed away or seek refuge on a steep island within the flood.
Step I 0: Apply historic life-loss distributions without considering additional
fac tors that might suggest one portion of the distribution would fit more closely than

312
another. If the method is not automated, use only mean values or mean values and
standard deviations rather than the entire distribution.
Step I I: This is a simple summation.
Step 12: This is also a simple calculation if one chooses point values throughout,
neglecting the uncertainty expressed in distributions.

Sensitivity
Assuming that steps I and 2 are performed well, the model is most sensitive to the
quantification ofE (steps 5 and 6), the fluctuation in E allowed within a homogeneous
subPar (step 7), and the quantification of zone densities (step 12). One should proceed
with caution when simplifying these steps in the model and perform sensitivity analyses
when in doubt.

Important empirical relationships
The conceptual model is informed by empirical relationships on many levels.
First, Table 15 in Chapter V that provides guidelines on estimating Ret (step 6) is based
on impressions following the characterization of 179 historical subPar. Second, Table 19
under step 7 provides an algorithm for differentiating subPar ba5ed on E that recognizes
that the sensitivity ofEfto E decreases as E increases and as

Wlavg

increases. This

relationship is reflected, in part, in Figure 14, but it is also reflected in dozens of other
subPar for which the range of Tpar; was apparent but the precise value for Tpar; could not
be quantified. Third, step 8 requires structural damage functions necessary to determine
the level of loss of shelter (Ls) at each structure. Functions currently exist, but they are
generally used to estimate economic damages and existing functions will probably need
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refinement before Ls can be esti mated with precision or confidence. In the mean time, the
designation Ls = Mh and pseudo-chance zones should help analysts apply the model in
the face of uncertainty. Fourth, havens and flood zones can be identified more readily if
damages can be understood on a detailed level when Ls = M. The same comments as for
the third point apply here, as well. Fifth, the method in step 12 for quantifying zone
densities follows certain assumptions about trends in people's behavior during the urgent
moments just before a flood arrives in force. These trends have not been quantified, but
they are expressed in Chapter VI and they show a consistent pattern throughout most of
the subPar that were examined. Sixth, all of the distributions ofPtpar; in step 13 are
empirical in nature. Each of these six empirical categories could be customized for any
Par type or subset of a Par type (for example motorists at bridges, on a road that parallels
a river with a slow rise, or fl eeing from a wall of water down a canyon).

Estimating loss of shelter (Ls)
The conceptual model is heavily dependent on the ability to estimate the degree of
structural damages. When buildings are overtopped by floodwaters , Ls = H and people
are assigned to the chance zone. Below these depths, however, it is important to judge
what kind of haven remains on the top floor or accessible roof. This, in turn, is affected
by whether or not a building floats and drifts into the main current; whether lower floors
are destroyed, submerging the top floor; and whether water that reaches the top floor
carries sufficient debris to tear away walls.
Answering these questions is beyond the scope of the current study, but it is
helpful to suggest ways in which researchers might estimate such dynamics. First,
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researchers should conduct a thorough literature review to discover what kinds of loss
di stributions currently exist for use by insurance companies or interested agencies. It is
important to remember, however, that Ls, havens, and flood zones are based on exposure
to strong currents and not on economic damages.
Second, structural engineers include lateral wind loads in their calculations when
they design buildings. In some cases, wind is modeled as a dynamic load or as an impact
load, since it can come in sudden gusts. This is analogous to the lateral movement of
water and to the sudden impact of a wall of water. Recognizing this similarity, current
software like ST AAD could be used to develop structural damage tables, curves, or
functions for standard building configurations that estimate damages at 1-ft increments of
depth and a range of corresponding velocities. It would be important to remember that
catastrophic floods are more dense that sediment-free water in calculating the loads.
These relationships could then be refined further to account for the impacts
caused by large debris like trees, rooftops, vehicles, and houses. Since these impacts
would be more random than the force of the flood alone-not only in terms of whether
they occur but also where they might occur on a structure-their affects could be
expressed in the form of a probability distribution .
Third, the functions developed above could be empirically tested or calibrated by
several means.
I.

Studying historic failures, it might be possible to reconstruct the velocity and

depth of a flood at individual structures and then to correlate these to specific damages.
The most important point to identify is the boundary between Ls = M and Ls =H. It is
not important whether a failure involves loss of life or whether it is a dam fai lure or a
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flash flood. If no historic events are available, enough flash floods occur every year to
begin to collect data in the near future .
2.

One could construct small-scale models and test them in the laboratory using

steady flows and sudden, debris-filled walls of water.
3.

It might be possible to identify a dam for which no significant losses to the

environmental, property or human life would be expected from a very large release of
water. If so, one could construct small, inexpensive structures in or beside the stream or
relocate structures from land that will be redeveloped, and then release increasing
quantities of water, tracking the damages with time. As an alternative to the second
option of using scaled models in the laboratory, one could use larger scaled models below
adam .
It is also important to realize that software is currently under development or
currently exists that includes the goal of quantifying physical damage to structures by
floods. Appendix E addresses this important opportunity for collaboration.

Automating the conceptual model
If the proposed model were to be applied to a large number of dams, it would be
useful to automate the procedure as much as possible. Ideally, it would be desirable to
write software that could read GIS data files and manipulate the data according to the
needs of steps 3-15 . Steps I and 2 are well established in the field of dam safety risk
assessment and currently rely on a combination of expert interaction and modeling
programs, so one would want to prepare the new program to accept output from the
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software used in these steps. At minimum, software is required to run the Monte Carlo
simulations if probability distributions are used to express Ef and Ptpar.
It might be necessary to approach steps 5 and 6 manually, since the large numbers

of variables that influence Wtavg and Ret; are difficult to express in a function and must be
estimated themselves. However, one might have a program suggest standard values such
as those in Table 15 of Chapter V and allow the user to alter them on a case by case basis.
Alternatively, one could input a base estimate for Wtavg and Ret, input values for each of
the variables affecting Wtavg and Ret (see goal 6 under "Goals for a Solution," above),
and assign these variables influence functions that shift the values of Wtavg or Ret up or
down. The analyst could then check each result and alter those that appear unreasonable.
This would certainly be an area for additional research.
As mentioned above, software currently under development might prove useful in
determining values for Ls (see Appendix E).

Customizing loss distributions
Recognizing that flood zones are not pure homogeneous base units, one way to
customize the distributions of Ptpar for each zone segment is to fully characterize each
subPar after the manner in Appendix B. The subPar in Appendix B, already
characterized, form a database that can inform an expert system. Given an expert system,
the analyst can then select whatever criteria or set of criteria he or she feels is most
important for a particular subPar. For example, in the Vaiont failure, the depth of the 325ft flood was critical; in the Anis Alluvial Fan flash flood, the velocity of the 3-ft flood
was critical , in combination with high levels of exposure; and in the failure of the
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Banqiao and Shimantan Dams, the shear expanse of the flood and the poor quality of the
peasant' s shacks was critical. Responding with the number of subPar the analyst requests,
the expert system would select the subPar that most closely matched the analyst's criteria,
produce their names for reference, and produce a customized life-loss distribution based
on their historic values for Ptpar.
When Ls = D, as an alternative to flood zones, the less-refined criteria for Ls
alone can be used to segregate Par; according to levels of exposure. These can then be
refined through customized loss functions, as described above, if criteria are selected that
are likely to distinguish between Ls = Mminor and Ls = Mncarly destroyed·

Critiq ue of the proposed models
Before exploring the empirical data that underlies the conceptual model, it is
useful to critique the extent to which the model meets the goals set forth previously.
Table 20 provides a report card.

Important Empirical Distributions
Exploratory Data Analysis
and Potential Trends

Introductory comments
Appendix C presents a table containing dozens of characterized variables for 179
subPar and 163 non-overlapping subPar. To date, only the first stages of analysis have
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Table 20.

A critique of the proposed models against the proposed goals

Goal: A Model Should.
1. be intuitively transparent and logically satisfying to
engender confidence.
2. be empirically grounded to validate its predictions.

3. focus on homogeneous base units that can be
compared across events.
4. reduce Par; to Tpar; before applying life-loss
relationships.
5. distributed Tpar; among homogeneous flood zones
before applying life-loss functions to eliminate
variance based on levels of exposure.
6. rely on a variable like E that describes the interaction
between warning time and evacuation time.
7. be linear with respect to Par so life loss is based on
the characterization of each Par; and not the manner
of its division.
8. use average values for homogeneous subPar rather
than point estimates for heterogeneous Par.
9. be capable of upgrade by refining past event
characterizations, by completing new event
characterizations, or by performing experiments to
improve estimated distributions.
l 0. be simple to use or be automated so that results can
be produced in an efficient and cost-effective
manner.
11. be versatile, able to produce a quick estimate for
preliminary analyses, a refined estimate for more
detailed analyses; a single, expected value, and a
range of probable outcomes in the form of a
probability distribution.
12. be allowed to be under development, but only if there
is some reasonable hope of estimating the needed
information in the future .

Level of Achievement
(Poor, Good, Excellent)
Detailed
Conceptual
Automated
Model
Model
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent with Room for
Continual Improvement
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Poor

Excellent

Poor

Excellent

Good-toExcellent

Good-toExcellent
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been possible. As new data points are added to tbe data set, ever-richer avenues can be
explored.
A caution should be noted, however. From the perspective of life-loss dynamics
in flood zones, every subPar is independent of every other subPar once they are reduced
to Tpar; and fully characterized. That is, life loss is person-specific and location-specific
and not event-specific. Other variables, however, are event-specific (i.e., Td, Fm, Hp, Dt,
M, etc.) and can appear to have statistical significance if some events are broken down
into more subPar than otber events. The current data set includes 38 events, but some
events like Dale Dyke (56 subPar), Mill River (19 subPar), and Buffalo Creek (16
subPar) dominate. The reason for this dominance is because these floods passed through
many communities and sources recounted the events on a personalized scale that made it
possible to identify both subPar and Tpar;. Fortunately, all of these events included
subPar with Ls

= L, Ls = M, and Ls = H, so tbis greatly reduced event-specific biases.

For now, four tracks have been explored: I) temporal relationships that provide a
reasonable estimate of Ef; = Tpar;/Par;; 2) probability distributions of Ptpar; based on
subPar that are homogeneous with respect to loss of shelter (Ls); 3) exploration of
variables that, in isolation, might skew Ptpar; toward the upper tail, lower tail , or central
portions of each Ls-distribution; and 4) probability distributions for flood zones. In a
sense, step 3 was an early attempt to reduce Ls to flood zones without defining flood
zones directly or determining their densities.
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Overview of the data set
Although there were 163 non-overlapping subPar in the data set from 38 separate
flood events, Tpar; could be accurately quantified for only a fraction of them. The reason
is simple: Tpar is seldom known or reported for historic floods. The exceptions are when
Wtavg = 0 and Tpar =Par, or when an author recounts a flood on a house-by-house basis.
Such floods are invaluable, not only because they portray the evacuation
dynamics, the flood dynamics, and the life-loss dynamics in great detail , but also because
they often can be broken down into subPar with known values for Ls and Zd. In all, there
were 92 subPar for which both Par; and Tpar; could be quantified. There were 122 subPar
for which Ls was known, but not all of these were homogeneous with respect to Ls.
Among subPar with Tpar; > 0, there were 38 subPar with Ls = HIOO%, 22 with Ls =
M I 00%, and 19 with Ls = LIOO%. When these subPar were further divided into zones, it
was possible to identify 45 isolated chance zones, three pseudo-chance zones, II
compromised zones, and 4 7 safe zones.

Reducing Par; to Tpar; (E vs. Et)
It is fitting to present the results of the analysis in the same sequence as the
information is needed in the model. Step I 0 reduces each Par; to Tpar; with the help of
Wtavg. Ret, and E, calculated for each Par; in steps 5-8. Once E is known, an empirical
relationship between E and Efprovides the means of moving from Par; to Tpar;. This
relationship is presented in Figure 14 and Figure 15.
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'..

• Bpar = Pre • Bpar ,. Post

Figure 15. The evacuation nonsuccess factor vs. the excess evacuation time (E) given
Bpar = Pre and Bpar =Post.

The first figure indicates that thtee out of the five largest values of E occurred
because an official warning was delivered before the dams failed. In two of these three
cases, Ef was substantially higher than one would expect from the general trend in the
graph (more visible in Figure 14). To these could be added subPar 35.5, the shore side
communities around Vaiont Lake. Those people had more than a day's warning and were
forcibly evacuated by the police-in some cases twice-yet 158 people (Ef"' 0.1 5)
evaded evacuation and died. That data point reflects a value forE of -5 minutes and an Ef
value of 1.0 because Par was quantified based on those who evaded evacuation. The
significance of these thtee events is that warnings prior to failure often carry less urgency
or credibili ty than warnings during or after fa ilure, and should not be treated in the same
way. Additional evidence comes from events that could not be included in the figure. For
example, warnings were disseminated from many sources, official and unofficial. up and
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down the Buffalo Creek Valley hours before the dams failed. Despite these efforts, the
warnings were generally disregarded due to the history of false alarms in the region.
Deaths occurred for about 12 miles.
Figure 14 narrows the scale to show the large number of E-values close to zero.
The fact that most E-values were close to zero is a byproduct of several factors: I) The
most common type of flood event that leads to many fatalities is one with short warnings
in a steep, narrow valley and total destruction of buildings, 2) events through long,
narrow valleys are most readily broken up into many subPar, and 3) writers are more
likely to chronicle an event on a house-by-house basis-helpful in quantifying Tpar;when communities are small and sequential than when they are large and dispersed.
Although it is not immediately apparent, a close comparison between Figure 14,
Figure 15, and Appendix C will reveal that negative E-values continue out to -30 minutes
and beyond with no departure from Ef= 1.0. There were no historical examples ofTpar;
<Par; when E < -5 minutes. Values ofE < -10 minutes reflect expansive, urban
neighborhoods or island communities with little or no warning time. As such, this graph
represents all types of communities, large and small, canyon and plain, when Wtavg is
short; and should accurately reflect the pattern of activity withiri the final, urgent minutes
before the arrival of any catastrophic flood. It fits especially well for those who live
within I ,000 ft of the hillside.
The strong and extended trend line at Ef= 1.0 shows that it would be unrealistic
to expect any evacuation of a homogeneous subPar when E < -6 minutes. However, most
people can run far and fast when their life depends on it, so between E = -4 minutes and E
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= +4 minutes, Ef drops from about 0.98 to 0.02 in an S-pattem with an inflection point at

Ef = 0.5 andy-intercept at 0.25 . There is, of course, wide scatter around this trend line.
The right tail of the graph can be extended indirectly through events like Buffalo
Creek that provide especially good studies in life loss with incremental increases in E.
The subPar can not be used directly because the values for Tpar; are not known.
However, every fatality was a member ofTpar; and the approximate value ofT par; can be
guessed via the life-loss distributions presented in Table 2 I (illustrated graphically later
in Figures 22 and 23). The results are displayed using new scales in Figure I 6. The new
data points were calculated by distributing L; proportionately to each level of Ls, then
dividing each Lij value by the appropriate average proportion of lives lost recorded in the
bottom row of Table 2 I. Potential Tpar; among houses with Ls

=

L were neglected since

they would have grossly distorted the results.
While it might be preferable to display confidence limits, it is gratifying to see
that the general pattern produced is exactly what one would have expected. That is, the
new data points fit well with the original pattern close to zero and they continue to
approach zero asymptotically with time. Note that while most people evacuate within the
first 5-l 0 excess minutes, even when the warning time exceeds the evacuation time by 40
and 55 minutes, there can still be stragglers that do not evacuate for one reason or
another.
There are two ways to use these figures. One way is to draw a smooth S-curve
through the center of the data points and then to read point estimates off this curve.
Another approach is to sketch upper and lower bounds around the data points and then to
determine the distribution of Ef within small increments of E. The distributions can be
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Table 21.

Proportion of lives lost within threatened subpopulations (Ptpar;) with
homogeneous Ls when values were available

Ls1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.97
0.94

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Homogeneous
HIOO%
0.93
0.57
0.93
0.50
0.89
0.40
0.86
0.38
0.84
0
0.83
0.80
0.78
0.71
0.66
0.64

Average = 0.857

Average= 0.202

H- 0.857

MIH- 0.236

0.3•- , - - - -- -- --

-

..-f.

Loss of Shelter
Ls- M100%
0.020
0.88
0.80
0.013
0.56
0
0.50
0
0.43
0
0.43
0
0.33
0
0.28
0
0.13
0
0.037 0
0.036 0

Ls- LIDO%
0.013 0
0.0025 0
0.0016 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Average0.000914
LIH- 0.00107
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Figure 16. The evacuation nonsuccess factor vs. the excess evacuation time (E),
including points back-calculated from L; and the average life loss for each
category of Ls.
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produced directly using the data points in Appendix C. As a general trend, the skewness
in this distribution shifts from positive to negative as E changes from negative to positive
values. Any prediction of life loss that intends to capture real-world dynamics needs to
incorporate this intrinsic variability.

Reducing Par; to Tpar1 (shortcomings
ofWt, Wtavg, and Sc)
Wt, Wtavg, and Sc are much less useful than E in predicting Ef. Figure 17 shows a
slight reduction in Ef as Wt increases beyond 45 minutes, but Figure 18 is essentially
trendless when Wt is less than 15 minutes. Figure 17, does, however, reinforce the notion
that pre-failure warnings are ineffective. The data point at the extreme upper right comer
represents the communities around Vaiont Lake, discussed above. Overall, when Wt
began prior to failure, less than 80% of the population evacuated in six out of seven
cases. The triangles represent these same seven data points, only Wt is limited to the time
subsequent to failure. Notice that under these constraints, the evacuation rates were in
keeping with other events, suggesting Wt was not taken seriously until the dams actually
failed.
Wtavg shows a stronger trend in Figure 19 and its corresponding close-up in Figure
20 than did Wt, while Sc in Figure 21 shows simultaneous trends in opposite directions.
Such illogical results are possible because, fundamentally , any measure of warning that is
independent of the required evacuation time is only half of the puzzle. In and of
themselves, warning times mumble when they try to declare who can and who cannot
escape the flood zone.
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App lying loss functions to
homogeneous units based on Ls
Once Tpar; is determined by multiplyi ng Par; by Ef, Par; must be distributed
among homogeneous units for which there are known , empirically based life-loss
distributions. Flood zones were a late addition to the model, so early analysis
concentrated on damage functions for Ls = H 100%, Ls = M 100%, and Ls = L I 00% with
the hope that these environments could also be related to conditions in the open.
Figures 22-24 tabulates the proportion of lives lost for each subPar; that was
completely homogeneous with respect to a category of Ls. These points could be chosen
at random as a means of using a probability distribution in a model. Other alternatives
invo lve selecting the average value from a range of values according the proportion of
subPar in that range. A third method would be to make a completely continuous function
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by drawing a smooth line through a histograph. The histograms for Ls = H100%, Ls =
MIOO%, and Ls = LIOO% are presented in Figures 22-24, respectively. In each case, the
height of a bar represents the number of data points within that range, and the data points
are all less than or equal to the number at the bottom of the column. The underlying
values can be found in Table 21 and in Appendix C.
Notice the strong trends when Ls =Hand Ls = L. When Ls = H, the most likely
value for the proportion of lives lost among Tpar; (Ptpar;) is 1.0, and the average death
rate is 85. 7%. When Ls = L, however, deaths are a rare exception, so one would generally
expect zero deaths and, on average, only 1 out of I ,000 people left stranded in the flood
zone would die (see the averages at the bottom of Table 21).
When Ls = M, the flood conditions could approximate Ls = L or Ls = H,
depending on the height of the building and the nature of the damages. Not surprisingly,
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Ptpar; ranges across the spectrum between Ls

~

L and Ls

~

H. Losses appear to be

clumped into three separate distributions. Most likely, the distribution near zero reflects
cases for which upper stories or other safe havens provide flood conditions most similar
to Ls

~

L. The distribution on the far right reflects tenuous conditions in which people are

more likely to be submerged or swept away than to find adequate shelter. The distribution
in the middle likely represents subPar with a range of major damages, some very severe
and other rather middle, producing a mixed distribution .
Figure 25 ignores the frequency of Ptpar; ranges, but it demonstrates the diversity
of values and the overall spread. The plot is based on Lsw, which is a weighted, linear
combination of Ls-values for which the average Ptpar; when Ls ~His the reference. The
equation is shown at the bottom of the graph and it is explained in Chapter V. The
importance of the graph is that life loss falls within the expected ranges for subPar with a
mixture of Ls values: it increases as Lsw approaches Ls

~H.

Refining loss functions
with predictive variables
While these Ptpar; distributions are satisfying, the wide range of possible values in
Figures 22, 23, and 25 suggest that loss of shelter, alone, does not adequately define
homogeneous base units. Does it make sense that life loss can range between 0% and
I 00% when Ls

~

H? Does Figure 23 represent three distributions or only one?

To try to narrow the range of each distribution that should be used in a given
context, Ptpar; was graphed against a number of possible predictive variables with the
data points broken out separately for each category ofLs ~ X!OO%. The most likely
candidates for predictors were various approaches to depth and velocity.
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Figure 26 shows Ptpar; vs. D, with Ptpar; broken out by Ls categories. Figure 27
duplicates this graph when D < 30 ft. It is important to remember that Dis a maximum
value and not necessarily representative of a subPar as a whole. However, together, these
figures suggest several valuable insights.
When D > 100ft, one can reasonably expect Ls = HlOO% and Ptpar; will fall
within that range of the Ls = 100% distribution for which Ptpar; > 0.94. This roughly
corresponds with the upper 40'h percentile of the Ptpar; distribution.
Although the graph implies that when D $ 3 ft one would expect only minor
damages, this is not necessarily the case. For example, with D"' 3 ft, velocities were
sufficiently high across the Anis Alluvial Fan that had it been a neighborhood instead of a
campground, damage would most likely have been major. The roads were washed away
in places and erosion was pronounced. At 4 ft, the flood through Eldorado Canyon caused
residential trailers to float and move into deeper water where they were destroyed. Ptpar;
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Figure 26. The proportion of the threatened subpopulation that perishes (Ptpar;) vs. the
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=

0.57 instead of 1.0 for this data point because three people were able to reach shore

before the trailers were swept away. At 6 ft of depth, frame houses below Lee Lake Dam
were destroyed, killing those who could not evacuate.
Taking each Ls category in isolation, there are no clear trends when D <30ft that
would allow one to focus on one part of a Ptpar; distribution over another. More severe
damage can be expected as D increases, but the graph does not provide a reliable
distribution for prediction since damages are highly dependent on velocities. However,
when D <:20ft, Ls = HIOO% unless buildings are very tall and sturdy (such as some
commercial structures) or some buildings are in water less than 20ft deep.
Figure 28 is almost identical to Figure 27, except that Wwr is used in place of
depth. Wwr represents the height of a wall of water or the comparable height of a fastrising flood, taken as 0.8*0 when R = V, 0.3*0 when R = H, and I ft when R = L. These
weightings are subjective, but they seek to capture the depths that are most likely to
impact people if they are caught while evacuating. Since most events in the data set had
walls of water, and since these walls were usually equivalent in height to D, little new
information is provided. However, note that key data points for Ls

=

HI 00% and Ls =

M I 00% are shifted toward smaller values, reinforcing the point made earlier that floods
less than 4 ft in depth can still cause considerable damage and life loss if velocities are
high.
Figure 29 indicates the relationship between Ptpar; and peak velocity. As forD, V
is not necessarily representative of Par; as a whole. When Ls = HI 00% or L I 00%, no
apparent trends exist that would allow one to refine the Ptpar; distributions in Figures 22
and 24. It is possible to postulate that when V < I 0 fps among buildings, Ptpar; will not
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exceed 0.15, but this should be verified through additional research and one would not
expect this to hold true if buildings were submerged.
Theoretically, D and V should have greater predictive potential when their
separate influences are combined. Figures 30 and 31 explore this for the product ofV*D,
which, again, is not necessarily representative of Par; as a whole. One can be reasonably
2

confident that when D*V > 600 ft /s, a relatively homogeneous, residential subPar will
have Ls = H 100% and Ptpar; > 0.8. Above D*V = 2,500 ft 2/s, one would generally expect
Ptpar; ?. 0.94. At the other extreme, when D*V < 40 ft 2/s, one would most often expect
Ptpar; < 0.15, but this can be violated as suggested by a Ptpar; value of 1.0 when D*V =
50 ft 2/s. In between these extremes, D*V offers little help in distinguishing levels of
damage or life loss. That is not to say that it is impossible to predict levels of damage in
this range, but only that the point values of D and V offer little help without knowing
what D and V are at each structure and the relative durability of the structures involved
(whether structures are mobile homes, unbolted frame houses, bolted frame houses, brick
houses, commercial structures, etc.).
The destructive velocity, Dv, seeks to represent an entire reach more uniformly
than D*V since it relies on W and Qp. However, there is still the dilemma that Dv does
not represent the fringes of a flood zone well or those segments of a reach wider or more
narrow than W. For the most part, only the maximum width was available, so Figures 32
and 33 display only Dvmin (Dv is minimized when W is maximized). There are no
apparent trends when Dv is small, but Ls = H appears to stop about Dv
=

= 600 ft 2/s and Ls

M appears to stop about Dv = 1,000 ft 2/s in homogeneous, residential communities.
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Researchers would want to confirm this with additional data points, however. Beyond Dv
=

I ,000 ft 2 /s, one would also expect Ptpar; to fall above 0.95.
Figure 34 explores the impact that day and night have on Ptpar;. The data are

inconclusive. Because Td usually remains the same for every subPar associated with a
given event, there is great potential to detect false trends. In particular, the Dale Dyke
Dam failure occurred at night, as do many lethal flood events, so there are more subPar
with Td

= N than with Td = H or S. It should be noted, however, that Td is already

incorporated into the model in that it profoundly affects E by shortening Wtavg and
lengthening Ret. Once people are trapped in a flood, the effects ofTd should be less
pronounced.
In the same way, the general preparedness of people to evacuate prior to failure
should influence the value of E through both Wtavg and Ret, but it should have little
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Figure 34. Range ofPtpar; for a dichotomous treatment of day and night (Td).
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bearing on life loss after the flood arrives. Figure 35 demonstrates no clear trend except
that Pr tends to be low among events with life loss.
As for both Td and Pr, the level of development in a region suggests something
about the rate at which a warning can propagate and tht: lt:ngth of time it might take to
evacuate (affecting E). Development should only affect Ptpar;, however, as it reflects the
shape of the floodplain, the likely damages present, and the nature of chance havens (or
lethal walls of housing debris). Thus, Figure 36 does not reveal reliable trends, but it does
show that the data set is dominated by events in relatively narrow valleys as opposed to
urban reaches. Only heavily urbanized areas, including tall buildings, qualify for Dev = 4,
and none of these were in the data set.
There is no obvious reason to expect E to influence Ptpar; after the flood arrives,
and Figure 3 7 shows no clear trends.
Figure 38 shows a trend opposite to what might be expected: Ptpar; is higher
when adverse attendant circumstances contributed essentially nothing to L; and lower
when Ac had a profound effect on L;. There may have been isolated cases in which Ac
was coded inconsistently, but overall the graph simply reflects two facts: events with high
rates of life loss are not dependent on Ac to kill people, and the data set was dominated
by events for which life loss was largely independent of Ac .
The same can be said for rescue resources. Among the floods studied, most had
low levels of rescue resources available in the first critical minutes when rescues are most
likely to reduce life loss. Generally, advanced rescue resources can help only those who
survive a flood's first onslaught, after which their survival is much more likely. An
example of the latter would be a large, urban area that floods and traps people on
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rooftops, treetops, and in upper stories. In such cases, people are available for rescue
simply because they have already reached a flood zone with a relatively low rate oflife
loss. Of course lives can be saved when people who are injured are rushed to area
hospitals. In any case, Figure 39 suggests no reliable trend in Rr vs. Ptpar; for any
category ofLs. Each category reflects a V-pattern centered at Rr = 2, which simply
indicates that the data set was dominated by events with Rr = 2, increasing the likelihood
of greater spread in Ptpar; at this value.

Summary of predictive variables
The following variables were not found useful in identifying subsets of the
distributions in Figures 22-24: Td, Pr, Dev, E, Ac, and Rr. The first three, however, have
a profound impact on the estimate of L through their influence on Wtavg, Ret, and E.
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The most promising variables appear to be depth and velocity or functions that
describe the nature of the flooding people experience. This is not surprising, since it is the
flood dynamics that cause fatalities. D, Wwr, V, D*V, and Dvmin all have the
shortcoming that they are either extreme point values or extreme averages that do not
necessarily describe the flooding unique to Tpar;. Moreover, if people are in havens, they
will not experience the full force of the flood. Nevertheless, the following trends can be
considered reliable under normal circumstances, with the idea that efforts should be made
to confirm them through additional historical characterizations.
I.

D in isolation:
a)

If D > I 00 ft, Ls = HI 00% and Ptpar; is represented by that portion of

Figure 22 for which Ptpar;

~

0.94 or possibly Ptpar;
~20ft,

~

0.9.

b)

When every building has Dij

Ls = HIOO%.

c)

When D < 30 ft, Ls will determine which Ptpar; distribution applies, but

in each case, the entire distribution applies.
d)
2.

3.

Wwr offers no clear predictive advantage over D.

V in isolation:
a)

The entire Ptpar; distributions apply when Ls

b)

It is possible that when V < I 0 fps in residential areas, Ptpar; ::; 0.15.

=

HIOO% or Ls = LIOO%.

V*D in isolation:
a)

When D*V > 600 ft 2/s accurately represents a residential area, Ls =

H \ 00% and Ptpar;
b)

~

0.8.

When D*V > 2,500 ft 2/s accurately represents a residential area, Ls =

HI 00% and Ptpar;

~

0.94.
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c)

When D*V < 40 ft 2/s, Ls =LorMand Ptpar; is almost always :S 0.15,

which eliminates most of the variance within the Ptpar; distribution for Ls =
MlOO%.
d)

Ls-values are heavily dependent on the durability and buoyancy of the

buildings.
4.

Dvmin in isolation:
2

a)

Above Dvmin = 600 ft /s, it would be rare for Ls = L.

b)

Above Dvmin = 1,000 ft 2/s, it would be rare for Ls = M. Also, Ptpar; ~

0.95 on the Ptpar; distribution for Ls = HlOO%.
5.

Notice that depth/velocity relationships provide guidance on Ls as well as

Ptpar;.

Applying loss functions to
homogeneous units based on Zd
The fundamental problem with most potential predictive variables is that they are
point estimates and may or may not describe the conditions in the immediate vicinity of
each member of Par;. It is incongruous to reduce a subPar to a fairly homogeneous unit
and then to attempt to refine the predictions further by including less homogeneous
variables. Instead, it is desirable to refine the units further and then to develop new
distributions for the next greater degree of homogeneity. This is the goal of flood zones.
Each subPar for which sufficient information was available was divided further
among one or more flood zones, regardless of whether or not Ls was homogeneous for a
particular subPar. As with Ls, each historic example of a zone was gathered together with
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other examples of the same zone to determine the distribution of the proportion of lives
lost under that level of flood exposure.
Table 22 lists the data points that were obtained. Flood zone densities replace the
designation Tpar; and Pr is used as the prefix for "proportion" to avoid confusion
between pseudo-chance zones (Pcz) and the proportion of lives lost in the chance zone
(Prcz).
The average value for each zone's proportion is listed in the second-to-last row.
Confirmation that these zones are more homogeneous units than categories of Ls is
evidenced by the fact that the average Prcz value (0.918) is higher than the average Ptpar;
value for Ls

=

H 100% (0.857); and the average Prsz value (0.000345) is an order of

magnitude less than the average Ptpar; value for Ls = Ll 00% (0.00 107). The high end of
the Ptpar; distribution for Ls = M was eliminated for Prcoz because those lives were lost
in chance zones. Similarly, the single data point at Ptpar;

= 0 for Ls = HI 00% represented

a threatened population that found haven in the safe zone.
The pseudo-chance zone closely resembles the chance zone rather than a
combination of the chance zone and compromised zone, although there were only three
data points to evaluate. Until this zone can be refined, it is probably appropriate to apply
the Prcz distribution to Pczd, although one could add the nonzero values from the Prcoz
distribution or, alternatively, the values that overlap with the Prcz distribution, with little
effect.
Figure 40 presents the distribution of Prcz in the form of a histogram and is
directly analogous to Figure 22. Figures 41 and 42 present the distributions of Prcoz and
Prsz, respectively, and should be compared to Figures 23 and 24. Figure 43 illustrates the
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Table 22.

Proportion of lives lost in each flood zone for which values were available

Chance Zone
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.991

Prcz
0.988
0.981
0.981
0.978
0.971
0.938
0.933
0.933
0.929
0.915
0.889
0.857
0.857
0.842
0.833
0.806
0.800
0.706
0.655
0.643
0.500
0.383

average- 0.918
Prcz- 0.918

Proportion of Lives Lost in the ..
Pseudo-Chance Compromised
Zone
Zone
Prpcz
Prcoz
1.000
0.500
0.900
0.500
0.900
0.241
0.222
0.036
0
0
0
0
0
0

Safe Zone

Prsz
0.013
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
average- 0.933 average- 0.136
average- 0.000
Prpcz/Prcz Prcoz!Prcz Prsz!Prcz- 0.000
0.148
1.016
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dramatic difference in fatality rates between chance zones and safe zones. Each of the 45
points across the bottom represents a unique homogeneous unit with its own value for
Prcz and Prsz. As such, the rectangular graph represents the entire population in every
chance zone or every safe zone, and the shaded regions represent the respective
percentage of lives lost in each zone. Numerically, if the chance zone had 3,000
members, 2,754 would die, but if the safe zone had 3,000 members, one or fewer people
would be expected to die.

Limitations to refining loss
functions with D, V, or Dv
Conceptually, point estimates ofD, V, or Dv are especially ill suited to
characterize the specialized environment within each flood zone. For example, by
definition, V only represents the velocity in a safe zone when an entire subPar is
characterized by shallow wading depths in the open. Compromised zones are
characterized by great variability, as reflected in its Prcoz distribution, so there can be no
one-to-on relationship between compromised zones and D, V, or Dv. Only the chance
zone is likely to be well-characterized by these predictors. In this case, the chance zone is
nearly identical with Ls = HlOO%, minus Ptpar; = 0. As such, the previous summary
comments regarding predictive variables hold true when they refer to Ls = HIOO%.

1.

D in isolation:
a)

IfD >100ft, the entire subPar is a chance zone and Prcz is represented

by that portion of Figure 40 for which Prcz ~ 0.94 or possibly Prcz
b)

When every building has Du

~

~

0.9.

20 ft, the entire subPar is a chance zone,

unless some buildings are 3 stories tall and resistant to the prevailing velocities.
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c)
2.

Wwr offers no clear predictive advantage over D.

V*D in isolation:
a)

2

When D*V > 600 ft /s accurately represents a residential area, the area is

a chance zone and Prcz <: 0.8 .
b)

2

When D*V > 2,500 ft /s accurately represents a residential area, the area

is a chance zone and Prcz <: 0.94.
3.

Dvmin in isolation:
a)

Above Dvmin = 1,000 ft 2/s, most or all of the area is a chance zone. Also,

Prcz <: 0.95.

Estimating incremental life loss
Chapter V presented several different definitions for incremental life loss, their
advantages and disadvantages, and the contexts in which they were most appropriate.
Incremental life loss can be estimated in the same manner in every case. By focusing on
flood zones, life loss can be predicted regardless of the source of the flood . The only
thing that changes with different flood types is Wtavg, Ret, and E affecting the size of
Tpar;, and the flood dynamics themselves affecting the availability of havens and the
density of each flood zone. Incremental life loss is simply the difference between the
number of lives lost given a single failure scenario and the number of lives lost given an
alternative scenario.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

" Estimating Life Loss for Dam Safety Risk Assessment" chronicles a journey that
begins with the importance of credible and defensible life-loss estimates in dam safety
risk assessment, moves to the need for an improved life-loss model, spends extensive
time behind the scenes gleaning insights through the characterization of flood events
using new variables and new approaches, and rests for a moment by presenting these
insights in the form of a conceptual model. The model is still under development and has
yet to be tested, so the journey is far from over.
With respect to the text itself, Chapter I introduced the topic of dam safety risk
assessment and the central role that life-loss estimation plays in that field. Chapter II
discussed important preliminary considerations in model development. Chapter III
provided a detailed review of previous life-loss models that pertained to floods, including
a critique of each. Chapter IV explored the DeKay-McClelland model in detail and raised
serious concerns regarding its future use. Chapter V defined nearly 100 variables and
their respective categories for use in characterizing flood events. Chapter VI provided a
detailed outline of historical insights that relate to flood events in one of 18 logical
categories. Chapter VII proposed the framework for a new conceptual life-loss model-a
model which is still under development and has yet to be refined or offered for testingwith sufficient details to indicate how it was developed and how it might be used.
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Conclusions

While "Estimating Life Loss for Dam Safety Risk Assessment" draws from the
strengths and weaknesses of previous models, it also breaks new ground in important
ways. The following are the most important conclusions and contributions from each
chapter.

Conclusions from Chapter I
It is critically important for the future of dam safety risk assessment that credible

estimates of life loss be developed.

Conclusions from Chapter II
There are enough interdependent variables to make every catastrophic flood event
extremely unique and large-scale statistical analysis problematic. Any successful model
must confront this complexity and represent the most important life-loss variables to
avoid having predictions dominated by unrecognized life-loss influences.
Selecting an unbiased data set on which to base regression or development of a
parametric modela is difficult, especially as it pertains to events with no life loss.

Conclusions from Chapter Ill
Historic attempts to model life loss have evolved over time, moving from purely
conceptual models to pure regression equations and finally toward an incomplete attempt
to mix the two.
No historic models have been based on a look at life-loss dynamics and human
behavior on the level of the individual in actual floods.
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There are at least six components that every life-loss model should contain, each
with guidelines on how these components can best be approached.

Unique contributions from Chapter III
This chapter provided the first detailed critique of the B.C. Hydro Model under
development by Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach (!998) and a thorough presentation and
evaluation of every model that had been developed at the time of the writing.

Conclusions from Chapter IV
Chapter IV lists 32 shortcomings related to the DeKay-McClelland equation, the
way in which it is used, the logit procedure on which it is based, the treatment of the
underlying data set, the choice and definition of the variables on which it relies, and the
inherent biases it contains. Without elaboration, the main shortcomings can be
summarized as follows:
l.

Life loss is nonlinear with respect to Par, causing inflated and highly variable

estimates of L when the model is applied to subPar.
2.

The model relies on heterogeneous Par, making application to homogeneous

Par or unique Par umeliable.
3.

The model does not distinguish between life-loss dynamics experienced by

those who fail to evacuate and those who successfully evacuate.
4.

The model uses the point estimate, Wt, rather thanE, ignoring important

issues regarding Ret, Wtavg, Sc, the urgency and credibility of the warning, the time of
day or night, the benefits of improved warning dissemination, and those most at risk.
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5.

Fd is too coarse for refined estimates, it implicitly assumes a Par has

heterogeneous levels of damage rather than extreme and consistent damage, and it fails to
recognize that the difference in life loss between buildings with major damage and total
destruction is one of the most important predictors of life loss.
6.

The data set itself is treated in ways that distort life-loss dynamics, such as

combining multiple watersheds into a single event, quantifying Par without regard to the
location or nature of the life loss (ignoring Pt), and characterizing variables in a manner
that can now be viewed as historically inaccurate.
7.

The DeKay-McClelland logit procedure, in combination with the data set

under consideration, produces an equation that is biased toward ever greater
underestimation of life loss as L grows and as P approaches 0.5.
8.

The underlying data set makes application of the equation to extreme flood

events inappropriate.
9.

The confidence limits surrounding the life-loss estimates are very large,

seriously undermining the equation' s credibility, unless they are taken into account when
using the method.

Unique contributions from Chapter IV
This chapter provided the first detailed examination and critique of the equation
developed by DeKay and McClelland (1993b) and the methods with which it is
commonly used in dam safety risk assessment. This was the also the first in-depth
examination of the implications of using a logit procedure in life-loss estimation and the
inherent danger of using any equation that is nonlinear with respect to Par. The chapter
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provided the first quantitative demonstrations of the effects of nonlinearity and regression
using the logit transformation; and the first historically grounded critique of Fd and Wt
on which the model relies.

Conclusions from Chapter V
Appendix A and Appendix D
Life loss in flood events is influenced by an extremely large and complex set of
interdependent variables that must be carefully defined and categorized if events are to be
characterized in a comprehensive, meaningful, and consistent manner.

Unique contributions from Chapter
V Appendix A and Appendix D
While a wide range of variables has been discussed in the abstract by previous
authors, this is the first time that most of them have been carefully defined, given a
unique symbol, and given categories and descriptions by which they can be characterized.
This is also the first time that simple and consistent rules of nomenclature have been
proposed for symbol development. Dozens of new variables and concepts have been
identified and carefully defined, including those most central to the conceptual model.

Conclusions from Chapter
VI and Appendix B
Flood events are not easy to understand in the abstract. Event characterization is
as much an art as a science. If an analyst wishes to avoid making historically unjustifiable
errors, there is no substitute for immersing oneself in the literature that describes historic
flood events and the stories of those who perished and of those who survived.
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A complex tapestry of historic insights can be woven around 18 logical topics that
describe the factors influencing life loss or life-loss models: I) The type of failure, 2)
detectability of the failure, 3) warning times and warning effectiveness, 4) evacuation
rates, 5) excess evacuation time, 6) subPar types and evacuation modes, 7) homogeneity
of subPar, 8) flood dynamics, 9) loss of shelter, I 0) havens, II) flood zones and the
distributi on of people among those zones, 12) the lethality rate outside safe havens or
zo nes, 13) the lethality rate inside safe havens or zones, 14) the lethality rate on dry land,
IS) life-saving interventions, 16) complications and aberrations, 17) post-flood trauma
psychological trauma, and 18) the applicability of historic events to future events via an
empirical life-loss model.

Unique contributions from Chapter
VI and Appendix B
This is the first time that any historic flood events have been examined on a
subPar basis, by loss of shelter, or by flood zones . This is the first time that any historic
events have been characterized with the level of detail present in the unpublished
working documents . Dozens of variables have never before been characterized, including
such fundamental variables as Wtavg. Ret, and E. This is the first time that such
characterizations have been carefully recorded and documented so that future researchers
can refine past characterizations, attempt to be consistent when making future
characterizations, and have access to previous research.

Co nclusions from Chapter
Vll and Appendix C
The proposed model offers the ability for analysts to construct any hypothetical
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flood event with any characteristics through different combinations of homogeneous base
units defined as flood zones.
Distributions describing the proportion of lives lost are empirically grounded and
intuitively defensible. The nature of dam safety risk assessment is to deal in hypotheticals
and sometimes-crude estimates, but within these constraints, the uncertainties should be
made explicit so that the results can be appropriately interpreted.

Unique contributions from
Chapter VII and Appendix C
This is the first time that Par type has been recognized as an important
consideration. This is the first time that homogeneous base units, approximated by flood
zones, have been proposed and defined such that they consider the unique characteristics
of havens inside and outside of buildings.
Although Lee et al. (1986) and Assaf, Hartford, and Cattanach (1998) both relied
on conceptual evacuation models, this is the first time that an empirical evacuation
funct ion has been proposed, the first time that the excess evacuation time (E) has been
formalized, and the first time that historically grounded guidelines have been offered for
estimating the representative evacuation time.
This model is the first to offer empirical probability distributions for the life loss
within homogeneous units and the first to explore ways of further refining these
distributions based on other predictive variables likeD and V.
This is the first model that can fit approximately as well with the most extreme
events like the failure at Vaiont, Italy, and minor flooding from normal seasonal rainfall.
It applies across the spectrum of potential fai lure modes and can consider any

359
characteristics unique to a given event. It circumvents the dilemma of which zero-fatality
events to include in a data set, because more hazardous events contain subPar with zero
life loss. Because the resulting distributions closely approximate true homogeneous base
units, data-set bias should be minimized and the distributions should have much broader
application than the global events from which they were derived.
Because the model relies on Sc and Wtavg. rather than Wt, it fits equally well with
dam failures , flash floods , and major floods that do not lead to dam failure . As such, the
quantification of incremental damages can be done directly by applying the model to the
two distinct flood scenarios and comparing L in each case.
Now that the groundwork is firmly laid, other researchers can expand the data set
further, refine the probability distributions over time, and seek out subPar with
characteristics that were absent given the subPar in Appendix B.

Recommendations

Every effort has been made to present the model in as final a form as possible
within the time allowed. Chapters V and VII present numerous suggestions on how to
quantify variables consistently and accurately, how to accomplish the steps in the model,
and how best to use and refine the pertinent historical distributions. Additional insight
can be gleaned by studying the ways in which variables were characterized in Appendix
B and the rationale recorded for each decision.
Nevertheless, there are several steps that might greatly improve the model for the
future. First, an expansion of the data set through additional characterization of historic
subPar will enable the various distributions to be further refined. Appendix A offers a
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lengthy list of events, many of which have not yet been characterized. Appendix A also
offers suggestions on which events currently hold the most promise and which events
might not. Hundreds of flash floods occur every year, offering a rich source of material
for researchers. Also, as future events unfold, researchers familiar with this model may
have the opportunity to conduct extensive post-failure interviews and field research to
attempt to characterize subPar on the level of Pt, E, Ls, and flood zones.
Second, the existing characterizations in Appendix C are provided so researchers
can explore more relationships than have been explored to date. There may be variables
or combinations of variables other than V and D that offer the potential to become
predictive variables to target specific ranges within the existing distributions of the
proportion of lives lost.
Third, resources could be devoted to developing reliable and practical functions
from which loss of shelter (Ls) can be estimated given depths and velocities from flood
routing and characteristics of the debris load. See Estimating Loss of Shelter (Ls) in
Chapter VII for suggested approaches.
Fourth, the model should be automated and integrated with GIS software and
flood-rout ing software like DAMBRK or FLOWA V so that it can be used in an efficient
and cost-effective manner across a portfolio of dams.
Fifth, if additional historic events can be fully characterized on the level required
for the model, the model should be applied to these events to test its validity. It should be
remembered, however, that the model does not claim that life loss will correspond with
the sum of the mean life-loss values provided by application of each distribution. Instead,
the model makes the natural variance provided by chance and unpredictable human
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behavior explicit, and it assumes that most life loss will fall within the range of values
that the distributions indicate.
Sixth, continuing research should explore in tandem both a detailed model,
intended to fully characterize those aspects of a flood event that are pertinent to life loss
as completely as resources allow, and a simplification of that model, intended to provide
a convenient, relatively quick algorithm for estimating life loss when a more thorough
approach is not possible or justified.
Any specific event provides a single outcome from a range of possible outcomes
that would have been possible. That outcome will very rarely match the mean value of all
possible outcomes, but it is possible, given the underlying distributions, to express the
expected value of an outcome for a hypothetical event and the likelihood of any other
outcome based on the distribution.
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Appendix A
Table of Flood Wave Events

Table A.l is a comprehensive list of every life-loss event reviewed for
characterization in Appendix B. It may be the most comprehensive list of fatal damfailure events in existence today, although it could be greatly expanded by hundreds of
additional flash flood events. Some of the events have been listed twice when more than
one designation is found in the literature.
Columns 5-8 are explained in the footnotes to the table. In brief, column 5 gives a
representative estimate of the life loss reported in tbe source documents. These values do
not necessarily correspond to the values chosen in Appendix B and they may need to be
revised if the events are characterized more fully.
Column 6 classifies each event according to its dominant characteristics, with the
first symbol carrying the greater weight. Column 7 indicates the 28 events in the database
explored by DeKay and McClelland (1993b), with the division of the Teton failure into
two separate cases from a single event producing a total of 29 case studies. Of those 28
events, they rejected 3 events as statistical outliers and treated over half of the remaining
events in a manner that this author considers potentially misleading because they either
combined multiple watersheds into a single event (events 3, 23, 69, Ill , 143), they
selected historic values significantly different from those chosen for Appendix B [events
3 (Par), 13 (Wt), 15 (Wt), 19 (Par or Tpar), 21 (Wt), 23 (Par, Wt), 28 (L, Par), 69 (Wt),
72 (Par), 86 (Par), 128 (Par), !59 (Par); and probably 96 (Wt) and 103 (Wt); see Figure
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Table A. I. Comprehensive list of every flood-wave event collected in files and
examined for characterization in Appendix B
bFlt 'D-M dValue

DATE

COUNTRY

1 Alia Sella Zerbino Dam (near Genoa)

8/ 13/35

Italy

> 140

D

B. L

2 Allegheny and Ohio River floods (Penn . & Ohio)
3 Allegheny County (Little Pine Creek, Penn.)

1937
5/30/86

USA
USA

<900

F
Ff

B, L
B

4/10/1885
2/6172

USA
USA

8/7/96
11 /Jf/66
1333

Spain
Italy

5/6/1850

USA
USA

EVENT

4 Angels Dam (California)
5 Anzalduas Dam (Mission, Texas)
6 Aris alluvial fan flood (Central Pyrenees)
7 Amo River flood

8 Arno River llood (Florence)
9 Ashburnham Reservoir Dam (Massachusettes)
10 Asherville Dam (North Carolina)
II Austin [Bayless Pulp & Paper Company] Dam (Penn.)
12 Austin Dam (Colorado River, Texas)

2/22/76
9/30/11
417100

13 Austin flash floods (Texas)

5/24081

14
IS
\6
I7

J/25/61
12/14/63

Babii Yar Dam (Ukraine)
Baldwin Hills Darn (California)
Bangladesh stonn surge (coast)
Banqiao & Shimaman Dams (China)

18 Bass Haven Lake Dam (Texas)
19 Bear Wallow Dam (North Carolina)
20 Bergeron Pond [Meadow Pond or Alton] Dam (N . 1-1.)
21 Big Thompson flood (Colorado)
22 Bila Desna Dam (near Jablonec nad Nisou)
23 Black Hills & Canyon Lake Dam (S . D.)
24 Bolan Dam (26 villages, northeastern Pakistan)
25 Boston molasses flood (Massachusettes)
26 Bouzey Dam (Moselle River near Epinal)
27 Brazil floods (widespread)
28 Buffalo Creek coal waste dam (West Virginia)
29 Burgess Falls Power Dam (Tennessee)
30 Bushy Hill Pond Dam [+7 dams downstream] (Conn.)
31 Cabin Creek flood (West Virginia)
32 Castlewood Dam (Colorado)
33 Chimney Rock & Bat Cave flood (N.C.)

11/12/70
8/8/75
8117/84
2/22/76
J/IJ/96
7/31/76
9/16
6/9f/72
9/76
1/15/19
4/27/1895
Jf/74
9/26172
6/29/28
6/6/82
8/9/16
1933

Italy

USA
USA
USA
USSR
USA

Bangladesh
China

USA
USA
USA
USA
Czech

USA
Pakistan
USA
France
Brazil

L

B
B
B
B
B, L
B
B, L

6/17/92
8/24/98

USA
USA
USA

41 Dry Creek flash flood, train wreck (Colorado)

817104

USA
USA

42 East Lee (Mud Pond) Dam (Massachusettes)

J/68

USA

43 Eastover Mining Co. sludge pond (Kentucky)
44 Eastwick RR Fill (Washington)

12/18/81
2/j2

45 El Cajoncito dike (La Paz, Baja Cal. Sur)

10/4/76

USA
USA
Mexico

46 El Habra Dam (3 failures; 3/ 10/1872. 11/26/27)

12/1881
9/14/74
10/10173

Algeria

USA
USA

U, M

65 D
245 Ff, D U,M
low D
21 D,O

Ff

37 Dam #2 (Pennsylvania)

U,M

500000 s
85000 D, F
I
D
4 D U,M
I
D
139 Ff U, M

2
34

USA
USA

48 Enid !lash flood (Oklahoma)

D
D
D
D
Ff
D
D

USA
USA

England

4 7 Eldorado Canyon flood (Nevada)

8
13
145
5

B
B, L

D
D
Ff

J / 11 /64

1994

2
4
>88

B

F

0
0
44-50

6123/83

B, L
B

F

125

36 Dale Dykes [Bradfield] Dam (Sheffield, England)

40 Dozier Lake Dam (Georgia)

127
300

USA
USA
USA

35 D.M.A.D. (Utah)

U,M

D
4 D
87 Ft; D
I

USA

34 Connecticut flash floods (Conn .)

6/14fl!65

9

D
F
D

7/16/16
6/4fl!82

38 Del Rio flash floods (Texas)
39 Denver flood (Sou the Plane River, Colorado)

'L

> 100
>1500

12
I

Ff
D
D

I
D
1242 Ff, F
I
F

L
B
L
L
L
L

U, M

B
L

u

p
L
L
B

D

263

B
B
B
B
B, L

L

R

p

B
L
p

u

p

L, P

2

D
F
D

J?
96+

B
L

I

D

B

7
600+

D
Dy

B

209
>9

D

L

Ff

B

9

Ff

L

L
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Table A. I . Continued
EVENT
49 Evans & Lockwood Dams (North Carolina)

50 Fort Pitt Dam (Pennsylvan ia)
5l
52
53
54
55
56

Frias Dam (probably the same as Pardo Dam)
Fushan Dam
Gaokou Village Dam (Hubei province, China)
Gleno Dam (Alps of north-central Ital y)
Grenoble Dam
Harris County flash llood (Texas)

57 Hill (Woodward) Dam (New Hampshire)
58 Holland Dykes (Nethe rlands)

DATE

COUNTRY

1989

USA

7/5/03

USA
Argentina
Chi na
China
Italy
France
US A
USA

1970
A.D. 516
3/8/98
1211123
1219
6/15176
5129/18
I/3Jij53

59 Holland Dykes (Netherlands)

11/142 1

60 Holland Dykes (Netherlands)

1211287
4/38
1933
1011887
7/ 1216 1
1957
1/ 14178
8/9[/ 16
3117/36
9/!2V77
7/ IOfT/5 1

6 1 Hwang-Ho River Dyke (act of war)
62 Hwang-Ho River flood
63 Hwang-Ho River flood

64 Hyokiri Dam
65 lsahaya floods (west Japan)

66 Japan's lzu Peninsula
67 Jarrolds Valley tlood (West Virginia)
68 Johns10wn tlood (Pennsy lvania)
69 Kansas City floods (Kansas, Missouri)
70 Kansas River (Kansas City)
71 Kantalai "tank" Dam (Sri Lanka)
72 Kelly Barnes Dam (Toccoa Fal ls, Georgia)
73 Kendall Lake Dam (South Caro lina)
74 Kenduskeag Village Dam (Maine)
75 Kerville-Medina area flash tloods (Texas)
76 Knife Lake Dam (Minnesota)
77 Kuala Lumpur Dam
78 Kuban-Kel Lake Dam (Uzbekistan & Kyrgyzstan)
79 Lake Keowee Cofferdam (South Carolina)
80 Lake Lud low Club Dam (New York)
81 Lake 0' the Hills Dam (Arkansas)
82 Lakes Eigiau & Coedty Dams (Dolgarrog)
83 Lakeside Dam (South Carolina)
84 Laurel Run Dam (Johnstown area, Penn.)
85 Lawn Lake and Cascade Lake Dams (Co lorado)
86 Lee Lake Dam (Massachusetts)
87 Little Deer Creek Dam (Utah)
88 Little Indian Creek (Tennessee)
89 Little Pine Creek flash flood (see Allegheny County)
90 Lower Otay Dam (San Diego, Cali fornia)
91 Lyman Dam (Arizona)
92 Lynchburg & Scousville (Virginia)
93 Lynchburg Dam (Virginia)
94 Lynmouth fast-rising fl ood
95 Machchu II Dam (Morvi , West India)
96 Malpasset Dam (France)
97 Mammoth Dam (Utah)

4121 /86
11/6177
10/10/90
11 11311853
1978
7172
196 1
7/8198
10178
1935
4172
11 /2125
9/18175
7/ 19V77
7115/82
3/24/68
6/16163
6129128
5/30/86
1127/ 16
4115/15
8119/69
6195
8115/52
8/ 11179
1212159
61240 17

Holland

Hol land
Holland
China
China

China
S. Korea
Japan
Japan
USA
USA
USA
USA
India
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
Malaya
Asia
USA
USA
USA
Wales
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
England
India
France
USA

11

'L

Fit ' O-M <~value

2

D

B

2
42-102
10000
7
600

D
D
D
D
D
D
Ff
D

L

high

8
I
1835+
10000
50000
500000
!8000
900000
127
>600
21+
75
30
25
II
>135
39
4
I
26
4
600
43+
7
3
I
16
I
40
3
2
I

3
9
14 or30
8
107
2
24
>1300
421
I

Dy. S
Dy , S
Dy, S
Dy
Dy, F
Dy, F
D
F/Ff
0, F
D
D
F U, M
F
R
D
D U,M
D
D
Ff
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
u
D
u
D U.M
D
u
D
Ff
D
D
F/Ff
D
F
D
D
U,M
D

L
L
L
L
L
L
B

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

L
L
L
B
p

L
B
p

L
L
L
L
L
L, p
L
L
L
B

L, p
p

B
p

L
B

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L. p
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EVENT

98 McMinnvill flash flood (Tennessee)
99 Melzingah Dams I & 2 (New York)
100 Merriespruit Tailings Dam (Republic of South Africa)

10\ Mill River Dam (Massachusetts)
I 02 Mississippi flood (Lower Mississippi)
103 Mohegan Park (Spaulding Pond) Dam (Connecticut)
I 04 Mohne Dam

105
106
I07
I 08

Moldavia Region, Belciu Dam (Onesti)
Mountjoy Hill Reservoir(Maine)
Nanak Sagar Dam (32 villages, Northern India)
Nevada Del Ruiz volcano glacier burst (Columbia)

I 09 Nix Lake Dam (Texas)

110 Northeastern U.S. floods
J II Northern New Jersey flood
112 Oakford Park Dam (Jeannette, Penn.)
11 3 Ohio floods (Ohio)

l 14 Or6s Dam
liS Palagnedra
116 Panshet & Khadakwasla Dams (Poona, Maharastra)
117 Pardo or Frias Dam (Mendoza, 1970)
II 8 Prospect Dam & Lord Reservoir (Colorado)
l 19 Puentes Dam
120 Quebrada Ia Chapa
121 Randall's Pond Dam [Lower] (Road Island)
122 River Ouse sea inundation
123 San lldefonso Dam
124 Sandy Run Dam (Johnstown. Penn .)
125 SchoelldopfStation rock slide (New York)

126 Seminary Hill Reservoir (Centralia, Washington)
127 Sempor Dam (central Java)
128 Shadyside [Wegee and Pipe Creeks] (Ohio)
129 Skagway Dam (Pueblo. Colorado)
IJO South Fork Dam (Johnstown, Penn.)
Ill Spain flash flood
IJ2 Spaulding Pond Dam (Mohegan Park, Connecticut)
Ill Spring Creek flash flood (Colorado)
ll4 Spring Lake Dam (Fiskeville, Rhode Island)
ll5 St. Francis Dam (California)
ll6 Stava Dam (Italy)
IJ7 Swift & Lower Two Medicine Dams (Montana)
ll8 Swimming Pool Dam (New York)
IJ9 Tarbela Dam
140 Tennessee flash floods
141 Teton Dam (Lower Reach, Idaho)
142 Teton Dam (upper reach, Idaho)
14l Texas Hill Country
144 Thompson Mill Dam (Tennessee)
145 Tigra Dam (Madhya Pradesh)
146 Timber Lake Dam (Virginia)

DATE

COUNTRY

1902
7114/1897

USA
USA

?

S. Africa

1874
spring, '27
l/6/6l
5/17/4l
8/15/91
8/6/189l
918/67
11/85
l/89
1/96

USA
USA
USA

Gennany

Romania
USA

India
Columbia
USA
USA

415184

USA

7/5/0l
l/13
l/25/60
1978
7112161
1970
2110/80
4/l0/1802
196l
l/11/01
lll!U5l
l/1626
7119U77

USA
USA

Brazil
Switzerland

India

bFlt 'D-M dValue

'L

Ff

L

D

L

17 D
14l D
lll F
6 D U,M
1200 D
107 D
4 D
100 D
20000 GB
I D
ll F
2 Ff U,M
2l D
<700 F/Ff
l0-50 D
24 ?

L

5
7

heavy

England
Bolivia

USA

Spain
Colombia
USA

<4000

D

USA

5

D

617156

USA

J?

0

10/5/91
1211 /67
6114/90
1965
51ll11889
197l
l/6/6l
7/28197
8/2511889
ll12/28
7/9/85
6/8/64
1979
7177
ll28102
6/5176
615176
8/lff/78
812116
8/14/17
6122195

USA

0
200
24
2
2209
!50
6
5
l
450
2l2
l5
4

D

Java
USA
USA
USA

Spain
USA
USA
USA
USA

Italy
USA
USA

R

L
L

L
L
L, p
L
p

L
L
L
L
L
p
L
L

L
L
L
L, p

u

L, p
p

u

B

L

D

Ff

L

L

D

42-102 D
0 D
608 D
250 ?
I D
l07 Dy, S

Argentina

B
L
L, p

L

D
D

p

Ff

L

D

U,M

L, p
L, p

Ff
D

L

D

B

u
u

B
p

D

L

D
Ff

Ff

L, p
p

D
D

u
u

Ff

U,M

D
D

USA

2
2l+
4
7
25
24

India

???

D

L

USA

I

D

B

Pakistan
USA
USA
USA
USA

D

p
p

p
B
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Table A.l. Continued
EVENT

DATE

COUNTRY

147 Tsao-Lin Natural Reservoir Earth Dam

5/18/51

Taiwan

148 unnamed dam#! (Colorado)

1923-29

USA

149 unnamed dam #2 (Colorado)
ISO unnamed dam (Minas Gerais)

1923-29
5186
1976
1893
10110/90
9177
6179
8179
10/9/63
8/ 11 / 1888
1/9/59
7/17/68
4/ 19/38
212211890
7/19/19
II /4U85
7176
1903
11/2104
6/ 14127

USA

IS\
152
I53
154
l 55
\56
157
158
I59

unnamed dam (Newfound, Noth Carol ina)
unnamed dam (Portland, Maine)
unnamed dam (South Carol ina)
unnamed dam (West Gennany)
unnamed dam (Wisconsin)
unnamed dam failure & flash flood (Puerto Rico)
Vaiont Dam
Valparaiso Dam
Vega de Tera Dam

160 Virden C re ek Dam (Iowa)

161 Wagner [Loop LoopJ Dam (Wash ington}
162 Walnut Grove Dam (Arizona)

163 Wegee Creek flash flood (near Shadyside, Ohio)
164 West Virginia flash floods
165 White River Incident (Washington)

166 Willow Creek flash nood (Oregon)
167 Winston Reservo ir (Nonh Carolina)
168 Wise River Dam (Montana)
169
l 70
171
172

Womack Dam No. I (Colorado)
Woodward (Hill) Dam (New Hampshi re)
Yangtze Kiang River flood
Yangtze Kiang River flood
173 Yangtze Kiang River tlood
174 Yangtze Kiang River flood
li5 Yangtze Kiang River flood
176 Zgorigrad Dam (nonhwestem Bulgaria)

6/27
5129/18
1911
193 1
1954
7/81
8/98
511166

Brazil
USA
USA
USA

Gennany
USA
USA

Italy

Chile
Spain
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA

China
Chi na
China
China
China
Bulgaria

bFit 'D·M dValue

'L

134

D

L. p

I
I
7
4
4
4
0
2
37
2000

D

L

D

L

D

L

D

L

D
D

L
L

D

L
L

D
D

L

D

B

>100

D

L

150
I
I
150
9
56
2
200
II
4
I
I
100000
200000
30000
>3000

D

U.M

B

D

L

D

L

D

p

Ff

B

Ff
D

L
L

Ff

L

D

p

D

L

D

L

D

8

Dy. F

L
L

Dy, F
Dy, F
Dy, F

3656 Dy. F
121 D

L
L
L
L. p

L = loss of life. Values are only preliminary estimates.
Fit ~ flood type: D ~ dam failure; Dy ~ dyke failure; Ff ~ flash flood; F ~ flood; Ts ~ tsunami; S ~sea
surge; H ~ hurricane flooding ; GB ~g lacier burst; 0 ~o ther flooding.
' D-M ~ data set explored by DeKay and McClelland. U ~ used in their regression; R ~ rejected as an
outlier; M ~t heir treatment is potentially misleading because they combined multiple watersheds, their
va lue for Par, L, or Wt was significantly different from the best historical estimate, and/or L had very little
relationship to Par ( i.e., Par ~ residential and L ~ motorists outside the neighborhoods).
' Value: B ~ characterized in Appendix B; L ~lacking key information on Par;, L;, or Wt;; P ~ looks
promising.
a

b
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26 in Chapter IV], or Par is quantified based on a different Par type (Pt) than the one
experiencing fatalities (events 3, 13 , 69 and possibly others).
Column 8 indicates the relative usefulness of the information contained in this
author's files for characterizing Par and subPar, the number of lives lost, and various
warning times for each event. B indicates that the event has already been characterized in
Appendix B, while "B, L" indicates the characterization was lacking essential
information and had to be excluded from the master table in Appendix C. L indicates that
there is limited information available and that, in most cases, the needed information will
be difficult or impossible to obtain. P indicates that an event could potentiall y yield a
useful characterization, in some cases without the need for additional source material.
The combination "L, P" indicates that additional source material would be needed. As
such, P and "L, P" can help researchers target their efforts if they wish to expand
Appendix B.
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Appendix B
Characterized Flood Events

The complete characterization of every flood event that was studied in detail as
part of this investigation was recorded in over 900 pages of single-spaced working
documents. These documents followed a specific format developed for this research, but
to date they have not been formally published. To summarize and illustrate aspects of
these documents, and to supply future researchers with the tools found helpful in
producing these documents, four types of information have been published here in
Appendix B: l) an alphabetical list of the events that have been characterized, numbered
to provide a key for references in the text, 2) an example of a complete event
characterization using the Kelly Barnes Dam failure in Toccoa Falls, Georgia, 3) striking
characteristics and valuable quotations (Schvq) from various subPar, and 4) eventspecific bibliographies. Do to the nature of these working documents, excerpts found
herein will generally not conform to the format found throughout the rest of the report.

Alphabetical list and numeric key
Table B. l lists every event and every subPar that has been characterized to date.
The list is ordered alphabetically by event and in numerical sequence by subPar. Events
that were lacking critical information have not been numbered (left column), but every
event included in the master table of Appendix C has been numbered consistently here
and there. Thus, this list serves as a master index for citations and for cross-referencing.
As an example of how the index works, subPar 17.1 refers to the community of Saunders
along Buffalo Creek in West Virginia.
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Table B.l. Master list and key for every event characterized in the unpublished version
of Appendix B

Event
I

2

3
4
5
6
6
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
10
10
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
16
16
16
16

SubPar Name
Alla Sella Zerbino Darn
Allegheny County Flash Flood: motorists, Saxonburg Blvd.
Allegheny and Ohio River Floods
Angels Darn
Anzalduas Darn
Anis alluvial fan flood (Spain)
Arno River flood (Italy)
Arno River flood (13 33)
Asherville Darn
Austin, Penn. (Bayless Pulp & Paper Co.) Darn : Austin City
Austin, Penn. (Bayless Pulp & Paper Co.) Darn: to paper mill
Austin, Penn. (Bayless Pulp & Paper Co.) Darn: Costello
Austin (Colorado River) Darn (Texas)
Austin, Texas, flash floods: residential
Austin, Texas, flash floods: Shoal Creek crossings
Austin , Texas, flash floods: Bee Creek crossing
Austin, Texas, flash floods: Bull Creek crossing
Austin, Texas, flash floods: Walnut Creek tributary crossing
Austin, Texas, flash floods: Hwy 35 and U.S. 183 crossing
Austin, Texas, flash floods: Dry Creek South crossing
Babii Yar Darn
Baldwin Hills Darn: to Village Green
Baldwin Hills Darn: other residential
Baldwin Hills Dam: commercial districts
Banqiao & Shimantan Dams (China): global event
Banqiao & Shimantan Darns (China): Shahedian Town
Banqiao & Shimantan Dams (China): Wencheng commune
Banqiao & Shimantan Darns (China): Weiwan Brigade
Bass Haven Lake Darn
Bat Cave and Chimney Rock Flash Flood
Bear Wallow
Bergeron Pond (also Meadow Pond or Alton) Dam
Big Thompson flood
Black Hills flash flood: Rapid City below Canyon Lake Darn
Black Hills flash flood: Rapid Creek & rural Pennington County
Black Hills flash flood: Keystone on Battle Creek
Black Hills flash flood: Box Elder on Box Elder Creek
Black Hills flash flood: Highway 79 where crosses Spring Creek

SubPar
#
I

I
I
I
I
I

2
I
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
I
2
3
I

2--3
4

1
I
I
I
I
I

2
3
4
5
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Event
16
16
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18

1818
18
18
18
18
18
18
18

SubPar Name
Black Hills flash flood: Sturgis on Bear Butte Creek
Black Hills flash flood: 16 widely scattered cities in 3 counties
Buffalo Creek Dams: Saunders
Buffalo Creek Dams: backwater up North Fork
Buffalo Creek Dams: 3 houses 0.4 mi below Saunders
Buffalo Creek Dams: farm between Saunders/Pardee
Buffalo Creek Dams: vehicles between Saunders/Pardee
Buffalo Creek Dams: Lorado and Pardee
Buffalo Creek Dams: Lundale and Craneco
Buffalo Creek Dams: Stowe
Buffalo Creek Dams: Crites
Buffalo Creek Dams: Latrobe
Buffalo Creek Dams: Robinette
Buffalo Creek Dams: Amherstdale and Becco
Buffalo Creek Dams: Braeholm and Fanco
Buffalo Creek Dams: Accoville
Buffalo Creek Dams: Kistler and Crown
Buffalo Creek Dams: Upper and Lower Man
Dale Dyke Dam: Bradfield
Dale Dyke Dam: Bradfield, destroyed
Dale Dyke Dam: Bradfield, major damage
Dale Dyke Dam: Roebuck House
Dale Dyke Dam: Damflask
Dale Dyke Dam: Damflask, destroyed
Dale Dyke Dam: Damflask, major damage
Dale Dyke Dam: Storrs Bridge
Dale Dyke Dam: Loxley and Rowell Bridge
Dale Dyke Dam: Little Matlock
Dale Dyke Dam: 1.5 miles of steep, narrow gorge
Dale Dyke Dam: Harrison' s Tilt & Forge
Dale Dyke Dam: Harrison's house
Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (high force)
Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (Ls- HIOO%)
Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (Ls- MIOO%)
Dale Dyke Dam: Malin Bridge (low force)
Dale Dyke Dam: Limerick Wheel and houses
Dale Dyke Dam: Limerick Wheel
Dale Dyke Dam: houses above Limerick Wheel
Dale Dyke Dam: Hillsbro'
Dale Dyke Dam: Hillsbro', destroyed

SubPar
#
6
7
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13

14
15
16
I
Ia
lb
2
3a
3al
3a2
3b
4
5

6
6a
6b
7
7a
7b
8
9
9a
9b
10
lOa

375
Table B. I. Continued

Event
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
19
20
21
22
22
22

SubPar Name
Dale Dyke Dam: Hillsbro', major damage
Dale Dyke Darn: Hillsbro', minor damage
Dale Dyke Darn: Hill Bridge
Dale Dyke Darn: Owlerton
Dale Dyke Darn: Owlerton, destroyed
Dale Dyke Darn: Owlerton, major damage
Dale Dyke Dam: Owlerton, minor damage
Dale Dyke Dam: across from Owlerton
Dale Dyke Dam: across from Owlerton, destroyed
Dale Dyke Darn: across from Owlerton, minor damage
Dale Dyke Darn: works below Parl3
Dale Dyke Darn: Farfield Gardens
Dale Dyke Darn: Hillfoot
Dale Dyke Darn: Neepsend Lane
Dale Dyke Darn: Neepsend downstream ofNeepsend Lane
Dale Dyke Darn: Rutland Road
Dale Dyke Darn: Harvest and Orchard Lanes
Dale Dyke Darn: Bacon Island
Dale Dyke Darn: Bacon Island, destroyed
Dale Dyke Darn: Bacon Island, major damage
Dale Dyke Darn: Philadelphia District
Dale Dyke Dam: Green Lane Dist. and area
Dale Dyke Darn: Long Croft (Ls -H)
Dale Dyke Darn: Long Croft (Ls- L)
Dale Dyke Dam: Kelharn Island
Dale Dyke Darn: Kelharn Island houses
Dale Dyke Darn: Kelharn Island mill
Dale Dyke Darn: adjacent and downstream ofKelharn Island
Dale Dyke Darn: Nursery Lane District
Dale Dyke Darn: Nursery Lane District, major damage
Dale Dyke Darn: Nursery Lane District, minor damage
Dale Dyke Darn: Lady's Bridge to Midland Railway Station
Dale Dyke Darn: Brightside and environs
Dale Dyke Dam: other/inland Sheffield neighborhoods
Dry Creek Flash Flood (Train Wreck)
Eastover Mining Company Sludge Pond Darn
El Cajoncito Dike (La Paz, BCS, Mexico)
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: restaurant
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: trailers swept away
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: trailers with mild damage

SubPar
#
lOb
lOc
II
12
12a
12b
l2c
13
13a
13b
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
2la
2lb
22
23
24a
24b
25
25a
25b
26
27
27a
27b
28
29
30
I
I
I
I
2
3
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Event
22
22
22
22
23
23
24
25
25
26
26
26
26
26
27
27
28
28
28
28
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29

SubPar Name
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: icehouse
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: half of boat dock nearest shore
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: half of boat dock farthest from shore
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood: on Lake Mohave
Evans and Lockwood Pond Dam: van on highway
Evans and Lockwood Pond Dam: downtown
Hyokiri Dam (S. Korea)
Kansas City Floods: private/public bldgs.
Kansas City Floods: motorists +pedestrians
Kelly Barnes Dam: Forrest Hall Dormitory
Kelly Barnes Dam: Residence Row
Kelly Barnes Dam: Trailerville
Kelly Barnes Dam: automotive
Kelly Barnes Dam: below Hwy. 17 bridge
Lakeside Dam: Lakeside Road across dam
Lakeside Dam: houses in Greenville County
Lee Lake Dam: dwellings destroyed
Lee Lake Dam: dwellings w/major damage
Lee Lake Dam: dwellings w/minor damage
Lee Lake Dam: Clark-Aiken plant (Ls- MIOO%)
Mill River Dam: Williamsburg residences (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Williamsburg commercial (Ls - H)
Mill River Dam: Williamsburg residences (Ls - M)
Mill River Dam: Williamsburg commercial (Ls- M)
Mill River Dam: Williamsburg residences (Ls- L)
Mill River Dam: Skinnerville residences (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Skinnerville commercial (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Skinnerville residences (Ls- M)
Mill River Dam: Haydenville residences & tobacco co. (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Haydenville commercial (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Haydenville residences (Ls- M)
Mill River Dam: Haydenville residences & commercial (Ls- L)
Mill River Dam: Leeds silk factory & boarding house (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Tpar by river/bridge- campers (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Tpar by river/bridge- waders (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Leeds button factory (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Leeds residences (Ls- H)
Mill River Dam: Leeds, water closet & Quigley (Ls- M)
Mill River Dam: Florence (Ls- L)
Mill River Dam: Northampton (Ls- L)

SubPar
#
4
5
6
7

I
2
1
I
2
I
2
3
4
5
I
2
1
2
3
4
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
13b
13c
14
15
16
17
18
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Table B. I. Continued
SubPar
SubPar Name
#
Event
Shadyside Flash Floods: Wegee Creek
I
30
Shadyside Flash Floods: Pipe Creek
2
30
~--St. Francis Dam: Powerhouse No. 2
31
St. Francis Dam: ranches
31
2
St. Francis Dam: Castaic Junction
3
31
St. Francis Dam: S. Pac. Section camp near Castaic (tents)
4a
31
St. Francis Dam: S. Pac. Section camp near Castaic (b1dgs)
4b
31
St. Francis Dam: Edison tent camp at Kemp
31
5
St. Francis Dam: motorists on Hwy. 126
31
6
Stava Dams (Italy): all destroyed structues in Stava
1
32
Stava Dams (Italy): undamaged Dolomiti Hotel
2
32
Thompson Mill Dam: houses detroyed
I
33
Thompson Mill Dam: houses with major damage
2
33
Thompson Mill Dam: houses with minor damage
33
3
Timber Lake Dam: U.S . 460 Bridge
I
34
Timber Lake Dam: U.S. 460 Bridge (boaters)
Ia
34
Timber Lake Dam: Turkey Foot Road Bridge
2
34
Vaiont Dam (Italy): town of Longarone
1
35
Vaiont Dam (Italy): high comer of Longarone
2
35
Vaiont Dam (Italy): Longarone Commune (6 villages)
3
35
4
Vaiont Dam (Italy): abutments of dam
35
Vaiont Dam (Italy): lakeside communities
5
35
Vaiont Dam (Italy): Belluno, 10 mi downstream
6
35
1
Vega de Tera Dam (Spain)
36
1
Wegee Creek Flash Flood of 1919
37
Ia
Wegee Creek Flash Flood of 1919: destroyed
37
Woodward (Hill) Dam
I
38
TOTALS: 38 events included in Appendix A, 179 subPar, and 163 non-duplicate
subPar.
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Selected example: Kelly
Barnes Dam failure
What follows is the complete characterization of the Kelly Barnes dam failure that
occurred on November 6, 1977 at Toccoa Falls, Georgia. Since it is included here only to
illustration the template style and nature of the characterizations used throughout the
unpublished working documents, this case study is presented exactly as it appears in the
otherwise unpublished working documents rather than in the traditional thesis format.
The illustration ends on page 413 , so intermediate headings are part of the example and
do not follow the pattern found throughout this thesis. In this example, there are five
subPar.
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE fTOCCOA FALLS)
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS

Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977
Par= 140; L = 39; P = 0.28
There were several dam failures or flash floods in the early 20'h and late 19'h
centuries that impacted relatively small populations located in the I 00-year floodplain
along narrow river valleys with little or no warning. This event is similar in many ways,
providing an excellent opportunity to compare these early failures with a modem failure.
Since the fatality rates were comparable, it suggests these early failures should be
included in historical studies meant to predict future life loss, so long as housing damages
and warning times are adequately defined.
To allow for global commentary and the efficient presentation of variables, many
aspects of the flood have been described in this preliminary global overview to avoid
cluttering the individual subPar. When one of those subPar uses an asterisk(*) it refers to
the information contained in this report.

Global Introductory Summary
Kelly Barnes Lake was located about half a mile above the 186-ft high Toccoa
Falls near Toccoa City, Georgia. A short distance downstream from the waterfall was the
small community of Toccoa Falls. The area impacted by the flood consisted of one-third
of Toccoa Falls Institute or Bible College and its faculty, staff, and students. At about
1:20 AM, the dam failed in such a way that it released 2 flood waves over a short
interval, the first 5-ft high and the second 30-ft deep. These waves plummeted over the
falls, then shot with tremendous speed across the 200-500 ft floodplain to destroy nearly
every residence they touched. Individual spouts of water carried debris 65 ft above the
normal creek surface as the waves slammed into objects, and as high as 100 ft when a
second, 30-ft wave collided with the initial 5-ft wave as it backed upstream behind the
bridge on Georgian Highway 17. Since it was night and most people were asleep, the
upstream residents had little if any warning. There were, however, a few people who
were quick to respond and who ran downstream with urgent cries that reduced the life
loss with distance (6).
Source 6 is one of the most detailed texts available on the human drama
encountered during a catastrophic flood. Foster begins his narrative with a foreword that
includes the following credentials: "I knew most of the people who died and all of those
who survived" (6, p. 9). Combined, sources I and 6 give a house-by-house account of the
flood and the resulting life loss, providing an excellent opportunity to quantifY subPar
and L; with high accuracy. Foster also provides an inspiring account of the way faith
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shaped the attitudes of students and faculty just before they died or after they lost family
members.
The subPar were:
l. Those living on the ground level of Forrest Hall, the single men's dormitory.
2. Those living in Residence Row, a series of houses near the creek.
3. Those living in or adjacent to Trailerville, a cluster of mobile homes occupied by
married students and their families.
4. Those occupying vehicles when they were hit by the flood.
5. Those living downstream from Georgia Highway 17 which was 1.5 miles below the
falls.
Global Event

Par (Population at Risk)
DeKay and McClelland followed the U.S.B.R. in
quantifying Par at 250. This value probably came from source 4, which stated,
"some 250 persons lived in dormitories, houses and mobile homes at the foot of
the falls." Fortunately, this early ball-park estimate was followed extremely
detailed accounts that allow us to quantify both Par and subPar with more
accuracy . The subPar are defined above in the Introductory Summary. Par 1 and
Par4 will be quantified first, followed by Par2, Par3, and Par 5 with the help of a
table.
The flood hit 7 buildings on the main campus (8). In sequence, they were
Gate Cottage, a restaurant; the Bandy residence owned by a former college
president; Forrest Hall, a college dormitory; the music building; Morrison Hall, a
college dormitory ; Ralis Hall, a dormitory for the closed high school (it floated
down the creek, p. 112); and a guard house. Fortunately, only Forrest Hall and the
Bandy Residence were occupied (6).
Although the flood surrounded the Bandy residence, the main current
bypassed this structure (6). Where the Bandy residence would appear on a map,
source 8 shows a structure on an oval of high ground that escaped flooding
altogether. Apparently, the flooding was quite mild and it might have touched
only one side of the building. Only 24-year-old Greg was home, in an upper room
30 ft above the creek. Since this person never had to move and never got wet, and
since the flooding did not threaten the integrity of the building, and since this
situation was unlike the flooding in any other subPar (6), this single individual
will be ignored as one who was never truly threatened.
Par 1, ground-level of Forrest Hall: Forrest Hall was a multi-story men ' s
dormitory with capacity for 147 students (6; source 2 indicates 140). Based on the
flood maps in sources 6 and 8, the building was L-shaped, with only the lower
part of the Lin the path of the flood (9, also). The flooded portion had 4-stories
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(6, text and photograph), but since the lowest level was called the "basement" in
source 2 and the stem of the L was not flooded, it is likely the stem had only 3
stories. This is significant in quantifying Par~, since it means that the ground floor
was roughly 0.5-0.7 times as large as each of the three stories above it,
depending on the dimensions of the L.
The ground-floor windows were all broken, but the structural integrity of
the building was not compromised and the upper floors were not damaged. Since
flood depths reached only 8 ft (9), the first flood could not have had more than a
few inches of water, if it got wet at all (9). A post-flood photograph (6, p. 83)
confirms this general description. The building was surrounded without warning
at night, so no one in the upper floors had time to enter the ground floor and
endanger themselves. Moreover, the natural route of escape would have been to
exit onto the hillside from the first floor (2 , 6, 9). Since there was no damage,
essentially no flooding , and no danger above the ground floor, only those on the
ground floor should be included in Par 1•
Although the dormitory ' s capacity was 147, there were 124 students in
residence when all were present, with far fewer on the weekends. Foster makes
the observation that 75 men could have died had the walls collapsed, so this
appears to be his estimate of the weekend occupancy when the wave hit (6).
Dividing these 75 occupants proportionally over the 3.5-3.7 floors places a
preliminary estimate of II - 14 students on the smaller ground floor.
There are at least three reasons to assume this range is still too high,
however. First, only 124 of the 147 beds were filled, leaving 23 beds unfilled . A
disproportionate number of empty beds were probably on the ground floor, since
college students generally prefer upper stories with better views.
Second, source 6 mentions the names of only 7 students who were on the
first floor. These were Kenny Carroll, who had been asleep less than an hour after
ending a date with Marcy Rees; Bobby Carter and Jon Kerr who caught Carroll
running the wrong way and turned him toward the stairwell (all 3 squeezed
through the door together); Chuck Dowell, who climbed the stairs to ground level
on the uphill side of the building; and Gerry Brittin, Rick Swires, and Cary Hanna
who drowned when they were unable to open their room doors against the water.
While it is not certain that this accounting was comprehensive, the author did give
a comprehensive accounting of every individual in every other structure in which
people died. As such, it is highly likely that these were the only 7 students present
on the ground floor.
Third, a review of the narratives in sources 6 and 2 (source 2 mentions 4
of these 7 students) reveals that all 7 were alone in their rooms. While the number
of rooms is not reported, most dormitories include a mix of double and singleoccupancy rooms. Based on the fact that these 7 students were alone in their
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rooms and the fact that the privilege of a single room was likely balanced by the
less-desirable location of the ground floor, it is likely that many of the first-floor
rooms had only one bed.
Overall, then, the range of ll - 14 is a high estimate, reduced by a
disproportionate number of single-occupancy rooms, empty rooms, and a highly
credible accounting of those actually present: Par 1 = 7, Tpar 1 = 7, and L 1 = 3.
Par4, those occupying vehicles: This level of detail is only found in source
6. There were 4 people that encountered the flood while in vehicles.

Before the first flood wave arrived, the creek was high and rising. After
having cookies and coffee at Ron Ginther's, firemen David Fledderjohann, Bill
Ehrensberger, and Eldon Elsberry decided to move the Sproulls and the
Woerners, the two families at the lowest elevation in the residential areas .
Elsberry turned to see the first 4- or 5-ft wall of water approaching and shouting a
warning. Fledderjahann sent him and Elsberry to sound the alarm across the
creek. The two men splashed through water to reach the truck, but the truck was
pushed sideways before they could reach the bridge. They agreed to abandon the
truck, but Ehrensberger hesitated. When he stepped out, his hip boots filled with
water and pulled him under to his death. Elsberry grabbed a tree, but it gave way
and he was pulled under, too. After getting his boots off, he was pinned to a rock
underwater and fought other obstacles, but he eventually made it to shore.
Dee Pinney was a volunteer fireman who worked for Fledderjohann. He
stayed behind when the others left the Ginthers', then left at about I :20 AM.
When the power went out, he drove along the creek road toward the approaching
flood, looking for an electrician and a fire truck. The water began to trickle 6
inches across the road, but it quickly rose to the floorboards. He tried to back up,
but hit a tree and stepped into knee-deep, then waste-deep water. He managed to
scramble up the hill on campus.
His sister, Eloise, lived in Trailerville. It is not known with certainty what
transpired, but she first called the operator at l :30, thinking the explosion she
heard was the print shop on fire. When she became aware of the flood, she
attempted to drive to Upper Trailerville, but the car stalled or was washed away
and she drowned: Par4 = 4, Tpar4 = 4, and L4 = 2.
Par2 and Par3 can be quantified with the help of a table which summarizes
the detailed descriptions in sources l and 6. Although details concerning
warnings, actions, and words are recorded for virtually every person in the flood ,
these are largely omitted here for the sake of space. All the deaths can be
considered general drowning deaths.
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Par 2, Resident Row: There were five houses in residence row (6, p. 113).
Beside these, away from the river, was a mobile home with a frame addition
(owned by the Ginthers). Based on a photo of where Residence Row once stood
(6, p. 84) and commentary in the text, every structure in Residence Row was
obliterated, including the Ginthers' residence. As shown in Table B.2, lives were
lost in every one of these residences: Par2 = 29, Tpar2 = 29, and L2 = 19.
Par3, Trailerville and nearby trailers: There is some question as to the
number of structures that were flooded. Source 6 shares the estimate from one
report that indicated "twenty-seven trailers were swept away" (p. 123). According
to source 8, "Approximately nine houses, 18 house trailers, two college buildings,
and many motor vehicles were completely demolished. Four houses and five
college buildings were damaged by water. Only two houses downstream from
Georgia Highway 17 were damaged" (sheet 2). Source 2 indicates that there were
" 11 houses, 25 trailer homes and various other buildings" at Toccoa Falls Bible
College (p. 34), but this says little about the number damaged.

The discrepancies appear to be primarily ones of classification. Sources 6
and 8 each contain a flood map marked with buildings. With respect to the flood
zone, they are essentially the same, except that source 8 appears to include some
small outbuildings and source 8 adds 2 trailers to an inner row in Trailerville.
Ignoring apparent outbuildings, the structures within the flood imprint were as
follows:
1. 7 buildings that were either clearly on the main campus or large enough to be
college buildings rather than individual residences;
2. 2 large buildings that were only partially flooded and another at the mouth of
Trailerville (the latter was probably a wood frame garage and one of the
former was probably a maintenance building, both of which were partially
destroyed; source 9);
3. 5 houses in a row along Residence Row and 1 residence next to these closer to
the bank (sum of Parz);
4. 4 buildings (source 6 calls them trailers in the text) iinmediately beyond
Residence Row and across the river where the river made a sharp turn to the
right; and
5. 22 (6) or 24 (8) residences close by in Trailerville, of which 2 escaped
flooding. Trailerville as a whole was "demolished" when the trailers were
either smashed or floated away (9, p. 15).
The 27 dwellings classified as trailers by source 6 can be accounted for by
the 20 flooded in Trailerville, the 4 just across the river, the trailer/frame-addition
associated with Residence Row, and 2 more below Highway 17, not shown on the
map. The 27 trailers and 5 frame houses in residence row make a total of 32
single-family dwellings.
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Table B.2. Record ofPar;j, Lij, damages, and warning by family/home
PAR2 : RESIDENCE ROW and GINTHERS NEXT DOOR
Family
Name
David
Fledderjohann
Pepsney and 3
Sproull girls
Williams
Dr. Jerry
Sproull
Woerners

Degree of
Damage
Fireman.

I

no house

7

Destroyed

2
2

Destroyed
Destroyed

5

Destroyed

Veer

6

Destroyed

Ginther

6

Destroyed

TOTALS:

29

19

Warning?
10-30 seconds from Elsberry's warning to
deadly water.
Center of flood, I" residence in Residence Row,
no evident Wt.
None
Moved 3 girls to Pepsneys' and returned. Then
heard Elsberry's warning (above).
Denise heard thunder of fuses going out, waking
up at I :26. She sensed the dam had broken and
ran outside a minute later, then ran through
Trailerville shouting and pounding on trailers.
Brother, David, initially followed, then ran back
for family. They all ran along path of flood, not
thinking to run up the mountain.
Saw approaching Ww, but rose to chest by time
got family up ladder to attic.
Ginther a fireman. Ran home, thinking dam had
broken. Water to knees after rousing children.

100%
destroyed

PAR3: TRAILERVILLE
Kemp ( I
trailer to go)
Metzger

5

I

4

2

Hamer
Ehrensberger
(Bill in Par4 )
Moore
Rupp
Anderson

4
2
7

2
I
3

Nicholson
Smith

4
3+

0
0

Eloise Pinney,
Dee Pinney's
twin (in Par4 )
TOTALS:

I

Par4

---

15

Mother shouted warning when water already 2 ft
deep.
Awakened by people screaming warnings, but
after putting on pants, trailer began to move
before could look outside.
destroyed

destroyed
Destroyed

None.
Maybe 20 seconds, based on Sc.
Heard warning from Denise Woerner. Trailer
moved after dressed and children roused.
Didn't look outside until the flood hit the trailer.
They were running across the floodplain toward
Upper Trailerville when the flood hit them.
She had enough warning to get in her car and
attempt to flee before getting caught.
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Based on one interpretation of source 8 (see the quote above), there was an
"approximate" total of 13 houses near the college, 2 houses downstream from
Highway 17, 18 house trailers, and 7 college buildings, for a total of 33 singlefami ly dwellings. If the 2 houses that were damaged below Highway 17 were
included in the 4 (total) houses that were damaged, there were a total of 31 singlefam ily dwellings that were damaged or destroyed.
Source I distinguished between "trailers" and "permanent trailers." With
respect to "permanent trailers," it appears that source 6 calls them trailers and
source 8 calls them houses, accounting for the different subtotals in each source.
Source 8 attempts a more detailed accounting of damages, so these will be given
precedence, but since the totals from source 8 were admittedly "approximate,"
and could fall on either side of 32, the total of 32 structures from source 6 will be
accepted.
Since the 2 houses below Georgia Highway 17 were spatially removed
from Par3 and they experienced the flood after it was weakened, they are treated
as Pars. Since Eloise Pinney has been included in Par4, her vacant trailer should be
excluded from Par3. Hence, Par3 will be based on 32 dwellings, minus the 6 in
Parz, minus the 2 in Pars, minus Mrs. Pinney's trailer since she was in Par4 and
the trailer was vacant, yielding 23 trailers in Par3. Of these, 19 trailers were
completely destroyed and 4 were damaged.
The trailers held a distinct demographic population, consisting primarily
of married students and their children, but also faculty and other college
employees (6, 9). While Eloise Pinney has been excluded from Par3, she
nevertheless informs the average occupancy rate in Trailerville. Based on known
occupancies, there was an average of3 .88 persons per trailer, including guests
and excluding those who were away from home. Applying the average occupancy
to the remaining trailers that were flooded yields a total of34 + (23- 8)*3.88 =
92 and L3 = 15 (excluding Par4).

Par 5, 2 houses below Georgia Highway 17: The 2 damaged houses below
Highway 17 form the basis for quantifying Pars. A debris dam formed behind the
bridge, causing the flood to pond until it eroded around each abutment and
continued with reduced velocities. In this area, "there was flooding of farm land,
local erosion, and bridge damage, but apparently no major damage" (9, p. 13).
Flood depths reached 5-7 ft on the floodplain. Using the same average as for
Par3, Pars= 8 and Ls = 0. As indicated under Tpars, it is highly likely that Tpars =
8.
ln summary, Par 1 = Tpar1 = 7, L 1 = 3; Parz = Tparz = 29, Lz = 19; Par3 =
92, Tpar3 = 64 (see Tpar), LJ = 15; Par4 = Tpar4 = 4, L4 = 2; Pars= Tpars = 8, Ls =
0; and Par= 7 + 29 + 92 + 4 + 8 = 140, Tpar = 7 + 29 + 64 + 4 + 8 = 112, and L =
39.
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L

(Life Loss)

Some sources report L = 37 (3) or L = 38 (2, 9), but this is because
the reports were immediately after the event (3) or based on the number of
recovered bodies. One person, Paul Williams, was swept away with his wife, but
his body was never found (I). See Par: L = 39 (1, 6, 7, 8).

Tpar (Threatened Population)

In addition to 39 fatalities, 60 people were injured
(7), meaning over 71% of Par came in contact with dangerous flooding . This
helps provide an estimate ofTpar3. Four students escaped from Par 1 without
injury. Of the 10 survivors from Par2, all were washed out of their homes and all
were likely injured. Of the 2 that escaped from Par4, I almost died and was
probably injured and the other waded to safety without injury before the flooding
peaked (6). Based on the calmer currents, lack of damage, and moderate depths in
Pars, there would have been few injuries there and probably none.

This leaves 77 survivors in Par3, of which approximately 49 were injured.
We know that the warning issued by Denise Woerner allowed a number of people
to escape before the flood reached them (see Wt). If7 out of the 23 families
evacuated, it would account for the 77 - 41 = 28 = 7*4 people that escaped injury.
This is a reasonable estimate on its face, but we also know that the flood was
filled with debris and universally destructive, so those who did not evacuate were
highly likely to be swept downstream and killed or injured. Combined, then, 92 28 who evacuated= 49 injured + 15 who died= 64 people who were in Tpar3.
While an approximation, it is an informed approximation that fits well with the
known facts and which should closely approximate the true value for Tpar3: Tpar3
= 64.
Combining this value with those for Tpar 1.2,4.s (see Par): Tpar = 7 + 29 +
64 + 4 + 8 = I 12.

Par 1 (Current SubPar)

See Par: Par,= 7, Par2 = 29, Par1 = 104, Par4 = 4,

Pars= 8.

L1 (L Among SubPar)
Tpar 1 (Tpar Among subPar)

See Par: L, = 3, L2 = 19, L1 = 15, L4 = 2, Ls = 0.
See Par and Tpar: Tpar 1 = 7, Tpar2 = 29, Tpar1 = ---,

Tpar4 = 4, Tpars = 8.

Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities

Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) There was
high water from the storm, but the flood had begun to go down again prior to
failure, so every fatality was a direct result of the dam break: Ln = Lnf = 0 and
Ldr = unknown.
Ft (Fatality Type)
Ft 1 • 3 = D= 100%; F4 = Af= 100%; Fts = N
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par.
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Flood Characteristics

D

Fit

(Flood Type)

V

(Peak Velocity)
There is no direct estimate ofV, but "Hydrologists
on the scene would say only that the water could have been going between 50 and
!50 miles per hour [73 - 220 fps]" (6, p. 26). Although these velocities are
extremely high, they were a product of the water cascading 186 ft over the falls.
The floodplain at the base of the falls was 113 to 1/6 as wide as the floodplain
downstream, so the water was forced out of the narrow canyon by the water
thundering down from above. Even so, by the time the water reached each subPar,
it would have slowed to the point that even the lowest end of this range seems
improbably. The Metzgers in Trailerville gave a subjective estimate of at least 35
mph (51 fps) as they watched a car wash by (6, p. 76). As a reasonable
approximation, V 14 =50 fps and V5 = unknown but much less.

D

(Maximum Depth)
The in-channel depth of the wave was as great as 30
ft (3). The flood rose 8ft at Forrest Hall, essentially filling the ground floor to the
ceiling (9): D 1 =8ft. D3 = 10 ft (9). Downstream of Georgia Highway 17, depths
above the floodplain were 5 - 7 ft (9), but they were probably less at the
residences. Without more information, the lower estimate will be chosen: D5 = 5
ft. D 2 and D4 shared the same area and would have had depths comparable to
those in DJ, since they were close together and both were near the channel: D2 =
D4 = 10ft.

Qp

(Peak Flow Rate)
Based on statistics and station marks in source 8
and a curve fitting the 4 computed velocities below the falls
(y = -10,031*ln(distance in feet) + 107,710), values for Qp; are shown in Table B .3
below:

Table B.3. Values ofQp by Par;

Drainage
Area
(mi)
4.6

Distance
Below
the Darn
(ft)
1,100

6.2
8.6
12.8
25.5

4,270
10,860
23,870
32,870

Peak Discharge
(mi)
(cfs)
0.21
23 ,000

Par;
(#)
I

Approx. Dist.
of Par; Below
the Darn
(ft)
3,900

2
3
4
5

5,300
6,100
5,300
> 10,000

Qp;
(cfs)
24,750

above falls

0.81
2.06
4.52
6.23

24,000
14,300
6,3 80
3,660

21,700
20,300
21,700

---
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Qb

(Bankfull Flow Rate)

W

(Maximum Width)

Dv

(Destructive Velocity)

R

(Maximum Rise Rate)

The peak outflow from Kelly Barnes Dam prior to
failure was 400 cfs (8) . This threatened the lowest houses in Par2 with flooding
and produced minor flooding in Trailerville: Qb = 300 cfs.

Based on the flood map in source 8, Wmax/Wmin
were as follows: WI= 325/325, w2 = 400/250, WJ = 6001300, w4 = 600/250
(because part near Par2 and part near Par3), and W5 = ---.

Dvmin/Dvmax is as follows: Dv 1 = 75175 , Dv 2
=53/85 , Dv 3 = 33/66, Dv4 = 36/85, and Dv 5 = ---.

There were two waves, the first about 5 ft high,
followed soon after by another 30 ft above the creek bottom. When the first wave
hit the bridge at Georgia Highway 17, it sent a backwash upstream that collided
·with the second wave. Observers at Par24 say this collision sent debris I 00 ft
above the normal level of the creek (6).
The initial surge shot over the falls , fell 186 ft, stalled a second or two
until the box canyon at the base filled, and then shot out of the canyon mouth with
great velocity and force like a "fire hose" (6, p. 27). The flow had sufficient
momentum that outside the main current, the water was actually calm in places.
The Brandy residence was spared at the head of the reach and the Metzgers found
themselves in stagnant water as they stepped outside in Trailerville. A car raced
by them in the flood, traveling at least 35 mph (6, p. 76).
At Residence Row, Eldon Elsberry was standing outside. He "wheeled to
see a wave of water four or five feet high rolling along soundlessly like rapids."
He shouted, "Look out! There's a wall of water" (6, p. 37). Looking at the sensory
clues summarized in the table under Par and expanded upon in source 6, others
also saw the wave approaching, but the initial wave did not crash over people's
heads or trailers in an instant. Rather, it rose so quickly that they were unable to
rouse their families and evacuate before they were trapped. Seconds later, and up
to a minute or two, homes disintegrated and the occupants were washed
downstream (6). "Most of the damage, at any given place, occurred in about 20
seconds" (6, p. 22).
Overall, then, both waves came initially as walls, but the first wall
collapsed enough to resemble fast-rising rapids, rising to full force in less than a
minute. Once trapped, there was no escape, and many experienced the full force
of the second wall of water: R = Ww, except Rs = V (see Ww) .

Ww (Height of Wall of Water)

The largest wall of water was described as 30 ft tall
(2, 4), but this was deep in the channel and would have included the depths from
previous flooding and the first wave. Since D was substantially less than 30 ft at
each subPar, it is more appropriate to equate Ww wi th D. Since flooding below
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Georgia Highway 17 was mitigated by the debris dam at the bridge, the wall of
water was likely transformed to a very rapidly rising flood in Par5 (Ww 5 = 0 ft) .

Dd

(Damage and Destruction)

See Par.

Dd 1: The water rushed rapidly and violently through the windows, pinning
doors closed before some students could escape. Since the building was brick and
near the edge of the flood, the structural integrity of the building was in no way
compromised, but in terms of flood dynamics and the impact on the interior, this
flood was characteristic of floods causing major damage.
Dd2: All 6 dwellings were destroyed.
Dd 3: 19 dwellings were destroyed and 4 had major damage.
Dd,: There were no dwellings, since this subPar was associated with
vehicles, but the vehicles were among Par2 and Par3, where virtually every
structure was swept away and destroyed. Forcefulness should be assigned
assuming complete destruction.
Dd 5 : Since there was "no major damage" around this subPar (9, p. 13),
these 2 dwellings had minor damage.

Fp

(Proportional Forcefulness)

Fp 1 = 1.0, Fp2 = 1.0, Fp3 = 1.0, Fp4 = 1.0, Fps = 0.0.

Fd

(Dichotomous Forcefulness)

Fd 1= I, Fd2 =I, Fd3 =I , Fd, = I, Fds

F5

(Incremental Forcefulness)

F5 1 = E, F52 = E, F5J = E, F54 = E, F5 s = L.

Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar)

= 0.

Fpar 1= 0.14, Fpar2 = 0.21, Fpar3 = 0.2 1, Fpar4 =

0.0, Fpars = 0.0.

H

(Height of the Dam)

Hp

(Height of Reservoir Pool)

Source 3 placed the height at 26ft. The basis for
this is unclear. The Federal Inventory listed the dam height as 20ft, but
measurements after failure indicated that the dam was about 40 ft (9). Source 5
reports that the dam was 42ft after scouring, 38ft of which was fill material: H =
38 ft.

Source 9 indicates that there was 1.5 - 2 ft of
freeboard below the dam crest, with 3.8 ft of water in the spillway, when the dam
failed (9). Source 8 offers a more recent and more detailed estimate, with the
maximum water surface before failure at elevation 1,141.6 ft , compared to a lowpoint crest elevation of about l, 147 ft. The water was dropping at failure, so Hp =
H- 6 = 32ft.

B

390
(Breadth of Dam)
Source 3 placed the width at !00 - 200 ft . Source 5
puts B at 400 ft, but the section taller than 20 ft was only 200 ft long: B = 200 ft.

Vol (Volume of Release)
Based on the highest pool elevation prior to failure
(some of which was released before the catastrophic failure) : Vol= 630 acre-ft (5,
8).
Rf

(Rate of Failure)
There were no witnesses, but, "Apparently failure
was sudden. According to residents below the darn, a roar was heard accompanied
by popping sounds probably !Tom breaking of trees and the impact of the old crib
logs [buried in the center of the dam] on the walls of the gorge" (9, p. !5). Since
Fm assumes some erosion and not an instantaneous blowout, Rf > 0.5 min: Rf= 2
min.

A

(Area of Final Breach)

Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par! and the Flood
T

(Time Summary)
The darn failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday,
Nov. 6, 1977 (5 , 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial,
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5).

Td
Tw
Ty
Ts

(Time of Day)
(Time of Week)
(Time of Year)
(Time of Season)

Wt

(Waming Time)
Denise Woerner somehow sensed the danger when
she awoke at I :26 AM . A minute later she was outside and "As she ran through
Trailerville she kept screaming and, according to one report, thumping trailers
hard with her open palm. A number of people who were thus awakened were
saved" (6, p. 6!). Based on the subtleties listed under Sc (in minutes): Wt1 = 0,
Wt2 = 0.33, Wt 3 = 1.5, W4 = 0.33, Wt 5 = 0.

N
Wend
II

w

Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
Based on the subtleties under Sc (in minutes):
Wtavg 1 = 0, Wtavg2 = 0.4, Wtavg3 = !, Wtavg4 = 0.33, Wtavgs = 0.25 .
Bt

(Building Types, %)
See Par3 under Par. The houses were frame and
brick construction (6, p. 50). Treating the trailer with a frame addition as a house
and treating "permanent trailers" as trailers, Bt 1 = H = l 00%, Bt2 = R = I 00%, Bt3
=M= 100%, Btt=N, Bts= RorM .
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Dev (Development/Urbanization)

The flood maps reveal that the majority of
dwellings in Toccoa Falls were not flooding (8), making the community a small
town, but below Highway 17 there were almost no dwellings : Dev 14 =L and
Devs=N.

Gf

(Goodness of Fit)

Gf1-s=H

0

(Outdoors)

It was night and only Par4 were outdoors.

Sc

(Sensory Clues)

Some residents heard the roar of the flood and the
popping sound of trees and logs hitting the canyon wall. This enabled some to
scramble to safety (6, 9). Nearer the campus, power lines and a transformer fell
exploding with sparks (2, 6). Immediately after this, the dark waters turned red
from freshly suspended Georgia clay (6).

On the ground floor of Forrest Hall, the first clues were the sights and
sounds of the flood itself as it leaked into the dorm rooms or burst the windows
(6). For example, Bobby Carter had just finished his nightly Bible reading and
was falling asleep when his windowsill fan washed across the room (2): Sc 1 = 0.
At Residence Row, firemen Eldon Elsberry, Bill Ehrensberger, and David
Fledderjohann were attempting to move the reluctant Sproulls to higher ground
since their yard was flooded. The Sproulls moved their daughters to another house
and the couple was back home with the firemen on their doorstep when Elsberry
saw the first wave coming and shouted a warning. Two of the rescuers attempted
to drive across the river to the head ofPar3 to warn others, but as soon as they
reached their truck, the wave hit.
This account and the others in the table under Par2 suggest Sc was about
20 seconds for those who noticed sensory clues, reducing to zero for the children
that had to be awakened. The exception was the Woerners, who were alerted by
Denise. It is unclear what alerted her, but somehow she knew the dam had failed
about 4 minutes before the others. It appears she lived in the second-to-last house
in the row and that, apart from her family, she did not warn Par2 but did warn
people in Par3. Tracing the warnings listed in the table under Par for Par2 and
assigning 0 Wt; to children that were awakened as the flood hit the houses:
Fledderjohann, Mr. and Mrs. Sproull, and Mr. Veer had Sc = 0.33 min; Mr.
Ginther had Sc = 1 min; Denise Woerner had Sc = 4 min; David Woerner had Wt;
= 3 min and Sc = 0.33 min.; 3 other Woerners had Wt; = I min and Sc = 0.33 min;
and 19 people had Sc = Wt; = 0 min. Hence, taking a weighted average, Sc2
rounds to 0.25 min and Wtavg2 = rounds to 0.4 min.
By the time Denise Woerner reached Trailerville, she had only I or 2
minutes to pound on trailers and shout warnings . Since people were asleep, it took
them a moment to respond. It is unclear how many trailers she reached. She may
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have reached the Metzgers, Andersons, Smiths, and Pinney (see table under Par),
but she did not apparently reach the other families which experienced fatalities.
Combined with Denise ' s warnings and the warnings that propagated through
Trailerville, perhaps 2/3 of these residents had some level of verbal warning, and
roughly half appear to have escaped without being washed downstream, although
this is largely an argument from silence. In terms of Sc alone, it would have been
comparable to that for Par2, but in terms of Wtavg, it would have been on the order
of I min : Sc3 = Sc2 = 0.25 min and Wtavg3 = I min.
Sc 4 = Sc 2 = 0.25 min and Scs =unknown, but phone lines were down so it
is reasonable to assign it the same value.

Pr

(Preparedness)

We

(Waming Effectiveness)

Since the flood rose and then fell around 9:00 PM,
"Some cars were moved and there was idle talk, but no apprehension" (6, p. 75).
The firemen were concerned about flooding because the water covered the only
bridge to Trailerville with a foot of water before it began to subside and the creek
had flooded before. About I 0:30 PM, Ron Ginther mentioned the dam with mild
concern, so Ginther and Fledderjohann road up to take a look. The water appeared
far down and the dam appeared safe, so the radioed back that the dam posed no
threat. Upon his return, Fledderjohann commented, "It' s as normal as ever. I've
seen it much higher many times." The water continued to drop until the bridge to
Trailerville was no longer submerged (6, p. 36). Despite suggestions to the
contrary in some sources, Fledderjohann was warning people of ordinary flooding
when the failure occurred, not a potential dam failure: Pr = N .
Recognizing that although there was often some
kind of warning, it was generally not timely in light ofSc and Tpar, We in
minutes was: We 1 = N, We2 = N , We3 = L, We• = N, Wes = N .

Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time):
(Epar 1)
Par;
(Ret I) The floodplain was not more than about 500
ft and the distance to high ground was less than half of this for nearly every
location, often much less. Hence, Ret 1 generally entailed waking up, ascertaining
the danger, getting minimally dressed, rousing children, and running a short
distance across easily-traversed terrain to safety: Ret b. J, 5 = 2 min.
Par4 , being already outside and aware of the approaching flood, had only
to make a quick lateral dash: Ret1 4 = 0.33 min.
Evacuation of Forrest Hall did not begin until water crashed through the
windows. Evacuation entailed running down the hall and up the stairs to the dry
first floor. Those who escaped estimated this flight, through water, as 7 - I 0
seconds (6, p. 31 ). However, the three students who drowned could not open their
doors against the water pressure, so their rate of evacuation may have been
slower: Ret! 1 = 15 seconds= 0.25 min.
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E

(Ease of Evacuation)
Es = -1.75.

In minutes: E1 = -0.25 , Ez = -1.66, E3 = -1, E4 = 0.

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Fm (Failure Mode)

A 12 ft by 30 ft sharp irregularity with sloping trees
suggested that the darn face had slumped years or decades prior to 1977 (8, 9).
Almost continual seepage had also been evident for some time (8). The dam was
also permeated by an extensive root system since it was heavily vegetated and
some trees were more than 1 ft in diameter (5). While piping may have
contributed, the 1977 failure was most likely dominated by a second floodinduced slump, followed by rapid erosion (5 , 9): Fm =Fe.

Ac

(Attendant Circumstances)

M

(Magnitude of Loading)

Ml

(Mag. of Loading, Locally)

N

Moderate rains had persisted for 5 days prior to the
failure, dropping 5.6 inches on nearby Toccoa. This amount was not unusual (9).
The precipitation above the headwaters of Toccoa Creek was greater and was
estimated at 7.2 inches. The heaviest rainfall fell between 6:30 and 7:30PM and
return periods for various lengths of time all fell within a range of2- 5 years (5 ,
8): M = L.
The rainfall was intense at the college in the hours
before the failure and there was some flooding (9), the college was built on the
floodplain (8): Ml = L.

Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Dt

(Dam Type)

Rr

(Rescue Resources)

The darn was built in 2 to 4 stages over decades,
with incomplete historical records. The best summary is found in source 5. The
initial stage was a rock-filled log crib (9), but the bulk of the finished darn was
earthen (2): Dt = E.

The local fire department and civil defense from
nearby Toccoa began rescue efforts before the flood subsided. This was
significant in getting the wounded to the County Hospital a quarter mile north (9).
National Guard units and helicopters were available later on Sunday. Overall,
however, the rescue resources available during the most critical stages of the
flood were limited: Rr = L.

Del (Delectability)

Local firemen inspected the darn an hour before the
failure, but they saw nothing to cause alarm. They were not, however, trained in
dam safety (9). Based on the historical slide and the continual seepage (see Fm),
there was cause for concern: Det = L.
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Sclrvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): H in every case.
See the opening paragraph at the head of this global overview. The rates of life
loss in this event help validate the use of comparable events that occurred prior to the
advent of modern transportation, communication, etc., so long as housing damages and
warning times are careful defined.
Despite newspaper articles to the contrary, the dam had not been officially
inspected for safety (3, 9).
There was strong attenuation of Qp with distance, as was assumed for the Dale
Dyke Dame failure, and as is typical of catastrophic floods . Computed values are listed
under Qp.
See Tpar. Among the 4 hardest-hit subPar, 60 out of93 survivors were injured.
This is one of the highest injury rates for any flood, indicating that the warning was
generally shorter than the necessary evacuation time and that Tpar"' Par.
The fact that the entire community impacted by this event was characterized by an
exceptionally strong Christian faith and a resulting strong sense of solidarity seems to
have dramatically reduced or eliminated the kinds of psychological debilitation seen in
other events with a high rate of community mortal ity (i.e., see Buffalo Creek). The
underlying burden of source 6 was to illustrate this perception by presenting every family
that experienced life loss and to present the impressions of those who came in contact
with them. First Lady Rosalynn Carter wrote the following introduction:
This is a story about faith .... a personal testimony that there is inherent courage
within us to face the challenges of life and death.
l visited Toccoa Falls College on the day after the disaster that you will
read about in this book. l went because l hoped that l could comfort those who
had survived. Instead I was enveloped by hope and courage and love.
The miracle of Toccoa Falls confirms what l believe. God loves us and
will help us always. He gives us unlimited strength when we trust in Him. (6, p.
13)
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAIL URE <TOCCOA FALLS)
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Par 1: ground floor of Forrest Hall Dormitory
Ll = 3, PI = 0.43
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Introductory Summary
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar).

Global Event

Par (Population at Risk)
L
(Life Loss)
Tpar (Threatened Population)

• 140
• 39
112

Par 1 (Current SubPar)
L 1 (L Among SubPar)
Tpar 1 (Tpar Among subPar)

•7
•3
•7

Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities

Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf=
0 and Ldr = unknown.
Ft (Fatality Type)
• D = I 00%
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par • .
Flood Characteristics

Fit
V
D

(Flood Type)
•D
(Peak Velocity)
• 50 ft!s
(Maximum Depth)
• 8 ft
Qp (Peak Flow Rate)
• 24,750 cfs
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate)
• 300 cfs
W (Maximum Width)
• Wmax/Wmin = 325/325 ft.
Dv (Destructive Velocity)
• Dvmin/Dvmax = 75175 ft 2/s.
R
(Maximum Rise Rate)
• Ww
Ww (Height of Wall of Water)
• 30 ft, but based on D in this case: Ww = 8 ft.
Dd (Damage and Destruction)
• Despite the lack of external structural damage, the
internal damages were probably sufficient to classify this as major damage. Every
window was broken violently and students were washed downstream.
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) • 1.0
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • I
F5 (Incremental Forcefulness)
•E
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar)
• 0.14
H
(Height of the Dam)
• 38ft
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool)
• 32 ft
B
(Breadth of Dam)
• 200 ft
Vol (Volume of Release)
• 630 ft
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Rf
A

(Rate of Failure)
(Area of Final Breach)

* 2 min

Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Pari and the Flood

T

(Time Summary)

The dam failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday,
Nov. 6, 1977 (5, 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial,
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5).
(Time of Day)
N
(Time of Week)
Wend
(Time of Year)
II

Td
Tw
Ty
Ts (Time of Season)
Wt (Warning Time)
Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
Bt (Building Types,%)
Dev (Development/Urbanization)
Gf (Goodness of Fit)
0
(Outdoors)
Sc (Sensory Clues)
Pr (Preparedness)
We (Warning Effectiveness)
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret
(EparJ)
Par;
E
(Ease of Evacuation)

W

* 0 min

* 0 min
* H = 100%

*L

*H

*I

* 0 min
*N

*N
(Representative Evacuation Time):
(Ret1) * 0.25 min

* -0.25 min

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Fm
Ac
M
Ml

(Failure Mode)
(Attendant Circumstances)
(Magnitude of Loading)
(Mag. of Loading, Locally)

* Fe

*N
•L

*L

Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Dt (Dam Type)
•E
Rr (Rescue Resources)
*L
Det (Detectability)
*L
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations):
Case Bibliography

*H
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE {TOCCOA FALLS)
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Par2 : those in or adjacent to Residence Row, apart from Par4
L2 = 19, P2 = 0.66
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Flood Characteristics (Continued)
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Spatial and Temporal Relationships
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Circumstances

Magnitude of
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Goodness of Fit

(l ,M.H,V)
H
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Fe

Warning
Effectiveness
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N
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Ml
Dt
Rr
Magnitude of
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N
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Introductory Summary
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar).

G lobal Event
Par (Population at Risk)
L
(Life Loss)
Tpar (Threatened Population)

• 140
• 39
• 112

Par2 (Current SubPar)
L2 (L Among SubPar)
Tpar2 (Tpar Among subPar)

• 19
• 29

* 29

Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities
Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf =
0 and Ldr = unknown.
Ft (Fatality Type)
* D = l 00%
ldentification/Location of Fatalities: See Par *
Flood Characteristics
Fit
V
D

(Flood Type)
(Peak Velocity)
(Maximum Depth)
Qp (Peak Flow Rate)
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate)
W (Maximum Width)
Dv (Destructive Velocity)
R
(Maximum Rise Rate)
Ww (Height of Wall of Water)
Dd (Damage and Destruction)
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness)
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness)
F 5 (lncremental Forcefulness)
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar)
H
(Height of the Dam)
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool)
B
(Breadth of Dam)
Vol (Volume of Release)
Rf (Rate of Failure)
A
(Area of Final Breach)

•o
•
•
•
•
•
•

50 ftls
10ft
21 ,700 cfs
300 cfs
Wmax/Wmin = 400/260 ft .
Dvmin/Dvmax = 58/85 ft 2/s.

•ww
• 30 ft, but adjusted to match D: Ww = I 0 ft.
• All 6 residences were destroyed.

• 1.0
• I
*E
• 0.21
• 38 ft
•
•
•
•

32ft
200ft
630ft
2 min
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Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Pari and the Flood

T

(Time Summary)

The dam failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday,
Nov. 6, 1977 (5, 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial,
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5).
(Time of Day)
N
(Time of Week)
Wend
(Time of Year)
11

Td
Tw
Ty
Ts (Time of Season)
W
Wt (Waming Time)
* 0.33 min
Wt.,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
* 0.4 min
Bt (Building Types, %)
* R = 100%
Dev (Development/Urbanization) * L
Gf (Goodness of Fit)
*H
0
(Outdoors)
*l
Sc (Sensory Clues)
* 0.25 min
Pr (Preparedness)
*N
We (Warning Effectiveness)
*N
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time):
(Epar I)

E

Par;

(Ease of Evacuation)

(Ret 1) * 2 min
• -1.66 min

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Fm
Ac
M
Ml

(Failure Mode)
(Attendant Circumstances)
(Magnitude of Loading)
(Mag. of Loading, Locally)

• Fe
•N

*L
•L

Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Dt (Dam Type)
•E
Rr (Rescue Resources)
•L
Det (Delectability)
•L
Scllvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H
Daniel Woerner, a young soccer player, reached shore as the flood rose around
him by jumping from one car roo f to the next before the vehicles became mobile (6).
People do not always take the safest or shortest route to safety in a flood. As an
example, the Woerners ran downstream along the road that paralleled the river, never
once thinking to run laterally up the mountain to high ground (6, p. 61). This was,
however, unusual.
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Ten-year-old Kirk Veer survived by opening the door to a truck that passed by
him underwater and climbing in to breath the bubble of air inside. Later, he reemerged to
ri se to the surface (6, p. 67).
Case Bibliography
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS)
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Par3: Trailerville and closely-associated trailers across the river
L3 = 15, P3 = 0.16

L
Life Loss

Global Event
p
Par

Subpopulation~______

Tpar

Proportion of

Population at

Threatened

Lives Lost

Risk

Population

L;

P;

Par1

Tpar1

Life loss at
Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current
Current SubPar Current SubPar
SubPar

(p)

(u)

(p)

(p)

(p)

(u)

(p)

(p)

39

0.28

140

112

15

0.1 6

92

64

Ln

Incremental Life Loss
Lnf
Lin
Lint
Incremental L
Using lnf

Ft
Fatality Types

Channel Life l

Dam Removal
Life Loss

(p)

(p)

Using ln
(p)

0

0

15

Qp

Qb

Peak Flow Rate

Bankful Flow
Rate

Maximum Width

(cis)

(ft)

(ft21s)

(M,H,V,Ww)
(cfslmin)

20300

300

600/300

33/66

Ww

Fs

Fpar

Incremental

Forcefulness
per SubPar

Height of Dam

Forcefulness

(bldg/p)

(ft)

(ft)

E

0.21

38

32

Td

Tw

Time of Day

Time of Week
(Wend o r

Natural

(cfs)

(L,M,H,V.E)

l!:!ight, !jome,
Separation)

N

Wday)
Wend

Incremental L

(p)

15

~~~6~1~6~0)
01 00

Flood Characteristics
Fit
v
D
Flood Type
Peak Velocity
Maximum
(D,Dy,Ff,F,Ts.
Depth
(f!/s)
(ft)
S,H,Gb,D)
D
50
10

Flood Characteristics (Continued)
Dv
R
w
Ww
Destructive
Velocity

Max. Rise Rate

Wall of Water
(Height)

(ft ; 0 ->

R)

10

Flood Characteristics (Continued)
H
Hp
8
Vol

(1 -12)

11

Fd
Dichotomous
Forcefulne ss

(0. 0- 1.0)

1.0

(0

or 1)

1

Rf

A

Height of

Breadth of Dam

Volume of

Reservoir

(Crest length)

Rate of 80%
Failure
{m in )

Area of Final
Breach

(ft)

Release
(acre-ft)

200

630

2

---

Spatial and Temporal Relationships
Ty
Ts
Wt
Wlavg
Time of Year

Fp
Proportional

Forcefulness

Time of Season
(§.ummeror
Winter)

w

Warning Time

(min)

1.5

Avg. Individual
Warning Time

(ft')

Bt

Dev

Bldg Types(%)

Development
(Urbanization)

(min)

(N,6·.~\~)R,

1

M1oo

(N,L,M,H)

L

Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued)
0
Sc
Pr
We
E
Gf
Goodness of Fit

Outdoors
{!n doors or
Outdoors)

Sensory Clues

Preparedness

(L,M.H,V)

(min)

H

I

0.25

(N,L,M,H)
N

Fm

Ac

M

Failure Mode

Anendant
Circumstances

Magnitude of
loading

(lp,le.F,Ff.Ff!O,Fo,
FeSp.Se.G.L)

Fe

Warning
Effectiveness

Ease of
Evacuation

L

-1

(N,L,M,H)

(min)

Attendant Circumstances
Ml
Dt
Rr
Magnitude of
local loading

(N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,L.M,H,V,E)
N
L
L

Dam Type
(N.E,R,M ,C.A)

E
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L
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Introductory Summary
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar) .

Global Event

Par (Population at Risk)
L
(Life Loss)
Tpar (Threatened Population)

• 140
• 11 2

Par_, (Currmt SubPar)
L 3 (L Among SubPar)
Tpar3 (Tpar Among subPar)

• 15
• 64

* 39

* 92

Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities

Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf =
0 and Ldr = unknown.

Ft (Fatality Type)
* D = !00%
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par •.
Flood Characteristics

(Flood Type)
(Peak Velocity)
(Maximum Depth)
D
Qp (Peak Flow Rate)
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate)
w (Maximum Width)
Dv (Destructive Velocity)
(Maximum Rise Rate)
R
Ww (Height of Wall of Water)
Dd (Damage and Destruction)
Fit

v

•o
• 50 ft/s
*!Oft
• 20,300 cfs
• 300 cfs
* Wmax/Wmin = 6001300 ft.
* Dvmin!Dvmax = 33/66 ft 2/s.
*Ww
• I 0 ft
• 19 mobile homes were destroyed and 4 had maj or

damage.

Fp (Proportional Forcefulness)
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness)
Fs (Incremental Forcefulness)
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar)
(Height of the Dam)
H
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool)
(Breadth of Dam)
B
Vol (Volume of Release)
Rf (Rate of Failure)

• 1.0
• I

*E
•
•
•
•
•
•

0.21
38 ft
32ft
200 ft
630 ft
2 min
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A

(Area of Final Breach)

Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par1and the Flood

T

(Time Summary)
The dam failed about 1:20 or l :30 AM, Sunday,
Nov. 6, 1977 (5 , 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward . The river
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial,
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5).
(Time of Day)
N
(Time of Week)
Wend
(Time of Year)
ll

Td
Tw
Ty
Ts (Time of Season)
Wt (Warning Time)
Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
Bt (Building Types,%)
Dev (Development/Urbanization)
Gf (Goodness of Fit)
0
(Outdoors)
Sc (Sensory Clues)
Pr (Preparedness)
We (Warning Effectiveness)
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret
(Epar ,;
Par;
E
(Ease of Evacuation)

W

• 1.5 min
• l min
• M = 100%
•L
•H
•I
• 0.25 min
•N
•L
(Representative Evacuation Time):
(Ret,; • 2 min
• -1 min

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Fm
Ac
M
Ml

(Failure Mode)
(Attendant Circumstances)
(Magnitude of Loading)
(Mag. of Loading, Locally)

• Fe
•N
•L
•L

Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Dt (Dam Type)
•E
Rr (Rescue Resources)
*L
Del (Delectability)
•L
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H
Where the main channel curved, water-surface elevations on the left bank
exceeded those on the right bank by as much as I 0 ft due to superelevation. Even in these
hi gh velocity areas, however, there were calm waters in the backwaters of creek mouths
(8).
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Mobile homes generally stayed intact as they floated away, unless they hit another
mobile home or other obstacle in the water. In that case, they disintegrated (6).
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS)
Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Par4 : those known to be in automobiles when the flood hit
L4 = 2, P4 = 0.5

--L -

Global Event
- Pir - -Tpar- r-- L;

- -p-- '

Life Loss

Proportion of

Population at
Risk

Threatened

140

Subpopulations
P;
Par;

Tpar;

Life Loss at

Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current
Current SubPar Current SubPar
SubPar

(p)

lives Los t
(u)

(p)

(u)

(p)

(p)

39

0.28

112

2

0.5

4

4

Ln

Incremental Life Loss
Lnf
Lin
Lint

Ft

Flood Characteristics
Fit
v
D

(p)

Population

(p)

Natural
Cha nnel Life L

Dam Removal

lncremental l

lncrementall

L1fe l oss

Using Ln

Using Lnf

0

0

2

2

Qp

Qb

Peak Flow Ra te

Bankful Flow
Rate
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(cfs)

(ft)

21700

300

600/250
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Fpar
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Forcefulness

(bldg/p)

(ft)

E

0.0

38

Td

Tw

Time of Day
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(L.M.H,V,E)

lliighl, tjome,
Separation)
N

(p)
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(p)

Fatality Types

Flood Type

(N,C,W,E,Af, (D,Dy,Ff,F,Ts,
Aa,D.Sf,O,U) S,H,Gb,O)
D
Af1oo

Flood Characteristics (Continued)
w
Dv
R
Ww
Destructive
Velocity

Max. Rise Rate

(it'is)

(~:,;~~)

36/85

Ww

Wall of Water
(Height)

(ft;O-> R)

10

Flood Characteristics (Continued)
H
Hp
B
Vol
Height of Dam

(ftls)

Maxi mum
Depth

(ft)

50

10

Fp

Fd

Proportional
Forcefulness

Dichot omous
Forcefulness

(0.0- 1.0)

1.0

(0

or 1)

1

Rf

A

Breadth of Dam
(Crest Length)

Volume of
Release

Rate of 80%
Failure

A rea of Final
Breach
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200

630

2

---

(ft)
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Spatial and Temporal Relationships
Wt
Ty
Ts
Wlavg
Time of Year

Time of Season

(1 - 12)

(§ummer or
Winter)

11

Peak Velocity
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Reservoir
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(p)

w
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Dev
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(Urbanization)
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C,H,Lm)
N

(N,L.M,H)

L

Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued)
Pr
We
E
Gf
0
Sc
Goodness of Fit

Outdoors

Sensory Clues

Preparedness

(L,M,H,V)

{!ndoo rs or
Outdoors)

(min)

H

0

0.25

(N.L,M,H)
N
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M

Fa ilure Mode
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Magnitude of
Loading

( lp,le,F,Ff, Ff!O ,Fo.
Fe,Sp,Stt,G.L)

Fe
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Effectiveness

(N,L,M,H)
N

Ease of
Evacu ation
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0

Attendant Circumstances
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Magnitude of
Local Loading

(N,L,M,H) (N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,L,M,H,V.E)
L
L
N

Dam Type

(N.E,R.M,C,A)

E

Rescue
Resources

(N,L,M,H)
L

Det

Schvq

Del ectability

Striking .
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(N,L,M,H,V)
L

(L,H)

H

408
Introductory Summary
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar).
Global Event

Par (Population at Risk)
L
(Life Loss)
Tpar (Threatened Population)

• 140
• 39
• 112

Par4 (Current SubPar)
L 4 (L Among SubPar)
Tpar 4 (Tpar Among subPar)

•4
•2
•4

Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities

Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss)
0 and Ldr = unknown.
Ft (Fatality Type)
* Af = I00%
Identification/Location of Fatalities: See Par • .

* Ln = Lnf =

Flood Characteristics

(Flood Type)
*D
(Peak Velocity)
• 50 ftls
(Maximum Depth)
• I 0 ft
Qp (Peak Flow Rate)
• 21,700 cfs
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate)
• 300 cfs
W (Maximum Width)
• Wmax/Wmin = 600/250 ft.
Dv (Destructive Velocity)
• Dvmin!Dvmax = 36/85 ft 2/s.
R
(Maximum Rise Rate)
• Ww
Ww (Height of Wall of Water)
• 30 ft, but adjusted for D: Ww = I 0 ft .
Dd (Damage and Destruction)
• This subPar was automotive, but the cars were
very near to buildings in Par2 and Par3 where virtually every structure was
destroyed.
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness) • 1.0
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness) • I
F5 (Incremental Forcefulness) *E
• No buildings: Fpar = 0.0.
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar)
• 38 ft
H (Height of the Dam)
• 32ft
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool)
• 200 ft
B
(Breadth of Dam)
• 630 ft
Vol (Volume of Release)
Fit
V
D
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Rf
A

(Rate of Failure)
(Area of Final Breach)

• 2 min

Snatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par! and the Flood

T

(Time Summary)

The dam failed about I :20 or I :30 AM , Sunday,
Nov. 6, 1977 (5, 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00PM, at the same time the
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial,
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5).
(Time of Day)
N
(Time of Week)
Wend
(Time of Year)
II

Td
Tw
Ty
Ts (Time of Season)
Wt (Warning Time)
Wta,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
Bt (Building Types, %)
Dev (Development/Urbanization)
Gf (Goodness of Fit)
0
(Outdoors)
Sc (Sensory Clues)
Pr (Preparedness)
We (Warning Effectiveness)
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret
(Epar 1)

E

Par;

(Ease of Evacuation)

W

• 0.33 min
• 0.33 min
•N

•L
•H
•0
• 0.25 min
•N
•N
(Representative Evacuation Time):
(Ret 1) • 0.25 min
• 0 min

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Fm
Ac
M
Ml

(Failure Mode)
(Attendant Circumstances)
(Magnitude of Loading)
(Mag. of Loading, Locally)

• Fe
•N
•L
•L

Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Dt (Dam Type)
•E
Rr (Rescue Resources)
•L
Del (Detectability)
•L
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H
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In the case of the firemen , their hip boots helped to pull them under (6). A similar
danger could apply to fishermen wearing waders.
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KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS)
Par : Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Pars: 2 houses below Georgia Highway 17
Ls = 0, Ps = 0.0

L
Life Loss

Global Event
p
Par
Proportion of

Lives Lost

Tpar

Li

Population at

Threatened

life l oss at

Risk

Population

Subpopulations
pi
Par1

Tpari

(p)

(u)

(p)

(p)

(p)

(u)

(p)

(p)

39

0.28

140

112

0

0.0

8

8

Incremental Life Loss
Lnf
Lin
Lint

Ft

Flood Characteristics
Fit
v
D

Ln
Natural
Channel Life L

Dam Removal

lncrementall

life Loss

Using Ln

(p)

(p)

(p)

0

0

0

Qp

Qb

Peak Flow Rate

Bankful Flow

Incremental L Fatality Types
Flood Type
Using lnf
(N,C,W, E,Af, (D,Dy, Ff.F,Ts,
(p)
Aa,D,Sf,O.U)
S,H,Gb,O)

0

N

0

Flood Characteristics (Continued)
Dv
R
Ww

w

Maximum Width
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Destructive

Max. Rise Rate

Velocity

~~~~~:')

(CIS)

(cis)

(ft)

(ft2/s)

---

300

---

---

Fs

Fpar

Incremental
Forcefulness

Forcefulness
per SubPar

(L ,M,H,V.E)

(bldo/o)

(ft)

E

0.14

38

Td

Tw

Time of Day
lliight, .!jome,
Sepa ratio n)

nmeofWeek
(Wend or

Time of Year

Wday)

(1 - 12)

N

Wend

11

v

Fd

(ft; 0-> R)

(0.0- 1.0)

(0 or 1)

0

1.0

1

Rf

A
Area of Final
Breach

(acre-ft)

Rate of 80%
Failure
(mi n)

630

2

---

(ft)

(ft)
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Spatial and Temporal Relationships
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w
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0
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Forcefulness
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Waming Time
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Release
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Depth
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(Crest Length)
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Reservoir
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Flood Characteristics (Continued)
H
Hp
8
Vol
Height of Dam

--

Proportion at Current SubPar Tpar at Current
Current SubPar Current SubPar
SubPar
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0.25
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Dev
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(N,L,M,H)

L

Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued)
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We
E
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Warning
Effectiveness
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Failure Mode

Attendant
Circums tances

Magnitude of
Loading

Goodness of Fit

(lp,le.F.Ff,FIID,Fo,
Fe:Sp,Se,G.L)

Fe

(N ,L,M ,H)

N

Attendant Circumstances
Ml
Dt
Rr
Magnitude of
Local loading

Dam Type

(N ,L,M,H,V ,E) (N ,L,M ,H,V,E) (N .E,R.M ,C.A )

L

Ease of
Evacuation

L

E

Det

Schvq

Rescue
Resources

Delectability

Striking .
(Predictor Fit)

(N,L,M,H)

(N ,L,M ,H,V)

(L,H)

L

L

H

412

Introductory Summary
See the Global Introductory Summary under • (before the individual subPar).
Global Event

Par (Population at Risk)
L
(Life Loss)
Tpar (Threatened Population)

• 140
• 39
• 112

Par5 (Current SubPar)
•8
L 5 (L Among SubPar)
•0
Tpar5 (Tpar Among subPar)
See Par5 under Par •. There is no direct historical
account of these two families. Nevertheless, since Sc was on the order of0.25
minutes or less, riverside phones were knocked out by the flood, nobody lived
nearby to issue a verbal warning, and the families would have been asleep, it is
highly unlikely that these families evacuated before being flooded : Tpar 5 = 8.
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities

Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss) • Ln = Lnf =
0 and Ldr = unknown.
Ft (Fatality Type)
N
Identification/Location of Fatalities: None
Flood Characteristics

(Flood Type)
(Peak Velocity)
(Maximum Depth)
D
Qp (Peak Flow Rate)
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate)
w (Maximum Width)
Dv (Destructive Velocity)
(Maximum Rise Rate)
R
Ww (Height of Wall of Water)
Dd (Damage and Destruction)
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness)
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness)
Fs (Incremental Forcefulness)
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar)
H (Height of the Dam)
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool)
Fit

v

•o
• 5 ft
• 300 cfs

•v
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

0 ft
2 dwellings had minor damage.
0.0
0
L
0.0
38 ft
32 ft
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B
Vol
Rf
A

(Breadth of Dam)
(Volume of Release)
(Rate of Failure)
(Area of Final Breach)

• 200ft
• 630ft
• 2 min

Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par! and the Flood
The darn failed about I :20 or I :30 AM, Sunday,
(Time Summary)
Nov. 6, 1977 (5 , 6, 8, 9) and reached the residences shortly afterward. The river
rose and then dropped again before that, around 9:00 PM, at the same time the
peak reservoir level subsided. This suggests that there may have been a partial,
temporary failure prior to the catastrophic break (5).
Td (Time of Day)
N
Tw (Time of Week)
Wend
Ty (Time of Year)
II
Ts (Time of Season)
W
Wt (Warning Time)
• 0 min
Wt0 ,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
• 0.25 min
Bt (Building Types, %)
• R or M
Dev (Development/Urbanization) • N
Gf (Goodness of Fit)
•H
0
(Outdoors)
•I
Sc (Sensory Clues)
• 0.25 min
Pr (Preparedness)
•N
We (Warning Effectiveness)
•N
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time):
(Epar 1)
Pari
(Ret t) • 2 min
E
(Ease of Evacuation)
• -1.75 min

T

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood
Fm
Ac
M
Ml

(Failure Mode)
(Attendant Circumstances)
(Magnitude of Loading)
(Mag. of Loading, Locally)

•
•
•
•

Fe
N

L
L

Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood

*E
Dt (Dam Type)
Rr (Rescue Resources)
•L
Det (Detectability)
•L
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): • H
Case Bibliography
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Striking characteristics and
valuable quotations
The following section is excerpted and in some cases modified or expanded from
the larger, unpublished version of Appendix B. The formatting and style are generally
preserved from the original appendix. Reference numbers refer to the event-specific
bibliographies in the next section.

ALLEGHENY COUNTY (FLASH) FLOOD. PENNSYLVANIA
Par: several watersheds in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 1986 = 1,700
Par 1: motorists on Saxonburg Boulevard below its intersection with Harts Run
Road on Little Pine Creek north of Pittsburg; L 1 = 9, P 1 = 0.33
To understand this event, it is important to distinguish between the flood 's peak,
characterized by a wall of water up to 4 or 5 ft high, and the slow rise that preceded it.
During the fastest rise leading up to the peak, the flood rose 3.5 ft over 45 minutes at the
intersection of Harts Run Road and Saxonburg Boulevard, upstream from most of the
damage and all of the life loss. Since the homes were primarily located between the river
and the road, an even slower rise rate first flooded the homes. Under these conditions, the
sensory clues of flooding would have given homeowners time to climb the hillside a few
seconds away long before the flooding reached lethal proportions. In the same way,
rather than being overwhelmed, most or all motorists were swept away only because they
did not abandon their vehicles during the long period when the rise rate primarily posed a
threat to property and not to life.
The consistent message from this event and from other life-loss events involving
flash floods is that modem tools used to predict flash flooding are prone to error and
failure. See Wt for reasons warnings are often delayed in flash floods. Also, in
transitioning to a computer-aided model, the NWS predicted that 5.5 inches of rainfall
would be required to cause flash flooding when 3.8 inches would have been more
realistic.

Wt
(Warning Time)
A NWS flash flood warning was issued at 5:53 PM,
about I hr after extreme flooding began. It was not issued earlier because the true
intensity of the storms was not expected. Although radar estimates did indicate
high rainfall estimates, forecasters attributed these to anomalous propagation
patterns that had frequently occurred in the past. Electrical outages in the flooded
area hampered verbal confirmations, and reports of flooding on Saxonburg
Boulevard were confused with the town of Saxonburg, where rainfall was light.

415
Once the flash flood warning was finally disseminated over the
Emergency Broadcast System, no one from the local TV or radio stations could
remember broadcasting it, nor could they remember receiving the warning over
the UPI or AP wire services: Wt = 0 min.
Sometimes, victims of flooding will climb onto the roofs of their vehicles rather
than wading to high ground, not realizing that a vehicle can be floated and washed away
by moderate flooding. In this way, they bypass their window of opportunity for escape
and drown when the flood rises high enough to mobilize the vehicle or when an
unexpected surge or wall of water suddenly sweeps them away. At least 3 victims died in
this way in this event.

ANGELS DAM
Par: down San Domingo Creek, Calaveras County, California, 1895 =unknown
Par 1: same as Par
L1 =I, P 1 =unknown
Workmen apparently left portions of cottonwood roots under the masonry section,
leaving the foundation vulnerable to piping.

ARAS ALLUVIAL FAN FLASH FLOOD AND DAM FAILURES
Par: Central Pyrenees, Spain, 1996 =unknown
Par 1: Las Nieves Campground
Ll = 87, PI = 0.58

"In terms of human lives lost, this flood has been the largest natural disaster in
Spain in the last 23 years" (I, p.268). In 1973, 150 people died in a flash flood .
The Anis barranco was the main feeder channel to the Anis alluvial fan. It
contained more than 30 check dams which had long since filled with sediment (some had
pine trees around 40 years old), giving it a terraced appearance. During the flash flood,
most of these darns were destroyed and much of the sediment was deposited via sheet
flow across the alluvial fan.
"The people that survived the disaster are mainly those who were able to take
shelter in one of the buildings or those who climbed the poplars planted on the camping
area. Most of those who died were drowned, trapped or buried in the sediment and hit by
moving debris." (1, p.277-8)
"The roadways of the camp site were scoured and acted as preferential flow paths
. .. The highly turbulent flow generated scours up to 1.5 m deep on bare surfaces and
next to obstructions like the road whose asphalt cover was tom off." (I, p. 279)
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Of those killed, about 50% were women and 25% children, so strength may have
been a factor. (1 , p. 278)

AUSTIN DAM (BAYLESS PULP & PAPER COMPANY DAM)
Par: Freeman Run River Valley, Pennsylvania, 1911 =unknown
Par 1: Austin City below the Bayless paper mill

Lt = 88, Pt = 0.045
The concrete structure was built about 800ft (less reliably reported as 500 yards)
below an original earthen dam that was in good shape and that held nicely when the
reservoir behind the concrete structure was drained in 1910. This earthen structure was 29
ft high, 380 ft wide, and had I ft of freeboard . It was designed to impound 25,000,000
gallons of water ( 76.7 acre-ft; 12, p. 8). When the concrete structure failed, it created a
vacuum that sucked the earthen darn with it, leaving virtually no trace of its existence.
Mary Blailse was interviewed in the hospital by a reporter shortly after the
disaster. She was doing accounting work at the Bayless mill when suddenly one of the
big pulp grinding stones crashed through her wall. The ceiling caved in and the flood
washed over her, but she must have been very near the edge of the flood because rescuers
later foun d her alive (and several others), with her leg pinned beneath the stone. The
stone was too big to move, so she pleaded with them to get an ax and chop off her leg.
"No man would volunteer. 'Cut if off,' I pleaded. 'You can stand it if! can."' After her
friends said they couldn't do it, she asked a large stranger. "By the lantern light I saw the
descending blade glisten. I think he chopped it four or five times before they could pry
me loose." Blailse apparently survived. Others were also rescued alive from wrecked
buildings, even three days after the event, sometimes located near dead bodies. (1).
When Grace Baldwin Collins heard of the danger, she called her mother (blind) and
father (old and lame) who were living with her and began slowly toward the nearest
mountain, supporting each one on an arm. She saw the flood approaching closer and
closer, and all who watched from safety urged her to leave her parents and save herself.
Instead, she held her head higher and was engulfed with her parents.
Three people were saved by riding above the logs on their beds when their homes
were destroyed.
Saturday was bath day, so many people were taking baths when the darn broke.
Turner street boardered the mountains, so people naturally ran that direction. Most
escaped, but "they di scovered that high fences of all types bordered the lots back of the
houses . . . and many people lost their lives trying to get over the fences . There were
several instances where older people frightened to exhaustion looked at the barriers and
the approaching flood so threw children over the fence just minutes before they were
swept away." ( 11 , p. 11 )
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AUSTIN DAM (COLORADO RIVER DAM)
Par: Colorado River, Austin, Texas, 1900 =unknown
Par 1: Power plant beside and just downstream of the dam
L1 = 8, P1 = 0.8
Twenty-eight feet of silt behind the dam was comparable to a liquid with unit
weight of 85 lb/ft3. This was probably a significant contribution to the failure forces that
shoved the dam downstream.

AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austin/Town Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981 = 1,196
Par 1: residential areas, primarily on Shoal, Walnut, and Little Walnut Creeks
L1 = 2, P1 = 0.0017
Based on R = 260 cfs/min = M, the global flood was truly threatening only for
those who waited too long to evacuate and for those who underestimated the ability of
shallow but very swift water to sweep away an automobile (subPar 2- 7). "In general ,
the common factor in nearly all the drownings was that they probably could have been
avoided if the victims had better understood the potential risks from extreme flood
conditions" (2 , p. 12).
The moderately fast-rising flood itself would have provided sufficient notice for
many residents to contemplate evacuation before the flood became lethal. The flood rose
slowly enough to drive or walk away from it without great hurry. The only residential
fatalities involved a couple who refused to evacuate after being warned.

AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austin/Town Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981
Par2: 3 vehicles at 3 crossings along Shoal Creek
Lz = 4, Pz = 0.8

= 1,196

Despite the high rate of fatalities at low-water crossings or hydraulically deficient
bridges, and despite the large quantities of debris in the flows, "it is indeed surprising that
no bridges were destroyed" (2, p. II).
The rise rate was only moderately fast , so none of the cars were broadsided by an
unexpected wave of water. Rather, each driver chose to enter a flooded crossing,
believing it to be passable. Although the darkness and rain probably contributed to the
deception, such choices are commonly observed in other events during the day, as well.
Even baricades and warnings do not necessarily prevent motorists from attempting
crossings when the waters appear shallow and slow enough to cross. Drivers can not be
trusted to accurately judge the ability of flowing water to float or move a vehicle into
deeper and more lethal water.
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Variables like Dv and Qp have limited application to vehicle fatalities at crossings
since the vehicles initially encounter only the water flowing over the road surface and not
the water flowing under the bridge or through a culvert.
Variables like E really misrepresent this type of Par, because this is really a form
of convergence after the warning has been issued and the area is cleared.

AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austinffown Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981
Par3 : West Lake Drive where it crossed Bee Creek
L3 = 2, P3 = 0.67

=

1,196

The fact that two cars could be swept away when crossing the same intersection
more than an hour apart demonstrates how deceptively safe an intersection may appear
when covered by relatively shallow but swift water.
Wt is not an important predictor for convergence fatalities at river crossings.

AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austinffown Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981
Par4 : Bull Creek crossing
L4 = 2, P4 = 1.0

= 1,196

As in other subPar during this event, the fact that the motorists were from out of
town may have decreased their awareness of the danger posed by any particular flooded
crossing.

AUSTIN. TEXAS. FLASH FLOODS
Par: creeks that flowed into Lake Austinffown Lake, Austin, Texas, 1981
Par5 : crossing at a tributary to Walnut Creek

= 1,196

Ls = 1, Ps = 0.5
Significantly, this fatality occurred during the very earliest stages of flooding on a
tributary to the main channel. Flooding need not be extreme to pose a significant hazard
to motorists at river crossings.
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BALDWIN HILLS DAM
Par: Baldwin Hills, western Los Angeles, California, 1963 = 16,500
Par 1: Residential regions from the dam to Village Green
L1 = 4, P 1 = 0.0028
"Automobiles were transported by comparatively moderate velocities across
pavements lubricated by a layer of sediment when the water was deep enough to give the
car some bouyancy . ... In several cases, people were rescued from cars being transported
by floodwaters by men wading alongside" (17, p. 121t). At Coliseum and Rodeo, human
chains braved the swirling waters to try to rescue motorists being transported by the flood
waters (9).
The age of the 5 victims may not have been a factor in their drowning (the flood
was strong enough to sweep people from their apartments), but it may have been a factor
affecting why they did not evacuate. Hundreds of others did not evacuate either, however.
"Several telephone poles, their wires still flowing with electricity, flamed at the
tops like giant candles." (9, p. BIO)
While the Hermans worked frantically to get their little guests back to their own
homes [at the interruption to the birthday party] ("Did you ever ask a six-year-old
her phone number? some of them don't even know how to spell their last
names!"), doorbells rang insistently all over Baldwin Hills .... There wasn't time
to think or ask questions or pack anything or even think much about the danger.
Parents just seized their children, piled into their cars in silence, and stepped on
the accelerators. Nobody looked back .... "One minute we were driving, the next
we were floating," Mrs. Herman remembered. "We got out. The water was up to
my waist. It was freezing cold, filthy, and full of debris. We got out of the way of
a tree just in time. My husband had our youngest child and the dog. I had the two
gi rl s who weren't mine under my armpits. My other two girls were holding onto
them." (14, p. 91)

BALDWIN HILLS DAM
Par: Baldwin Hills, western Los Angeles, California, 1963 = 16,500
Par3 : Commercial districts and their surrounding roads; primarily shopping centers
LJ =I, P3 = 0.000069
The 12-ft deep, 30 x 20ft. excavation for an 81-inch sewer pipe into which Mrs.
Schwartz car sank was totally obscured by the flood waters, rendering it invisible (2).
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BANGLADESH STORM SURGE AND CYCLONE
Par: Bangladesh, 1970 =unknown
Par 1: same as Par
L1 = 225,000, P1 =unknown

Being a storm surge, this flood was quite dissimilar to a flash flood or dam failure
in that it did not diminish with width. Nevertheless, it did reveal the tremendous loss of
life that is possible when immense quantities of water are released on an unprepared
population. In this case, 225,000 people died. Despite an officially warning time of about
3 days, the dissemination of the warning was limited.

Wt

(Warning Time)
The cyclone was tracked for three days, through the Bay of
Bangal, until it struck on Nov. 12, 1970, at night. Warnings reached Dacca early,
but not the low lying islands to the south at greatest risk.

BANOIAU AND SHIMANTAN DAM FAILURES
Par: Huai River Basin, Henan, China, (tributaries to the Yangtze), 1975 = 3 million
Par 1: The global event, minus the 3 remaining, identifiable subPar
L. = 65773, P. = 0.022

The flood was simply too large and in too foreign a setting to understand it fully.
The fact that E was an extremely large, negative number (E = - 1380 min),
suggests that this failure may point toward an upper envelope on the potential lethality of
a flood with relatively minor F-values and a Dv value less than 3.
As Par; grows, parameters like V and Ww become less representative, being
localized maximums and not representative values. On the flip side, parameters like E
also become less representative, being averages rather than localized extremes that could
be more damaging. Parameters like Dv may still apply, on average, since localized, peak
flows tend to increase the value while localized peak widths tend to decrease the value.
On the whole, a representative value may still result.

BASS HAVEN LAKE DAM
Par: Tributary of Coon Creek, near Athens, Texas, 1984 = 8
Par 1: same as Par
L. = 1, P. = 0.15

This failure is unique in that no members of Par were downstream when the dam
failed, none were threatened by flooding, and all danger was from the material of the
embankment itself. The failure was initiated intentionally but progressed at an
unexpected rate, leading to a rapid draw-down slope failure.
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BEAR WALLOW DAM
Par: two homes along river, near Asheville, N.C.= 7
Par 1: same as Par
L 1 = 4, P 1 = 0.57
Apart from the small Par and the small Volume, this flood approaches a worstcase scenario: a flood that destroys all homes, without warning, at night, in the winter.
For this reason, it is critical to determine whether the second home had occupants that
should be included in the Par.

BERGERON POND DAM
(also known as ALTON DAM or MEADOW POND DAM (11))
Par: Alton, New Hampshire, 1996 = 25; Par 1: same as Par
L 1 = 1, P 1 = 0.040
The dam was constructed in 1992 and last inspected in July of 1994. The
emergency action plan was approved two months later. It was followed, resulting in the
notification and evacuation of some 50 people (II).
The Thoroughgoods tried to escape in their car when the saw the flood coming,
but the flood caught them in the garage, filling up to their windows . They retreated with
their dog upstairs as the water rose 5 ft in their first floor, collapsed several first floor
rooms, and filled their basement. This again shows the relative safety of roofs and levels
above the flood stage (8).

BIG THOMPSON FLASH FLOOD (AND DIVERSION DAMl
Par: Big Thompson River/Canyon, 1976 = 2500
Par 1: same as Par
L1 = 145, P1 = 0.058
There was a general impression from people analyzing the event that the
evacuation warnings were disbelieved because at the lowest end of the canyon the local
weather was often fair or produced only light rain during the day, and because previous
floods had not exceeded I 0 ft compared to the 20 that occurred this time (4, 8). In other
words, mild conditions and prior experience with milder floods can create a kind of
detrimental, upbeat attendant circumstance (Ac) that deters evacuation.
Rather than panic, people typically disregarded warnings that were not repeated or
otherwise made more believable . For example, one waitress reported that no one in her
restaurant moved after being warned of landslides and flooding, but they left after
receiving a second, false report that a darn upstream in Estes Park had broken (4, 5).
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There was not a wall of water but a steady, rapid rise. In Drake, Sensory clues
were the only warning most people received (4). These included heavy rainfall, a visually
rising river, and the change in the sound of the river as the flows increased. Those who
attempted to evacuate by automobile or who did nothing seriously imperiled themselves,
while those who immediately sought high ground were the safest.
"Trees with trunks over 2 feet thick were gouged from the canyon's walls, and
boulders l 0 feet in diameter were rolled down the riverbed .... Dotted about the canyon
were many concrete slabs, all that remained of the buildings the flood had swept away"
(6 , p. 125).
There was tremendous scour and deposition. "In a few hours [the flood] turned
Tom Hart's tomato patch into a ten-feet-deep ravine strewn with three-ton boulders"
(Cynthia Russ Ramsay, in 6, p. 125). Elsewhere, cars were buried 6 feet beneath the bed
of the Big Thompson River.
Although some trees withstood the waters, "The ground became so sodden that
the roots could barely support the trunk and branches: 30-foot-tall pine trees could be
felled by a vigorous push" (6, p. 125).
The last cry heard over the CB of one victim buried in her car was "My God! It's
the end of the world!" (6, pl25)
A family which survived the Rapid City flood (1972), one which was familiar
with sever flooding in Texas, and one familiar with tornadoes all responded to warnings
immediately by heading toward higher ground. While not a scientific sample, these
examples represented what investigators considered a benefit from experience with sever
disasters. By contrast, those familiar with local flooding that routinely failed to threaten
lives were often reluctant to respond to warning, explaining later that they had survived it
before; why should this time be any more dangerous (4)?
The likelihood of people to respond to evacuation warnings increased with the
number of warnings they received (4).

BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375
Par,: Rapid City, S.D., below Canyon Lake Dam along Rapid Creek
L 1 = 171, P 1 = 0.040

Pactola Reservoir was 25 stream miles above Canyon Lake Dam (3). It
contributed virtually nothing to the flood (4), so runnoff was limited to the 66 mi2
drainage between the reservoirs (4).
There was no real-time reporting system for river flow and rainfall (5).
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" We learned that people had been hesitant to leave their homes as they couldn't
relate to the danger because of previous smaller floods in other years." (7, p II)
Between 8:00 and 9:25, Mayor Barnett asked Lt. Hennies to again call the radio
stations, this time to ask people to stay away from the west end of town, nearest the dam.
Expecting curiosity seekers and resulting traffic problems, the Lieutenant asked him to
cance l the request and the call was never made.
"The water was chest high and the front of the truck was floating from time to
time. From the rear of the fire truck we could see with the aid oflarge spotlights.
people were clinging to anything that would float. Roofs and walls from damaged homes
all had people clinging to them, floating refrigerators, cars and propane tanks. People
were hanging in trees, the roar of the water was terrible and the sounds of screams [for]
help were even loader than that. People floated by just out of reach and we couldn't get to
them .. . . The screams died down as people fell from the trees and rooftops and were
swept away. " (7.2, p. 30)
"There was [this] boat [that] came down the creek with three or four people in it,
moving at a tremendous speed, totally out of control and about the time it got to where
the water fountain was, the boat shot 30 or 40 feet straight in the air. This was the last
time we saw the boat or the people" (7.15 , p. 371 ).
""Across the street a house caught fire and burned. An electric substation
exploded and lighted the sky .... Near W. Blvd and Main the stench of gas was heavy
and it was apparent that gas was rising out of the filling station gas tanks and the danger
of fire was great." (7.2, p. 30)
St. John ' s Hospital lost power along with 93% of the city. The emergency
generator was also unavailable because the natural gas line which fueled it had been shut
down to reduce the danger from dozens of broken gas lines. Service was not restored
until 2:42 AM, 2 hr and 45 min after power was lost (7.5, p. 64f). The hospital was also
surrounded by flood waters, so not a single doctor could reach the building. The sole
medical authority was the night nursing supervisor (7.14, p. 347).
Chuck Hewitt, a worker at the hospital, recounts fighting a waterfall of water to
climb the hospital stairs to reach entrance, of being knocked down 2 or 3 times while
trying to clear dangerous debris from around the building, and of wading through
sho ulder-high water to get food from the Safeway store for patients (7.15, p. 366ft).
Some invalids died, while others required special effort to save. One 71-year-old
lady saved her daughter by holding her on a mattress, standing herself in water up to her
chest because she couldn't get her on the roof. The water was slimy, it was hard to stand,
and if it had risen higher, they both would have perished (8, p. 43).
Most of the bodies were mangled and beyond recognition (7.7, p. 130).

424
Though Pennington County had an emergency plan, few were familiar with it and
" no one could relate it to their current situation" (7.8, p. 204).
"The NWS had an unlisted number but it was not available to State Radio. State
Radio also tried to call on a hotline, part of the National Air Raid warning service ..
Unfortunately, the loud speaker at NWS was probably turned off' as it frequently was
and the call was not answered (7.12, p. 304).
Two reasons dominated people's reluctance to evacuate when receiving warnings:
I) there was no experiential precedent for a flood of this magnitude; the most recent large
flood I 0 years earlier had only flooded lawns and basements, and 2) the stream rose at
night, when people couldn't see what was happening (7 .20, p. 617). Due to this darkness,
there are no pictures of the flood.
"All bridge approaches were overtopped except in the outer fringes of the flood
zone. Water surface profiles were highly irregular; natural formations , debris piles, and
urban improvements partially diverted flows, causing the water to flow at different
elevations in a cross section across many of the streams. The differences in crosssectional water surface elevations were most obvious in the mountain areas upstream
from Rapid city, in Keystone, and in Sturgis, where flood depths were relatively shallow.
Superelevation of flows on the outside of curves caused stages to rise and flood land that
was elevated well above the average flood stages." (9, p. 38)
The post-flood emotional disturbances were many (see source 7.18 for excellent
and sobering examples).
We

(Warning Effectiveness)
"Although these [early media) warnings were
timely and useful .. . they did not carry with them a sense of urgency" because
the magnitude of precipitation was unknown. "One person remarked that, ' It (the
first warning for Rapid Creek) was the kind of warning that suggested that I
should bring in the lawn furniture' " (5 , p. 15).
Later, REACT, 4-wheelers, the Rapid City Police, the Fire Departments,
and the National Guard all made door-to-door warnings in the Canyon Lake Area
(7, p. 137). In some cases, they also used sirens and bullhorns (7.20, p. 614). Still,
over l 0% of Par was trapped by flood waters and later rescued (over 1,000
persons) orperished(7.8, p. 203; 7.13,p. 316; 7.20, p. 618), mostofthese in
Rapid Ci ty (about 25% ofPar 1) . Many refused to believe the reports, even when
contacted by friends, relatives, or emergency personnel, and some were so
angered by the media reports that they called the radio station to chastise them for
scaring people (7.8, p. 203).
The door-to-door efforts were sincere and urgent, but a lot of people did
not attempt to leave "until they heard it [the flood) next door" (7.20, p. 615) or the
extent of the flood was obvious (9) .
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While the city had civil defense sirens, it did not occur to anyone to sound
them (7.20, p. 617).
A large number of people who heard the media reports drove to watch the
flood, many losing their lives (7.20, p. 618; other sources).
Since somewhere between 50% and 90% evacuated, We= M.

Ac

(Attendant Circumstances)

At least 9,500 telephones lost service and longdistance service to towns such as Keystone was lost (7.3, p. 52). "By II :30 p.m.,
the flood had disrupted communications to nine Northwestern Bell exchanges,
two Independent company exchanges, [and] five Minuteman Missile sites. ''
(7.4, p. 58).

About I 1:47, 93% of the electrical load was out of service in Rapid City
due to houses floating down the creek and destroying the main transmission
feeder lines. Lines were shut down to avoid electrocuting people in the flood (7 .5,
p. 64!). Prior to this, lights went out in the flooding area, making rescue
operations difficult, especially with downed wires everywhere and large debris
moving up to 40 mph (7.13, p. 316).
In particular, the darkness hindered both warnings and rescues: Ac = H.

BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375
Par2: The flooded, rural/unincorporated portions of Pennington County, including
Rapid Creek above Canyon Lake Dam; L2 = 36, P2 = 0.0068

Sclrvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): Would be H if only
Rapid Creek, but due to the large number of locations and creeks, Schvq = L.
" Many of the victims, campers in the Black Hills area near the streams," were
overcome while they slept or before they could reach high ground. In one cabin, 3 out of
7 campers perished
A little before II p.m. , Tom heard water coming in the cabin. He woke us all up .
We couldn't open the cabin door to get out because of water outside. I kicked out
a window and right then a car smashed into it. We all grabbed a mattress in the
one room in the cabin and floated in the water-it was four or five feet deep-and
the cabin started floating downstream. It went at least a mile and then one wall of
the cabin broke away from the rest of it. (8, p. 43).
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Although Wt was 120 min, and Wtavg around 55 min, personal Wt; was 0 for
many people in the most danger (camping) and the effectiveness of the warnjngs was
likel y very low.

BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375
Par3 : Battle Creek in and near Keystone
L3 = 12, P3 = 0.075

"The Black Hills attracts many campers and visitors, and it was difficult to warn
those people in the more remote canyons and valleys. This is a [growing] national
problem ... " (5, p. v)

BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota= 12,375
Par4 : Box Elder Creek near the town of Box Elder and Black Hawk
L4 = 15, P4 = 0.038

What is striking is that Box Elder experienced an attenuated flood (only 17,000
cfs compared to 51,000 cfs near Doty School on Nemo Road or 30,100 near Nemo)
because it was located on the plains (8, 9). This means the flood should also have been
shallower, albeit more widespread. Yet, compared to no deaths along its length in the
canyons, where the waters were deeper and swifter, there were IS deaths in Box Elder.
This suggests several observations: 1) death rates are highly variable and not easy to
predict based on flood characteristics alone; 2) the fact that the flood peaked at 5:00AM
in Box Elder, when everyone was asleep, compared to 9:00 PM the rught before near
Nemo, when people were still awake (Nemo was evacuated by 7:45 ; see Wt7), appears to
have been a key factor; 3) Even though Box Elder could have had 5 to 8 hr of warning
time from officials experiencing great loss of life in streams with comparable canyon
flow (notably in Rapid City), either the warning was not passed on or the evacuation was
not effective; 4) the absence of record-breaking thunderstorms locally probably made few
residents of Box Elder expect great flooding; and 5) once a flood reaches lethal
proportions, the flood magnitude is probably far less important than temporal/spatial
considerations.

BLACK HILLS FLASH FLOOD AND CANYON LAKE DAM FAILURE
Par: Rapid, Box Elder, Battle, Spring, & Bear Butte Creeks, South Dakota = 12,375
Par6 : City of Sturgis on Bear Butte Creek
L6 = 0, P6 = 0.0

This case demonstrates how variables like Dv can misrepresent a case. Dv is
measures for the main flow, but in this case, the main flow impacted very few structures.
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Instead, a large number of structures were inundated by quiescent backwaters. A variable
like Schvq can help flag this.

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS,
AND VARIABLES DEPENDENT ON SHARED ANALYSES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972
Par= 3,170; L = 139; P = 0.044

Pearl Woodrum wrote the Governor of West Virginia 4 years before the failure on
Feb. 5, 1968: "Every time it rains it scares everyone to death. We are all afraid we will be
washed away and drowned . .. please for God's sake have the dump and water destroyed.
Our lives are in danger." She urged others to write, but they were afraid of losing their
jobs with the mines (24).
Considering the death of Michael, who died 3-4 months after conception when his
mother died, " I still wonder everyday about what my other baby would have been.
Michael would have been 24 now" (7, Larry Owens, p. 168).
A poisonous snake bit a little girl, even though it was winter. "The flood water
brought them out. One of the most dangerous things to contend with after a flood is
snakes" (7, James Singleton, p. 179). Hundreds of snakes were swimming in the lake
following the Eldorada Canyon flood, as well.
Some reported as many as I ,000 people injured (25), but Jason Riggins, the hospital
administrator, indicated they treated 511 in the emergency room, with 20 being admitted
to the hospital. Another 645 were directed to Red Cross shelters (7, p. 172).
In this event, as with most similar events, there was widespread looting of stores
that survived the flood, evacuated homes, and debris piles (3, etc.). It did not stop until
the National Guard arrived (7, Harold Hale, p. 97).
As in other violent floods (i.e., see Eldorado Canyon), most recovered bodies had
no clothes, the clothes having been tom off the bodies by the currents. Many who
survived also lost their clothes to the flood (7, 14).
Like the flood in Eldorado Canyon and other floods preceded by debris darns and
a wall of water, the wave road the valley a bit like a bobsled. "Clusters of homes on one
side of the tracks were swept away altogether while clusters on the other side, lying at
precisely the same elevation, were barely splashed." According to an anonymous
eyewitness, "This water, when it carne down through here, it acted real funny. It would
go this way on this side of the hill and take a house out, take one house out of all the
rows, and then go back the other way.lt would just go from one hillside to the other" (10,
p. 30).
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The emotional problems following this flood were extreme and ubiquitous.
Wilbur and Deborah are good examples. Their account of the flood is presented under
Schvq for Par6 in Lorado. Afterward, they moved to a new house far up the hillside above
any conceivable flood, above Man where flooding was the mildest (I 0). Two years after
the flood , Wilbur described his state:
Every time it rains I get that old dirty feeling that it is just a natural thing for it to
become another flood . .. . If there's a storm warning out, why I don't go to bed
that night. I set up. I tell my wife, "Don't undress our little girls . . .. "
My nerves is my problem. Every time it rains, every time it storms, I just
can ' t take it. I walk the floor. I get so nervous I break out in a rash. I' m taking
shots for it now .. ..
Every time it rains or goes to come up a storm, I get my flashlight-if it' s
2:00 in the morning or if it's three. Now it ' s approximately 500 feet from my
house to the creek, but I make me a round about every thirty minutes, looking at
that creek . ... to see if the creek has raised any .
What I went through on Buffalo Creek is the cause . ... The whole thing
just happens over and over again in my dreams.
I don' t want to get out, see no people. I despise even going to town, going
to the supermarket. I just want to be by myself ... don't want to see nobody.
Why? I don't know. I'm just a different person .. . . I didn't event go to the
cemetery when my father died [about a year after the flood].
Deborah also described her state:
I' m neglecting my children. I've just completely quit cooking. I don' t do no
housework. I just won ' t do nothing. Can' t sleep. Can ' t eat. I just want to take me
a lot of pills and just go to bed and go to sleep and not wake up .. .. I loved to
cook. I loved to sew. I loved to keep house ... . But now I've just got to the point
where it don' t mean a thing in the world to me. I haven't cooked a hot meal and
put it on the table for my children in almost three weeks ....
l just didn't want to live .... I just cried all the time.
At one point, she planned a suicide, but her family stopped her, drug her back into the
house, and gave her some nerve medicine (10, p. 143-145).
Many had worked very hard all their lives and were just starting to fee l like they
were getting ahead, having purchased and remodeled their homes, when their life's work
was stripped away in a few minutes. Some time after the flood, testimonies like these
were common: "I've just about given up all hope . . . . It seems like it's useless to even
want to go on and try again," and 'There were months and months and months where l
felt l was just sitting around waiting to die. And I believe a lot of these people was the
same way" (I 0, p. 158).
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Others were devastated by the manner in which they lost loved ones. " One of our
very close friends stayed drunk for almost five months because he could still hear his
brother and sister screaming ... when the water hit them" (I 0, p. 171 ). Carol Hoosier,
who ran from her parents porch while her mom ran inside and died with Hoosier' s father,
"was under constant care of doctors" for two years following the flood for "physical as
well as emotional problems" (7, Carol Hoosier, p. 106).
Most of those who survived the flood were subjected to the horror of seeing
bodies wash by, seeing bodies wash into their homes or into nearby debris piles, seeing
bodies dug out of the mud by bulldozers or rescue workers, or scanning rows of black,
mutilated, corpses in the temporary morgues in an effort to identify family or friends. It
often took multiple passes before people could identify close relatives, the flood so
distorted their appearances (7). "The bodies were mangled. I saw arms twisted just like
you' d wring out a dish rag .... Some had the back of their heads missing. It was horrible
(7, Ruth Morris, p. 1421).
Numerous witnesses along the length of the valley recall being traumatized by a
false report that another dam had broken or was ready to break, sending people in a panic
back up the mountainsides (7).
Structural anchors can actually make a house more dangerous, causing it to be
destroyed rather than floating on the flood as a temporary raft: "We noticed the houses
that had chimneys busted up and washed off, but the ones without chimneys just floated
over and piles up" (7, Leroy Mays, p. 127).
Whether winter or summer, one of the lasting dangers of a large flood is that it
can sweep poisonous snakes out into the open or near residential areas: " We had a little
girl to be bitten by a snake, and though that seems unusual for that time of the year, what
people don ' t realize is that the flood water brought them out. One of the most dangerous
things to content with after a flood is snakes" (7, James Singleton, p. 179). In a similar
way, hundreds of rattlesnakes were washed out of Eldorado Canyon and into the lake
downstream during that flash flood .
The discrepancies between Wt and Wtavg point to several shortcomings of Wt.
First, warnings prior to failure do not carry the urgency or credibility of warnings after
failure. Second, an official warning can be issues such that the early warning
effectiveness is extremely low. This can result in high life loss with a long warning time,
or it can be masked by a highly effective evacuation in the final few minutes based on
post-failure warnings or sensory clues. Third, the official Wt may be 0 while the sensory
clues provide adequate warning for most people to escape. In all three cases, Wt has very
little predictive power, distorting reality as it pertains to most members of the subPar.
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BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Par 1: Saunders
Ll = 8, PI = 0.40
In rev iewing the list of fatalities in source 7 and those in other events such as the
Dale Dyke Dam failure, it is clear that entire families often perish in floods . The lethality
of a flooding situation can broadly be broken down into three types of functions : I)
Above a certain threshold and at a certain distance from safety, the function is horizontal-the flood is lethal to virtually everyone it touches. Those who escape do so by
outrunning the flo od altogether or by experiencing a fluke of the current that washes them
to safety. 2) At the other end, the function is also flat-the flood may be extremely
inconvenient and cause non-structural damages, but fatalities are the exception. Such
floods may rise deeply or run swiftly, but not at the same time. There is adequate safety
on a nearby hillside or on a higher story within a building, and fatalities occur due to
flukes not experienced by the majority of the population. 3) In between, the fata lity rate
fo llows a ri sing or fa lling curve that depends on many factors, where "flukes" that cost
lives are common and "fl ukes" that save lives are also plentiful.
Roger Lambert indicated that "houses would float a small distance in the water,
but then bigger waves would crush them to pieces while they were in the air" ( 16).
Lambert had one leg and an artificial one. Since the limb was in the trunk of the
car, he had to use crutches to begin climbing the hillside. He lost one crutch rushing to
get out of the car, lost the other a few more feet up the hill, and had to crawl the rest of
the way to reach safety (16). This gives a good idea of the urgency the evacuees fe lt as
they struggled to beat the flood in the few seconds that were available.

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Par3 : 3 houses clustered 0.4 mi downstream from Saunders
L3 = 4, P3 = 0.12
Danny Peters noticed 3 waves of water at their hillside house (7, Danny Peters, p.
169).

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Par6: Lorado and Pardee
L6 = 32, P6 = 0.11
"The wall of water roaring down Buffalo Creek swept a good deal of seepage
before it like an enormous broom. That is why a yard could be overrun with water and
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small debris before the wave itself arrived" (10, p. 138). One man named Wilbur reported
his family's experience in Lorado, confirmed by his wife: "For some reason, I opened the
inside door and looked up the road-and there it came. Just a big black cloud .... like ..
seeing barges coming down four or five abreast. . . . It was coming slow, but my wife was
still asleep (downstairs] ... and the other kids were still upstairs asleep." He screamed to
his wife, she leaped up and looked outside, and there was already shallow water and
smail debris washing into their yard, well ahead of the wall of water. She roused the kids
and they piled into the car. The only escape route was upstream, so they drove toward the
approaching mass of houses, decided to abandon the car, and scrambled under a gondola
(railroad car) on the way toward the hillside. While under the gondola, it was struck by
their neighbors house, wrecking it, but also turning the bulk of the flood toward the
center of the valley and giving them time to scramble out and up the hill. Wilbur saw
about 14 people in the 5 houses above his washed away in their homes. Many others were
scrambling up the bank near them. Shortly after this, Wilbur passed out (10, p. 138ft).
The erratic selectivity of the flood could be seen at one site where a house was
completely washed away, but the fence and gate were still standing and the Logan
Banner paper box was still attached (7, anonymous female, p. 29).

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Par7 : Lundale and Craneco
L1 = 66, P7 = 0.15

Bill Owens survived, without any physical harm, after being washed up into a
tree. His sister and sister-in-law died (7, anonymous female, p. 28).
The train on the track at Craneco diverted a lot of water, sparing the houses
behind it on higher ground (7, Barbara Brunty, p. 50, and others).

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Par10: Latrobe
LIO = 6, PIO = 0.10

Josephene Adkins was caught by the edge of the flood because she turned back
during the evacuation to get her pocket book. She almost pulled her husband under with
her, but he managed to hold onto the railroad tracks and he pulled her out after his mother
came over to help (7, Adkins, p. 12!).
"When it hit, the debris just piled up against the coal cars on the tracks, and it
formed a sort of barricade that protected us from the water. I will always believe that was
the hand of God protecting us. The water was diverted away from us" (7 , Barbara Burton,
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p. 57). Other houses in Lundale were similarly protected by the coal cars (7, Evelyn
Mays, p. 125).

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Paru: Robinette
Lu = 3, Pu = 0.011
Jeana, my youngest, looked up at me and asked, "Mommy, is this the end of
time?'' I said, "No, honey, the end of time will come with fire, not water." Just as
I said that, a transformer hit the train trestle, and fire was shooting out
everywhere, and then the railroad trestle came down in the water. That just about
scared Jeana to death. (7, Barbara Spears, p. 184).

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Par 12 : Amherstdale and Becco
Lu = 2, P12 = 0.0039
I seen the first house hit the bridge, then the second, then the third and fourth.
And then a mobile home hit those houses where they had done jammed up against
the bridge, and I guess the pressure and the impact was rolling under and that
mobile home just vanished underneath. I never did see no more of it. There were
three women in it. They were standing in a big picture window and their mouths
were moving. I gathered they were hollering. (I 0, p. 33 under "the view from
Braeholm" but with respect to Amherst Camp upstream)
When the sensory clue is rising water and debris, it does not necessarily prompt
an urgent response, even when it is known a dam is in danger of failing, unless the true
magnitude of the event is understood. For example, Barbara Brunty in Amherstdale had
discussed the possibility of the dam failing many times, but she felt such an event would
only put 2 or 3 ft of water in the yard. Her sister Opal called that morning to warn her that
miners feared the dam would soon fail. She looked out the window every few minutes to
keep tabs, but she let her husband sleep until she saw the creek rising fast. Soon after that,
the creek began to bulge in the middle (see Sc). Her husband told her to evacuate. She
started to leave, but then went rummaging for a change of clothes for her daughter,
looking for something old that could get dirty. Once outside, she returned for her pocket
book. Once outside a second time, she returned to call her neighbor, but the phone was
out. Before she ran next door, she went to get an umbrella and grab a blanket. There was
not enough time to warn her neighbor as the water rose, flooding the roads, then the car,
then her house (7, Barbara Brunty, p. 48ff).
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In Amherstdale, as at other towns, when the drifting houses jammed together
behind bridges, forming temporary or permanent debris dams, it provided an opportunity
for many to escape their houses and walk across the mass of debris to safety on the
hillside (7, several witnesses, including Barbara Brunty, p. 48ft).

BUFFALO CREEK MINE-WASTE EMBANKMENT FAILURES
Par: 17 mining towns along the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley, 1972 = 3,171
Par14: Accoville
Lt4 = 2, Pt4 = 0.048
The tendency of people to seek to evacuate by automobile is not only based on a
false sense of efficiency but on the fact that it is a very valuable commodity that people
want to save from a flood. There was evidence of this in many eyewitness reports (7). As
an example, instead of running up the nearby hillside, Mikey Wilson insisted on running
over to his neighbors volkswagen so he could drive it up the hillside. Those on foot
reached the hill long before he did, and the water washed over the back of the vehicle,
coming within seconds of causing Wilson's death (7, Barbara Spears, p. 183).

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)

DELINEATION OF PAR, SUBPAR, LIFE LOSS,
AND PARAMETERS COMMON TO ALL 30 SUBPAR
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, Yorkshire, England, 1864
Par= 20,800, L = 263, P = 0.013
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): It would be extremely
rare to have subPar defined in a more homogeneous manner, or to have them described
more thoroughly. Without exception (except perhaps ParJo), Schvq =H.
Many bodies were never identified because in many cases every member of the
family died and nobody was left to recognize key features.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par3 .: Damflask, 2.5 miles below Dale Dyke Dam
LJa = 5, PJa = 0.20
A strange phenomona was seen in Mr. Hobson's garden after the flood. There was
a hole 12 ft deep and many yards in diameter, apparently caused by a flood vortex. Such
holes occurred many places along the length of the flood.
All five deaths occurred to people who did not heed the timely warnings. One
refused to believe the report and delayed in bed. The other four were at work at the mill,
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one of the few places were it was normal to work all night. Since the earliest warnings
occurred before the dam actually fai led, they likely felt pressured to keep their normal
work shi fts, despite the danger.
Although a small minority of the total number of casualties in the entire event,
there were many deaths like those of the 4 mill workers. Since these water-powered
fac ilities were very near or even on the river, they were exposed to the full force of the
flood. A very high percentage of those who were working late in such facilities died. If
the flood had occ urred in the early evening, after dark, instead of at midnight when very
few workers were present, there might have been many times as many deaths

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par3 b: Storrs Bridge, between Damflask and Loxley
LJb = 0, PJb = 0.0

Scltvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): The fit is good, except that
the houses were near the edge of the flood so Ov is not representative.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par5 : Little Matlock, below Rowell Bridge and about 3.6 miles below the dam
Ls = 9, Ps = 0.56
Here, like most places, the deaths were concentrated in the home, where the
flooding was the most severe. In this case, the front houses provided a buffer, protecting
those behind. In a row of 5 apartment-style houses, the first (empty) unit was removed in
its entirety, the second was severely damaged and 7 of7 people died. In the next house
back, sheltered still further, only l of 7 died- not because the wall was removed but
because he washed out a second-story window.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par6 : 1.5 miles of steep, narrow gorge from Little Matlock to Malin Bridge
L6 = 2, P6 = 0.33
Based on the I 00% mortality rate at the streamside commercial structures-here,
at Par3. , and elsewhere- the late hour was a key factor in reducing this type of fata lity by
perhaps 30 or 40 fold . When people were at work, the shift was a small fraction of the
day crew, but the majority of riverside mills, wheels, forges, and the like were completely
unoccupied. The local work-patterns are a key ingredient in quantifying subPar in
commercial districts .
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAMl
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par7 : tbe contiguous balf of Malin Bridge witb exceptionally violent flooding
L, = 102, P, = 0.93

"A large number of the bodies were never identified, the reason being that in
many cases entire families were drowned, no one surviving who could recognise the
features of corpses which were recovered" ( l , p. 3 7). Moreover, none of the closest
neighbors survived.
Corpses from this area often had very few clothes on-maybe a single stocking or
a coat-suggesting to researchers at the time that the sleeping occupants had no time to
dress before their houses collapsed and were washed away. In light of other events,
floods often strip the clothing off people who are fully dressed, but the weight of other
evidence supports the notion that there was little time for people to get dressed during the
Dale Dyke Dam failure.
Stone or brick houses do not readily float, so that if they fai l, they are more likely
to collapse on the occupants than to provide a raft.
Life loss here was so complete, it is educational to examine the lives that were not
lost:
l . The two who survived from the Spooner household floated out the secondstory windows on their beds and were washed to adjacent fields, where they
were rescued. In both this event and many other events, lives have often been
saved by mattresses, either by floating on them inside a room, or by riding
them downstream until they bump into a place of refuge. Also, in other
instances, people have been drowned when swept out their window on a
mattress.
2. The watchman was standing outside Ann Mount' s house, speaking with her at
her door. On seeing the flood coming (Sc ), he ran for high ground and
escaped; she ran inside and drowned.
3. William Watson's house was destroyed and he was swept downstream with 4
other fami ly members. He was holding onto a "balk of timber" (I, p. 40) for
support. The family stayed together at first, but then the current carried him
apart and deposited him on top of a pile of debris that had washed against the
Widdowson' s house. This is the only house in this subPar that was not
destroyed. He called out for help and they pulled him through a window.
4. The 4 Widdowsons just mentioned were the only other survivors.
This indicates the life loss expected when an entire neighborhood is swept away
in an instant by a flood less than 2-stories deep: l survived by evacuati ng ahead of the
flood, 3 by riding rafts to a refuge and then being rescued, and 4 by experiencing lesssevere flooding ; l 02 died. Although the houses were 2-stories, they provided no refuge
when they were erased.
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par8 : the contiguous half of Malin Bridge called Holme Row
Ls = 0, Ps = 0.0

Harrison attributes the lower lethality of the flood in this area to the sheltering
effect of adjacent buildings and to more substantial construction in Holme Row. These
adjacent buildings were not described. Perhaps they were well-situated end houses that
received the greatest damage, perhaps Par7 was close enough to temporarily deflect or
absorb the strongest currents before being removed by the flood, or perhaps there were
non-residential structures such as barns or shops on the periphery. In any case, reports
indicate that the flood rose and fell in about 15 minutes, so even structures that were
completel y washed away could conceivably have deflected the peak flows-first as a
wall and then as a temporary pile of stone rubble.
It is most likely that Holme Row benefited from being the second line of defense,
as it were. The depth here was half as deep (or less) as in Par7, and since Par7 occupied a
strip of land adjacent to the river, Holme Row was probably some distance inland. Par7
would have helped direct the major currents downstream, buffering the land behind it:
Par8 = 24*4 = 96 and L8 = 0.

Although the first floors were flooded to 5 or 6ft, every home had a second story,
where most people slept. Without this refuge, under Wtavg = 0, there would likely have
been life loss. With this refuge, they were able to get up, get dressed, and watch the flood .
There were at least 3 close calls for people who encountered the flood while downstairs.
Two managed to climb the stairs to the second story, while the third broke a hole into a
neighbors house and was rescued.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par9 : Limerick Wheel and houses across from Malin Bridge
L9 = 3, P9 = 0.33

Even when flooding is nearly 2-stories deep, people may survive by holding near
the ceiling for air. This assumes that currents are sufficiently mild to avoid destroying the
structure or washing the occupants out through windows or damaged walls, that people
have time to reach the second story, and that the victims can stand on furniture or tread
water throughout the duration of the flood.
Corresponding to the observation above, notice that because the structure was
sturdy stone, the flooding was able to rise to a great depth while causing no more than
minor structural damage. If the structure had been a frame house, it would have floated
away and perhaps been destroyed when colliding with other houses or obstacles.
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par 10 : Hillsbro', 6 miles from the dam and below Malin Bridge
L10 = 39, P10 = 0.45
Par1, Par10, and Par11 , all experienced severe flooding, but in ways that distinguish
the Iife loss in each. Par1 had flooding that, in combination with the buildings present,
was powerful enough to strip away even the foundations. Almost everyone died. Par 10
had flooding which washed away some homes, flooded others above the rooftops, and
damaged others, but left just enough space in about half of the homes to breath.
Consequently, life loss was close to 50%. If Brick Row had not been 3 stories tall, life
loss would probably have been comparable to that for Par7. Par 11 had flooding very
similar to Par7 , but a debris dam deflected enough of the current that the buildings
remained standing, despite their major damage. Life loss here was reduced to I 0%. This
study suggests some hypotheses worth exploring:
When Par are present, life loss is very near to I 00% when homes are
completely destroyed or entirely submerged.
When a community is marked by severe damages, including complete
destruction of many homes, life loss may approach 50%, with life loss
concentrated primarily where damages are greatest or houses are submerged.
Even when suffering extreme damage, if a home is not destroyed and
maintains a refuge, life loss can be dropped to between I 0 and 50%. Here, life
loss occurs where major damage exposes occupants to currents that can sweep
them out a door or window or through a broken wall ; where occupants are
overcome quickly before they can get to the refuge; or where occupants can't
swim, they fall into swirling waters, and others are not able to rescue them.
There may be value in exploring life loss separately for houses which are
completely submerged or completely destroyed, and for those which are
damaged severely but without eliminating places of refuge. If separate
functions could be developed, these could then be applied to the expected
damage statistics in predicting life loss. Of course, these examples are limited
to cases where Wtavg = 0, so there was no prior evacuation.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
SubPar# 10: Hillsbro', 6 miles from the dam and below Malin Bridge
Par 1ob: houses that were partially destroyed (major damage)
LJOb = 32, PIOb = 0.44
Dd

15 houses and 2 inns had major damage. In some
cases, the flood completely submerged the structures, but many structures were on
higher ground or had 3 stories. The inns were only flooded to the first floor, the 9
three-story houses in Brick Row were partially flooded in the highest floor, and a

(Damage and Destruction)
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few people like George Cooper and his wife escaped by climbing to the top of
their two-story house (1).
As suggested under Dd, above, it appears that everyone or virtually everyone who
survi ved was able to reach a high point in a structure where they could keep their head
above water. Everyone appears to have died in structures that were completely
submerged (largely single story). Had Brick Row not been three stories high, life loss
would probably have been much greater. This suggests that for Tpar, the main difference
in life loss between cases where structures are destroyed and those where buildings
remain standing with major damage is the availability of a comparatively safe refuge on
an upper floor or the roof. If this refuge is removed through complete submergence, life
loss is comparable in buildings with complete destruction and with only major damage.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par 11 : Hill Bridge, overS miles from the dam
L 11 = 10, P 11 = 0.096

D

Dv
Dd

Fp
Fd
F5

(Maximum Depth)

"The waterline was nearly on a level with the top of
the second storys" (l , p. 44). This is consistent with Mallin Bridge upstream: D =
14ft.
(Destructive Velocity)
99,500/ W = 378 ft
(Damage and Destruction)
See the description under Par; above. Crooke's
home had minor damage, but the rest appear to have suffered some level of
structural destruction.
(Proportional Forcefulness) 0.96
(Dichotomous Forcefulness) l

(Incremental Forcefulness)

E

This subPar, Par 8, and Par7 make an interesting set that demonstrates the
relationship between flood lethality and life loss. Par7 was utterly washed away and only
the exceptions survived. Although Par 11 had almost identical values forD, Dv, Fp, Fd,
and Fs, the true structural damage was much less-{)nly 4 structures were destroyed and
there was no indication that any structures were washed away. The remaining damage
was quite serious, including in many cases the loss of entire walls and most of the
second-story floors , but the remnants of most houses allowed over 90% of the subPar to
survive. Pars had flooding that filled most of the first story, but structural damage was
almost nonexistent and the vast majority of this subPar never got wet. Life loss there was
0.
As a side note to the discussion above, Hill Bridge could have resembled Par 7
with respect to both structural removal and life loss, but "a barricade formed of the
accumulation of trees, chairs, sofas, and other articles brought down by the flood,"
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providing protection to this housing development. This is one small example of how
uncertain flood routing can be under the dynamic action of a catastrophic flood.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par 12 : Owlerton, the first large community on the plains, over 6 miles from the dam
L12 = 5, P12 = 0.0063
Over and again, the sensory clues indicating the flood was coming were missed
until the houses were surrounded or filled with water. There were 3 possible reasons for
this: I) the flood rose exceptionally quickly, but it did not usually come as a wall,
instantaneously breaking trees and houses, 2) there was an exceptionally strong wind, so
people sometimes confused the flood with the gale, and 3) most people were asleep.
However, even when people were awake, unless they actually saw the flood coming,
sounds alone were insufficient to trigger a timely response. Here are two examples of
reactions from those who were awake:
Mrs. Proctor herself did not go to bed, but sat up reading. Soon after half-past
twelve she heard a tremendous roar like the sound of many waters, and she
immediately went to the door, to see what was the cause of the commotion. Just
as she was about to open the door the water began to come in. She ran into the
room where her daughter and the others were sleeping, and had only just time to
get them upstairs when the door and windows gave way, and the water filled the
lower rooms up to the ceiling. Had the inmates been three minutes later they
would assuredly have been drowned. (I , p. 51)
Sergeant Foulds and his wife went to bed about eleven o' clock. Mrs. Foulds was
awoke in about an hour by a great noise in the room. She exclaimed to her
husband, "The wind is breaking the windows of the room." He jumped out of bed,
and was astonished to find himself up to his hips in water. (I, p. 52)
There are two important footnotes to the Foulds' story (above). First, the pressure
from the water made it difficult or impossible to open doors. This dilemma was observed
by Harrison with respect to many houses and some failed rescue attempts. In this case,
Sergeant Foulds was unable to open the door to the bedroom of his two young children
and both of them drowned. Second, the Foulds were sleeping on the ground floor. In
areas with flooding less than I 0 ft deep, most of the deaths occurred to people so located .
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
SubPar# 12: Owlerton-first large community on the plains,> 6 mi from the dam
Parl2b: houses/barracks with major damage
L12b = 2, P12b = 0.013
Defining F (Fp, Fd, F5) in such a way that major damages and totally-destroyed
structures are lumped together as a single category produces identical F values for Par 12a
and Parm, even though P12a = 1.0 and Pm = 0.013.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM>
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Paru: an enclave across the river from Owlerton
Ln = 0, Pn = 0.0
Deep floods are not necessarily lethal, even with short warning time. Here, safety
was very near because the hills were very steep and the houses were close enough to
cross directly from the second story of the homes. This was a common means of escape
in similar reaches upstream when the houses were surrounded by the flood. If the flood
had come with higher velocity, however, the houses may have been washed away before
escape was possible. In terms of priority, floods with high velocity appear to be more
lethal than floods which are relatively deep.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
SubPar# 13: an enclave across the river from Owlerton
Par 13 b: 5 houses with minor damage
Lnb = 0, Pnb = 0.0
V13

(Peak Velocity)

• Since the flooding was deep, but the structural
damage was light (see D and Dd), this subPar did not experience the flood's peak
velocity of26.5 fps. Most likely the mill dam and steep hills worked together to
shield this enclave, producing a deep backwater. For consistency, the 13.5 fps
assumed in the next reach below will be used here also (see V 1s): V = 13.5 fps.

V13b (Peak Velocity)

As indicated under V13, the water was deep, but the
structural damage was minimal, indicating a deep backwater. V is difficult to
estimate, but it was slow, probably on the order of I - 3 fps: V = 2 fps.

Dv

(Destructive Velocity)

99,500/W = 185

This is a good example of how Dv can completely misrepresent an isolated
location, in this case a deep backwater with very mild currents.
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Although TparJJb = 6, all 6 escaped to the hillside from the second story without
getting wet after the flood arrived .

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAMl
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par 1s: Farfield Gardens, above Neepsend, about 7.5 miles below the dam
L1s = 24, P1s = 0.44

When houses are single story, life loss can be very great even when the number of
houses destroyed is small. Although almost two thirds of these structures had only minor
structural damage, the flood reached the ceiling or higher in many cases and the resultant
life loss was nearly 50%.
Among those who survived, most or all appear to have climbed on their roofs.
This was not always safe, however, since at least one person was swept off the roof and
drowned.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par 1s: all ofNeepsend downstream ofNeepsend Lane
L1s = 15, P1s = 0.021

Three deaths were caused because John Mayor's wife was an invalid and so the
fami ly chose to sleep downstairs. It is likely that many persons today with limited
mobility choose to live or sleep on the ground floor, where escape from flood waters that
come without warning is much more difficult.
The following story illustrates why simple velocity*depth curves derived through
laboratory studies fall short of the practical realities some people face in a flood.
Mrs. Needham managed to get into Austin's house, but the water was so deep that
she was lifted off her feet. All this time she had a young child in her arms, which
added to the difficulties of her desperate struggle for preservation. She tried to get
up stairs into the bedroom, but the door was shut, and the pressure of the water
was so great that the A us tins could not push the door open. Mrs. Needham exerted
herself to the utmost to hold the child out of the water, notwithstanding which it
was drowned i her arms, and she was obliged to let it go, inorder to saver herself
from being swept away by clinging to the nearest object she could lay hold of.
This happened to be a table, and it floated up nearly to the ceiling with Mrs.
Needham clinging to it. Her other child was also swept away and drowned . (I, p.
60)
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par20 : Harvest and Orchard Lanes, the first flooded district in Sheffield
L2o = 8, P2o = 0.0034
All 8 deaths occurred to people who slept downstairs on the first floor. Such
sleeping quarters were unusual in this area, since most houses were 2-stories with upstairs
bedrooms.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par21 : Bacon Island, in the center of the channel in upper Sheffield
L21 = 3, P21 = 0.032
There is inherent difficulty in defining such things as "evacuation time" since the
time it takes to evacuate the flood zone is often much greater than the time it takes to
reach a place of moderate safety. In the case of two-story buildings, safety might be a few
seconds away on the second floor. Even when one's house provides no refuge, and the
peripheries of the flood are out of reach, safety may not be far away.
Consider the story of the Sharmans. Bacon Island was entirely flooded , and with
such depths and velocities that 100% of the homes were partially or completely
destroyed. The Sharman's house quickly filled part way up the second story. Fortunately,
there was an adjacent hill that rose so steeply that police-constable John Thorpe was able
to stand waste-deep on it, in the flood, and catch all 9 occupants as they jumped without a
ladder. This was within inches of the torrent which moments after the rescue swept the
house away so that only its foundation remained. Behind him, there was ground of
sufficient height that Thorpe was able to first catch their baby and deposit it in safety
before helping the rest of the family.
Although John Thorpe was not able to warn anyone before the water entered their
houses, his warning was early enough to allow many to evacuate, often with his help,
before they were killed. Here, again, Wt, Wtavg, and E do not fully capture the time
dynamics.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par23 : the Green Lane District and contiguous neighborhoods, upper Sheffield
L23 = 1, P23 = 0.00065

D

(Maximum Depth)

One of the works was flooded 4ft deep. On Dun
Street, in Green Lane, Dennis M'Laughlin drowned when his ground-floor room
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was flooded to the ceiling. All of Ball Street was flooded part way up the secondfloor bedrooms, and street lamps were extinguished by the flood: D = I 0 ft .
Despite considerable depth in places, since the structures were 2-stories tall and
only one had any structural damage, only one person died. Again, this person lived
downstairs.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par24: Long Croft, between Green Lane and the river
L2• = 6, P24 = 0.026
V
D

(Peak Velocity)
• I 0 fps
(Maximum Depth)
• Some houses were flooded above the first-floor
ceiling. This being between Parn and the river, depths here were comparable to or
greater than Dn: D = I 0 ft.

The flood conditions here were almost identical to those for Par23 , although
currents may have been swifter since this subPar was closer to the identical reach.
Together, they give an idea of the life-loss potential when 2-story buildings are flood up
to l 0 ft deep, currents are swift enough to carry people far down stream, but the
combined forces of the water are insufficient to tear away walls or dislodge houses.
When trying to wade through a flood, the size, age, and stamina of the wader are
critical, as are the vagaries of the flood itself. Consider the following story:
When the watchman alarmed Mrs. Ryder, she ran down stairs, followed by her
two children. She managed to open the door; but had no sooner done so than a
torrent of water rushed into the house. Mrs. Ryder seized hold of her daughter,
and, breasting the waves, though quite undressed, carried the girl to the top of the
street. The boy followed, clinging to his mother's night-dress. Mrs. Ryder was
almost exhausted, and, in order to rest for a moment, clung to a lamp-post which
had not yet been washed down. Just at this moment, a sudden rush of water
carried the boy off his feet. "Oh, mother!" he screamed out. "Oh, Bob! Shrieked
his little sister in reply. The next moment the torrent bore him away on its surface,
and his cries soon died away amid the roar of the flood. Mrs. Ryder, though up to
her neck in the water, still struggled for her own life and for that of her daughter.
The water swept them in the direction of the King William Inn, the inmates of
which house pulled Mrs. Ryder in, and she and her daughter were saved . .. "(I,
p. 75)
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DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par25 : Kelham Island, in the center of the river about the middle of Sheffield
L2s = 2, P2s = 0.083

Identification/Location of Fatalities: Mr. Eaton died when he left his second-story
bedroom to try to save his pig, and Mrs. Eaton died trying to help her husband.
Evacuations are rarely as quick as they could be and people can not be counted on
to choose the safest behavior when faced with a visible flood. There were several
examples during this event of people rushing back to their houses or yards to get
something they forget, to rescue a pet, or to free valuable livestock. These often resulted
in very close calls, or, in this case, the only two fatalities.
Fires are remarkably common during floods , having occurred in several different
historical events (i.e. Johnstown and others). In this one, the men at the Kelham Rolling
Mills managed somehow to set the building on fire while climbing into the rafters for
safety. Fortunately, the flood rose quickly enough that the flames were soon
extinguished.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par26 : the communities adjacent to and downstream of Kelham Island
L26 = 2, P26 = 0.0028
In this case, a woman evacuated her first-floor apartment when the flood waters
burst in. A second family lived upstairs, and seeing her, they quickly extended a sheet to
pull her up. While clinging to the sheet, a second wave knocked the woman loose and she
drowned. This was just one of several stories in which an individual was lost while being
rescued or had a child swept away or knocked out of their arms by a sudden wave. This
second wave may have been the result of the dam failing in what some recalled as two
distinct stages. In any case, there is no doubt that sudden wave surges or localized
pockets of unexpectedly high velocity can prove to be especially lethal.

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par 28 : Lady's Bridge to the Midland Railway Station, the final reach in Sheffield
L2s = 2, P2s = 0.0027
It was winter and the wind was very strong, so there was a real risk of freezing to
death. Undoubtedly, some who were swept away were soon overcome by cold. Here,
some watched a man clinging to a lamp post who "perished, as much from the
benumbing influence of the cold as from the effects of the water" (I, p. 83).

445

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM>
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par 29 : Brightside & environs, downstream suburb of Sheffield below Wicker Station
L29 = 2, P29 = 0.0016

Sc

(Sensory Clues)
*The occupants of the Shuttle House in Brightside
at the head of Sanderson' s Dam slept through the flood as it surrounded their
house. They were not aware it had come until the next morning, long after it had
departed again: Sc = 0

See Sc. This is strong evidence supporting significant attenuation of the flood by
thi s point, as assumed in quantifying Qp, V, and R throughout Sheffield and its suburbs
(see *).

DALE DYKE DAM (also called BRADFIELD DAM)
Par: Dale Dyke, Loxley and Don Rivers near Sheffield, England, 1864 = 20,800
Par30 : Sheffield neighborhoods primarily inland of Par 15 through Par29
L1o = 0, PJO = 0.0
There is always the potential for life loss around water. People might be
electrocuted, stumble and knock themselves unconscious and drown, have limited
mobility and fall into the water while alone, or panic and suffer lethal medical sideeffects. However, when flooding is shallow and slow, such deaths have been quite rare,
historically.
Par30 is limited to areas with almost uniformly minor flooding-more so than any
of the previous subPar. As such, it is not an inherently biased conglomerate of areas
which by chance had zero life loss. Instead it pools many areas, some contiguous and
some not, that shared a uniform set of descriptive variables. Some of the previous subPar
also had zero fa tali ties, but they were distinguished by the nature of flooding at those ·
locations. It follows that this subPar was expansive enough, the flood damages consistent
enough, and the life loss predictable enough that Par3o suggests flooding conditions at or
below which life loss is not expected except under unusual circumstances.

DRY CREEK FLASH FLOOD
Par: Dry Creek train crossing near Eden, Colorado, 1904 = 138
Par1 : train called the Missouri Pacific Exposition Flyer
Lt = 96, Pt = 0.70
Floods which compromise the integrity of train crossings, or flooded regions
occupied by a train , can cause high numbers of fatalities either by drowning trapped
occupants or through fatal injuries resulting from a crash.
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Significantly, the track itself was not flooded, but the bridge failed under extreme
flooding conditions when crossed by the train.
This type of fatality, along with fatalities caused by roads being overtopped or
undermined by floods , should probably be treated separately from general drowning
deaths in residential areas.

EASTOVER MINING COMPANY SLUDGE POND DAM
Par: Ages, Harlan County, Kentucky, 1981 = 100
Par 1: same as Par
L 1 = l, P 1 =0.01
"Residents heard two explosions before the break, raising the possibility of
sabotage. The dam was inspected by the Mine Safety and Health Administration Dec. 14
[4 days before the failure]" (I , p. 5).

EL CAJONCITO DYKE FAILURE
Par: El Cajoncity River through La Paz, Baja California Sur, 1976 = 2,000
Par 1: same as Par
L. = 800, PI = 0.40

Identification/Location of Fatalities: These were poor shack-dwellers living in and
along a dry riverbed, made dry by diverting the flow with a dike.

Bt

(Building Types, %)

Sh= 100%.

It is unclear what kind of forcefulness would have been experienced had the
building been more substantial. On the one hand, a 6 ft wave, after attenuating, may have
done little damage farther downstream or toward the edges of the flood. On the other
hand, the peak discharge was maintained for 7.5 hours, so damages may have been higher
than one might expect. In any case, the presence of flimsy shacks removed places of
refuge that would have likely reduced life loss had the flood occurred in a region with
better building standards.

ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS,
AND PARAMETERS COMMON TO SEVERAL SUBPAR
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974
Par= 50, L = 10, P = 0.2
A flash flood sent a huge wall of water through the normally dry mouth of
Eldorado Canyon, Nevada.
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This event was fairly unique in that all of the victims were immediately swept into
Lake Mohave on the Colorado River, rather than down a stream corridor, a dynamic
which dramatically changed the hydraulic characteristics of the flood (see Schvq 7).
Damages were almost exclusively limited to the Eldorado Canyon Resort. Just 2
miles upstream in a tributary called Eagles Wash, there was no wall of water but a series
of rapid pulses that increased until the flood reached 4 to 6 ft deep through a section 400
to 600ft wide. Dr. J. H. Sessums was forced to abandon his car at this location and watch
it bob downstream like a cork. It traveled only a mile before the flood subsided enough to
set it down again ( l ; 2!, statement). Ninety to 95% of the 2,000 acre-ft of sediment-laden
water that flowed into Lake Mohave passed the resort within 30 minutes(!, hydrograph).
Flows from Eagles Wash, Techatticup Wash, and Eldorado Canyon converged slightly
more than a mile above the lake, half a mile above the upstream portions of Nelson ' s
Landing. Intense rainfall moving down-basin, fairly uniform slopes close to 400 ft/mi
along each channel, and a noted lack of vegetation caused very rapid and closely
coordinated runoff. A constriction just above the restaurant then helped push the
instantaneous flow into an even greater wall of mud, debris, and water. This canyon had a
history of flooding , but this particular flood was by far the worst on record ( l ).
"Peak flow apparently followed, rather than coincided with, the initial surge of the
flood. Therefore, peak flow estimates probably do not bear directly on damage and
casualties" (l, p. 8).
The flood destroyed all power and telephone lines into the area, so survivors had
to travel by boat before anyone outside the event knew about the disaster.
As the commentary under Ac indicates, the intense hail and rain on site probably
reduced life loss in many cases by causing people to leave the flood zone, or it may have
endangered some by masking auditory sensory clues.
The local downpour caused many to seek shelter, especially at the icehouse. John
Gallifent barely escaped from his trailer after observing abnormally large runoff in many
small gullies and rills through his window. Mrs. Kirby Koop described the runoff along
the normally dry canyon floor as knee- to thigh-deep before the first major wave arrived
(I). In an area prone to flash floods , such visual clues were significant.
"Rattlesnakes-hundreds of them-were swimming in the water" (2!, statement
by Patsy Johnson).

ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974 =50
Par2 : those among trailers that were swept away and destroyed at the trailer park
L2 = 4, P2 = 0.57
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When there is no warning time and a building is completely destroyed, the fatality
rate may depend on whether or not that building is near the edge of the flood. When far
from safety, fatality rates approach I 00% for these conditions (as in the restaurant, Par 1).
When near the edge, a flood may come in surges or rise slowly enough that occupants
can flee out a back door or window, or quickly wade to safety and flee up the adjacent
hillside before the structure is swept away (as in the present case). Whether a building is
destroyed or not is less critical when it is destroyed slowly, in stages, or following
sensory clues and it is near safety.
When the flood moved down the canyon, it sloshed from side to side, ricocheting
off the walls, and yielding dramatically uneven high water marks on either side. For
example, the greatest depth on the wall immediately behind the trailer court along the left
bank was 4 ft. Across the nearly-level canyon on the right bank, one piece of debris was
left 16 ft above the canyon floor (l ). Ricocheting across the canyon, the main flow
reversed within a few hundred feet. Seven-hundred feet beyond the trailer area, the left
bank around the restaurant was submerged 20 to 25 ft. Directly across on the right bank,
the concessioner' s home came within 3 ft of being flooded, but the water only rose 5 ft
high (I , p. 19, fig. 14). Such uneven water-surface profiles, though dramatic, are not
uncommon with catastrophic floods involving huge walls of water. Not only do curves in
the channel, protruding ridges, high volumes, and high velocities increase the effects of
superelevation and turbulent sloshing, but debris dams routinely form from boulders,
trees, mudslides and man-made obstacles like bridges, trailers, houses, and automobiles.
These can accumulate on one side of the channel, forcing the water to pile up; they can
constrict a channel, backing up water generally; or they can redirect the flow in an
unexpected direction not suggested by the original channel geometry. Such dynamics
reveal the limitations of using modem modeling programs that assume a level water
service or that neglect the effects of debris dams during dam-failures or flash-flood
events.

Par5 :

ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974 = 50
the half of the boat dock closest to shore, ground up and sucked underwater
Ls = 2, Ps = 0.5

At the canyon mouth was a marina with a ramp to the shore off to one side. This
created a gap across the water of about 200 ft when measured from shore in line with the
canyon. The canyon entered the long and narrow reservoir at a right angle. The dock was
about 450ft long and extended away from the canyon and at a slight angle. Since the
reservoir was formed in the Colorado River, the bed slope beneath the dock was roughly
the same as that throughout Nelson's Landing-about 280 ft/mi or a little over 5 ft/100 ft
(1, see Schvq 1).
There were three occupied boats at the dock when the flood hit, two in the first
half of the dock and one in the second half. When the flood hit, the dock broke in half-
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possibly as a result of being hit by a vehicle. The flood affected these two halves quite
differently based on their respective distances from shore, so they have been divided into
separate subPar.
Schvq7 describes the flood ' s general hydraulic behavior once it reached the lake.
A summary follows, with additional details derived from statements from Manuel Cortez
and Craig Grugel who watched the event from an elevated parking area beside the boats,
and statements from Maryanna and Helen Grugel who were in one of the boats when the
flood arrived (21, statements).
Those in the boats expected a flood, but not a wall of water. Without warning, a
wall of water and debris 25-30 ft high skated across the lake and broke, crashing down
about 200 ft from shore, taking out the first part of the dock and gas pumps, and causing
the lake surface immediately beyond to temporarily mound up (Craig told his mother it
looked like 50 ft). Subsequent waves closely followed, causing the many moored boats to
smash together. The extremely dense flow did not continue across the surface, but rushed
to the bottom, carrying objects like trucks, trailers, telephone poles, and boats with it.
These objects did not resurface. This strong undertow, continually fed by the flood and
new surges, created a turbulent boundary like a paddle-wheel or someone mixing eggs
that pulled nearby surface objects toward shore and the violence. Eventually, this action
would grind up the entire first half of the dock.
The nearest occupied boat contained Frank Olsen, whose boat quickly went down .
He drowned. The other boat held Herbert Grugel, his wife Helen, and Craig Grugel's
wife Maryanna. After the first wave struck, Mr. Grugel told the two women to put on
life-preservers and Mrs. Grugel told Maryanna to sit down and pray. Mr. Grugel went to
the bow to try to find another life-preserver. As he was putting it on, the boat was hit
broadside by the fourth or fifth wave and sank. Apart from God's hand, it is likely that
the two life jackets saved the only two who survived-Helen and Maryanna. Even so,
their clothes were partially ripped off. Each were under so long they expected to die, but
they surfaced far from the flood in calm water and managed to swim to shore: Pars = 4
and L5 =2.
This flood pulverized debris and ripped the clothes off its victims-both those
who died and those who survived (I, 2). Stripping of clothes is a common feature found
in many other violent floods as well, and does not indicate that the victims were
undressed when the flood arrived.
See Schvq7.
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ELDORADO CANYON FLASH FLOOD
Par: Eldorado Canyon Resort and Lake Mohave, Nevada, 1974 =50
Par7 : those on or in Lake Mohave close to the canyon mouth or adjacent shoreline
L1 = 2, P1 = 0.5
John K. Daily was in one boat and Rod and Barbara Hallin were in another-a
green and white tri-hull. Both boats capsized and Daily drowned. It is not reported
exactly where these boats were located, but since the flood affected the surface flow only
close to shore, they must have been near the shoreline and not far from the canyon mouth.
However, since they were not seen at the dock, they were floating freely at some lateral
di stance.
The morning after the flood, at ll :00 AM on Sept 15, a 19-year-old boy named
Tsutomu Robert Kinugasa drowned when he waded 15ft from shore while his
companions chatted on the bank. He was caught by an unexpected undertow, surfaced
once, and went down. He could not swim.
This death has been included in this subPar, despite its late timing, because the
undertow was generated or greatly exacerbated by the flood . The flood sent about 2,000
acre-ft of dense, sediment-laden water, at 40 fps and in about 30 minutes, in such a way
that it developed a localized, violent, spiral flow very close to shore (1, 2). The canyon
was about 35 miles upstream from Davis Dam on the 50-mile long reservoir in the
Colorado River (I , p. I 0 and map on p. 3). Since the lake would have had a residence
time greatly in excess of one day and since the flood event was characterized by a large
volume, great violence, and a dramatically different density than the rest of the river,
spiral currents would have continued to hug the shoreline for some time after the event.
Whatever the natural currents would have been at the site where Kinugasa drowned, their
potential lethality was greatly increased at the time of his death: Par7 = 4 and L 7= 2.
Eyewitness accounts from Kirby Koop, Lemuel Washington, and Manuel Cortez
(I ; 21, statements) indicate that the 20-ft wall of water did not propagate across the lake.
Rather, it skated a short distance across the surface due to momentum, then sought the
lowest reaches in the lake as the large amounts of sediment and debris had made the flood
much denser than the cleaner lake water. There was very little pushing action at the
surface and very little disturbance of the lake beyond the point of entry. Watermarks gave
no evidence of a wave through the lake higher than 1.75 ft (1). Beyond the first few
hundred feet, the dock and boats were displaced safely away from shore. Nearer to shore,
the flood generated a swift and violent undertow, described as being free from pushing or
whirlpool action and instead resembling someone beating eggs or a paddlewheel backpaddling. This action drew the near-shore surface waters toward the flood-even against
active boat motors-and sucked large objects like trucks, boats, a dock, and trailers
beneath the surface, grinding the dock and trailers to pieces and ripping off the clothes of
those who were sucked under. As the death of Kinugasa (Par7) indicates, abnormally
strong undertows continued to circulate around the shoreline of the lake the next day,
miles away.
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This particular flood was noteworthy for the density of its leading edge. Located
in a dry desert, there was virtually no vegetation to resist erosion. Both Lemuel
Washington and Kirby Koop described the initial flood surge-which would have
determined the flow path to follow- as having a viscosity equal to or slightly less than
that of freshly mixed concrete. The mixture sprayed out gravel and was stacked with
trucks, rrailers, and 01her debris (1; 2!, statements by Kirby Koop and the Washington
brothers with Lucas; 2K, Supplemental Report).
Even so , such descriptions are not unique to this event. Not only is this a common
characteristic of flash floods in Nevada-like deserts (I), but it appears to be a common
characteristics of nearly all floods with a leading wall : the wall is partially sustained by
muck-initially mud, rocks, sticks, and trees, followed by houses, bridges, fences ,
automobiles, and other obstacles (see, for example, the Buffalo Creek dam failure). Since
nearly all catastrophic floods are densely sediment-laden, the action of this flood would
likely be imitated by most walls of water that plunged suddenly into a large, deep
reservoir.
Lake Mohave was narrow and the flood entered it at close to a 90 degree angle, so
the " length" of the lake was about 1 mile and the "width" was about 50 miles. Due to
sediments deposited in the lake, the shoreline was extended about 350 feet and gained 1.1
acres of land surface. The average estimated thickness of deposits between the pre-flood
and post-flood shorelines was 9ft (1 , p. 14, Table 4), suggesting the lake (Colorado
River) reached a depth of around 18 ft within 300 to 400 ft of the shore. This fits the
general slope at Nelson' s Landing of280 ft/mi (1 , p. 10 and fig. 12), which would drop
18 ft over a distance of 339ft.
Conditions under which a flood might be expected to significantly impact a lake ' s
surface for more than a few hundred feet would include a shallow lake or if a flood wave
was superimposed on a substantial existing flow that had previously conditioned the lake
to have a dense current in the direction the wave was traveling.

EVANS AND LOCKWOOD POND (also called SUMMERTIME LAKEl DAMS
Par: Hybarts Branch, Fayetteville, Cumberland County, N. Carolina, 1989 = 471
Par 1: vehicle occupants on the flooded portion of the S-lane Morganton Road
Lt = 2, Pt = 0.33

Wt

(Warning Time)
The occupants of the van were warned not to cross
the flooded Morganton Road (I ). Reasonable estimates of Wt are possible based
on circumstantial evidence. Evans dam was known to have overtopped for I hour,
followed by Lockwood Pond Dam being overtopped for 30 minutes. Clearly, both
dams were being watched. All four lakes in this series were visible from houses
dotting their shores; and being well within the city, they were surrounded by
heavily populated areas and busy, multilane highways. By 1989, there would have
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been regular traffic reports for the area, and news crews in helicopters could have
quickly captured a dam failure in this area on film. The failure of Evans Dam
could not have gone unnoticed, resulting in intense monitoring of the subsequent
dams in the series and rapid news flashes.
Since Lockwood Pond Dam overtopped by about I ft for 30 minutes prior
to failure, it is safe to assume that people were actively warned to avoid the
flooded Morganton Road crossing for a minimum of 0.5 hr (the period of steadystate flow) and perhaps as long as 1.5 hr. Being conservative, Wt 1 = 30 min.
Wt.,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
Apparently all cars were being warned to avoid this
stretch of Morganton Road. Although traffic reports probably issued warnings,
warnings appear to have been given to drivers as they arrived at the flood edge,
also , so Wtavg = 0.5*Wt = 15 min .
Par 1 indicates a common problem: How does one predict the number of people
who will ignore a clear warning when there is ample time to evacuate or avoid entering a
potential flood zone? In this case, the threatened population entered the hazardous region
moments before the wave arrived, despite warnings not to cross.

KANSAS CITY FLOODS
Par: greater metropolitan area, Kansas and Missouri, 1977 = 3000
Par 1: residents and shoppers not associated with their vehicles
Ll = 4, PI = 0.0015
The greater Kansas City metropolitan area experienced 2 record-breaking storms
within a 24-hr period. The first storm began about I :00 AM on September 12, 1977,
causing the small creeks and rivers that lace the area to crest around 6:00 AM with minor
flooding . The second storm began about 8:00PM that evening.
Since the ground was saturated, 90% of this storm immediately ran off. Nuisance
flooding began by 8:22, when basements and some streets got wet (5), and severe
flooding began by 9:00 PM. There was widespread flooding across I 0 counties, causing
2
damages in nearly every basin within a 1000 mi area, 60% of which was metropolitan.
The area was relatively level with gently rolling hills. Even in the hardest-hit
areas, the flood does not appear to have exceeded much above 7 ft. There are no reports
of a wall of water or a sudden surge, so the event was atypical of a sudden dam failure.
However, over the span of an hour or two, flood waters gained sufficient breadth, depth,
and strength to cause about $80 million in damages in the two hardest-hit basins and 25
people lost their lives (2).
Although atypical of catastrophic dam failures or floods through narrow canyons,
this event might be similar to the progressive, slow release of a large reservoir behind a
short dam above a large, metropolitan community that extends a long distance
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downstream with a very modest slope. It does not necessarily correspond to a wide flood
across a plain, however, since the size of this Par was a function of the number of streams
involved, not the distance from the channels.
The striking thing about this event was that none of the deaths were due to
drowning associated with a residential or commercial structure: 17 fatalities were drivers
or passengers of vehicles, 4 were pedestrians, and 4 were heart attacks, electrocutions, or
unknown causes (3). Two of the fatalities had been watching the flood waters (5).

Tpar (Threatened Population)
If flooding begins 40 minutes before it becomes
threatening, what fraction of Par evacuates during that time? How many people
remain out of curiosity or to try to salvage a vehicle or belongings? How many
refuse to abandon a vehicle while it still safe to wade, not knowing how high the
water will rise or the threat posed once the vehicle is mobilized? How bad does
flooding have to get before people are willing to go out in a downpour? A
reasonable guess at Tpar might be 5% or 10% of Par, after flooding became
dangerous but before it reached its peak, but there is no basis for estimating the
true value.
R

(Maximum Rise Rate)
Based on the hydrograph for Brush Creek at Main
(see Qp), the creek rose in linear fashion from a flow close to zero (the morning
peak had already dissipated) to a flow of 17,600 cfs in about 2.5 hours.

T

(Time Summary)
The second storm began about 8:00 at night,
flooding low streets and basements by 8:22PM and reaching levels of incipient
lethality by 9:00 PM.

We

(Warning Effectiveness)
The flood does not appear to have been viewed as
life-threatening, and for most it was probably not. Source 5 recounts a story
revealing people's attitudes and the fact that the flood rose slowly enough to
retreat before it:
Most people took action only when water reached them. At a restaurant
near Brush Creek, the managers and customers watched the water rise, and
some "toasted the flood ." When water reached the door of the restaurant,
the door was closed. When water broke windows, the building occupants
evacuated via the back door to a higher level. ...
There is evidence that a portion of the public heard the flash flood
watches and warnings, but paid no attention to them because they had
heard so many watches and warnings of all types before without
personally experiencing any disasterous consequences. (5, p. III-731)

The two critical factors that limited life loss in this event were: I) the flood rose
slowly, giving adequate sensory warnings for evacuation, and 2) the topography was not
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steep and the flooding spread away from the stream channels, so although it was deep
enough in places to require swimming, the currents were not uniformly lethal.

KELLY BARNES DAM FAlLURE (TOCCOA FALLS)
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS
Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977
Par= 140; L = 39; P = 0.28

There were several dam failures or flash floods in the early 20th and late l9 1h
centuries that impacted relatively small populations located in the I 00-year floodplain
along narrow river valleys with little or no warning. This event is similar in many ways,
providing an excellent opportunity to compare those early failures with this modem
failure. Since the fatality rates across the centuries were comparable, the rates of life loss
in this event help validate the use of events that occurred prior to the advent of modem
transportation, communication, etc., so long as housing damages and warning times are
careful defined .
Despite newspaper articles to the contrary, the dam had not been officially
inspected for safety (3, 9).
There was strong attenuation of Qp with distance, as was assumed for the Dale
Dyke Dame failure, and as is typical of catastrophic floods. Computed values are listed
under Qp.
See Tpar. Among the 4 hardest-hit subPar, 60 out of 93 survivors were injured.
This is one of the highest injury rates for any flood, indicating that the warning was
generally shorter than the necessary evacuation time and that Tpar"' Par.
The fact that the entire community impacted by this event was characterized by an
exceptionally strong Christian faith and a resulting strong sense of solidarity seems to
have dramatically reduced or eliminated the kinds of psychological debilitation seen in
other events with a high rate of community mortality (i.e., see Buffalo Creek). The
underlying burden of source 6 was to illustrate this perception by presenting every family
that experienced life loss and to present the impressions of those who came in contact
with them. First Lady Rosalynn Carter wrote the fo llowing introduction:
This is a story about faith. . . a personal testimony that there is inherent courage
within us to face the challenges of life and death.
l visited Toccoa Falls College on the day after the disaster that you will
read about in this book. l went because I hoped that l could comfort those who
had survived. Instead I was enveloped by hope and courage and love.
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The miracle of Toccoa Falls confirms what I believe. God loves us and
will help us always. He gives us unlimited strength when we trust in him. (6, p.
13)

KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE (TOCCOA FALLS)

Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Par2 : those in or adjacent to Residence Row, apart from Par4
L2 = 19, P2 = 0.66
Daniel Woerner, a young soccer player, reached shore as the flood rose around
him by jumping from one car roofto the next before the vehicles became mobile (6).
People do not always take the safest or shortest route to safety in a flood. As an
example, the Woemers ran downstream along the road that paralleled the river, never
o nce thinking to run laterally up the mountain to high ground (6, p. 61). This was,
however, unusual.
Ten-year-old Kirk Veer survived by opening the door to a truck that passed by
him underwater and climbing in to breath the bubble of air inside. Later, he reemerged to
rise to the surface ( 6, p. 67).

KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE <TOCCOA FALLS)

Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Par3 : Trailerville and closely-associated trailers across the river
LJ =IS, P3 = 0.16
Where the main channel curved, water-surface elevations on the left bank
exceeded those on the right bank by as much as 10 ft due to superelevation. Even in these
high velocity areas, however, there were calm waters in the backwaters of creek mouths
(8).
Mobile homes generally stayed intact as they floated away, unless they hit another
mobile home or other obstacle in the water. In that case, they disintegrated (6).

KELLY BARNES DAM FAILURE (TOCCOA FALLS>

Par: Par: Toccoa Falls College and Toccoa Creek, Georgia, 1977 = 140
Par4 : those known to be in automobiles when the flood hit
L4=2,P4=0.S
In the case of the firemen, their hip boots helped to pull them under (6). A similar
danger could apply to fishermen wearing waders.
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Par 1:

LAKESIDE DAM
Par: Greenville County, South Carolina, 1975 = 60
Lakeside Road near Piedmont where it crossed Lakeside Dam
La = 1, Pa = 0.33

Par (Population at Risk)
At 6:30AM, Avanell Myers, age 25, drove her
1964 Dodge through a misty rain to drop off her 3-year-old daughter, Melody
Ann, at her sisters on the way to work. At 6:40 , she hit her brakes, but the car
plunged off Lakeside Road into a 50-ft deep and I 00-ft wide hole where Lakeside
Dam used to be. She received internal injuries and injuries to her back, but she
managed to climb out of her car. She was, however, unable to free her daughter
sitting beside her, who drowned as floodwaters carried the car a short distance
downstream. It is unclear whether Melody Ann was washed free of the car or
whether the car eventually disappeared into the flood, but she did fight to get free
and it took rescuers 4 hours to find her body (I, 2).
Myers ' next-door neighbor, Ernest Bryant, age 42, left for work moments
after the accident. He said, " When I came around the curve, it looked misty,
dusky, not right. I hit my brakes and slid" (2). The front wheels of his truck
stopped part way over the edge of the broken pavement. When he got out, he saw
headlights glowing in the water below. He ran back home, told his wife to get
help, and drove his other car around the lake to barricade the street on the other
side. Leroy Bryant, age 16, went with his mother to help Avanell Myers who was
standing ankle-deep in water (I , 2).
The primary danger to Par 1 was the 50-ft plunge. After such a fall, even water
with little force had a high potential to cause drowning, especially to a young child.

LAKESIDE DAM
Par: Greenville County, South Carolina, 1975 = 60
Par2 : damaged houses in Greenville County
L2 = 0, P2 = 0.0
This case demonstrates the importance of defining Forcefulness more precisely.
Even though Fp = 0.47, Fd =I, and Wtavg = 0, no houses were destroyed, no lives were
lost, major damages were primarily non-structural damages from mud, and the maximum
depth was about 4 ft , sufficiently shallow in which to stand.
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LEE LAKE DAM FAILURE
Par: houses along East Lee Brook, Massachusettes, 1968 = 123
Par 1: dwellings that were destroyed
L, = 2, P, = 0.4

A 20-ft wide dam in the same location failed in 1886, killing 7 people (7).
If it had been any other time than Sunday, day or night, there would likely have
been significant life loss at the Clark-Eiken plant (7).

MILL RIVER DAM FAILURE

DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS
Par: 6 towns along 10 miles of the Mill River above its mouth, Massachusettes, 1874
Par= 1,700; L = 151; P = 0.089

The flood dynamics were comparable in the first 4 villages, killing virtually
everyone who was unable to reach high ground before their corresponding structures
were destroyed. However, since only a few minutes of warning were available to each
community as local Paul Reveres road ahead of the flood , this event provides an excellent
opportunity to estimate the evacuation rate over a small range of Wt and Wtavg· Due to
the detailed, house-by-house narrative that was common after 191h century floods, this
event also provides an excellent opportunity to compare life loss under varying degrees
of structural damage (Ls = H, M, or L).
Poor choices due to panic are uncommon during floods, but when panic occurs,
life loss can be increased dramatically . As an example, 12 people died while evacuating
the Nonotuck silk mill in Leeds, despite the fact that the flood barely grazed the building.
Thirteen people became confused about where to go, panicked, ran to cross the bridge on
the ri ver in hopes of reaching high ground on the other side, and were swept away .
People were similarly stupefied while evacuating the button factory in Leeds.
Here, the buildings were utterly destroyed, but during the evacuation, rather than running
for high ground, many ran into the city streets, either trying to reach their homes and their
families or simply trying to outrun the flood . According to the papers at the time, there
was general panick among this set of workers . As examples of behavior, Carrie Bonney,
Sarah Ryan, and her 4-year-old son Charles "had ample time to save themselves but were
co mpletely stupefied with terror, and, with a fixed stare, stood motionless" until swept to
their deaths. About half of those who died in Leeds were employees of the button factory
(3) .
It is significant that, due to panic among two sets of factory workers, roughly 75%
of the deaths in Leeds occurred among those least threatened by the flood . The workers in
the button factory were the first to be warned in this village and those in the silk mill
would scarcely have gotten wet had they not run downhill.
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As an example of panic during the Dale Dyke Dam failure, a man ignored the
protests of his family and jumped from an upper story window, causing himself fatal
injuries, even though flooding was extremely minor at his residence, posing no direct
threat to life.
Although Wt1 was twice as long as Wli;.s in Skinnerville, Wtavg 1 was
approximately half as long as Wtavg6.8 · The difference iay in the rate of warning
propagation and dissemination, which Wtavg considered but Wt neglects. Here, the
relative magnitudes of Wtavg are in line with Tpar/Par;, but the trend is counterintuitive
with respect to Wt.
Note that the evacuation time was increased substantially due to families being
separated during work hours. This was very, very significant in this event, contributing
up to 50% of the fatalities in Leeds.
A young boy described the flood as follows: A great mass of brush, trees, and
trash was rolling rapidly toward me. I have tried many times to describe how this
appeared; perhaps the best simile is that of hay rolling over and over as a hayrake moves
along the field, only this roll seemed twenty feet high, and the spears ofgrass in the
hayrake enlarged to limbs and trunks of trees mixed with boards and timbers; at this time
I saw no water. (3 , p. 97).
For two weeks, huge crowds came everyday to the area by road and train to see
the damage (3).

Par 1:

SHADYSIDE (WEGEE AND PIPE CREEKS) FLASH FLOODS
Par: Wegee and Pipe Creeks near Shadyside, Ohio, 1990 = 547
Wegee Creek (see also Wegee Creek Flash Flood of 1919 for a similar event)
Ll = ll, PI = 0.40

In a long, narrow river valley, when a wall of water progresses slower than people
can evacuate by car, there will typically be motorists or residents who detect the flood
through sensory clues and who flee downstream in an automobile. If they can gain
distance, these motorists may stop along the way to warn residents or to pick up family or
neighbors. At the least, they will typically turn on their lights, honk their horns, and
possibly shout quick warnings out their windows. Such warnings do not always
communicate the approaching danger effectively, but they generally prompt a curiosity
that alerts other residents to sensory clues or alternate forms of warning. This allows
many to run up a nearby hillside or to evacuate by automobile. Such actions generate a
chain reaction, as more vehicles evacuate, people warn their neighbors, or people notice
the swarm of unusual activity outside their windows. This contagious process can
mobilize the better part of a community, saving countless lives, even in the absence of
warnings by public officials. However, it is by nature much more random than a formal
evacuation plan implemented by trained public officials. As such, when many houses are
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rapidly destroyed, the chances that at least some people will remain ignorant of the
approaching danger and fall victim to the flood remains high. The Buffalo Creek Dam
Failure provides an excellent example of this process as it worked itself out over 15 miles
(see Wt, Wtavg, and Sc under the Buffalo Creek Dam Failure). Since there were flood
alerts but no formal flood warnings, this type of informal warning propagation
undoubtedly unfo lded in both Wegee and Pipe Creeks, as well.
Post-flood profile surveys did not indicate that debris dams necessarily formed,
but a photograph of a huge pile of boards behind a bridge indicates that such dams
formed at least partially (2). Such dams tend to counteract the natural attenuation of a
wall of water, renewing its height.

SAINT FRANCIS DAM FAILURE
Par: along San Francisquito Creek and Santa Clara River, California, 1928 = 2,250
Par 1: work camp at Powerhouse No.2
Ll = 81, PI= 0.99

Less than 2 years after completion, Saint Francis Dam in San Francisquito
Canyon, failed catastrophically and without warning just before midnight. The failure
released a wall of water ranging from 50- 120 ft high on numerous sleeping families in
small encampments along 9 miles of San Francisquito Creek. The flood then followed the
Santa Clara River 43.5 miles to the ocean, killing people in several small communities
along the way.
The flood is unique in U.S. history in terms of the depth of the flood and in terms
of the distance over which the flood remained highly lethal. Summaries from Source I
indicate that 2 days after the event, 53 were listed as Dead in Santa Paula, 19 in
Moorpark, 48 in Fillmore, 13 in Castaic, 53 in Newhall, 14 in Ventura, 89 in Edison
Camp, and 20 in the South Pacific section camp near Castaic. While these values would
have been revised over time, this demonstrates that the flood caused significant life loss
all the way to the ocean (Santa Paula, then Ventura), nearly 53 miles below the dam.
Also, in light of Par6, a significant percentage of these were motorists.
Life loss is a function of distance from the dam only as it is effected by warning
times, depths, velocities, widths, loss of shelter, or other variables that are themselves
indirect functions of distance from the dam. As the original wave increases in depth and
magnitude when Wtavg = 0, life loss can be extended indefinitely until the wave itself
looses lethal potential.
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STAY A DAM FAILURES
Par: Stava, Italy, 1985 = 300
Part: all structures destroyed in Stava
Lt = 270, Pt = 0.94

This was one of the deepest, most violent, and most lethal floods on record. There
were two mine-waste tailing dams high on the mountain. Photographs (2) reveal that they
were built one immediately behind the other, terrace-style on a 30-45 degree slope.
Such compact construction meant that the volume of the embankments was probably
equal to or greater than the volume of the water they impounded, resulting in a flood
dense with mud.
On July 19, 1985, the upper pond collapsed, immediately removing the lower
pond and releasing a 100-ft wall of water and mud that erased the village of Stava half a
mile below in 20 seconds, burying residents in mud and debris up to 18 ft deep. There
was no official warning, the sites of the previous buildings could not be identified from
the air or the ground, and life loss was virtually 100%. As Franco Ruggero described the
expanse of mud, wreckage and uprooted greenery that was once Stava, "This is Stava,
where you see nothing" (8). With the help of helicopters and dogs trained to sniff out
buried victims, 18 survivors out of nearly 300 victims were dug from the mud (4, 6, 8, 9,
10, etc.).
The lethality of a sudden wave of water can be enhanced by a large sediment load
that makes swimming difficult and which can literally bury victims alive, hiding them
from rescuers and preventing escape under their own power. In some respects, such
floods resemble mudslides. Nineteen victims were recovered alive from the mud at Stava,
but far more were unearthed after they had died.
Flash floods in dry regions (see Eldorado Canyon) and flood waves from earthen
embankment failures--especially embankments made from mine tailings (see Buffalo
Creek)-are often characterized by a dense concentration of suspended solids and even
preceded by a wall of mud. In the case of the Stava failure, the sediment concentrations
were extreme. Photographs of the reservoirs reveal that the volume of the two
embankments was probably comparable to the volume of the deep, 150ft by 300ft ponds
(2) , yet "the dam itself was flattened" (9) and "the dam was washed away completely"
(6). Source 3 indicates that the wave carried equivalent amounts of water and mud. It is
likely that much of this mud settled near its origin, but at Stava, a wave up to 130 ft (4, 5,
6) deep deposited sediment up to 18ft deep (3) as it quickly passed, then continued to
deposit mud for another 3 miles (5).
Rescue workers reported that some of the bodies had been dismembered (9).
Among the first 150 bodies recovered, 15 were so disfigured that it was impossible to tell
the victim ' s sex (10).
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"Civil Protection Minister Guiseppe Zamberlette recounted, 'The sites of the
hotels and houses had to be pointed out to me. It's as if they never existed' (3, p. 11).
Huge walls of water tend to create sufficient spray and dust and to be sufficiently
unexpected that they are not always easy to identify as they approach. In case after case,
walls of water are described as resembling fog, smoke or fire. In this case, one survivor
described the 100-ft wall of water as follows: "I saw the end of the world. I saw a white
wall coming toward me. I couldn't tell if it was fire or what" (9).
Here, like in many catastrophic floods, more than one distinct wave was observed.
A man called Pietro told reporters his brother had climbed a tree to escape the first wave,
but a second wave carried him away.

THOMPSON MILL DAM FAILURE
Par: Barren Creek below the Thompson Mill dam, Tennessee, 1916
Par 1: every house that was destroyed
L, = 24, P, = 0.59

= 78

On Aug. 3, 1916, Thompson's mill pond collapsed suddenly while most people
sle pt. The wall of water traveled 5 miles to the next creek, causing major damage or
destruction to most homes it touched . Life loss was limited to homes that were
completel y destroyed, being swept away before members could evacuate.
Although this event occurred in 1916, there is no reason to think L would be less
today if no warning were given, structures were within the floodplain, and the structures
sustained the same degree of damages. In other words, based on housing damages alone
and a very short Wtavg, modem failures would be no less lethal. However, current abilities
to monitor dams, alert communities, restrict floodplain development, and enforce stricter
building codes for multi-story residences might reduce L in a modem setting.

TIMBER LAKE DAM
Par: road crossings and a few trailers on Buffalo Creek, 1995 = 7
Par 1: bridge across Buffalo Creek on Highway U.S. 460

L1 = 1, P1 = 0.17
Par (Population at Risk)
Par for this event is obscured by the fact that dozens
or perhaps hundreds of watersheds were flooded throughout the state. Based on
the statistics in the Introductory Summary, the most expansive view of Par would
be roughly (I ,622 houses statewide that were destroyed or seriously damage +
????houses with minor damage)*(3 persons per house) > 5,000 and perhaps as
great as 30,000. This expansive view of Par would be consistent with the
approach taken by Dekay and McClelland in Allegheny County, Kansas City, or
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the Black Hills floods . Since we are looking only at flooding caused by the dam
failure on Buffalo Creek, Par was considerably smaller.
The main threat to life loss was posed to motorists, since there were 7 river
crossings in the first 6 or 7 miles downstream .

Pr

(Preparedness)

Although the Timberlake Homeowner's Association
had an emergency action plan for their dam (9), the members of Par were
completely unprepared for a dam failure: Pr = N.
See Fm for the role of human failure in dam failures .

Fm

(Failure Mode)
Although the spillway was repaired one year
previously, the dam failed when the only person with a key to the spillway first
waited too long to begin his trip to the dam and then got stranded on the way due
to flooding (6). Water flowed over the top of the dam, and then it burst quite
suddenly under the excessive pressure (12): Fm =Fe.

See Pr and Fm: an emergency action plan did not help save lives or prevent the
failure of the dam.

Ac

(Attendant Circumstances)

Flooding prior to failure blocked traffic from
crossing the bridge on U.S. 460, the location likely to have more traffic than all
the other bridges combined. In place of vehicle traffic, rescuers were present.
Even so, the rescuers had a better chance of floating to safety than would have
motorists trapped in their cars. In the case ofPar1, Ac1 = N.

Although the dam was declared inadequate in 1981 due to an undersized spillway,
it was "grandfathered in" after the spillway was improved (6). The dam was certified in
1991 , and an engineer' s review in September of 1994 rated the dam as in "good
condition/maintenance is better." The homeowners were praised for repairing the
spillway after winter storms (5).
Jonathon Wright was one of those stabilizing Martin's rope (the rescue worker
looking for occupants in the cars stranded on the bridge). While ducking under the rope,
prior to the dam failure, he fell and rescuers grabbed him before he was swept away. He
reflected, "I have a new respect for water. It was an incredible force. Words can't
describe it ... Your foot leaves the ground and you' re gone" (14).
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VAIONT DAM (ALSO SPELLED VAJONTl
DELINEATION OF PAR, LIFE LOSS, AND VARIABLES MORE EASILY
PRESENTED THROUGH A GLOBAL ANALYSIS
Par: communities along 12 miles of the Piave River and the shoreline behind Vaiont
Dam on the Vaiont River in Italy, 1963
Par= 3,000; L = 2,056; P = 0.69

Due to the unprecedented magnitude of the flood waves generated in this event,
the Yaiont disaster provides a unique opportunity to explore the impact of huge waves on
several different communities. While rather unique in terms of its cause, floods with
similar characteristics might be generated if a high concrete arch dam or a high concrete
gravity dam were to fail instantaneously, either through internal weaknesses or as a result
of an earthquake or explosion. Earthen or rock fill dams perched high on steep slopes or
which fail very rapidly have similar potential for destruction (i.e, see Stava Darn for a
much smaller reservoir that caused nearly comparable fatality rates).
Vaiont Dam is a double-curved, thin-arch, concrete dam that was the tallest dam
of its kind and the second-tallest dam in the world, rising 871ft. Following years of slow
movement, a massive portion ofMt. Toe plummeted into the reservoir, displacing a huge
quantity of water that washed over lakeside communities and plunged over the dam,
obliterating the towns below. As a testimony to the design of the dam, the dam itself did
not fail, even though the forces it experience far exceeded those for which it was
designed. The following summary is a composite drawn from sources 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Mt. Toe had a reputation for unstable slopes, causing some to question whether
the dam should be built. Nevertheless, construction on the dam began in 1956 and it was
completed in 1960, when the reservoir began filling. On Nov. 4, 1960, a crack on Mt. Toe
opened I ft wide and 8,000 ft long. Engineers placed markers on the slope to help
monitor its movements. Based on scale models of the dam and the entire basin, engineers
decided that the worst landslide they could envision would be safe to human life if the
lake were kept 75ft below the dam 's crest. It was believed that a wave no more than.S ft
deep could pass over the crest and the primary concerns applied to the communities
around the reservoir.
Due to demand for power, however, the reservoir was raised to within 41 ft of the
crest, beginning in April of 1963. As a result, another long crack appeared on the
mountain. From July to September there were small earth tremors and the lake water
"boi led up." Over the three years leading up to the failure, the average rate was 3/8 of an
inch per week. This rate increased dramatically during the three weeks leading up to the
failure. From Sept. 18- 24, the rate was 3/8 of an inch per day, from Sept. 25- Oct. I it
was 4-8 inches per day, from Oct. 2-7, it was 8-16 inches per day, Oct. 8 saw 16
inches and the slope moved 2.64 ft on Oct. 9 prior to the complete failure. Animals which
customarily grazed on the slope must have sensed the movement since they left the area
around October I.
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On September 26, Nino Biadene, the deputy director-general for technical
matters, ordered the valves to be opened so the water level could be reduced. Based on
previous calculations, this rate was limited so as not to unbalance the hydraulic pressures
in the slope. As the water drained, the rate of slippage increased, causing the many
scientists now monitoring the slope to install floodlights to help read the slope markers at
night.
By the end of September, engineers and geologists considered it highly probable
that there would be a landslide by the end of November. By October 8, engineeringgeo logists realized that the markers were moving in unison and that they involved a slide
area 5 times greater than previously thought. The morning of the 8th, the day before the
failure, Biadene and the mayor of Erto sent warning messages throughout the lakeside
communities. In the letters, the mayor urged residents to evacuate on government trucks
at 4:00PM. The power company supplied trucks to help remove families and livestock,
some people were removed by police helicopter, and the evacuation was enforced
through stationed police guards.
The evening of October 9, 1963 , was rainy and dark. Just before 9:00PM,
additional warnings were sent to select areas downstream and efforts were made to block
the roads, but there was not a strong sense of danger since very little water was expected
to fall over the dam. At I 0:40:41 PM, illuminated by the floodlights, 312 million (4) or
314 million (6) yd 3 of mostly rock fell offMt. Toe, completely filling the reservoir for
l.l miles immediately behind the dam to heights of 490ft (6) or 574ft (4) above the
reservoir service. Seismic records demonstrate that the entire slide quit moving in less
than 30 seconds, with most of it over within 14 seconds, after travelling up to 100 fps (68
mph). Seismographs detected this event across Europe at Rome, Trieste, Vienna, Basel,
Stuttgard, and Brussels; the readings indicated that an earthquake did not precede the
slide.
According to observers at Erto, the entire reservoir for 1.2 miles formed one, vast,
curving wave that hung in the air for l 0 seconds. Measurements would indicate that the
highest wave rose 460 ft above the reservoir, but the strong updraft created by the nearly
instantaneous displacement carried water and rocks still higher to at least 885 ft . This
blast of air blew out windows around the lake and a similar blast ahead of the wall of
water downstream would blow out windows in Longarone. The wind violently shook a
house 850 ft above the reservoir at Casso before lifting up the roof and hurtling in rocks,
spray, and rain for what seemed like 30 seconds to the owner. The man jumped from bed
and left the room just before the roof crushed his bed.
Part of the water backed up in the reservoir, engulfing the lowest portions of the
various lakeside villages. Two huge waves came together and crested at least 325 ft
above the top of the 871-ft dam, forcing the bulk of the displaced reservoir downstream.
The wave crest fell nearly a quarter of a vertical mile into the Vaiont River below. The
flood wave was 230ft high when it left the mouth of the Vaiont canyon 0.5 miles away
and crossed the Piave River at an orthogonal angle. The wall of water rushed across the

465
mile-wide Piave River valley and up the opposite slope. Along this trajectory, on the far
side of the valley, was the town of Longarone. The water smoothed the physical surface
of the valley and completely removing every structure in this town except for a few
fortunate buildings poised high on the mountain. Part of the flood backed far up the Piave
River, but most of it washed downstream, carving a swath a mile wide and utterly
destroying everything it touched for 4 or 5 miles. Due to the width of the valley, the flood
had attenuated significantly after the first few miles until it rose only 15 ft at Bell uno I 0
miles away. There, !50 houses were damaged that were not sufficiently protected by
dikes.
Based on the flood hydraulics, this wave probably carried more lethal force than
any other flood wave associated with a reservoir in recorded history. As such, it tended to
utterly destroy everything it touched in an ali-or-nothing rampage. The number of dead
outnumbered those who were injured by 40 to I. "Almost all persons who survived,
including those around the major impact areas, did not lose any of their material
possessions" (5 , p. 211 ).
Cultural. religious, organizational and political considerations hindered an
accurate accounting of the dead in this disaster. The following points were observed
during the investigation presented in source 5:
As of October 15, 6 days after the event, the official count of recovered bodies
was only l, I DO-roughly half of those who actually died and a little over 40%
of the semi-official estimates.
Fire officials did not begin to systematically move down the valley to look for
bodies below the impact point until the 5th day.
When the Italian Army concluded there were no more injured to rescue, they
decided not to uncover the dead with heavy equipment. Instead, they used
only shovels (5)-tools that could not possibly clear the debris over such a
broad region (2 miles wide with bodies found 60 miles downstream).
There was a great reluctance on the part of residents to help officials carry
dead bodies in any form. The task was eventually assigned exclusively to the
fire department.
The press consistently reported life-loss figures about 50% higher than the
official estimates.
The nature of the human-impact was poorly understood. Compared to more
than 2,000 fatalities, there were only 86 injured survivors. The reason was
simply that the wave had such lethal potential that it killed nearly everyone
that it touched. Those who were only injured were located farther from the
dam or in the mountain communities around the reservoir. In contrast to the
small number of injuries, several thousand hospital beds were prepared by
relief organizations. In contrast to the areas where assistance was most
needed, early efforts were concentrated at the heart of the disaster where few
remained who needed assistance. It took 36 hr to get a communication line to
the lakeside communities.
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In many cases, whole families died, along with their neighbors, so none
remained who could identify the bodies or name those who were still missing.
The area attracted large numbers of tourists, making it more difficult to
identify bodies or to compile a comprehensive list of the missing.
Officials were not highly motivated to recover bodies: "Many of the
authorities felt that the search for bodies should have been stopped much
earlier since any new corpse found would very likely be in a highly
deteriorated condition." Officials were complaining about corps that leaked or
lost limbs when touched by the third day after the failure. One high ranking
official complained: " It's absurd to dig down lOft of rocks and stones and
find a body so we can re-bury it in only 5 ft of dirt" (p. 209).
Beyond these observations should be added the fact that no source provided an
official estimate of missing persons. Unofficially, officials estimated that there were
another 200 to 300 persons missing, but such a vast range indicates any list was far from
accurate or complete, if it existed at all. Official lists of fatalities were strictly limited to
the number of recovered bodies (3). This practice suggests why the press routinely made
estimates 50% higher than officials, especially in the first days after the disaster.
The differences in the reported height of the dam (see H) reveal the difficulty in
obtaining even the most verifiable statistics. This kind of divergence is common for many
variables in a great many of failure events. What is especially frustrating is that sources
almost never report the basis for these statistics nor the fact that other sources have
reported different values.
Here are a few close calls at the extreme edge of the flood (3):
I. Twenty-two-year-old Maria Teresa Galli was closing her balcony shutters when the
house dissolved and she was swept away in a combination of wind and water. She
thought, "I'm flying ... walking ... swimming!" She survived after washing into the
ground floor of a 2-story home that survived.
2. A paralyzed man asked his wife what was going on. She stepped out on the balcony
to look and was snatched away by a passing edge of the wave before he even knew it
was a flood .
3. l n one family, a cousin opened the door to see what the roar was about, then slammed
it shut again crying, "We're all dead! " Water washed over them-presumably from
run-up--then retreated a moment later, leaving some with broken bones but only one
dead.
Apparently referring to a larger area than Longarone village-perhaps with
reference to Longarone commune-source 3 indicated: "Out of every six children in
Longarone proper, five died .. . . One boy said wonderingly, "When I walk past
grownups, they all look at me as if they want me" (3 , p. 66).
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The impact on the living can be far greater when many people die. In this event, I
woman survived from a family group of 55. In another family group of 36, only the
Giacinta Vignago and her grandson survived. The psychological impact was severe:
An unharmed woman with an unharmed baby in her arms, the only survivors of a
large family , wandered from soldier to reporter to priest, to anybody, begging in a
gentle voice, "Kill me . Please kiil me." (3 , p. 66)

Sc

(Sensory Clues)
Animals behaved strangely as the time for the
failure approached. The evening of the event, cattle and dogs demonstrated
unease. A caged canary fluttered violently until it strangled itself to death in the
bars of its cage. The owner turned to his wife and said, " Something's going to
happen! The darn . .. ?" (3 , p. 60).

VAIONT DAM (ALSO SPELLED VAJONTl
Par: the Piave River and behind the dam on the Vaiont River, Italy, 1963
Par5 : the lowest reaches of Casso, Pineda and San Martino
Ls = 158; Ps = l.O

=

3,000

The high fatality rate around the lake demonstrates the danger of defining Wt so
that it can begin before an actual failure . The sense of urgency before a failure is
sometimes missing, causing people to ignore or circumvent even coordinated and
officially enforced evacuation efforts.
The communities around the lake were evacuated the day before the disaster.
Casso was considered to be in danger of sliding into the reservoir. The mayor of Erto sent
warning notices throughout the region, urging residents to leave on ENEL-SADE trucks
that would come at 4:00PM on Oct. 8, the day before the failure. (ENEL-SADE was the
government-controlled power company that governed the darn following its
nationalization.) The carabinieri (national police) ordered evacuations of Casso, Erto, and
San Martino. Inhabitants were removed not only by truck but by helicopter, over their
protests. Some returned at night and had to be evacuated a second time on October 9th.
Patrols of I 0 carabinieri stayed behind to guard each village. Those who died (at least
! 58) ignored the evacuation warnings and eluded the police (3, 5).

VEGA DE TERA DAM
Par: Vega on the Tera River in the Zamora District of northwest Spain, 1959
Par 1: same as Par
L 1 = 153, P 1 = 0.37

=

415

Two of the few differences between this event and the Vaiont Darn failures were
the size of the wall of water and the brief warning time.
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The flood wave dispersed in the lake below Rivadelago, so the heavily populated
region down the next river valley along the Rio Duero was not damaged (I). It is possible
that over half of the population at Rivadelago survived because of the mitigating
influence of this lake. Compared to the 20-ft wall of water that washed through town, the
lake rose only 2 m (6 or 7 ft) where the flood entered. As at Eldorado Canyon, the lake
was probably fairly calm once people were washed beyond the immediate shoreline.

WOODWARD DAM (also called HILL DAM) FAILURE
Par: Flaoder's Brook, from dam to Hill Village, New Hampshire, 1918 = 165
Par 1: same as Par
Ll = 1, PI = 0.0061

The value of this case is that in the face of a flood wave that completely washed
away or destroyed almost every inhabitable structure it touched, a warning of about 20
minutes was sufficient to reduce the life loss to one person.

Bibliographies speci fic to each event
The majority of reports available to me for various failure events were
photocopied from files collected by Wayne Graham for the United States Bureau of
Reclamation or by other researchers. In many cases these source files contained
photocopies, fragments of sources, or typewritten copies that had incomplete reference
information. In other cases, the documents consisted of surveys, notes of conversations
with local officials, eyewitness testimonies, or staff summaries that were not formally
published. It was not uncommon for source documents to be rare, existing today only in
local libraries or private collections.
In light ofthe huge quantity of material collected and the number man hours
required to accumulate the original files, it would have been prohibitive to search for the
original documents or to obtain the missing reference information on each. Therefore, the
following bibliographies contain only the information that was available to me.
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These bibliographies are not comprehensive regarding the source material that
was available, but they are comprehensive with respect to the source material that was
found useful. In order to support fully the characterization of each event, it was necessary
to make thousands of references to these sources. To facilitate this, bibliographic sets
were numbered. This numbering has been preserved (and in some cases added) here.
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Steinbeck, L. (Feb. 1979). Flash Flood on the Big Thompson: A Case Study. Prepared
for the Workshop on State Management and Resource Scarcity and Natural Hazards,
Denver, Co lorado, April 24, 1978 .
3.

Foster, H. D. , (1980). Disaster Planning: The Preservation of Life and Property.
Sringer-Verlag, New York, Inc., p. 175-6.

4. Gruntfest, E. C. (Aug. 1977). What People Did During the Big Thompson Flood.
Working Paper 32, prepared for the Denver Urban Drainage and Flood Control
District.
5. Gruntfest, E. C., Downing, T. E., Wbite, G. F. (Feb. 1978). "Big Thompson Flood
Exposes Need for Better Flood Reaction System to Save Lives," Civil EngineeringASCE, p. 72-73.
6. Lane, F. W. (1986). The Violent Earth. Croom Helm Pub.
7. U.S. Department of Commerce and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (Nov. 1976). National Disaster Survey Report 76-1, Big Thompson
Canyon Flash Flood ofJuly 31-August I, 1976, A Report to the Administrator.
Rockville, Maryland.
8. U.S. Geological Survey Water Resources Division (1977). Flood, July 31-Augustl,
1976, Big Thompson River, Colorado; Meteorology, Hydrology, Big thompson River
and Cache La Poudre River Basins.
Black Hills Flash Flood and
Canyon Lake Dam Failure
I. Dekay, M. L. and McClelland, G. H. (1993). "Appendix, Additions and Changes to
the Bureau of Reclamation Data." An unpublished appendix to Dekay, M.L. and
McClelland, G. H. (1993) "Predicting Loss of Life in Cases of Dam Failure and Flash
Flood." Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No.2, p. 193-205.
2. Graham, W. J. (June, 1998). Estimating Loss of Life Due to Dam Failure . Prepared
for the United States Committee on Large Dams 1998 Lecture held Aug. I 0-14, 1998
in Buffalo, N .Y.
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3. Johnson, K. A. (Aug., 1973). "Meteorology and Hydrology of Rapid City Flood,"
Proceedings of the 21" Annual Hydraulics Division Specialty Conference . ASCE,
Bozeman, Montana, p. 451-455.
4. Mumford, J. A. Summary of Selected Dam Failures During Floods. Flood Section,
E&R Center (most likely internal departmental summary for the USBR).
5. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Aug. , 1972). Natural Disaster
Survey Report 72-1, Black Hills flood ofJune 9, 1972, A Report to the Administrator,
Rockville, Maryland.
6. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (May, 1977). Climatology of the
United States No. 60: Climate ofSouth Dakota.
7. Natural Disaster Institute (1976). Night of Terror: The Black Hills Flood ofJune 9,
1972. Rapid City, South Dakota. This is essentially a compilation of source
documents on the flood, so it includes an evolution of reports from different periods
following the flood. Unfortunately, many of these reports do not have a creation date
to help identify chronological updating, and the copy used here contains only the
most pertinent pages, so there is some risk of misattribution when intervening pages
are missing. Some pages appear to be the work of the editors, so they will be
referenced as source 7. Any ambiguous references in the text will include a page
number to help mitigate the risk of misattribution.
7.1 . Rapid City Chamber of Commerce
7.2. Hennies, T. L. (June 28, 1972) "Investigative Report to [Police] Division
Commander, Capt. Theunissen."
7.3. Northwest Bell "News Release."
7.4. "Rapid City Storm Damage Report Northwestern Bell Telephone Company."
7.5. "Black Hills Power and Light Company Flood Notes: St. John's Hospital."
7.6. Hydrology .. .
7.7. Childs, C. E. (Nov. 1972). "Body Dispatch, Body Identification, Missing and
Found Persons."
7.8. "Summary Report, State Civil Defense, the Rapid City Flood."
7.9. Division of Criminal Investigation (Aug. I 0, 1972). " Flood Disaster, June 9,
1972." After Action Report, Rapid City Flood, Attachment No.3 and "Report
of Death Certificates from the Office of the Clerk of Courts of Pennington
County, South Dakota."
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7. 10. South Dakota Department of Highways, " Summary of Damage Estimates for
1972 Rapid City Flood." After Action Report, Rapid City Flood, Attachment
No . 8.
7.11. State Radio Communications, "Report on Rapid City Flood, June 1972." After
Action Report, Rapid City Flood, Attachment No. 15.
7 . 12. An engineering report .
7. 13 . National Guard (Aug. 7, 1972). " Final (After Action) Report (RCS: ARNGB-

98).
7. 14. Fi sher, F. L. (ART, Bennet Clarkson Hospital) " Disaster plan Versus the Real
Disaster."
7. 15. Hewitt, C. (Sept. II , 1972; Bennet Clarkson Hospital).
7.16. Sieler, P. G. (Station Manager at KRSD Radio and TV).
7. 17. KIMM Gene Taylor Broadcasting Co. (Jan . 8, 1973).
7.18. " Emotional Disturbances: The Rapid City, South Dakota flood-June 9, 1972."
7. 19. A report on military losses, losses in general, and warnings.
7.20. A general report on the flood and losses.
8. Schwarz, F. K., Hughes, L. A., Hansen, E. M. , Petersen, M. S., and Kelly, D. B.
( 1975). The Black Hills-Rapid City Flood ofJune 9-10. 1972: A Description of the
Storm and Flood. Geological Survey Professional paper 877, U.S. Gov. printing
office , Washington, D.C.
9. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Dec. 1972). Flood Report, Cheyenne River Basin,
So uth Dakota Black Hills Area, Flood of9-IO June, 1972.
I 0. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of
the Interior.
Buffalo Creek Mine-Waste
Embankment Failures
I.

"The Pittston Mentality," (June II , 1972). Sunday Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West
Virginia, p. I Dff.

2. Brennan, B. (Aug. 17, 1980). Sunday Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West Virginia.
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3. Charleston Gazette, (Feb. 29, 1972). "Flood Remains Scraped Away, Toll Rises to
67," Charleston, West Virginia, p. A I.
4. Church, J. S. (Feb. 21 , 1997). "The Buffalo Creek disaster: Extent and Range of
Emotional and/or Behavioral Problems," Matewan Bullet, Matewan, West Virginia,
Vol. 3, No.8, p. 19.
5. Davies, W. E. (July, 1973). "Buffalo Creek Dam Disaster: Why It Happened," Civil
Engineering, ASCE, p. 69- 72.
6. Davies, W. E., Bailey J. F., and Kelly, D. B. (1972). West Virginia's Buffalo Creek
Flood: A Study of the Hydrology and Engineering Geology, Geological Survey
Circular 667, 32 pages.
7. Deitz, D. and Mowery, C. (1992). Buffalo Creek: Valley of Death. Mountain Memory
Books, south Charleston, West Virginia, 286 pages. NOTE: This book is a
compilation of transcripts from Senate hearings, hearing deposition summaries, and
personal accounts by those who survived the flood . In all, there are 50 separate
accounts and dozens of source documents and interviews from the hearings . As such,
the text's authors are really editors. Rather than listing the many true authors
separately, they are cited along with this text where relevant.
8. Disaster on Buffalo Creek: A Citizens' Report on Criminal Negligence in a West
Virginia Mining Community.
9. Engineering News-Record (Mar. 2, 1972). "A Dam In Name Only Blamed for
Disastrous Flood," p. I 0.
I 0. Erikson, K. T. (1976). Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the
Buffalo Creek Flood. Simon and Schuster, New York.
II. Erikson, K. T. (Feb. 21, 1997). " February 26, 1972," Matewan Bullet, Matewan, West
Virginia, Vol. 3, No.8, p. Iff. This is a reprint of Everything in Its Path.
12. Harmon, T. (May, 6, 1972). "5 Say Danger Was Known 6 Hours Before Flood,"
Charleston Daily Mail, Charleston, West Virginia.
13. Haught, 1. A. (April, 27, 1972). "Peril Known, Buffalo Mining Didn't Act,"
Charleston Gazette, Charleston, West Virginia.
14. Jeter, Rusty (Mar. 23, 1999). Personal conversation with Duane McClelland. Jeter
was working for the West Virginia National Guard at the time of the flood, and he
observed the length of the flooded valley as he assisted in searching for bodies,
cleaning up, and performing other post-disaster assistance. He arrived the day after
the event. At the time of this conversation, he was working for the United States
Army Corps of Engineers in Huntington, West Virginia.
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15 . Lambert, E. (Mon. , Feb. 28, 1972). "Concern of Man for His Brother Is Almost
Fatal ," Logan Banner, Logan, West Virginia.
15b. Lambert, E. (Mon., Feb. 28, 1972). " Many Saw It Happen," Logan Banner, Logan,
West Virginia.
16. Lambert, E. (Mon. , Feb. 28, 1972). "Family 200 Feet from Slag Pile Barely Escaped
Death in Flood," Logan Banner, Logan, West Virginia.
17. Matewan Bullet (Feb. 21, 1997). "February 26, 1972 Over 125 Lives Were Lost in
Logan County Dam Collapse at Buffalo Creek," Matewan, West Virginia, Vol. 3, No.

8, p. l.
18 . Runner, G. S. (1974). Hydrologic Investigations Atlas 54 7. United States Geological
Survey.
19. Runner, G. S. (May, 18, 81). Notes from personal conversation with Wayne Graham
of the USBR in Denver. Runner was with the United States Geological Survey and is
the author of the Hydrologic Investigations Atlas 54 7 (above).
20. Spence, B. (Feb. 21, 1997). "The Death of Buffalo Creek," Matewan Bullet,
Matewan, West Virginia, Vol. 3, No.8, p. 21.
21. Steele, G. (Mar. 12, 1972). "Dam Burst Witnesses Absent from Hearings," Sunday
Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West Virginia, p. I B.
22. United States Bureau of Reclamation. (1983). Dams and Public Safety. A Water
Resources Publication, U. S. Department of the Interior, p. 132- 133.
23 . Walton, M. (April 30, 1972). "Buffalo Firm on Way to Dam When It Burst,"
Charleston Gazette-Mail, Charleston, West Virginia.
24. Walton, M. (stamped July 3, 1972). "Every Time It Rains, It Scares Everyone to
Death," a staff article for a local paper-probably one of those in this bibliography
and probably published within 3 days of the date stamped.
25. Walton, M., (????). "After the Flood," larger work unknown, p. 78ff.
Dale Dyke Dam Failure
(Also Called Bradfield Dam)
I. Harrison, S. (MDCCCLXIV [ 1864 ]). A Complete History of the Great Flood at
Sheffield on March II & 12, 1864; Being a True and Original Narrative, from
Authenric Sources, Comprising Numerous Facts, Incidents, and Statistics Never
Before Published . published by Harrison, S., Sheffield Times, 13, Great Sutton
Street, England.
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1.1. Jackson (Chief Constable of Sheffield), " List of the Dead and Missing," p. 93-97.
This report includes the residence of each of the deceased, accurately locating
them by subPar in almost every case since it was late at night and even those who
worked at this hour did so close to home.
1.2 . Jackson (Chief Constable of Sheffield) is reportedly the author (p. !04), "The
Destruction of Property," p. 98- I 00. These are broken down by almost I 00
separate locations (building clusters, communities, streets, islands, etc.).
1.3. Rawlins, R. and Beardmore, N., "Mr, Rawlins Report on the Flood," p. I 0 I 109.
1.4. "The Inquest," p. II 0- 145.
1.5 . " Measures of Relief," p. 146- 160.
2. Lane, F. W. (1986) . The Violent Earth . Croom Helm Pub, p. 126 (a single sentence).
3. Milne, A. (1986). Floods hock: the Drowning of Planet Earth. Alan Sutton Pub., p.
123 .
4.

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of
the Interior, p. !28-132 .

Dry Creek Flash Flood
(Train Crossing Near Eden)
I . Morehead, J. (June 21, 1965). "Cloudburst, 'That Fiend of Foothills,' Spells disaster,"
The Denver Post.
Eastover Mining Company
Sludge Pond Dam
I. Anonymous, (Dec . 24, !981 ). "Pond Collapse Called Sabotage," Engineering News
Record, p. 5.
El Cajoncito Dyke Failure
!. Vazquez, T., Dominguez R., Fuentes 0 ., and Maza J. A. (1997). "Flash Floods in
Mexico," What We Have Learned Since the Big Thompson Flood, Proceedings of a
meeting Held in Fort collins, Colorado, July !3-15, 1996, available from the Natural
Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, p.
!53- 160. This source makes reference to the following articles:
1.1. Avante newspaper, La Paz, Baja California Sur (Oct. 7, 1976).
! .2. £1 Hera/do newspaper (Oct. 4, !976).
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1.3. £1 Hera/do newspaper (Oct. 6, 1976).
Eldorado Canyon Flash Flood
I. Glancy P. A. and Harmsen, L. (1975). A Hydrologic Assessment of the September 14,
1974, Flood in Eldorado Canyon, Nevada . United States Geological Survey Paper
930, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C.
2. National Park Service (NPS) file PWR-PGSO-LAME, Dam Incidents, EAP's. This
file was a loose compilation of official NPS source documents on the Eldorado
Canyon flash flood . Some documents were hand-written by witnesses and some were
official reports. The report is broken down below by tabulated section (A- K).
A. Summary
B. More summary
C. Fact sheet on fatalities, damages, debris deposits, recovery costs, and agencies

involved in the post-disaster operations.
D. NPS Supplementary Case/Incident Report-an operational record of the search,
cleanup, damage identification, and body recovery operations.
E. National Weather Service information (map and handwritten notes).
F. Photographs
G. NPS meetings and decisions
H. Briefing sheets and summary of newspaper articles, 9/14/74-10/4/74.
I.

Statements of witnesses regarding their observation of victims (combination of
typed and handwritten reports from eyewitnesses)

J. Statements of witnesses about the event in general
K. Miscellaneous NPS reports
Evans and Lockwood Pond Dams
(Lockwood Also Called Summertime Lake)
I. Evans and Lockwood Dams near Fayetteville, North Carolina. This is a short,
updated report sent to Wayne Graham by Lori Spragens of the Association of State
Dam Safety Officials, Inc., on August 13, 1993 .
2. Failure of Lockwood and Evans Dams, Cumberland County. This is a report sent to
Wayne Graham by James K. Leumas, dam safety engineer from the North Carolina
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Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources, Division of Land
Resources on Aug. l , 1994.
3. Storm Data and Unusual Weather Phenomena, (Sept. 1989), for North Carolina (state
31), Cumberland County.
4. United States Bureau of Reclamation, (April, 1939). Policy and Procedures for Dam
Safety Modification Decisionmaking [sic}, Denver.
5. Yates, S. (Sept. 16, 1990). "Damaged Darns Beach Homeowner's Dreams,"
Fayetteville Observer-Times, p. lA.
Hyokiri Darn
I . U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of

the Interior, p. 150.
Kansas City Floods
I . Dekay, M. L. and McClelland, G. H. (I 993). "Appendix, Additions and Changes to

the Bureau of Reclamation Data." An unpublished appendix to Dekay, M.L. and
McClelland, G. H. (1993) "Predicting Loss of Life in Cases of Darn Failure and Flash
Flood," Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No.2 , p. 193-205.
2. Hauth, L. D., Carswell, W. J. , and Chin, E. H., (1981). Floods in Kansas City,
Missouri and Kansas, September 12-13, 1977, Geological Survey Professional Paper
PIJ69, U.S .G.S . and NOAA, United States Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
3. Larson, L. W. and Vochatzer, J. M. , (May 2-3, 1978). "A Case Study: Kansas City
Flood September 12-13, 1977," Conference on Flash Floods: Hydrometeorological
Aspects of the American Meteorological Society with the American Geophysical
Union, May 2-3, 1978, Los Angeles, California, American Meteorological Society,
Boston, Massachusetts, p. 163-167.
4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, (Dec. 1977). Kansas City Flash
Flood of September 12-13, 1977, Natural Disaster Survey Report 77-2.
5. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, (April, 1989). Policy and Procedures for Dam Safety
Modification Decision Making, Interim Guidelines, Department of the Interior, p. 11173f.

Kelly Barnes Dam Failure
(Toccoa Falls)
I. Anonymous, (Nov. I 0, 1977). " Flood Victims," The Toccoa Record, Toccoa Falls, p.
unknown.
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2. Anonymous, (Nov. 21 , 1972). "A Dam Breaks in Georgia, and the Disaster
Dramatizes a National Problem," Time, p. 34.
3. Anonymous, (Nov. 8, 1977). "Congressman Says Dam at Toccoa Not Inspected,"
Rocky Mountain News, Denver, Colorado, p. II.
4. Anonymous, (Nov. 7, 1977). "Georgia Dant Bursts, Killing at Least 37," Rocky
Mountain News , Denver, Colorado, p. unknown.
5. Crisp, R. L., Fox, W. E., Robison, R. C., and Sauer, V. B. (Dec. 21, 1977). Report of
Failure of Kelly Barnes Dam and Findings, Federal Investigative Board, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 22 pgs.
6. Foster, K. N. and Mills, E. (1978). Dam Break in Georgia: Sadness and Joy at
Toccoa Falls, Horizon House Publishers, Portland, Oregon, !59 pgs.
7. Memorial sign at Toccoa Falls (photograph).
8. Sanders, Jr. , C. L. and Sauer, V. B. (1979). " Kelly Barnes Dam Flood of November 6,
1977, near Toccoa, Georgia," Hydrologic Investigations Atlas HA- 613, U.S.
Geological Survey, sheets I and 2.
9. Sowers, G. F., (Nov. 1977). "Dam Failure at Toccoa Falls," USC OLD News, p. 1316.
I 0. U.S. Geological Survey (1964). Topographic Quadrangle Map for Georgia, 7.5
minute series, N3430-W8315AMS 4353 Ill SE-series V845.

Lakeside Dam Failure
I. Brock, F. , (Sept. 18, 1975). "3-Year-Old Dies After Dam Breaks," Greenville

Piedmont, p. I, 7.
2. Higgins, B. (Sept. 19, 1975). "3-Year-Old Dies in Flood," probably the Greenville
Piedmont, p. l .
3.

Questionaire on Failures. Accidents, Damage During Construction, or Major
Repairs, to Dams and/or Reservoirs filled in by local dam safety officials.

4. Staff Report (Sept. 19, 1975). "Nine Families Homeless as Flood Cleanup Operations
Begin," Greenville Piedmont, p. 7.
Lee Lake Dam Failure
I. Anonymous (Mar. 28, 1968). " Dam Failure Cause Still Unknown.," Engineering
News-Record, p. 32.

486
2. Anonymous (Mar. 28, 1968). " Water Figures in Week of Failures-Lee, Mass.,"
Engineering News -Record, p. 17.
3. Anonymous, (Mar. 25, 1968). '" We'd Better Got Out ... '" The Boston Globe, p.
unknown.
4. Anonymous, (Mar. 27, 1968). "Lee Dam Collapse Laid to Errors," The Boston Globe,
p. unknown.

5. Anonymous, (Mar. 27, 1969). "75 families Evacuated During Lee Dam Vigil," The
Boston Globe, p. unknown.
6. Banner, E., (Mar. 25, 1968). "Woman Found Dead in Lee Flood Debris" The Boston
Globe, p. I , 12.
7. Murphy, J. V., (Mar. 31, 1968). " Lee Residents Say Dam Burst Timing Spared
Hundreds," The Boston Globe, p. unknown.
8. Yee, M.S., (Mar. 25 , 1968). "Lee Dam Bursts, I Dead, 2 Missing; 6 Houses Swept
Away; Motorists Feared Lost; 30-Acre Lake Lee Emptied," The Boston Globe, p. I,
8.
9. Yee, M. S., (Mar. 26, 1968). "Loss in Lee $15 Million," The Boston Globe, p.
unknown.
Mill River Dam Failure
I. Anonymous, (May 19, 1874). "The Most Terrible Disaster Ever Known in Hampshire
County . . . , "Hampshire Gazette and Northampton Courier, I large page.
2. Benson, L. W. ( 1954). "Floods and Disasters [Chp. 41]," The Northampton Book:
Chapters from 300 Years in the Life of a New England Town 1654 -1954, The
Tercentenary History Committee, Northampton, Massachusetts.
3. Sharpe, E. M. , (Spring 1995). Capitalism and Calamity; The Mill River Flood of
1874, dissertation, University of Delaware, 312+ pages.
4. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of
the Interior, p. 163-164.
5. Van Vorhis, J. (date?). The Look of Paradise; a Pictorial History of Northampton,
Massachusells, 1654-1984, p. 78-79.
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Shadyside Flash Floods
(Wegee and Pipe Creeks)
I . Dekay, M. L. and McClelland, G. H. (1993). "Appendix, Additions and Changes to
the Bureau of Reclamation Data." An unpublished appendix to Dekay, M.L. and
McClelland, G. H. (1993) "Predicting Loss of Life in Cases of Dam Failure and Flash
Flood," Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No . 2, p. 193-205. For this event, they cite the
following source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, (1988). County and City Data Book,
1988, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office.
2. National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce (Jan. 1991). Shadyside, Ohio, Flash Floods, June 14, 1990,
Natural Disaster Survey Report, Silver Springs, Maryland.
3. National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.

Department of Commerce (printed April 9, 1999). Web Page:
http://www.nws. noaa.govl erl ilnlshadyside. html.
4. Shindel, H. L. (1991). Flood ofJune 14 - 15, 1990, in Belmont, Jefferson, and
Harrison Counties, Ohio, with Emphasis on Pipe and Wegee Creek Basins Near
Shadyside, U.S. Geological Survey, Water-Resources Investigations Report 91-4147,
Columbus, Ohio.
5. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Dec. 1990). Envestigation of Flooding;
Reconnaissance Report; Wegee and Pipe Creeks, Belmont County, Ohio, a review
draft sent to the Ohio Department ofNatural Resources on Aug. 7, 1991 .
Saint Francis Dam Failure
I. Author unknown (Mar. 15, 1928). Los Angeles Examiner, p. unknown.
2. Bowers, N. A. (Mar. 22, 1928). "St. Francis Dam Catastrophe-A Great Foundation
Fai lure," Engineering New-Record, p. 466-72.
3. Clark C. (1982). Flood in the Planet Earth series, Time Life Books, Inc., Alexandria,
Virginia.
4. Outland, C. F. (1977). Man-Made Disaster: the Story of St. Francis Dam . .. , The
Arthur H. Clark Company, Glendale, California, 1977.
5. Rogers, J. D. (1995). " A Man, a Dam, and a Disaster: Mulholland and the St. Francis
Dam," The St. Francis Dam Disaster Revisited, Nunis, D. B. Jr. , and Johnson, C. N.
Eds. , Historical Society of Southern California, Los Angeles, and Ventura County
Museum of History and Art, Ventura, California, p. 1-110.
6. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, (1983). Dams and Public Safety. U.S. Department of
the Interior, p. 171-183.
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Stava Dam Failures
I. Anonymous, (July 21, 1985). " Dam Collapse Leaves Family Broken," The New York
Times, New York, New York, p. unknown.
2. Anonymous, (July 25, 1985). "More Than Rain at Fault in Failure," Engineering
News Record, McGraw-Hill, p. ! 0.
3. Anonymous, (Oct. 1985). "Dam Disaster in the Dolomites," Hazard Monthly, p. II.
4. Associated Press, (July 20, 1985). "220 Die as Dam Breaks in Italy," Rocky Mountain
News , Denver, Colorado, p. 3.
5. Associated Press, (July 20, 1985). "Dam Break Kills 220 in Italy," Rocky Mountain
News , Denver, Colorado, p. lA and 6A.
6. Associated Press, (July 20, 1985). "Italian Dam Bursts; 220 Die in Flood," The
Denver Post, Denver, Colorado, p. lA? and II A.
7. Associated Press, (July 21 , 1985). " 19 Survivors Rescued from Dam-Break Muck,"
The Denver Post, Denver, Colorado, p. SA.
8. Associated Press, (July 21, 1985). "Italy Searches for More Flood Victims, Answers,"
Rocky Mountain News , Denver, Colorado, p. 7B.
9. Dionne, E. J. Jr., (July 20, 1985). "At Least 80 Killed in a Dam Collapse in Northern
Italy; 200 or More May Be Dead .. ." The New York Times, New York, New York, p.
Iff.
I 0. Dionne, E. J. Jr., (July 21 , 1985). "Toll in Collapse ofltalian Dam Climbs to 150,"
The New York Times, New York, New York, p. Iff.
Thompson Mill Dam Failure
I. Anonymous, (Aug. 3, 1916). "Claiborne Cloudburst Kills 25. Eleven Dead Identified;
many Others Missing; Property Devastated," The Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville,
Tennessee, p. I.
2. Anonymous, (Aug. 3, 1916). "Dam Had Been Cause of Controversy in Courts.
Supreme Tribunal Held It Could Be Legally Retained, Says I. W. Moyers," The
Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. unknown.
3. Anonymous, (Aug. 3, 1916). " Death and Desolation in the Wake of the Flood," The
Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. 2.
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4. Anonymous, (Aug. 3, 1916). "Death List is Expected to Reach Thirty from Claiborne
Cloudburst; Seventeen Bodies Recovered and work of Rescue Is Continued," The
Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. unknown.
5. Anonymous, {Aug. 3, 1916). "Lives Lost and Property Ruin by Heavy Rains," The
Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. 2 (a continuation of source 6).
6. Anonymous, {Aug. 3, 1916). "Nine Inches of Rainfall in the Tazewell Destric [sic],"
The Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. l .
7. Anonymous, (Aug. 3, 1916). "Relief Expedition to Assist Stricken People," The
Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. 2.
8. Anonymous, {Aug. 4, 1916). "Claiborne's Death List Standing at 25. Family of Eight
Missing and They May Eventually Be Added to List of Dead. Desolate Picture Is
Reveals in Little Valley Swept Bare by Disastrous High Waters," The Knoxville
Se ntinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. l.
9. Anonymous, {Aug. 4, 1916). " Desolation and Need in Flood Section Pictured.
Eyewitness Tells of Horror and Suffering Following Claiborne Flood," The Knoxville
Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. unknown.
l 0. Anonymous, (Aug. 4, 1916). "Middlesboro Estimates Death List 28," The Knoxville
Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. unknown.
11 . Anonymous, (Aug. 5, 1916). "Flood Dead in Claiborne Is 24, 4 Missing," The
Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. unknown.
12. Anonymous, {Aug. 8, 1916). "Claiborne Flood Tide Is Repeated," The Knoxville
Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. unknown.
13. Anonymous, (Jan. 23, 1938). "24 Lives Are Lost in Barren Creek," The Claiborne
Progress, Knoxville, Tennessee, reprinted from same paper, Aug. 1916 edition, p. 1f.
14. Falconnier, J. W. , (Aug. 7, 1916). "Harrowing Stories of Flood Tide; Claiborne
Horror Is Indescribable; Survivor Tells of Combat with Raging Torrent," The
Knoxville Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee, p. 5ff.
Timber Lake Dam
1. Anonymous wire reports, (June 24, 1995). "Rains Smack Folks on both Sides of
Hills," The News & Advance, Lynchburg, Virginia, p. unknown.
2. Anonymous, (June 24, 1995). "Dam Bursts, Drowns Rescue Worker" and "One Man
Dead After Dam Fails," Washington Post, p. unknown.
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3. Associated Press and Staff Reports, (July 4, 199S). "Disaster Declaration Clears Way
for Federal Relief; Attention Shifts to Aid for Flood Victims," The News & Advance,
Lynchburg, Virginia, p. AI , A8.
4. Associated Press, (June 29, 199S). " High River Swamps Towns; Mudslides Close
Highways," The News & Advance, Lynchburg, Virginia, p. AI, A8.
S. Associated Press, (June 29, 199S). "Report: Darn in 'Good Condition' Last year;
Engineer' s Review Praised Owners of Timber Lake Darn for Improvements," The
News & Advance, Lynchburg, Virginia, p. unknown.
6. Coleman, S., (June 24, 199S). "Heavy Rains Proved Too Much for Darn," The News
& Advance, Lynchburg, Virginia, p. AI, A8.
7. Curley D., (June 2S, 199S). "Missing Woman's Car Found; Officials Fear the Worst
But Keep Hoping," The News & Advance, Lynchburg, Virginia, p. AI , A4.
8. Daffron, M., (July 6, 199S). "Area Farmers Escaped Worst ofFload Damage; Fences,
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493
Appendix C
Summary Table of Assigned Variable Values

Appendix C consists of a master table of the coded characterizations of every
subPar in the unpublished version of Appendix B. The greatly abbreviated, published
version of Appendix B, above, describes and illustrates the nature of the data underlyi ng
the table. The meaning of the codes is defined at length in Chapter V and summarized in
appendix D. The table itself, Table C. l , is located in a pocket at the back of this report.
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Appendix D
Tools for Researchers

Alphabetical list of variables

Table D.!. An alphabetical list of variables

A
Ac
Ah
B
Bpar
Bt
Ch
Coh
Coz
Cozd
Cz
Czd
D
Dd
De
Det
Dt
Dv
E
Ef
Eparj

FS
Fd
Fit
Fm
Fp
Fpar
Ft
Gf
H
Hp
L

Variables
La
Lcoz
Lcz
Ldr
Le
Lh
Lidr
Lin
Linf
Ln
Lnf
Location- Deaths
Lpcz
Ls
Lsw
Lsz

M
Ml
0
p
Par
Par;
Pcz
Pczd
Pr
Prcoz
Prcz
Prpcz
Prsz
Psh
Pt
Ptpar

Qb
Qp
R
Ret
Rf

Rr
Sc
Schvq
Sh
Sz
Szd
T
Td
Tpar
Ts
Tw
Ty

v
Vol

w
We
Wt
Wtavg
Wte
Wti
Wtpf
Wtpof
Ww
Wwr
Zd
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Summary reference table
Table 0 .2 lists each variable alphabetically, followed by its name, categorical
breakdown, tips for accurate coding, and appropriate units in both the SI and English
systems. The letter p represents the unit persons, living or dead; bldg represents
buildings, and u indicates that a variable is unitless. Under coding, wrt is shorthand for
with respect to. Ordinal variables are coded according to a subset of the following

sequence: N = ~one, L = !,ow, M =Medium or Moderate, H =High, V = Y:ery High,
and E = ];;xceptionally High.

Explanation of variables
During event characterization, it was invaluable to have a concise, single-spaced
summary of the definitions found in Chapter V, with tips on how to code the variables
consistently. For the benefit of future reserachers, this working document has been
reproduced here in its original form . Phrases have been left as incomplete sentences and
it has not been reformated to fit the style in the body of the thesis because these changes
would mi srepresent its historic form , reduce its value as a concise working reference, and
reduce its usefulness as a research aidthe only reasons for its inclusion in this appendix.

Populations at risk
Population at Risk (Par)
Historic: "The number of people that were evacuated or the number of people that
would have been evacuated had there been any warning." (Dekay and McClelland, 1993,
p.l96). Or those likely to have encountered flooding that could have posed some
reasonable threat.
1. Cutoff at extreme edge of flooding: canyon or little flow dispersal. V > 3 fps
at 1 ft; lateral slope> 0.0 1.
2. Cutoff at 1.5 ft of flooding: leisurely flood/backwater. V < 0.5 fps at 2ft.
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Table 0.2. Alphabetical reference table of variables (see Chapter V for detailed
descriptions)

Symbol
A

Name

Ac

Area of Final Breach
Attendant Circumstances

Ah

Aerated Haven

B

Bpar

Breadth of the Dam
Basis of Par

Bt

Building Types (by%)

Ch

Chance Haven

Coh
Coz

Compromised Haven
Compromised Zone

Cozd

Compromised Zone Density

Cz

Chance Zone

Coding
Measures orthogonal to final flow
Wrt the IMPACT Ac had on Wt~E, R, L, or other variables: N, L,
M,H
Pocket of protection when
building nearly destroyed.
Top width
Is Par based on Pre-evacuation or
Post-evacuation, regarding a
preliminary wave prior to failure?
N None; T - tents; Sh -shacks
or flimsy buildings; M = mobile
homes or RV s; R = residential
homes; C = commercial; H =
commercial over I story; Lm =
hospitals, nursing homes, elem.
sc hools, or other buildings with
less mobile populations.
Tenuous refuges reached by
chance.
Psh and Sh.
Roughly central 80% of Coh in
terms of severity of flooding.
Number from Tpar, likely to be in
a compromised zone.
All Ch, the open flood, and

Sl
units
m"

Eng.
units
ft

u

u

m
u

ft

bldg

bldg

u

u

u
u

u
u

u

u

u

u

u

u

m

ft

bldg

bldg

-U-- --u-

u

underwater.

Czd

Chance Zone Density

Number from Tpar, likely to be in
a chance zone.

D

Depth

Dd

Damage and Destruction

Dev

Development (Degree of
Urbanization)
Delectability

Det

Deepest location potentially
encountered by a member of Pari
List# of buildings destroyed,
severely damaged, and slightly
damaged by category.
N - none, L - small town, M suburban, H =highly urbanized.
N- no signs of trouble; Lmonitor wouldn't anticipate
failure; M =alter operation, but
don't expect failure this year; H =
failure not unlikely if no action; V
=failure imminent and not readily
avoided.

u

u

u

u
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Table 0.2. Continued

Name

Symbol
Dt

Dam Type

Dv

Destructive Ve locity

E

Ease of Evacuation avg.
surplus evacuation time
Evacuation Nonsuccess Factor
Evacuation subPar
Forcefulness coded using five

Ef
Epar;
Fs

even increments

Fd

Forcefu lness coded
dichotomously

Fit

Flood Type

Fm

Fai lure Mode

Coding
Description: N none, E
earthen, R ~ rock fill, M ~
masonry, C =concrete gravity, A
~ concrete gravity arch.
(Qp • Qb)/W. Dv can be Dvmi"'
Dvmax• or Dvavg depending on the
choice ofW.
See equation under the definition.
Ef

Tpar/ Pari.

L - (0- 0.2), M- (0.2- 0.4), H (0.4- 0.6), V ~ (0.6- 0.8), E ~
(0.8. 1.0)
Based on a qualitative guess at
Fp, Fd is coded as 0 or I (I for Fp
"0.2)
D - dam failure, Dy - dyke
fa ilure, Ff ~ flas h flood, F ~
flood, Ts = tsunami or tidal wave,
S = sea surge, H = hurricane
(deaths not lim ited to fl ood
conseq uences), Gb ~g lacier
burst, 0 ~othe r (such as water
tower or storage tank bursting)
I internal: lp piping, Ie
em bankment failure: sliding,
overturning, foundation
fai lure, or blowout with
normal water levels;
F = flooding: F = flooding apart
from dam failure, Ff ~ flash
flood, Ff/D = dam failure
contributes little volume to a
flash flood, Fo = overtopping
or spillway washout; Fe~
embankment failure:
sl ump ing, sliding, overturning,
fou ndation failure, or blowout
during overtopping or higherthan·design reservoir
elevations;
S ~se ismic failure: Sp = piping
or other gradual development
following an earthquake, Se =
a rapid em bankment failure
during or shortly after an
earthquake;

SI
units
u

Eng.
units
u

m /s

ft /s

min

min

u
p
u

u
p
u

u

u

u

u

u

u
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Table 0.2. Continued

Symbol

Name

Coding
gate failure not leading to
dam breach;
L ~ landslide not leading to dam
breach.
Fp (residences seriously
damaged or destroyed)/( all
residences with any damage)
Fpar - (habitable structures
severely damaged or
destroyed)/(Par;); habitable means
residences, not businesses
Quantify each, when possible:
N = none; C =campers, riverside
recreationists; W = waders and
swimmers; 8 = boaters and
rafters; L = boaters or swimmers
on a lake; E ~employees working
at the dam; Af ~ auto-related; Aa
= auto accident; D = general
drowning in town; Sf= slope
failure at dam; 0 = other nondrowning; U ~Unknown mix.
Variance in risk 7 spatial
homogeneity wrt the river: L,M,

SI
units

Eng.
units

u

u

bldg/p

bldg/p

u

u

u

u

m
m

ft
ft

p
p
p

p
p
p

p
p
p
p
p

p
p
p
p
p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p
u

p

G

Fp

Forcefulness coded as a
proportiOn

Fpar

Forcefulness defined in tenns
of all habitable structures and
Pari

Ft

Fatality Type

Gf

Goodness of Fit

H,V
H
Hp

Height of the Dam
Height of Reservoi r Pool at
Failure

L
La
Lcoz
Lcz
Ldr
Le
Lh
Lidr
Lin
Linr
Ln
Lnf
Locations
of Deaths

Life Loss (Loss of Life, LOL)
Adjusted Life Loss
Life Loss in the Compromised
Zone
Life Loss in the Chance Zone
Life Loss Given Dam Removal
Expected Life Loss

Historic Life Loss
Incremental Life Loss (using
Ldr)
Incremental Life Loss (using
Ln)
Incremental Life Loss (using
Ldf)
Natural Channel Life Loss or
Never a Dam Life Loss
No Failure Life Loss
Locations of deaths

Measured in relation to the height
of the dam, regardless of siltation.

u
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Table 0.2. Continued

Symbol
Lpcz
Ls

Name

Coding

Life Loss in the Chance Zone
Loss of Shelter

Weighted Loss of Shelter

Lsw
Lsz

Life Loss in the Safe Zone

M

Magnitude of Loading

Ml
0

Outdoors

p
Par
Par;
Pcz

Magnitude of Local Loading

Proportion of Life Loss
Population at Risk
Subpopulation at Risk
Pseudo-Chance Zones

Pseudo-Chance Zone Density

Pr

Preparedness

Prcoz

Psh

Proportion of Lives Lost
Compromised Zone
Proportion of Lives Lost
Chance Zone
Proportion of Lives Lost
pseudo-Chance Zone
Proportion of Lives Lost
Safe Zone
Pseudo-Safe Haven

Pt

Par Type

Prpcz
Prsz

Description and code: N - none
(s unny-day failure), L (expected
every few years), M (once every
5-15 years), H (once every 15-50
years), V (once every 50-100
years), E (rarerthan 11100 years)
Same as M.
I - indoors (winter, work hours,
night); 0 ~o utdoors (summer,
recreationists, campgrounds)
P;- L;!Par;

Pczd

Prcz

Percent of buildings in each
category: L ~ minor structural
damage with flooding below I ft
of first floor ceiling; M ~ major
structural damage; H ~ complete
submergence or destruction; Mh
~ uncertain whether M or H.
See Chapter V

Buildings for which it is uncertain
whether will be destroyed, float
away, or experience very major
damage.
Number from Tpar; likely to be in
a pseudo-chance zone.
N - unaware; L - aware, but
don't think serious; M ~a lert for
or experienced in evacuation; H =
expecting to evacuate and steps

SI
units
p
bldg

Eng.
units
p
bldg

u
p
varies

u
p
varies

varies
u

varies
u

u
p
p
u

u
p
p
u

u

u

u

u

in the

u

u

in the

u

u

in the

u

u

in the

u

u

u

u

u

u

A safe haven that drifts down
stream less than 300 ft.
The surroundings of a Pari,
tagged with percents when mixed.
C =campers, including
recreationists near the river.

500
Table 0.2. Continued

Symbol

Ptpar
Qb
Qp
R

Name

Proportion of the Threatened
Populati on
Bankfull Volumetric Flow Rate
Peak Volumetric Flow Rate
Maximum Rise Rate (of the
flood wave)

Ret

Representative Evacuation
Time

Rf

Rate of Failure

Rr

Rescue Resources

Se

Sensory Clues

Sehvq

Striking Characteristics and
Valuable Quotations

Sh
Sz

Safe Haven

Szd

Safe Zone Density

T

Summary of mo/day/yr, hr, and
day of week
Time of Day

Td

Safe Zone

Coding
W - wade fishermen, swimmers,
etc. B ~ boaters and rafters. L ~
boaters and swimmers on a lake.
E ~ employees working at the
dam. Note, it may be desirable to
reclassif'y this Pt as D, W, or
another overlapping category. Af
~ motorists. T ~ those on trains.
D ~ in or near buildings and
general drowning deaths in town.
U = unknown mix. Whenever
possible, subPar should be broken
down into pure Pt I 00%.
Proportion of the Threatened
Population that dies

Quantif'y numerically or: M moderate (out walk), H ~rapid
(need rapid action), V ~ very
rapid (hard or impossible to
outpace), Ww ~ wall of water
(quantif'y with Ww).
Code as 2, 15, 45, 120, 240 or
more precisely if data permits
(see chart above).
Not truly a rate: the minutes for
the most rapid 80% of the breach.
N - none; L - limited (hand
tools); M ~ modem (urban, post
1950); H ~high (abundant extras)
Wt based on sensory detection of
the flood.
Insightful narrative, quotations,
and a summary of distinctions.
Wrt the overall fit of the variable
set: L ~ low, H ~high.
A refuge where death is rare.
Safe havens and mildly
compromised havens
Number from Tpar; likely to be in
a safe zone.
List dates & times, narrative.
N- night (most people are
asleep; II :30 PM-6:00AM);

SI
units

Eng.
units

u

u

ems
ems
m/min

efs
efs
ftlmin

min

min

min

min

u

u

min

min

u

u

u
u

u
u

u

u

u

u

u

u
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Table 0.2. Continued

Symbol

Name

Threatened Population

Tpar
Ts

Time of Season

Tw

Time of Week

Ty

Time of Year (month)
Peak Velocity at Par;
Volume of Release
Maximum Flood Width at Par;

v
Vol

w

Coding
S - separation (most families are
separated by school or work; 8:00
AM - 6:00 PM on weekdays); H
~home (most families are
together; 6:00- 8:00AM, 6:00II :30 PM; weekends, holidays, or
Par1 dominated by recreationists
and day hours).
Par present when flood arrives.
S- summer (May- October),
W ~w inter (November- April)
Wend weekend; Wdayweekday
l - Jan. ; 12 - Dec.
May be wave travel speed.

W - Wmv.· Alternatively, one can

SI
units

Eng.
units

p
u

p
u

u

u

u
m/s
m
m

u
ft/s
acre-ft
ft

u

u

min
min
min

min
min
min

min
min
min
m
ft
p

min
min
min

use Wtmi 11 or Wtav

We

Warning Effectiveness

Wt
Wtavg
Wte

Warning Time
Average Warning Time

Wt;
Wtpf
Wtpof
Ww
Wwr
Zd

Individual Escape Time or
Warning Time for Escape
Individual Warning Time
Pre-failure Wt
Post-failue Wt

N (no official warning), L (<50%
get and believe timely warning),
M (up to 90% get and believe
timely warning), H (nearly
complete evacuation before flood
wave arrives).

Not used directly.
Not used directly.
Can begin prior to failure(~ Wt)
Does not begin until failure.

Wall of Water (Height of)

lf"O", means no wall, so useR.

Wall of Water w ith D via R
Zone Density(ies)

See chapter V.
Number of people in a zone

ft
ft
p
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3.
extremes.

Cutoff at a convenient contour between 6 and 12 inches: Between the

Life Loss (L)
Deaths of any kind and at any location that can be attributed directly or indirectly
to flooding, without regard to whether or not the deaths would have occurred had the dam
not failed under the same initiating hydrologic conditions. 'When victims remain on the
list of missing in the most recent reports, they are included in L.
Threatened Population (Tpar)
All those present when the flood wave arrives.
SubPar (ParJ
Subdivided whenever there is a clear change in a major variable.
Proportion of Life Loss (P)
P = L!Par and P; = L;/Par;.
Natural Channel [Never a Dam} Life Loss (Ln)
Expected L given that the dam had never been built. Assumes less flood plain
development and different recreational patterns. Ln is counter-historical, except in the
case of flash floods on undarnmed rivers.
Life Loss Given Dam Removal (Ldr)
Assumes the dam is removed, sediment issues are resolved, and the channel
through the reservoir is restored, using the then-current development and geomorphology.
No Failure Life Loss (Lnj)
Had the dam not failed given the same initiating conditions.
Locations of Deaths
Where an individual was overcome, in contrast to where found . Associates death
with a Par;, or more detail when available.
Fatality Type (Ft)
Ideally, each symbol accompanied by an associated number of deaths.
N
none .
C
campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river.
W
those in the river when the flood wave appears: wade fishermen,
swimmers, rescue workers, etc.
B
those on the river when the flood wave appears: boaters and rafters.
L
those in or on a lake when the flood wave appears: boaters and swimmers.
E
employees of the dam who are at the dam for construction, repairs,
monitoring, failure prevention, etc.
Af = automobile occupants killed by flood waters.
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Aa = those killed in an automobile accident during evacuation.
D
general drowning deaths in town (trapped in a building or washed away)
apart from the previous categories.
Sf
slope fai lure at or very near the dam itself.
0
other= non-drowning deaths other than auto-related or slope failure near
the dam: mudslide associated with the flooding and not the dam failure
itself, suicide, heart-attack, exposure, etc.
U = unknown mix.

Flood Characteristics
Flood Type (Fit)
D = dam failure .
Dy = failure of a dyke, thus being similar in some respects to a long dam.
Ff
a flash flood, meaning the flood wave is sudden and fast rising or a wall of
water.
F
flood , meaning a widespread event that can't be described according to the
other categories.
Ts
a tsunami or tidal wave .
S
a sea surge.
H
flooding caused by a hurricane and distinguished from F or Ff in that the
deaths are not necessarily a result of the flooding.
Gb = a glacier burst.
0 = other types of flooding difficult to categorize, such as when a storage tank
or water tower bursts.
Peak velocity a/ Par; (T1
Approaching flood wave or post-failure flood routing.
Maximum depth a/ Par; (D)
Estimated using high water marks or the height of a wall of water (variable Ww).
The datum should be the lowest point at which Par; might have originally occupied.
Peak Volume/ric Flow Rate (Qp)
BankfUll Volumetric Flow Rate (Qb)
Maximum Width of Floodwaters a/ Par; (W)
W = Wmax · Alternatively, one can use Wtmin or Wtavg.
Destructive Velocity (Dv)
Dv =(Discharge above bankfull)/(width of flooded region)= (Qpeak- Qbankfuu)/width.
Not (maximum depth)*(velocity).
Should use maximum values, even if at different times.
Dv can be Dvmin. Dvmax. or Dvavg depending on the choice of W.
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Maximum Rise Rate (R)

Steepest portion of the rising edge of the outflow hydrograph (cfs/min):
M
moderate (can walk away from the flood waters if no lingering).
H
high = rapid (requires immediate, rapid action to avoid being trapped).
V
very rapid (difficult or impossible to outpace waters, even with immediate
evacuation on foot or by automobile).
Ww =wall of water (indicates the rise rate is instantaneous and can only be
quantified by measuring the height of the wall of water--variable Ww).
"Wall of Water" [height of) (Ww)

Most credible estimates should be averaged . Ww = 0 when not a wall.
Damage and Destruction (Dd)

The number of structures each destroyed, seriously damaged and damaged to any
extent, by category of structure and degree of damage.
Forcefulness (Fp, Fd, F5, Fpar):
(Fp) = (# residences destroyed or seriously damaged)/( all residences experiencing

any damage).
(Fd) = I whenever Fp?. 0.2. subjective; includes the destruction that would have

been likely if residences were physically present.
L = low (0 - 0.2).
M = medium (0.2- 0.4).
H = high (0.4 - 0.6).
V =very high (0.6- 0.8).
E = exceptionally high, meaning there was nearly complete destruction
(0.8- 1.0).
(Fpar) = (# habitable structures [D.Q! businesses] of any type, damaged severely or
destroyed)/(Par;).
(F5)

Height of the Reservoir Pool at Failure (Hp)

Given overtopping, the depth of overtopping is added to the height of the dam. In
the absence of overtopping, the distance to the reservoir pool below the dam crest is
subtracted from the height of the dam.
Height of the dam (H)

Ideally, this is measured from the streambed.
Breadth of the Dam (B)

This is the crest length, not the thickness . Hand B describe the dam prior to
failure.
Vo lume of Release (Vol)

Does not include additional inflows into the reservoir after failure.
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Rate of Failure (Rj)
The "most rapid" 80% of the failure (in minutes).
To help standardize eye-witness accounts:
nearly instantaneous (i.e., "as an explosion", "quicker than you can write these
words", etc.)= 0.5 minutes.
very rapid erosion or slope fai lure short of near-instantaneous = 5 min.
more or less rapidly as evidence supports.
Area of Final Breach (A)
Spatial and Temporal Relationships
Between Par; and the Flood

Summary of month/day/year, hour, and day of the week (J)
A complete record. T is broken out below.
Time of Day (Jd)
N
night (most people are asleep; 11 :30 PM - 6:00 AM).
S
separation (most families are separated by school or work; 8:00AM- 6:00
PM on weekdays).
H
home (most families are together; 6:00- 8:00AM, 6:00- 11:30 PM;
weekends, holidays, or Pari dominated by recreationists during non-night
hours).
Time of the Week (Jw)
Wend= weekend.
Wday =weekday.
Time of the Year (Jy)
Month, coded as 1-12.
Time of the Season (Js)
S
summer (May - October).
W = winter (November- April) .
Warning Time (WI)
From when the first official warning to when the leading edge of potentially lethal
flood waters first arrive at the leading edge of Par;. Official warning is any warning that
reaches a member of Par;, is intended to be received by others, and encourages
evacuation.
Average Warning Time (Wtavg)
Ballpark estimate of the average individual Wt;, independent of the "official" Wt.
It includes Sc, but excludes warnings that the population as a whole tends to discount,
such as reports that a dam might fail following a history of false alarms.
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Building Types by Percent (Bt)
Categories might need to be lumped together:
N = none.
T = tents.
Sh = shacks or flimsy buildings.
M
mobile homes or RVs.
R
residential homes.
C
commercial.
H
commercial over 2 stories.
Lm = structures with less mobile populations (hospitals, nursing homes, schools).
Development (Dev)
Degree of urbanization:
N
none (rural, communities under 100)
L
low = small town
M
medium = suburban
H
highly urbanized; large city, densely populated, high rises
Goodness offit (Gj)
Spatial variable that describes the variance in risk--that is, their spatial
ho mogeneity or heterogeneity with respect to the river:
L = low= poor (a large, urban area; multiple communities over a long reach of
river; wide flood plain; mix of canyon and open plain; variable values
would suggest excessive danger more often than not if applied on the
individual level).
moderate= satisfactory (a typical small town or mountain community with
M
some residences near the river and some on higher ground or in the hills; a
series of small communities with similar warning time; a wide flood plain
with urban/suburban development among which the flood rises slowly).
H
high = good (all of Pari reside within a narrow flood path; small canyon
community clustered along the river; campgrounds; very small Par in a
similar location, such as a few cars at a flooded road).
V
very high= very good (a huge wave which submerges an entire community
without warning; a wave which annihilates virtually every structure within
the area of Pari; no basis for saying some members of Pari are safer than
others and no time to escape before the flood arrives).
Outdoors (0)
Tents are considered outdoors.
l
indoors (winter, work hours, night).
0 = outdoors (summer, recreationists, campgrounds).
Sensory Clues (Sc)
Using testimony, estimate this warning (min.). Sc = 0 when none.
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Preparedness (Pr)
Preparedness to evacuate at least half an hour before Wt begins. Considers news
reports, false alarms, evacuation rehearsals, alerts, experience with flooding, etc.
N
none (not aware of the potential for danger 0.5 hr before Wt begins).
L
low (aware the safety of the dam is in question, but not considered serious).
M
moderate (alert to the potential for evacuation or experienced in
evacuation).
H
high (expecting to evacuate and concrete steps toward that eventuality).
Warning Effectiveness (We)
How effectively a warning campaign mobilizes a community. It can be gauged
historically by evacuation effectiveness:% of Par; receiving a warning, rate warning
propagates, and effectiveness in mobilization (believability and urgency).
N
no official warning.
L
low (fewer than 50% receiving or believing a timely warning).
M
moderate (up to 90% receiving and believing a timely warning).
H
high (virtually complete evacuation before the flood wave arrives).
If no numbers, guess using testimony. Note even a haphazard warning may
propagate effectively given enough time.
Evacuation subPar {Epar}
A subgroup of Par; characterized by the same Ret. Epari need not have equal
numbers, and the number of groups can be one or more depending on the degree of
heterogeneity within Par;.
Representative Evacuation Time (Ret)
The number of minutes it will take to evacuate Epar;, for use in calculating E. The
following table can provide guidance, but case-specific information should govern.
Ease of Evacuation [Avg. Excess Evacuation Time} (E)

t Epar * (Wt"'"- Ret)
E,

J.. l

1

Par,

When E is negative, the average evacuation time needed was greater than the time
available.
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Table DJ. Reference guide to aid in estimating E and Ret

Width
of the
Flood
(ft)
1,000
1,000
2,500
2,500
2,500
5,500
5,500

Outdoor
Distance
to Safety
(ft)

Dev
(N, L,
M,H)

Sense of
Urgency

Mobility
(L, H)*

300
300
1,000
1,000
1,000
2,500
2,500

N-M
N-M
N-L
M-H
N-H
M
N-M

High
High
High
High
High
High
High

5,500

2,500

M-H

High

H
L
H
H
L
H
L
L-group
home

Range of
Evacuation Times
for a Family
(min)
Day
Night
0.5-3
1-6
2-10
4-15
3-6
4-10
3-10
4-15
3-10
5-15
5-20
5-30
10-30
10-30
2030-180
180

Ret;
(min)
Day
1
4
4
6
6
10
15

Night
2
6

45

60

7
8
8
15
20

*L implies one person with limited mobility living with one or more others with nonnal (H) mobility. The
final row is an exception, where a nursing home or similar facility is in view.

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Failure Mode (Fm)
l = internal
lp =piping
le =embankment failure: sliding, overturning, foundation failure, or blowout
with normal water levels
F =flooding
F = flooding (dam failure not present or not relevant)
Ff= flash flood (no dam failure)
Ff!D =dam failure contributes little volume to a dominant flash flood
Fo =failure due to overtopping or spillway washout
Fe= embankment failure: slumping, sliding, overturning, foundation failure,
or blowout during overtopping or reservoir elevations significantly higher
than those for which the dam was designed to ordinarily operate.
S = seismic failure
Sp =piping or other gradual development following an earthquake.
Se = a rapid embankment failure during or shortly after an earthquake.
G = gate failure not leading to dam breach.
L = landslide not leading to dam breach.
Attendant Circumstances (Ac)
Ac refers to conditions that attend a flood, the presence of which can increase the
fatality rate of the event. Examples include an earthquake, extreme weather conditions
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such as snow or ice, hurricane-force winds, extreme prior flooding, or a downed radio
tower.
It should be noted that power failures, darkness when Td = N, and rain are
common features of many floods, and the laner two are already noted in the variables Td
and MI. As such, they should only be included under Ac if their impact was exceptional.
Attendant circumstances should first be described, then corporately assigned a
subjective rank based on the impact the circumstances had on variables like Wt, E, and R.
N
none.
L
low impact.
M
moderate impact.
H
heavy impact.
Magnitude of Loading (M)
Narrative description: peak rainfall , representative rainfall measurements, and
durations would be typical.
N
none (i.e. , and internal failure).
L
low = small (loading is common; could be expected every few years).
M
moderate (loading is infrequent; once every 5-15 years).
H
high = large (loading is uncommon; could be expected once every 15-50
years).
V
very large (loading is quite rare; could be expected once every 50-100
years).
E
exceptionall y large (loading is difficult to imagine; more rare than 1/100
years).
Magnitude of Local Loading (Ml)
Narrative; coded the same way as M.

Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood
Dam Type (Dt)
N
none.
E
earthen.
R
rock fill.
M
masonry.
C
concrete gravity.
A
concrete gravity arch.
Rescue Resources (Rr)
Helicopters, National Guard, paid or volunteer firefighters, police, emergency
management and evacuation personnel, reliable communication, earth-moving
equipment, boats, etc.
N = none (rescuers are prevented from assisting until the next day; victims are
overwhelmed so quickly that no rescue attempts are feasible).
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L

M

H

low= limited (rescuers are able to help some people, but they are mostly
limited to hand tools: ropes, rowboats, floating debris, human chains, etc.).
medium= modem (modem communication, transportation, and rescue
resources are available locally, at least in moderate supply; generally
reflects the state of development present in urban areas of the USA after
1950).
high = exceptional (large numbers of military or rescue workers stationed
nearby, immediate access to many local helicopters, an abundance of boats
in the community; plenty of floating debris, trees, tall buildings, or hills to
sustain victims until they can be rescued; modern wireless communication
systems; state-of-the art early-warning and evacuation system).

Delectability (Del)
Signs of imminent failure more than 3 hours before failure.
N
no signs of trouble.
L
low (one or more minor changes at the dam, but would not lead the typical
dam monitor to anticipate failure).
M
moderate (sufficient changes to consider altering the reservoir operation as
a precaution, but would not lead a typical monitor to expect failure within
the year).
H
high (evidence demanding immediate attention, as it suggests a dam failure
is not unlikely if no action is taken).
V
very high (dam failure appears probable or imminent and can not be readily
avoided).
Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations (Schvq)
Brief narrative summarizing those aspects that are unique or are not adequately
described by the variables. Eyewitness descriptions of deaths can provide insight.
L
low= poor (existing variables do a poor job of fully capturing the unique
attributes of this flood event).
H
high= good (existing variables do a good job of fully capturing the nature
of this flood event).
Important Variables Brought to Light
During Characterization of Events
Pre-Failure Warning Time (Wtpj) and
Post-Failure Warning Time (Wtpoj)
Wtpf indicates the full length of Wt when it begins prior to failure. Wtpof does
not start counting until failure begins. Hence, if Wt begins an hour before failure and the
flood travels for 30 minutes, Wtpf= Wt = 90 min and Wtpof= 30 min.
Wall of Water Weighted by the Rise Rate (Wwr)
See definition in Chapter V.
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Basis of Par (Bpar)
This variable identifies cases where pre-failure jitters causes some to leave and
Par is then based on those who choose not to leave until a subsequent
warning mobilizes the entire population.
Pre = pre-evacuation, meaning before any evacuations have begun.
Post = post-evacuation, meaning Par is based on those left behind after the first
group leaves and Tpar is based on those who become trapped in the flood.
Par Type (Pt)
List each separately and tag with its percent of Par;.
C
campers, including recreationists hiking/walking/standing near the river.
W
those in the river when the flood wave appears: wade fishermen,
swimmers, rescue workers, etc.
B
those on the river when the flood wave appars: boaters and rafters.
L
those in or on a lake when the flood wave appears: boaters and swimmers.
E
employees who are at the dam for construction, repairs, monitoring, failure
prevention, etc. Note, it may be desirable to reclassify this Pt as D, W, or
another overlapping category for purposes of analysis.
Af = automobile drivers or passengers.
T
people occupying a train.
D = those who, prior to evacuation, are in or near buildings. This corresponds to
general drowning deaths in town. These people might encounter the flood
while indoors, while evacuating on foot, or while evacuating in a vehicle,
but generally speaking, they were quantified based on structural damages
and the mode or place of death may not be known.
U
unknown mix. Whenever possible, subPar should be broken down into pure
Pt (C , W, B, L, Af, or D) to facilitate characterization and analysis.
Proportion of the Threatened Population (Ptpar)
This is similar toP, except that it is the ratio LIT par.
Evacuation Nonsuccess Factor (Ej)
Ef= Tpar/Par.
Tpar and "flood arrival" are defined in such a way as to ignore trivial flooding
that does not greatly hinder free movement (generally 6-12 inches for waders close to the
hillside and lesser depths for those evacuating by automobile).
Safe Havens (Sh), Chance Havens (Ch), and Pseudo-Safe Havens (Psh)
See Global Insights from the Case Studies in Chapter VI.
Safe Havens (Sh)
Safe havens may or may not be flooded, but they represent places of shelter in
which deaths have historically been extremely rare. When deaths occur, they generally
invol ve young children or persons of limited mobility who can't swim and are trapped in
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an area without another person of average ability to assist them. Safe havens include the
following:
I. An upper story with sufficiently shallow flooding that occupants are not washed
out a window and can float on a bed or stand freely: flow does not rise more than
one foot above the windowsills in the highest story (about 3 ft).
2. Quiescent flooding that does not trap people without air. Such flooding can come
within I ft of a flat ceiling or 2ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling, whether or not
the ceiling is elevated.
3. An attic that is accessible from within a house or trailer.
4. An accessible rooftop that does not depend on chance to reach.
5. A stout tree that is easy to climb, taller than the flood, and not toppled.
6. Any island or region that experiences shallow flooding during the flood ' s peak,
such that depths are easy to resist while standing or clinging to convenient
anchors such as telephone poles or lampposts (depths of l-5 ft, depending on the
velocity).
7. The hillside beyond the flood if a member ofTpar; can readily drive or wade to it
while the flood is still shallow, or if they can reach it directly from the roof or an
upper story.
Chance Havens (Ch)
Chance havens are refuges in the flood, including floating debris and other types
of havens, that are reached primarily by chance or whose benefits are highly unreliable.
They contribute significantly to the variance in fatality rates across similar events.
Chance havens fall into at least five categories:
I. Rafts and floatation aids: severed rooftops, mattresses, propane tanks, logs, etc.
2. The roof of a floating buildings whenever it drifts more than l 00 yards.
3. Any immobile structure or refuge that is reached while drifting, including
rooftops, upper-story windows, aerated havens, treetops, overhanging branches,
debris dams at bridges that allow victims to walk to dry land, and the shore itself.
If people must rely heavily on chance to reach a largely inaccessible roof, this
would also constitute a chance haven.
4. Aquatic havens: any location from which shore can be easily reached without
fighting high velocities, such as a lake or a quiescent backwater.
5. Wading havens: These are rare, falling in the narrow range of depths and
velocities that are too high to be considered safe havens and too low to
consistently sweep people away . Due to debris, waves, and unpredictable
turbulence, such chance havens might not last long.
Pseudo-Safe Havens (Psh)
Pseudo-safe havens are safe havens on or in buildings that become reclassified
once the building begins to drift. They exist only among a subset of buildings with major
damage. Note that rooftops are considered chance havens (Ch) rather than pseudo-safe
havens when a building drifts more 300 ft.
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Aerated Havens (A h)
Aerated havens are typically found only when parts of stationary buildings are
torn away (the upper end of Ls = M) . They are those pockets of protection formed by the
remaining walls, floor, counters, etc., that provide a place for survival if the occupants are
fortunate enough to have been located in that portion of the building.
Compromised Havens (Coh)
This simply places pseudo-safe havens and aerated havens in a single category.
Loss of Shelter (Ls)
The goal is to define subPar such that Ls = H 100%, M I 00%, or L I 00%.
L
Low loss of shelter= no structural damage or minor structural damage
limited to flooding on the first floor.
M
Major loss of shelter= major structural damage.
H
high (complete) loss of shelter = total destruction.
Mh
highly uncertain whether Ls = M or Ls = H.
Ls is not equivalent to economic damages. Ls = L implies relatively safe havens
on every floor , Ls = M implies complete loss of a safe haven on the first floor, and Ls =
H implies complete loss of all safe havens (and aerated pockets ofless-safe shelter)
including any accessible rooftops. Since loss of a safe haven is generally accompanied by
structural damage, traditional categories of minor and major damage generally agree with
Ls = L and Ls = M when they are based on structural damages and not mere water
damage. By contrast, Ls = H only if no accessible, aerated pockets of protection remain,
regard less of whether a building floats off its foundation or is later condemned.
The following refinements, based on historical observations, should be kept in
mind (see Global Insights from the Case Studies in Chapter VI):
Ls = L
When there is minor structural damage and the flood does not encroach within
a foot of the first-floor ceiling or within 2 ft of the peak of a sloped ceiling.
Ls = M
If the flood does not crest an accessible roof.
If walls are ripped off but portions of walls and floors or counters remain to
shelter occupants; but if only trivial structural members remain such that all
shelter is lost, the dwelling is destroyed.
If a building floats off its foundation and maintains an accessible pseudo-safe
haven for the duration of the flood.
Ls=H
Any time it is tom apart and submerged in the flood.
If a rooftop is inaccessible and the top floor or accessible attic is submerged.
!fa roof is accessible, the building is considered destroyed only if the flood or
flood waves wash across the crest of the roof to an extent likely to wash
people into the flood. Since the momentum of the flood riding the slant of the
roof will cause waves to run up, this elevation is generally on the order of a
foot or two below the roofs crest.
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Ls = Mh
Ls = Mh means that, based on uncertainty, analysts view Ls
as having roughly equal probabilities.

= M and Ls = H

Weighted Loss of Shelter (Lsw)
Ls is put on a scale from 0 to I (see Chapter V for details).
Safe Zones (Sz), Compromised Zones (Coz)
Chance Zones (Cz),and Pseudo-Chance Zones (Pcz)
• Safe Zones (Sz). all safe havens and havens that have been only mildly
compromised.
Compromised Zones (Coz) : that central portion of compromised havens that have
not been purposely classified as safe zones or pseudo-chance zones.
Chance Zones (Cz) : places where people are submerged or face the open flood ,
and ali chance havens that might be reached while drifting.
Pseudo-Chance Zones (Pcz) : buildings in that range of depths* velocities for
which it is unclear whether the building is likely to be destroyed, float far
downstream, or experience very major damage.
Zone Density or Zone Densities (Zd),
Safe Zone Density (Szd),
Compromised Zone Density (Cozd)
Chance Zone Density (Czd), and
Pseudo-Chance Zone Density (Pczd)
Density represents the distribution of Tpar; among flood zones based on
topographic, structural, and hydraulic considerations as they interface with flood routing
and the rise rate of the flood . The word "density" refers to the number of people who
have access to a category rather than to the physical dimensions of flood zones
themselves. Access includes the physical ability to move to a location and sufficient time
to get there before being cut off by the flood. Accessibility is cut off if the flood rises too
quickly, but this is rarely a concern when Ls = M, the usual case for which densities are
widely distributed.
Thus, Szd, Cozd, Pczd, and Czd, each represent the number of people expected to
be in each of the corresponding flood zones. People can be expected to choose Sz, Coz,
Pcz, and Cz in that order, as they are available. People should be assigned to the highest
level that persists for the duration of the flood, with the understanding that they are only
assigned to Cz if the haven they previously reached ceases to exist.
Life Loss in Zones (Lsz, Lcoz, Lpcz, Lcz)
These are analogous to L;, except that they are specific to the zones sz, coz, pcz,
and cz.
Proportion of Lives Lost in Zones (Prsz, Prcoz, Prpcz, and Prcz)
These are analogous to Ptpar;, except that they are specific to the zones sz, coz,
pcz, and cz. Note that "proportion" is designated with Pr instead of the traditional Pin
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order to avoid confusion between the pseudo-chance zone (Pcz) and the proportion of
lives lost in the cz (Prcz).

Template used to characterize
events in Appendix B
To assist in characterizing every event in a consistent manner, the data for each
characterization was recorded on a template. The template leads with a summary table
that lists every variable ' s value for that event, along with a brief reminder of the
variable's name or meaning, and the choices from which it can be coded. Next, each
variable is given its own section following the pattern of presentation in Chapter V.
During characterization, every variable assignment is fully supported with narrative and
sou rce citations so that researchers can judge the relative merits of the characterizations,
make their own informed adjustments, or refine them as additional information comes to
light. When a variable is followed by an asterisk(*) it means that the narrative supporting
the designation is found under the same variable for Par 1 or the global introductory
characterization of the event as a whole. Three dashes (---) means that there is not
currently enough information to estimate the variable.
Because the variables under the sixth category, "Important Variables Brought to
Light During Characterization of Events and Subsequent Analysis," were not part of the
original analyses, they were not included in the event template. Future researchers may
wish to update the template to reflect these important additions. In particular, they should
add the important variables Pt, Ptpar, Ef, Ls, Szd, Czd, Pczd, and Cozd.
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NAME OF DAM/FLASH FLOOD/FLOOD
Par: location, year= size
Part: same as Par
OR
Part: description
Lt = ##, Pt = 0.#####
Global Event
--c-----p--Par
Life Loss

(p)

Proportion of

Population at

lives Lost

Risk

(p)

(u)

Tpar

l1

Threatened
Population

life Loss at

(p)

---

---

Ln

Incremental Life Loss
Lnf
lin
lint

Natural

---

---

lncremental l
Using Ln

(p)

(p)

(p)

---

---

---

---

Qp

Qb

Peak Flow Rate

Bankfull Flow

(cfs)

Rate
(cfs)

---

---

Fs

Fpar

Incremental

Forcefulness

Forcefulness
per SubPar

(L,M,H,V ,E)

(bldg/p)

---

---

Td

Tw

Time of Day

Time of Week
(Wend or

(!!!ight, J:!ome,
Separation)

---

Wday)

---

Current SubPar Current SubPar
(p)
(u)

Flood Characteristics
Fit
v
D
Peak Velocity

(ft/s)

(ft)

---

---

---

---

(ft)

---

---

---

(~~%~\':})

Wall of Water
{Height)

(ft; 0 ··> R)

---

(0.0

°

1.0)

---

(0 or 1)

---

Rf

A
Area of Final

Breach

(ft)

---

---

---

---

(ft)

---

Spatial and Temporal Relationships
Ty
Ts
Wt
Wt.vg
Time of Season
(§ummeror

Warning Time

Winter)

(min)

(min)

---

---

---

Fd
Dichotomous
Forcefulness

Failure
(min)

---

12)

Fp
Proportional

Forcefulness

Rate of 80%

Breadth of Dam
(Crest Length)

°

Depth

Volume of
Release
(acre-ft.)

Height of
Reservoir
(ft)

---

Maximum

Flood Type

(O,Dy,FI,F,Ts,
S,H,Gb,O)

Flood Characteristics (Continued)
Vol
H
Hp
B

(1

---

Aa ,D,SI,O,U)

Max. Rise Rate

Time of Year

---

(p)

Ft

Destructive
Veloc1ty
(ft 2/s)

Height of Dam

SubPar

(p)

---

Flood Characteristics (Continued)
w
Dv
R
Ww
Maximum Width

Tpar1

Current SubPar Tpar at Current

---

lncrementall
Fatality Types
Using lnf
(N,C,W ,E,AI,

No Fa1lure life
Loss

Channel life L.
(p)

Subpopulations
Par1
PI
Proportion at

Bt

Avg. Individual Bldg Types(%)
WamingTime (N ,T,Sh ,M,R,

C,H,Lm)

---

(ft')

Dev
Development
(Urbanization)

(N,L,M,H)

---

Spatial and Temporal Relationships (Continued)
Sc
Pr
We
E
Gf
0
Goodness of Fit

Sensory Clues

Preparedness

Warning
Effectiveness

Ease of
Evacuation

(min)

(N,L,M,H)

(N,L,M ,H)

(min)

---

---

---

---

---

Ac

M

(L,M,H,V)

Outdoors
.{!ndoors or
Outdoors)

--Fm

Attendant Circumstances
Dt
Rr
Ml

Failure Mode
Magmtude of
Magnitude of
Dam Type
Attendant
(lp.le.FFI,Ff/O,Fo. Circumstances
Loading
Local Loading
Fe.Sp,Se.G, L)
(N,L,M,H)
(N,L,M,H,V,E) (N,L,M ,H,V,E) (N,E,R,M ,C,A )

Det

Schvq

Rescue
Resources

Delectability

Striking
(Predictor F1t)

(N ,L,M ,H)

(N ,L,M,H,V)

(L,H)
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[ntroductorv Summary
Global Event

Par (Population at Risk)
L
(Life Loss)
Tpar (Threatened Population)

Par, (Current SubPar)
L 1 (L Among SubPar)
Tpar 1 (Tpar Among subPar)
Incremental Losses and Data on Fatalities

Ln, Ldr, Lnf (Natural Channel-, Dam Removal-, No Failure Life Loss)
Ft (Fatality Type)
ldentificatiotr!Location of Fatalities --Flood Characteristics

Fit
V
D

(Flood Type)
(Peak Velocity)
(Maximum Depth)
Qp (Peak Flow Rate)
Qb (Bankfull Flow Rate)
W (Maximum Width)
Dv (Destructive Velocity)
R
(Maximum Rise Rate)
Ww (Height of Wall of Water)
Dd (Damage and Destruction)
Fp (Proportional Forcefulness)
Fd (Dichotomous Forcefulness)
Fs (Incremental Forcefulness)
Fpar (Forcefulness per SubPar)
H
(Heiglrt of the Dam)
Hp (Height of Reservoir Pool)
B
(Breadth of Dam)
Vol (Volume of Release)
Rf (Rate of Failure)
A
(Area of Final Breach)

•
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Spatial and Temporal Relationships Between Par1and the Flood

T
(Time Summary)
Td (Time of Day)
Tw (Time of Week)
Ty (Time of Year)
Ts (Time of Season)
Wt (Warning Time)
Wt.,g(Avg. Individual Wt)
Bt (Building Types, %)
Dev (Development/Urbanization) •
Gf (Goodness of Fit)
0
(Outdoors)
Sc (Sensory Clues)
Pr (Preparedness)
We (Warning Effectiveness)
Epar (Evacuation SubPar) and Ret (Representative Evacuation Time):

E

(Epar 1)
(Eparz)
(Epar3)
(Epar4)
(Epar5)

(Ret 1)
(Retz)
(Ret3)
(Ret 4)
(Ret5)

(Ease of Evacuation)

•

Natural Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Fm (Failure Mode)
Ac (Attendant Circumstances)
M (.~agnitude of Loading)
Ml (Mag. of Loading, Locally)
Human Circumstances that Attend the Flood

Dt (Dam Type)
Rr (Rescue Resources)
Del (Detectability)
Schvq (Striking Characteristics and Valuable Quotations): •
Case Bibliography
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Appendix E
Existing Automated Tools

Early in the search for existing models, an emphasis was placed on identifying
software that might be adapted for use in analyzing life loss from flood events. Major
agencies involved in dams, hydrology, or emergency management were contacted and
asked about case histories and their current resources for quantifying Par, modeling
evacuations, predicting life Joss in the event of a dam failure, estimating warning times,
and modeling with a computer. Each contact was also asked for additional contacts inside
and outside their agency.
Agencies contacted included each of the state departments of dam safety through
the central office of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials; the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the National Institute of Building Sciences,
associated with FEMA; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, operated by Battelle in
Richland, Washington, for the U.S. Department of Energy; The Utah Division of
Comprehensive Emergency Management and Planning; the Natural Hazards Research
and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado; the National Weather
Service; the U.S. Federal Highway Administration; the United States Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR); the Information Technology Lab and the Institute of Water
Resources in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; the Center on the Performance of Dams
in the National Performance of Dams Program (NPDP) at Stanford University; the U.S.
Committee on Large Dams (USCOLD); the International Committee on Large Dams
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(!COLD); and Innovative Emergency Management, a private company in Banton Rouge,
Louisiana, that contracted to do work initiated in FEMA and later the U.S. Army.
It soon became apparent that existing tools were inadequate, so efforts were
shifted elsewhere. As such, what follows is not comprehensive, but it provides an
introduction to resources that might be adapted for use in a life-loss model for flood
events.
There are software designed to model specific disasters other than dam failures.
FEMA produced a program called SLOSH to simulate a coastal storm surge generated by
hurricane-force wind speeds (Zizil) and a program called HURRIVAC to simulate
evacuation when roads are closed due to wind and water from a hurricane (Drury).
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory supports CAMEO, ALOHA, EPI, CHARM, and
MARPLOT to simulate chemical clouds. CAMEO was developed primarily for safety
officials responding to a chemical spill or leak. It provides an emergency response plan
and maps the release area, tracking a plume with the other programs. ALOHA includes a
database of physical properties for about 900 common hazardous chemicals and can be
used to predict the rate at which vapors escape from a leak and their patterns of
dispersion in the atmosphere in a straight line downwind of an outdoor chemical spill.
The concentration on either side of the line is based on a Guassian distribution. EPI
appears to have been ALOHA's predecessor. CHARM simulates an isolated puff without
an ongoing source. MARPLOT maps plume patterns (Probasco).
None of these programs can be applied to floods directly, but they may provide
guidance to those wishing to model floods or evacuations. There are three programs,
however, that offer greater promise.
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One is proprietary, called Q-world, and was developed by Innovative Emergency
Management. In theory, in half a second it can track the movement of a chemical cloud,
keeping track of its concentration, loss functions, and evacuation dynamics, to yield a
central value for life loss and corresponding confidence levels. The principal of the
company, Madhu Beriwal, thought it would be simple to customize the program to track
a flood wave instead of a chemical plume, but, unfortunately, supporting documentation
was never sent after repeated phone calls (Beriwal 1998).
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, operated by Battelle, develops and
promotes the Federal Emergency Management Information System (FEMIS)--an
automated decision support system that allows the user to plan emergency responses in
advance and then call them up during an emergency for execution. The program tracks
resources, provides a task list, provides a contact list, stores event logs, displays a status
board, and models hazards and evacuation. The first four components are most useful for
an emergency action plan (EAP), while the final two components are relevant to life-loss
estimation. Currently, the program can only model the spread of a toxic chemical plume
to support the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), but
programmers intend to expand its capabilities to model floods, hurricanes, earthquakes,
and wildfires. The FEMIS program integrates geographic information systems (GIS via
Arc View), a relational database management system (RDBMS), an electronic plan
management system, and other software, all of which must be purchased commercially. It
includes a normal mode, a planning mode, and an exercise training mode. The program is
built on efforts encapsulated in a program called IEMIS by FEMA, The U.S. Army, state
and local governments, and other contractors (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory).
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FEMA is developing a software package called HAZUS (Hazards US) that is
intended to provide damage estimates for various natural disasters. To date, it can only
simulate damages from earthquakes, but FEMA plans to include preview models for
floods and hurricanes in 2002. "This initial release of the two additional models will
enable users to assess the potential for direct damage to residential, industrial, and
commercial buildings" (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999, p. 1). In its
present form , the supporting documentation seems to indicate that one can model
structural damages caused by a darn failure resulting from an earthquake, but since the
flood module has not yet been fully developed, this functionality must be limited. The
model also includes casualty estimates in buildings with slight structural damage,
moderate structural damage, extensive structural damage, and after collapse, but these
loss functions follow from earth tremors rather than flooding. Significantly, one can enter
custom casualty rates "if improved information is available" (National Institute of
Building Sciences, 1997, p. 9-43). One can also provide custom flood mapping or rely on
the default Flood Insurance Rate Maps. The program' s land-use classifications might
provide a first cut at Par types. HAZUS uses TIGER files (Topologically Integrated
Geographic Encoding and Referencing system) developed by the U.S. Census Bureau
based on 1990 census data. The files contain data on roads, streets, railways, waterways,
and census boundaries.
Of these three, FE MIS appears to offer the greatest promise for making EAPs and
HAZUS offers the greatest potential for rapidly implementing an improved life loss
model for flood events using software that is currently in development. Most

523
encouraging, the focal point of HAZUS is the estimation of structural damages to
buildings and infrastructure, critical in estimating Ls and ultimately flood zones.
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